Defense analyst Anders Puck Nielsen says there’s a tendency for many to believe that, although Ukraine has put up a good fight, a Russian victory in the Russo-Ukrainian War is inevitable. (I assume he’s seeing these on the various MSM channels I stopped watching a long time ago, as the only place I see such assumptions these days is among comment trolls and the occasional ZeroHedge headline.)
Some takeaways:
“When Russia launched the invasion of Ukraine back in February, many people assumed that it was going to be an easy win. It was not only Vladimir Putin who believed that they could finish this war within days or weeks. Many people thought so. And even after it became clear that there would not be a quick victory, many people still carried over this assumption that Russia is going to win eventually because that is the only possible outcome.” (I too thought a Russian victory was the most likely (though not certain) outcome in the first few days, before it become apparent just how badly bungled the invasion planning was, how fragile Russian supply lines were, how poor the communication was between different branches of the Russian military, and how neglected even basic maintenance was for Russian equipment.)
“They think of Russia as a giant. And then they think about Ukraine as a small country. But that is not really a good comparison.”
Unmentioned by Nielsen is that one reason they thought so is just how much old Soviet military equipment Russia still had lying around. That assumption was somewhat overstated, and, again, a whole lot of that equipment was poorly maintained.
Russia’s massive display of incompetence didn’t change the minds of many who still saw Russian victory as inevitable. “The assumption was that this just means it’s going to take longer, and then Russia is going to figure it out, and they are going to win.”
“We still have analysts who say that Ukraine could never push Russia back from the occupied territories, and that there has to be a negotiated solution where Ukraine gives something to Putin to end the war. And then these analyst also often seem to take it at face value when Putin or Lavrov or somebody else comes with threats about escalation.” (True, but I don’t think anyone pays serious attention to such people any more, if they ever did.)
Nielsen says there are a number of reasons why Russia can’t just carry out a mass mobilization, or start tossing nukes around.
Putin launched the war due an entire chain of bad assumptions, including those about the inevitability of Russian greatness.
“Ukraine is winning the war of attrition, and they will start pushing Russia backwards.”
“That’s why I think this idea that a Russian victory is inevitable is so dangerous. On the Western side, it leads to the belief that it is dangerous to provide Ukraine with heavy weapons. And this can mean that Ukraine won’t be able to finish the war as quickly as they otherwise could. And on the Russian side it means that they won’t be motivated for peace talks, even if the situation on the battlefield is awful.” (Not sure I agree here; The U.S., UK, Germany, and Poland have all transferred significant heavy weapons to Ukraine.)
“It will be extremely hard for the Russian leaders to embrace the idea that a defeat is possible. Like, not even that it is going to happen, but just that it could be a possibility. Because that would require them to question everything they believe to be true about Russia and being a great power. So they will be able to live in denial for a very long time.”
“If we want the war to end, we need Putin to understand that a defeat is a real possibility. And the best way to do that is to equip Ukraine with the weapons they need to win.”
I’ve assumed from the very beginning that Russia was going to lose this… and that was when I was predicting a collapse of the conventional Ukrainian military within six weeks. Back then I was predicting that the Russians would take control of the area east of the Dneiper River and then they would get bled white by the inevitable insurgency. They were going in with a force structure not much stronger (on paper) than what we went into Iraq with. The problem with that is Ukraine is much bigger place than Iraq, the population is more dispersed (not concentrated on the rivers) and Ukrainians would have a much larger base of resources to work with than the Iraqi’s did. Also, because the Russians were never going to take the whole country, there would plenty of safe havens for insurgents to operate from.
Even though the Russians failed to secure what I thought they would, they’re still facing a lot of the same issues. We’re seeing signs of an insurgency already starting (particularly in Kherson and Melitopol). It takes time to get an insurgency rolling though. At 6 months in, we’re kinda on the low end of that time scale. One of the most difficult barriers to getting an insurgency started is that they need to believe that the enemy can be beaten. Well, the Ukrainian Army is proving this in the field right now. That has got to help speed this along.
Russia could be heading into the winter facing two serious problems: facing increasing from the front an an exploding insurgency in the rear. Not a fun place to be.
My assumption that the Sove… err, Russians, that’s who they are this week, would lose was based on the essential incompetence and corruption they’ve habitually displayed in their military.
They’ve been masquerading as a first-rate military power since WWII, based on propaganda and all the support that they got from the US and others. The reality? LOL… Sweet babblin’ baby Jesus. The Soviets couldn’t even support their own forces at war, absent Lend-Lease. Basic materials like explosives, trucks, aircraft, ammunition, even the winter boots they needed all came from the US. Once that largesse was shut down, then they were forced into autarky after the war, and that led to disaster whenever they couldn’t swindle or steal the stuff they needed. Much of the inability of the Soviet Union to feed itself stemmed from the diversion of their fertilizer feed stocks into the military explosives industries, and it was only after that diversion stopped during the post-Berlin Wall era that their agriculture even began to approach its real potential.
Russia is a nation of downtrodden serfs overseen by kleptocrats, and the serfs are constantly stealing down below while angling to “go big” and become successful kleptos in government. There’s a reason you don’t see any Russian exports besides raw materials; anyone who manages to build something decent in that country is going to get knocked down and robbed by some mafioso. Who, like as not, works for a government agency.
Seventy years of communism left Russia mentally scarred and emotionally crippled. They all believe the propaganda they’re fed, because that’s what they know. The idea that they should think for themselves and hold the politicians accountable? Unthinkable, literally. That’s just not the Russian mindset. The Ukrainians were beginning to break out of that crap, and that’s why Lukashenko and Putin are so dead-set on destroying them; they’re afraid that the mentality may spread to their own borders, and leave them without jobs.
It’s hard to wrap your head around the Soviet/Russian military. At one and the same time, they’ve had some really innovative thoughts on military affairs, and have taken a scientific approach to it all, but on the other…? Oi, vey…
Seriously… Read some of their stuff about tactics and operational art. Excellent work, produced by men who can’t seem to manage the conscript troops in their barracks well enough to ensure the actual end of what they delightfully term dedovschina. They have amazing theories about how to conduct war, but no real NCO corps, or ability to produce one. Nor do they really see the necessity, wanting commissioned officers to be the only real leadership. Apparently, the fact that it’s not working isn’t penetrating their thick skulls, so they keep right on doing the same old, same old, left over from the days when Lenin and Stalin decided that the old Tsarist NCO corps was entirely too full of revolutionaries and not to be trusted. This is the legacy behind why there are no real Russian NCOs or actual from-the-ranks leadership, and why their small units outside the VDV and other “special” elements suck ass.
I’ve assumed from the very beginning that Russia was going to lose this… and that was when I was predicting a collapse of the conventional Ukrainian military within six weeks. Back then I was predicting that the Russians would take control of the area east of the Dneiper River and then they would get bled white by the inevitable insurgency. They were going in with a force structure not much stronger (on paper) than what we went into Iraq with. The problem with that is Ukraine is much bigger place than Iraq, the population is more dispersed (not concentrated on the rivers) and Ukrainians would have a much larger base of resources to work with than the Iraqi’s did. Also, because the Russians were never going to take the whole country, there would plenty of safe havens for insurgents to operate from.
Even though the Russians failed to secure what I thought they would, they’re still facing a lot of the same issues. We’re seeing signs of an insurgency already starting (particularly in Kherson and Melitopol). It takes time to get an insurgency rolling though. At 6 months in, we’re kinda on the low end of that time scale. One of the most difficult barriers to getting an insurgency started is that they need to believe that the enemy can be beaten. Well, the Ukrainian Army is proving this in the field right now. That has got to help speed this along.
Russia could be heading into the winter facing two serious problems: facing increasing from the front an an exploding insurgency in the rear. Not a fun place to be.
My assumption that the Sove… err, Russians, that’s who they are this week, would lose was based on the essential incompetence and corruption they’ve habitually displayed in their military.
They’ve been masquerading as a first-rate military power since WWII, based on propaganda and all the support that they got from the US and others. The reality? LOL… Sweet babblin’ baby Jesus. The Soviets couldn’t even support their own forces at war, absent Lend-Lease. Basic materials like explosives, trucks, aircraft, ammunition, even the winter boots they needed all came from the US. Once that largesse was shut down, then they were forced into autarky after the war, and that led to disaster whenever they couldn’t swindle or steal the stuff they needed. Much of the inability of the Soviet Union to feed itself stemmed from the diversion of their fertilizer feed stocks into the military explosives industries, and it was only after that diversion stopped during the post-Berlin Wall era that their agriculture even began to approach its real potential.
Russia is a nation of downtrodden serfs overseen by kleptocrats, and the serfs are constantly stealing down below while angling to “go big” and become successful kleptos in government. There’s a reason you don’t see any Russian exports besides raw materials; anyone who manages to build something decent in that country is going to get knocked down and robbed by some mafioso. Who, like as not, works for a government agency.
Seventy years of communism left Russia mentally scarred and emotionally crippled. They all believe the propaganda they’re fed, because that’s what they know. The idea that they should think for themselves and hold the politicians accountable? Unthinkable, literally. That’s just not the Russian mindset. The Ukrainians were beginning to break out of that crap, and that’s why Lukashenko and Putin are so dead-set on destroying them; they’re afraid that the mentality may spread to their own borders, and leave them without jobs.
It’s hard to wrap your head around the Soviet/Russian military. At one and the same time, they’ve had some really innovative thoughts on military affairs, and have taken a scientific approach to it all, but on the other…? Oi, vey…
Seriously… Read some of their stuff about tactics and operational art. Excellent work, produced by men who can’t seem to manage the conscript troops in their barracks well enough to ensure the actual end of what they delightfully term dedovschina. They have amazing theories about how to conduct war, but no real NCO corps, or ability to produce one. Nor do they really see the necessity, wanting commissioned officers to be the only real leadership. Apparently, the fact that it’s not working isn’t penetrating their thick skulls, so they keep right on doing the same old, same old, left over from the days when Lenin and Stalin decided that the old Tsarist NCO corps was entirely too full of revolutionaries and not to be trusted. This is the legacy behind why there are no real Russian NCOs or actual from-the-ranks leadership, and why their small units outside the VDV and other “special” elements suck ass.