Ian McCollum: “Why The M7 And 6.8x51mm Are Bad Ideas”
I’m not enough of an expert to know whether the new M7 U.S. battle rifle chambered in 6.8x51mm is a good idea or not. But I’m pretty sure Ian McCollum is such an expert, and he says it’s a bad idea:
“I have thought from the very beginning that this program was a bad idea.” As evidence by this snippet from 2019.
“I really didn’t expect that that the US Army would adopt anything from the NGSW program. We do have a long history of doing weapons development trials, looking at all the options, and adopting nothing new. And that’s what I thought would happen here. Obviously, it didn’t.”
“I had a chance to do some shooting with a civilian 68 by 51 or 277 Fury Spear rifle, the civilian version of the M7 several years ago. It was a good rifle. Um, like as a technical thing, it worked well. It handled well, but that doesn’t mean that it’s a good idea for the military to adopt it.”
“This video isn’t about the rifle itself. It’s about the doctrine and the concept behind its adoption, which is the part that I think is a really bad idea.”
“There were two main justifications that are typically given for the decision to get rid of the intermediate, light recoiling, highc apacity cartridge, the 5.56 [NATO], and replace it with a much higher pressure, much heavier recoiling, much physically larger and physically heavier cartridge, the 68 x 51[mm].”
“The first one is when we were in Afghanistan, US troops were often taken under fire by enemy forces from ranges at which they could not effectively respond with their little wimpy 5.56 M4s. And that’s very true. Something like 50% of combat engagements in Afghanistan took place in excess of the practical engagement range of the M4.” Taliban would routinely ambush U.S. troops from higher in the hills “800 or 1,000 meters away.”
“And so the justification is often given that if we had some big honking rifle with a magnified optic on it that could reach out to 800 yards, well then, by gosh, we could have taken that dude out.”
“And my counter to that is that the world has changed since we were fighting in Afghanistan.”
“But if that were happening today, you know what the answer would be? It’s not rearm everybody in the Humvee. It’s you have a box of a couple of little one-way attack drones sitting in the Humvee.”
“We’ve all seen the drone footage from Ukraine. Like that’s exactly what would happen if we were in Afghanistan dealing with that situation today. There’s no need for a new small arm to do it.”
“And it’s so totally counterproductive to make all the sacrifices of going back to a full power battle rifle in order to be able to do what you can do more effectively with, I don’t know, a couple thousand military procurement one-way attack drone.”
“The second justification was armor penetrating capability. Our potential near-peer allies are developing really good, next generation body armor and we need our infantry weapons to be able to defeat that body armor. And I think this is also a mistake, or I think the adoption of the M7 is not the ideal solution to that problem either.”
So they needed armor penetration but want to keep the rifle short for usability, and to put a suppressor on it. “This is how we end up with a 13-in barrel that has to achieve 30 something feet per second, which means you have to jack the pressure, the chamber pressure of the cartridge way up in order to get a high, you know, 140 or 130 grain bullet at 3,000 plus FPS.”
“Now we have an 80,000 PSI cartridge. And interestingly, looking at Cappy Army’s video, in order to try and mitigate the weight issue, Sigs M71 actually cuts the barrel down even shorter to 11 in. And the SIGR rep that they had in that video was talking about potentially upping chamber pressures to 125,000 PSI…Maybe that’s that’s a typo. Maybe that’s a misspeaking thing.”
80,000 PSI is already really high. Most cartridge pressures top out around 65,000 PSI. At 80,000 PSI, the M7/.277 Fury is already the highest pressure cartridge in the world. 125,000 PSI is simply insanely high.
“To me, that’s just mind-bogglingly insane. Like, at that sort of pressures your barrel life is going to be abysmal. Your parts life and everything is going to be abysmal. Like that’s that’s not a really good compromise to achieve higher velocity.”
“There are capabilities out there for armor penetration that are much more focused on bullet construction and don’t need to have necessarily the sort of super hyper velocity that you get out of an 80,000 PSI cartridge.”
“I recently had the chance to visit CBJ in Sweden. The 65 CBJ cartridge is a pistol caliber cartridge that uses some velocity, but also a lot of material science and projectile design to create a remarkably effective, to many people a shockingly effective, armor penetrating cartridge without having to do a whole lot. And they do it in the chamber pressures of 9 by 19 parabellum.”
“If you took the guys from CBJ and you told them, ‘Right, here’s a DoD contract. We need you to come up with an armor-piercing loading for standard 5.56 carbines that will go through and whatever they want to get, whatever they want to be able to defeat with the M7, with the 68 x 51. Give that standard to the guys at CBJ. Tell them they’re going to be doing it out of a 14.5 in barreled M4 carbine with a .223 chamber. And I’m willing to bet that they can they can do it. They’ve got 30 years of expertise developing, designing the small details that make so much difference on a project like this.”
That ammo is always going to be expensive, but not as expensive as adopting an entirely new battle rifle.
“Every new military weapon out there has some sort of whoopsie, we messed that up and we had to recall a bunch of guns and fix them. Like everyone in history always has it. It’s going to happen on the M7 if it’s not already. It’s going to happen on the M249 or the M250s if it hasn’t already. And all that’s incredibly expensive and I don’t think actually necessary for the goal of being able to defeat significant good armor.”
“If you put a tenth that amount of money into development of a 5.56 armor penetrating cartridge, you now have the ability to issue that really fancy expensive ammo when it’s necessary, or standard 5.56 ball and retain all of the benefits that we already have in 5.56 carbines.”
Then there’s the issue that most infantry soldiers aren’t really good at hitting anything out in the ranges the M7 is supposed to fill a need for. “And my concern with that is every time the US has gone into a war, they’ve ended up in the aftermath doing some research and trying to figure out what worked and what didn’t.”
“What is the effective range of an infantryman with a rifle? The answer that pretty much always comes back is 100 to 300 meters. At 100 meters, infantry are really good at hitting stuff with rifles. At 200 meters, they’re reaching their effective limit. And at 300 meters, it’s really rare that anyone’s doing anything very effective.”
Plus NATO studies showed “In 70% of cases, 300 meters was the maximum range that you could actually see a person standing up.”
“So when you consider all of the compromises that go into, and the expenses that go into, trying to generate a rifle that can give an infantryman a 600 meter effective reach out and touch that guy range, well, 70% of the time it’s a total waste, because the dude could be standing upright and walking around slowly with no idea he’s under observation, but he’s not under observation, because you can’t actually see someone 300 meters away when you’re prone.”
And that’s when someone is standing up. “Go look at footage from Ukraine and tell me how often are guys just standing up straight in the middle of nowhere.”
“Compromising a lot of the other capabilities of an infantry small arm in order to attempt to give the infantry a rifle that is effective at 500 meters, in my opinion, is a waste of time and it’s a really bad choice, because most of those infantry cannot make any sort of practical, effective use of that capability at 500 meters. They can do it to 200. The really good ones can do it to 300. And that’s where it falls apart.”
“It would be much better to maximize the effectiveness of the rifle within the the operational envelope that we know they’re really good in. Take a rifle and optimize it for one to 200 yards and go with that. Embrace that and then accept that you’re going to need other options for longer shots.”
Then take better marksmen and give them sniper rifles optimized for that role. “That’s absolutely well worth it. But what’s not well worth it is trying to turn everyone into the unit into that guy and in the process massively compromising their ability to maintain fire superiority because they run out of ammunition.”
And here’s the video that McCollum’s video references:
In this video, you can clearly hear the Sig rep claim the gun was designed to withstand 125,000 psi. Like McCollum, I have my doubts…
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28 Responses to “Ian McCollum: “Why The M7 And 6.8x51mm Are Bad Ideas””
Ian McCollum is walking you through his interpretation of an Expeditionary Warfare School monograph by USAR Captain Braden R. Trent:
‘Maintaining Lethality Dominance: The Future of Small Arms and the Joint Force’
By USAR Captain Braden R. Trent, 20 March 2025
Most opposed to the M7 complain of the weight and inertia of the rifle. They want a light, handy weapon like the M4 Carbine. There really is no way to provide both the range and terminal effectiveness of the 6.8x51mm cartridge in an M4 package. ArmaLite failed miserably with the fiberglass wrapped titanium barrels of their Hollywood AR-10s.
Modern small arms barrels burn out by nitriding at the typical current pressures of 65,000 psi with no signs of fatigue. Their life depends upon how fast you shoot them. Belt fed machine guns can destroy a barrel in 400 rounds. The very same cartridge in a Ruger Number 1 will get you a 10,000 round barrel life. We can extend both types of barrels’ lives with very expensive metallurgy (Stellite 21 inserts), but not enough to economically justify the effort. Those inserts also greatly reduce barrel strength, another issue with the M7.
Modern tank gun barrels fail by fatigue at their current typical chamber pressures of 120,000 psi. Their barrel life is typically 20 – 50 war shots (full pressure loads). We could get greater life out of tank gun barrels by making them very much heavier, but this produces extremely heavy turrets, poor vehicle balance, and slow W&E movements. Gun stabilization systems become colossal in size and energy requirements. The op research people told us that a modern tank would not last 20 shots on the modern battlefield (before drones!), so the short life span of tank guns was never an issue.
Ian is wrong about fancy armor piercing bullets. Tungsten has become unobtanium and DU is socially unacceptable. The Swedes greatly underestimate the developments of NII Stali, which have driven the entire body armor penetration issue. There are even better body armor developments on the horizon, and the 6.8x51mm may not be adequate even at close ranges.
This is just another example of the military-industrial complex trying to soak the American taxpayer. If the Taliban had rifles that were affective at 800 to 1000 yards, the Defense Department should buy them at market prices and save billions of dollars.
There are rifles good out to that range (or farther), but they’re not good for close quarters combat, which the M4 (and theoretically the M7) are.
The M7 is trying to be good as both a close quarters assault rifle and a long range sniper rifle, and the side effects of trying to do both those thing are undesirable.
Re: ” If the Taliban had rifles that were affective at 800 to 1000 yards, the Defense Department should buy them at market prices and save billions of dollars.”
Yes, but don’t you see? The function of the military-industrial-Congressional complex isn’t to procure the best weapons for our armed forces at the best prices for the taxpayers, it is to perpetuate the gravy train of lucrative defense contracts awarded to arms manufacturers, and to get ambitious Pentagon officer promoted, and General-Flag officers that next star. Doing things the economical and logical way, as you suggest, is unacceptable to them because it doesn’t grease enough palms or fatten profits enough for the quarterly reports.
You don’t need a new fancy round to punch holes in a BTR, at least the 1990s vintage ones (BTR-80 and older). 7.62 NATO M61 AP rounds will do the trick, at least according to what I was taught at the Benning School for Boys, circa 1996.
Soviet APCs and IFVs were actually pretty thin skinned. I recall the Gulf War vet NCOs in my first unit (mech infantry) noting that they switched to shooting 25mm HE at Iraqi BMP-1s and BTRs, because the sabot rounds would just fly right through without doing much damage unless they hit fuel, ammo, or the engine.
It’s not that the Taliban had rifles effective at 800 to 1,000 meters. They used belt-fed PKMs and such. With a planned ambush, a bunch of PKMs can do a lot of work on an infantry unit with only a handful of M240s and noting else that punches back. Pack up and leave before CAS arrives, and the work is done.
I spent 20 years on M1 tanks (M1IP, and all M1A1 variants as well as early years of the M1A2). The life span of the tube is no longer measured in how many rounds are fired through the tube. In fact, it hasn’t been since the early 90’s. The 1500 rounds thing is a sort of guideline. What happens now is that every year the tube, mount, recoil mechanism, and breach get a procedure called a bore scope and pullover. Anything that has a mechanical or material defect is replaced. The reality, though, is that tube life, even firing combat rounds (M829A4) and training rounds (M865), is several hundred rounds, at least.
As far the M7 goes, there were a lot of ways to solve the engagement distance and body armor challenges. Creating a hybrid monstrosity with ridiculous cartridge pressures, significant weight challenges, and reduced ammunition capacity was not it. That was a case of designing your new weapon for your last war and is incredibly comparable to the French building the Maginot Line in the 1930’s.
I can think of several easy solutions. More squad light machine guns and GP machine guns (ie the SAW and the M240) at the squad and platoon level. More light mortars at the platoon and company level. Better combined arms, since a tank just flat out solves this problem. Invest in designing and developing small FPV drones carried at the squad and tank level.
That’s just off the top of my head. After spending a bit of time looking at the M7 a couple years ago, I came to the conclusion it was the result of Generals designing weapons for another Afghanistan and that sooner, or later, it would no longer be the combat arms standard and instead become a very specialized tool in certain niche situations.
No mention of the barrel length.
Basically, it’s just a SBR which cannot reach out to those distances no matter what caliber.
How many times do we have to lesson this lesson?
If ya’ll think the MIC is where all the money goes, I have a bridge to sell you. NGOs and all the congressional pork projects make the MIC look like pikers. Remember USAID? $80B with nothing to show for it except ridiculous sounding projects to support transgender mimes in Mauritania and such. Lots of beltway insiders got rich off those scams. Millions of fake SNAP recipients, millions more illegals getting free room and board, and the list goes on.
Yeah, the money spent researching the M7 is probably a waste, but it’s a drop in the bucket.
The issue in Afghanistan wasn’t with the Taliban using long range rifles, but their use of the PKM. A PKM fires 7.62x54R and is a belt fed GPMG, but it only weighs about 17 lbs (compare to 26 lbs for the M240B).
So the US deficiency was the lack of light weight machine guns firing full powered rounds.
I’m not sure a bunch of drones would be an effective substitute.
A drone is going to be more expensive than a bunch of bullets. Note it’s likely to require a wire guide because jamming is pretty pervasive already. Do you think that’s less likely to be true for a long range guerilla fight? So even more expensive.
Then you have to guide it in, while taking sniper fire. I’m assuming the guerillas are ambushing the troops, the other way around is not really worth talking about, it’s too lopsided.
And then you likely have to do it to each ambusher separately, since they’re likely to be dispersed enough to prevent just that.
While if you had a couple of rifles in the troop that had the range, with training to match, well the guerillas are likely to take off, or die.
Lawrence Person above had the right idea, you’re not going to get a rifle that’s good at both close range and long range that you can standardize on for everyone.
On body armor, current armor only covers more critical areas. Rifles in Ukraine in 5.56, 5.45 and 7.62×39 seem to be performing fine. They are being used more as PDWs anyway with most of the killing being done with heavier weapons.
Georgiaboy61. I totally agree with you. I was being facetious.
I did a little research. The Springfield 1903 used in WW1 was effective to 1000 yards. The Defense Department could go into the basement and find some unused ones and save us billions.
Admittedly, it is difficult to see a camouflaged target at 200 yards, but this doesn’t obviate engaging the enemy at that distance. Increasingly, a 200 yard shot is made possible by improved optics.
Thermal sights can detect distant targets that are at the far edge of what the 5.56 NATO can reliably incapacitate. What is needed is a cartridge that offers better terminal results than the 5.56 but is more controllable than the .30 Russian short (7.62×39).
The 6.5mm offers bullets with superior sectional density than the 5.56 with a better trajectory than the 7.62 “kurtz”.
Better sectional density translates into superior penetration, which out to be a consideration in defeating body armor.
In short, a 6.5mm @ 2,650 fps when paired with a thermal scope can give a sizable advantage to the well-trained individual operator. Whether this can be applied at scale to at the fire team level is something that would have to be tested.
Considering that we have an all-volunteer force, it is reasonable to expect a high level of performance from frontline troops. For the rear guard, the M-4, in its current form ought to suffice.
The M7 is in 6.8x51mm, a 6.8mm (.277 inch) caliber, not 6.5mm (.264 or .268 inch).
The $ 12,000 M157 fire control optic installed on the M7 lacks thermal vision and is still experiencing teething problems. The Army move last month to end PEOs will probably delay fixes to the M157, as well as any thermal vision alternative.
The top-of-the-line 120x570mm APFSDS cartridge is the Rheinmetall D73. It is too powerful for the U.S. M256 L44 120mm gun and ruptures barrels on the first shot. Its chamber pressure and velocity are still classified.
Firing of the U.S. M829A4 APFSDS-T M829A4″Silver Bullet” cartridge is strictly limited due to “in bore structural failures” (IBSF). The cartridge has been derated several times in an attempt to prevent IBSFs without success. Velocity of the M829A4 is now approximately equal to the M865 TPCSDS-T practice cartridge and its pressure is probably about the same (although classified). It is about 900 fps slower than the Rheinmetall DM63A1 cartridge which is the NATO exemplar 120x570mm APFSDS cartridge. Production of the M829A4 was terminated in 2024.
Re: “Georgiaboy61. I totally agree with you. I was being facetious.
I did a little research. The Springfield 1903 used in WW1 was effective to 1000 yards. The Defense Department could go into the basement and find some unused ones and save us billions.”
I hear you – roger that!
I was cracking wise myself, sort of anyway… a past acquaintance of mine did a tour inside the Five-Sided Puzzle Palace while in uniform, and the tales he could tell you of waste, malfeasance and scams.
By the way, if you ever get a chance to shoot one of those old M1903s, they’re often every fine rifles! Unlike many folks who have used them, I like the M1905 sights – which were a technological-ballistics marvel for their time.
“The M7 is in 6.8x51mm, a 6.8mm (.277 inch) caliber, not 6.5mm (.264 or .268 inch).”
Missing the point, as usual.
The 6.5 Grendel, using a 123 gr. projectile, offers > 1,000 ft pounds of energy @ 300 yards. Fitted with a tungsten-cored penetrator, it is capable of defeating body armor. Add a thermal vision scope to the rifle and you have the ability to deploy with a weapon system that outperforms the 5.56 NATO.
So contrary to the assertion by Gun Jesus that an obstacle exists to “long-range” shooting, it is entirely possible to field a rifle/optical sight that allows for engagement at 250-300 yards by well-trained shooters.
The 6.5 Grendel may not have sufficient velocity to penetrate armor at these distances but only field testing would reveal this.
There Is good likelihood that the M4 can be supplemented by a more effective rifle and 6.5mm is where the search should begin. The M7 looks like a dud but this is no reason to abandon hope of finding a better candidate.
“So contrary to the assertion by Gun Jesus that an obstacle exists to “long-range” shooting, it is entirely possible to field a rifle/optical sight that allows for engagement at 250-300 yards by well-trained shooters.”
Contrary to your snark, Ian is expressing the well established science of the CONARC Operations Research Office (ORO) which was summed up in their 1954 report: “Development of Weapons for the Defeat of Personnel”. It is the culmination of a number of studies in the first half of the 1950’s which included a comprehensive review of 3 million casualties during WW II and the Korean action by the U.S. Army Medical Office.
The head of ORO, Norman A. Hitchman, concluded: “that the majority of combat rifle use does not exceed 300 yards, and that marksmanship is severely degraded by terrain and visibility at ranges beyond 100 yards. In fact, the chance of being struck by a rifle bullet is seen as being nearly as random as being struck by a fragment from a high explosive shell. The time and amount of target exposure had more bearing on whether a target was hit versus marksmanship skills.”
Thus began the Small Caliber, High Velocity (SCHV) program which begat the AR-15 / .222 Remington Special. 6.5mm cartridges were explicitly rejected after some study of the effectiveness of the 6.5x50mmSR used in the Japanese Type 38 rifle. It was responsible for most American casualties inflicted by rifle fire in the PTO.
In the late 1980s, there were a series of cartoon illustrations that exemplified for this. The perfect battle rifle would also have a flotation device demanded by the Navy and a chainsaw attachment for the Engineers and a scope demanded by the Snipers and a flashlight demanded by the Officers and a can opener demanded by the Cooks and compass demanded by SF…..
Nothing this rifle can do is new.
The Swiss Army knife is the worst tool of everything it does. It has clippers, but they are hard to use. It has a magnifying glass, but it is too small. It has a screwdriver, but the knife body is a terrible handle.
Re: “Contrary to your snark, Ian is expressing the well established science of the CONARC Operations Research Office (ORO) which was summed up in their 1954 report: “Development of Weapons for the Defeat of Personnel”. It is the culmination of a number of studies in the first half of the 1950’s which included a comprehensive review of 3 million casualties during WW II and the Korean action by the U.S. Army Medical Office.”
The description above contains enough information to sow doubt in the findings generated. The ORO could not possibly have reviewed three million deaths from WW2 in any scientifically rigorous manner, given the uncertainties, ambiguities and other data which cannot be known after the fact.
Which means they guessed, modeled, made inferences, and so on. Which may be well-and-good, but is not the same as science.
ORO may have had its valid uses, but they were – to be blunt – a bunch of rear-area chair-warmers who collective experience with combat was probably nil.
This does not mean their findings were/are useless, but it does mean that they are far from authoritative.
The head of ORO, Norman A. Hitchman, concluded: “that the majority of combat rifle use does not exceed 300 yards, and that marksmanship is severely degraded by terrain and visibility at ranges beyond 100 yards. In fact, the chance of being struck by a rifle bullet is seen as being nearly as random as being struck by a fragment from a high explosive shell. The time and amount of target exposure had more bearing on whether a target was hit versus marksmanship skills.”
Operations Research isn’t combat. Did Hitchman serve as a combat infantryman? Did he have direct experience in the subject? If in the negative, then he had no basis upon which make such authoritative statements. He sounds entirely too sure of himself for someone who wasn’t even there.
@Sid
Re: “The Swiss Army knife is the worst tool of everything it does.”
Thank you for making this vital point… how gratifying it is to learn that one isn’t alone after all this time!
Small arms are the tools of the infantryman. Tools ought to be designed with specific tasks in mind, and not designed by committee to try to do everything.
The search for the “universal weapon” for the soldier is a fool’s errand and has been since 1945. Classes of cartridges and weapons which fire them exist precisely because no one category can perform all small arms tasks equally well.
The Department of Defense & Secretary McNamara – pulled the plug on the M-14 because they maintained that a full-scale battle rifle wasn’t suited for combat in SE Asia. Along came the M-16, our first true assault rifle, so what does the Army do? Try to stretch it into a battle rifle’s role, too, by insisting that its sights be good out to 800m.
Then as now, Big Green can’t seem to make up its mind what it wants. But what the heck, it is only money, and only taxpayer money at that!
The reason I took issue with the ORO findings is that if one goes through military history, it is fairly easy to find engagements in which infantry small arms fire played a key role, even at ranges beyond 300 yards.
To name two, the Battle of San Juan Heights in the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the Battle of Spion Kop in the Second British-Boer War in 1900. In both battles, LR precision rifle fire was a decisive part of the victor’s success.
The somewhat dismissive tone of the ORO report to small arms fire makes it sound as if infantry ought not to bear arms at all going into harm’s way, so ineffective was their use.
What about technological developments as a influence upon ground combat? By the time of WW1,
The reason I took issue with the ORO findings is that if one goes through military history, it is fairly easy to find engagements in which infantry small arms fire played a key role, even at ranges beyond 300 yards.
To name two, the Battle of San Juan Heights in the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the Battle of Spion Kop in the Second British-Boer War in 1900. In both battles, LR precision rifle fire was a decisive part of the victor’s success.
The somewhat dismissive tone of the ORO report to small arms fire makes it sound as if infantry ought not to bear arms at all going into harm’s way, so ineffective was their use.
What about technological developments as a influence upon ground combat? By the time of WW1, massed rifle fires was not as common at ranges beyond 300 yards because by then crew-served weapons such as machine-guns, mortars and artillery had taken over that role of LR interdiction.
In light of these developments, it is perhaps understandable that infantry marksmanship began its long decline which has continued to the present day, in the years after 1918.
A final point (from Ken Royce) deserves to be made about the utility of small arms fire: Firepower isn’t shots per minute, it is hits per minute. The rise of the assault rifle and intermediate cartridges capable of select-fire operation has increased the firepower of the individual infantryman in terms of shots taken per unit of time, but actual hits obtained per unit of time has dropped off dramatically, while ammo expenditures have gone way up.
Hosing down an enemy area may keep heads down, but if no/few hits are obtained, then it hasn’t really done anything to degrade his combat effectiveness. And now all of that extra ammo that your assault rifle’s light weight has allowed you to carry into the field, has been used up.
Aimed rifle fire – one shot/one kill – still applies.
The U.S. Army Medical Office published hundreds of volumes cataloguing military casualties and deaths from World War I through the Korean action. They are not classified, but their book runs were quite small and few outside the American military know of their existence due to reticence over their extremely gruesome content. The details and photographs were supplied by medical personnel at the front lines.
You can occasionally find a copy of the 932 page summary volume offered for a couple of hundred dollars. It was published by Office of the Surgeon General/Dept. of the Army in Washington, D.C. in 1962:
Wound Ballistics
By Col. James B. Coates & Maj. James C. Beyer
Norman A. Hitchman (1918 – 1993) was a WW II combat veteran who was extremely well respected throughout Ordnance Branch for his studies at ORO.
Ian McCollum is walking you through his interpretation of an Expeditionary Warfare School monograph by USAR Captain Braden R. Trent:
‘Maintaining Lethality Dominance: The Future of Small Arms and the Joint Force’
By USAR Captain Braden R. Trent, 20 March 2025
Most opposed to the M7 complain of the weight and inertia of the rifle. They want a light, handy weapon like the M4 Carbine. There really is no way to provide both the range and terminal effectiveness of the 6.8x51mm cartridge in an M4 package. ArmaLite failed miserably with the fiberglass wrapped titanium barrels of their Hollywood AR-10s.
Modern small arms barrels burn out by nitriding at the typical current pressures of 65,000 psi with no signs of fatigue. Their life depends upon how fast you shoot them. Belt fed machine guns can destroy a barrel in 400 rounds. The very same cartridge in a Ruger Number 1 will get you a 10,000 round barrel life. We can extend both types of barrels’ lives with very expensive metallurgy (Stellite 21 inserts), but not enough to economically justify the effort. Those inserts also greatly reduce barrel strength, another issue with the M7.
Modern tank gun barrels fail by fatigue at their current typical chamber pressures of 120,000 psi. Their barrel life is typically 20 – 50 war shots (full pressure loads). We could get greater life out of tank gun barrels by making them very much heavier, but this produces extremely heavy turrets, poor vehicle balance, and slow W&E movements. Gun stabilization systems become colossal in size and energy requirements. The op research people told us that a modern tank would not last 20 shots on the modern battlefield (before drones!), so the short life span of tank guns was never an issue.
Ian is wrong about fancy armor piercing bullets. Tungsten has become unobtanium and DU is socially unacceptable. The Swedes greatly underestimate the developments of NII Stali, which have driven the entire body armor penetration issue. There are even better body armor developments on the horizon, and the 6.8x51mm may not be adequate even at close ranges.
The Rheinmetall smoothbore 120mm cannon barrel has a life expectancy in excess of 1,500 rounds.
This is just another example of the military-industrial complex trying to soak the American taxpayer. If the Taliban had rifles that were affective at 800 to 1000 yards, the Defense Department should buy them at market prices and save billions of dollars.
There are rifles good out to that range (or farther), but they’re not good for close quarters combat, which the M4 (and theoretically the M7) are.
The M7 is trying to be good as both a close quarters assault rifle and a long range sniper rifle, and the side effects of trying to do both those thing are undesirable.
“The Rheinmetall smoothbore 120mm cannon barrel has a life expectancy in excess of 1,500 rounds.”
Only with practice rounds, not war shots.
Re: ” If the Taliban had rifles that were affective at 800 to 1000 yards, the Defense Department should buy them at market prices and save billions of dollars.”
Yes, but don’t you see? The function of the military-industrial-Congressional complex isn’t to procure the best weapons for our armed forces at the best prices for the taxpayers, it is to perpetuate the gravy train of lucrative defense contracts awarded to arms manufacturers, and to get ambitious Pentagon officer promoted, and General-Flag officers that next star. Doing things the economical and logical way, as you suggest, is unacceptable to them because it doesn’t grease enough palms or fatten profits enough for the quarterly reports.
You don’t need a new fancy round to punch holes in a BTR, at least the 1990s vintage ones (BTR-80 and older). 7.62 NATO M61 AP rounds will do the trick, at least according to what I was taught at the Benning School for Boys, circa 1996.
Soviet APCs and IFVs were actually pretty thin skinned. I recall the Gulf War vet NCOs in my first unit (mech infantry) noting that they switched to shooting 25mm HE at Iraqi BMP-1s and BTRs, because the sabot rounds would just fly right through without doing much damage unless they hit fuel, ammo, or the engine.
It’s not that the Taliban had rifles effective at 800 to 1,000 meters. They used belt-fed PKMs and such. With a planned ambush, a bunch of PKMs can do a lot of work on an infantry unit with only a handful of M240s and noting else that punches back. Pack up and leave before CAS arrives, and the work is done.
I spent 20 years on M1 tanks (M1IP, and all M1A1 variants as well as early years of the M1A2). The life span of the tube is no longer measured in how many rounds are fired through the tube. In fact, it hasn’t been since the early 90’s. The 1500 rounds thing is a sort of guideline. What happens now is that every year the tube, mount, recoil mechanism, and breach get a procedure called a bore scope and pullover. Anything that has a mechanical or material defect is replaced. The reality, though, is that tube life, even firing combat rounds (M829A4) and training rounds (M865), is several hundred rounds, at least.
As far the M7 goes, there were a lot of ways to solve the engagement distance and body armor challenges. Creating a hybrid monstrosity with ridiculous cartridge pressures, significant weight challenges, and reduced ammunition capacity was not it. That was a case of designing your new weapon for your last war and is incredibly comparable to the French building the Maginot Line in the 1930’s.
I can think of several easy solutions. More squad light machine guns and GP machine guns (ie the SAW and the M240) at the squad and platoon level. More light mortars at the platoon and company level. Better combined arms, since a tank just flat out solves this problem. Invest in designing and developing small FPV drones carried at the squad and tank level.
That’s just off the top of my head. After spending a bit of time looking at the M7 a couple years ago, I came to the conclusion it was the result of Generals designing weapons for another Afghanistan and that sooner, or later, it would no longer be the combat arms standard and instead become a very specialized tool in certain niche situations.
No mention of the barrel length.
Basically, it’s just a SBR which cannot reach out to those distances no matter what caliber.
How many times do we have to lesson this lesson?
If ya’ll think the MIC is where all the money goes, I have a bridge to sell you. NGOs and all the congressional pork projects make the MIC look like pikers. Remember USAID? $80B with nothing to show for it except ridiculous sounding projects to support transgender mimes in Mauritania and such. Lots of beltway insiders got rich off those scams. Millions of fake SNAP recipients, millions more illegals getting free room and board, and the list goes on.
Yeah, the money spent researching the M7 is probably a waste, but it’s a drop in the bucket.
The issue in Afghanistan wasn’t with the Taliban using long range rifles, but their use of the PKM. A PKM fires 7.62x54R and is a belt fed GPMG, but it only weighs about 17 lbs (compare to 26 lbs for the M240B).
So the US deficiency was the lack of light weight machine guns firing full powered rounds.
This was never about penetrating armor. This was about making tens of millions of dollars for Sig and the generals that go to work for them.
I’m not sure a bunch of drones would be an effective substitute.
A drone is going to be more expensive than a bunch of bullets. Note it’s likely to require a wire guide because jamming is pretty pervasive already. Do you think that’s less likely to be true for a long range guerilla fight? So even more expensive.
Then you have to guide it in, while taking sniper fire. I’m assuming the guerillas are ambushing the troops, the other way around is not really worth talking about, it’s too lopsided.
And then you likely have to do it to each ambusher separately, since they’re likely to be dispersed enough to prevent just that.
While if you had a couple of rifles in the troop that had the range, with training to match, well the guerillas are likely to take off, or die.
Lawrence Person above had the right idea, you’re not going to get a rifle that’s good at both close range and long range that you can standardize on for everyone.
On body armor, current armor only covers more critical areas. Rifles in Ukraine in 5.56, 5.45 and 7.62×39 seem to be performing fine. They are being used more as PDWs anyway with most of the killing being done with heavier weapons.
Georgiaboy61. I totally agree with you. I was being facetious.
I did a little research. The Springfield 1903 used in WW1 was effective to 1000 yards. The Defense Department could go into the basement and find some unused ones and save us billions.
Sorry, CBJ tech explains right in their website why they can’t make armor piercing 5.56. It’s in the “300 Blackout CBJ” section…
Admittedly, it is difficult to see a camouflaged target at 200 yards, but this doesn’t obviate engaging the enemy at that distance. Increasingly, a 200 yard shot is made possible by improved optics.
Thermal sights can detect distant targets that are at the far edge of what the 5.56 NATO can reliably incapacitate. What is needed is a cartridge that offers better terminal results than the 5.56 but is more controllable than the .30 Russian short (7.62×39).
The 6.5mm offers bullets with superior sectional density than the 5.56 with a better trajectory than the 7.62 “kurtz”.
Better sectional density translates into superior penetration, which out to be a consideration in defeating body armor.
In short, a 6.5mm @ 2,650 fps when paired with a thermal scope can give a sizable advantage to the well-trained individual operator. Whether this can be applied at scale to at the fire team level is something that would have to be tested.
Considering that we have an all-volunteer force, it is reasonable to expect a high level of performance from frontline troops. For the rear guard, the M-4, in its current form ought to suffice.
The M7 is in 6.8x51mm, a 6.8mm (.277 inch) caliber, not 6.5mm (.264 or .268 inch).
The $ 12,000 M157 fire control optic installed on the M7 lacks thermal vision and is still experiencing teething problems. The Army move last month to end PEOs will probably delay fixes to the M157, as well as any thermal vision alternative.
The top-of-the-line 120x570mm APFSDS cartridge is the Rheinmetall D73. It is too powerful for the U.S. M256 L44 120mm gun and ruptures barrels on the first shot. Its chamber pressure and velocity are still classified.
Firing of the U.S. M829A4 APFSDS-T M829A4″Silver Bullet” cartridge is strictly limited due to “in bore structural failures” (IBSF). The cartridge has been derated several times in an attempt to prevent IBSFs without success. Velocity of the M829A4 is now approximately equal to the M865 TPCSDS-T practice cartridge and its pressure is probably about the same (although classified). It is about 900 fps slower than the Rheinmetall DM63A1 cartridge which is the NATO exemplar 120x570mm APFSDS cartridge. Production of the M829A4 was terminated in 2024.
Re: “Georgiaboy61. I totally agree with you. I was being facetious.
I did a little research. The Springfield 1903 used in WW1 was effective to 1000 yards. The Defense Department could go into the basement and find some unused ones and save us billions.”
I hear you – roger that!
I was cracking wise myself, sort of anyway… a past acquaintance of mine did a tour inside the Five-Sided Puzzle Palace while in uniform, and the tales he could tell you of waste, malfeasance and scams.
By the way, if you ever get a chance to shoot one of those old M1903s, they’re often every fine rifles! Unlike many folks who have used them, I like the M1905 sights – which were a technological-ballistics marvel for their time.
“The M7 is in 6.8x51mm, a 6.8mm (.277 inch) caliber, not 6.5mm (.264 or .268 inch).”
Missing the point, as usual.
The 6.5 Grendel, using a 123 gr. projectile, offers > 1,000 ft pounds of energy @ 300 yards. Fitted with a tungsten-cored penetrator, it is capable of defeating body armor. Add a thermal vision scope to the rifle and you have the ability to deploy with a weapon system that outperforms the 5.56 NATO.
So contrary to the assertion by Gun Jesus that an obstacle exists to “long-range” shooting, it is entirely possible to field a rifle/optical sight that allows for engagement at 250-300 yards by well-trained shooters.
The 6.5 Grendel may not have sufficient velocity to penetrate armor at these distances but only field testing would reveal this.
There Is good likelihood that the M4 can be supplemented by a more effective rifle and 6.5mm is where the search should begin. The M7 looks like a dud but this is no reason to abandon hope of finding a better candidate.
Drones are much less effective at securing the retirements of procurement officers.
“So contrary to the assertion by Gun Jesus that an obstacle exists to “long-range” shooting, it is entirely possible to field a rifle/optical sight that allows for engagement at 250-300 yards by well-trained shooters.”
Contrary to your snark, Ian is expressing the well established science of the CONARC Operations Research Office (ORO) which was summed up in their 1954 report: “Development of Weapons for the Defeat of Personnel”. It is the culmination of a number of studies in the first half of the 1950’s which included a comprehensive review of 3 million casualties during WW II and the Korean action by the U.S. Army Medical Office.
The head of ORO, Norman A. Hitchman, concluded: “that the majority of combat rifle use does not exceed 300 yards, and that marksmanship is severely degraded by terrain and visibility at ranges beyond 100 yards. In fact, the chance of being struck by a rifle bullet is seen as being nearly as random as being struck by a fragment from a high explosive shell. The time and amount of target exposure had more bearing on whether a target was hit versus marksmanship skills.”
Thus began the Small Caliber, High Velocity (SCHV) program which begat the AR-15 / .222 Remington Special. 6.5mm cartridges were explicitly rejected after some study of the effectiveness of the 6.5x50mmSR used in the Japanese Type 38 rifle. It was responsible for most American casualties inflicted by rifle fire in the PTO.
In the late 1980s, there were a series of cartoon illustrations that exemplified for this. The perfect battle rifle would also have a flotation device demanded by the Navy and a chainsaw attachment for the Engineers and a scope demanded by the Snipers and a flashlight demanded by the Officers and a can opener demanded by the Cooks and compass demanded by SF…..
Nothing this rifle can do is new.
The Swiss Army knife is the worst tool of everything it does. It has clippers, but they are hard to use. It has a magnifying glass, but it is too small. It has a screwdriver, but the knife body is a terrible handle.
@10×25
Re: “Contrary to your snark, Ian is expressing the well established science of the CONARC Operations Research Office (ORO) which was summed up in their 1954 report: “Development of Weapons for the Defeat of Personnel”. It is the culmination of a number of studies in the first half of the 1950’s which included a comprehensive review of 3 million casualties during WW II and the Korean action by the U.S. Army Medical Office.”
The description above contains enough information to sow doubt in the findings generated. The ORO could not possibly have reviewed three million deaths from WW2 in any scientifically rigorous manner, given the uncertainties, ambiguities and other data which cannot be known after the fact.
Which means they guessed, modeled, made inferences, and so on. Which may be well-and-good, but is not the same as science.
ORO may have had its valid uses, but they were – to be blunt – a bunch of rear-area chair-warmers who collective experience with combat was probably nil.
This does not mean their findings were/are useless, but it does mean that they are far from authoritative.
The head of ORO, Norman A. Hitchman, concluded: “that the majority of combat rifle use does not exceed 300 yards, and that marksmanship is severely degraded by terrain and visibility at ranges beyond 100 yards. In fact, the chance of being struck by a rifle bullet is seen as being nearly as random as being struck by a fragment from a high explosive shell. The time and amount of target exposure had more bearing on whether a target was hit versus marksmanship skills.”
Operations Research isn’t combat. Did Hitchman serve as a combat infantryman? Did he have direct experience in the subject? If in the negative, then he had no basis upon which make such authoritative statements. He sounds entirely too sure of himself for someone who wasn’t even there.
@Sid
Re: “The Swiss Army knife is the worst tool of everything it does.”
Thank you for making this vital point… how gratifying it is to learn that one isn’t alone after all this time!
Small arms are the tools of the infantryman. Tools ought to be designed with specific tasks in mind, and not designed by committee to try to do everything.
The search for the “universal weapon” for the soldier is a fool’s errand and has been since 1945. Classes of cartridges and weapons which fire them exist precisely because no one category can perform all small arms tasks equally well.
The Department of Defense & Secretary McNamara – pulled the plug on the M-14 because they maintained that a full-scale battle rifle wasn’t suited for combat in SE Asia. Along came the M-16, our first true assault rifle, so what does the Army do? Try to stretch it into a battle rifle’s role, too, by insisting that its sights be good out to 800m.
Then as now, Big Green can’t seem to make up its mind what it wants. But what the heck, it is only money, and only taxpayer money at that!
@10×25
The reason I took issue with the ORO findings is that if one goes through military history, it is fairly easy to find engagements in which infantry small arms fire played a key role, even at ranges beyond 300 yards.
To name two, the Battle of San Juan Heights in the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the Battle of Spion Kop in the Second British-Boer War in 1900. In both battles, LR precision rifle fire was a decisive part of the victor’s success.
The somewhat dismissive tone of the ORO report to small arms fire makes it sound as if infantry ought not to bear arms at all going into harm’s way, so ineffective was their use.
What about technological developments as a influence upon ground combat? By the time of WW1,
Re: @10×25
The reason I took issue with the ORO findings is that if one goes through military history, it is fairly easy to find engagements in which infantry small arms fire played a key role, even at ranges beyond 300 yards.
To name two, the Battle of San Juan Heights in the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the Battle of Spion Kop in the Second British-Boer War in 1900. In both battles, LR precision rifle fire was a decisive part of the victor’s success.
The somewhat dismissive tone of the ORO report to small arms fire makes it sound as if infantry ought not to bear arms at all going into harm’s way, so ineffective was their use.
What about technological developments as a influence upon ground combat? By the time of WW1, massed rifle fires was not as common at ranges beyond 300 yards because by then crew-served weapons such as machine-guns, mortars and artillery had taken over that role of LR interdiction.
In light of these developments, it is perhaps understandable that infantry marksmanship began its long decline which has continued to the present day, in the years after 1918.
A final point (from Ken Royce) deserves to be made about the utility of small arms fire: Firepower isn’t shots per minute, it is hits per minute. The rise of the assault rifle and intermediate cartridges capable of select-fire operation has increased the firepower of the individual infantryman in terms of shots taken per unit of time, but actual hits obtained per unit of time has dropped off dramatically, while ammo expenditures have gone way up.
Hosing down an enemy area may keep heads down, but if no/few hits are obtained, then it hasn’t really done anything to degrade his combat effectiveness. And now all of that extra ammo that your assault rifle’s light weight has allowed you to carry into the field, has been used up.
Aimed rifle fire – one shot/one kill – still applies.
The U.S. Army Medical Office published hundreds of volumes cataloguing military casualties and deaths from World War I through the Korean action. They are not classified, but their book runs were quite small and few outside the American military know of their existence due to reticence over their extremely gruesome content. The details and photographs were supplied by medical personnel at the front lines.
You can occasionally find a copy of the 932 page summary volume offered for a couple of hundred dollars. It was published by Office of the Surgeon General/Dept. of the Army in Washington, D.C. in 1962:
Wound Ballistics
By Col. James B. Coates & Maj. James C. Beyer
Norman A. Hitchman (1918 – 1993) was a WW II combat veteran who was extremely well respected throughout Ordnance Branch for his studies at ORO.