Russo-Ukrainian War Update for February 24, 2022

And the war came.

BBC correspondents heard loud bangs in the capital Kyiv, as well as Kramatorsk in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine. Blasts have also been heard in the southern port city of Odesa.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky said Russia had carried out missile strikes on Ukraine’s infrastructure and on border guards.

Russia’s defence ministry has denied attacking Ukrainian cities – saying it was targeting military infrastructure, air defence and air forces with “high-precision weapons”.

Tanks and troops have poured into Ukraine at points along its eastern, southern and northern borders, Ukraine says.

Russian military convoys have crossed from Belarus into Ukraine’s northern Chernihiv region, and from Russia into the Sumy region, which is also in the north, Ukraine’s border guard service (DPSU) said.

Belarus is a long-time ally of Russia. Analysts describe the small country as Russia’s “client state”.

Convoys have also entered the eastern Luhansk and Kharkiv regions, and moved into the Kherson region from Crimea – a territory that Russia annexed from Ukraine in 2014.

If multiple Russian convoys just crossed the border without significant opposition from ground troops (either tanks or hidden soldiers with antitank and RPGs) it’s quite the indictment of Ukrainian war-planning.

The Russian offensive was preceded by artillery fire and there were injuries to border guards, the DPSU said.

There have also been reports of troops landing by sea at the Black Sea port cities of Mariupol and Odesa in the south. A British resident of Odesa told the BBC many people were leaving.

As I mentioned last night, Putin’s fiction that this is “a military operation in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region” is an obvious lie. Here’s a tweet highlighting the wide range of Russia’s operations:

Here’s a snapshot of the Livemap of the Russian invasion:

Ukrainians are discovering that modern warfare isn’t a great respecter of conventions:

(Some of the footage circulating on Twitter is evidently from previous conflicts. Hopefully the above are not among them, but if they are let me know.)

There are conflicting reports on whether Antonov International Airport on the outskirts of Kiev is currently in Russian hands or not. The fighting there has reportedly gone back and forth.

More from National Review:

At least 16 cities in Ukraine are reporting explosions. Footage of cruise missiles flying over Ukrainian heads is appearing on social media. Apparently, a Russian soldier parachuting into Ukraine has posted video of himself on TikTok. There are reports that Belarusian military forces have joined the Russian forces in attacks on Ukrainian border guards.

We are witnessing, on our television screens and through the web, the largest land war in Europe since 1945, an unprovoked attack by an autocratic superpower with nuclear weapons against a flawed but independent democracy that had committed no crime or provocation. The world is less safe today than it was at the start of the week. Many Ukrainians are already dead, some Russian forces have likely also been killed, and a lot more people will die in the near future.

This is exactly the nightmare scenario that U.S., NATO, and European Union policy aimed to prevent; short of a Russian invasion of NATO member states, this is the worst-case scenario. This is not another relatively small-scale, minimal-conflict land grab like the Russian seizure and occupation of Crimea in 2014. This is the full wrath of the Russian war machine coming down like a ton of bricks on a country of 80 million people.

Russian forces are also trying to take the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.

Some links and observations:

  • Ukraine spent about one-fifth of its 2021 budget on security and self-defense, $9.6 billion of $47.65 billion. That’s not nothing, but it clearly wasn’t enough to deter Putin.
  • The grandees of the Democratic Party are treating the situation with the exact level of gravitas you would expect:

  • Here’s an essay by Stephen M. Walt on how this war came from liberal western policy delusions:

    At the most basic level, realism begins with the recognition that wars occur because there is no agency or central authority that can protect states from one another and stop them from fighting if they choose to do so. Given that war is always a possibility, states compete for power and sometimes use force to try to make themselves more secure or gain other advantages. There is no way states can know for certain what others may do in the future, which makes them reluctant to trust one another and encourages them to hedge against the possibility that another powerful state may try to harm them at some point down the road.

    Liberalism sees world politics differently. Instead of seeing all great powers as facing more or less the same problem—the need to be secure in a world where war is always possible—liberalism maintains that what states do is driven mostly by their internal characteristics and the nature of the connections among them. It divides the world into “good states” (those that embody liberal values) and “bad states” (pretty much everyone else) and maintains that conflicts arise primarily from the aggressive impulses of autocrats, dictators, and other illiberal leaders. For liberals, the solution is to topple tyrants and spread democracy, markets, and institutions based on the belief that democracies don’t fight one another, especially when they are bound together by trade, investment, and an agreed-on set of rules.

    After the Cold War, Western elites concluded that realism was no longer relevant and liberal ideals should guide foreign-policy conduct. As the Harvard University professor Stanley Hoffmann told Thomas Friedman of the New York Times in 1993, realism is “utter nonsense today.” U.S. and European officials believed that liberal democracy, open markets, the rule of law, and other liberal values were spreading like wildfire and a global liberal order lay within reach. They assumed, as then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton put it in 1992, that “the cynical calculus of pure power politics” had no place in the modern world and an emerging liberal order would yield many decades of democratic peace. Instead of competing for power and security, the world’s nations would concentrate on getting rich in an increasingly open, harmonious, rules-based liberal order, one shaped and guarded by the benevolent power of the United States.

    Had this rosy vision been accurate, spreading democracy and extending U.S. security guarantees into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence would have posed few risks. But that outcome was unlikely, as any good realist could have told you. Indeed, opponents of enlargement were quick to warn that Russia would inevitably regard NATO enlargement as a threat and going ahead with it would poison relations with Moscow. That is why several prominent U.S. experts—including diplomat George Kennan, author Michael Mandelbaum, and former defense secretary William Perry—opposed enlargement from the start. Then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were initially opposed for the same reasons, though both later shifted their positions and joined the pro-enlargement bandwagon.

    Proponents of expansion won the debate by claiming it would help consolidate the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and create a “vast zone of peace” across all of Europe. In their view, it didn’t matter that some of NATO’s new members were of little or no military value to the alliance and might be hard to defend because peace would be so robust and enduring that any pledge to protect those new allies would never have to be honored.

    Moreover, they insisted that NATO’s benign intentions were self-evident and it would be easy to persuade Moscow not to worry as NATO crept closer to the Russian border. This view was naive in the extreme, for the key issue was not what NATO’s intentions may have been in reality. What really mattered, of course, was what Russia’s leaders thought they were or might be in the future. Even if Russian leaders could have been convinced that NATO had no malign intentions, they could never be sure this would always be the case.

    One need not buy all of Walt’s assertions to realize that liberal foreign policy wonks got Russia badly wrong.

  • More on the point of traditional liberal foreign policy tools no longer working:

    One of the problems with using economic sanctions as your primary tool of deterrence in foreign policy is that eventually you’ll run into a hostile foe or force that does not care about trading with the U.S. or even money at all. In fact, it is fair to wonder how much money motivates any of America’s current foes.

    The Taliban certainly don’t particularly care about money; they think they’re on a mission from Allah. Iran has been hit with just about every sanction in the book, and no doubt it’s had an impact on the Iranian economy, but the mullahs don’t seem to care much. Kim Jong-un and the North Korean regime have been sanctioned many, many times, and they just keep getting better and better at evading them. The U.S. and China are too economically intertwined to easily enact sanctions that are serious enough to alter the decision-making in Beijing.

    And then there’s Vladimir Putin’s Russia — a government that foresaw the types of moves the West was likely to make, and prepared accordingly:

    Russia has drastically reduced its use of dollars, and therefore Washington’s leverage. It has stockpiled enormous currency reserves, and trimmed its budgets, to keep its economy and government services going even under isolation. It has reoriented trade and sought to replace Western imports.

    But even more than that, for a greedy kleptocrat, Putin doesn’t seem primarily motivated by money or his country’s economic prospects. Putin’s address yesterday was a long stream of grievances, and it is clear that what really enrages him is that Russia is not as powerful as it was when he was a younger man and the Soviet Union existed.

  • Many have called for Russia to be removed from SWIFT.

    The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT, is a cooperative of financial institutions formed in 1973 and headquartered in Belgium. It is overseen by the National Bank of Belgium with cooperation from other major central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve System, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank.

    But SWIFT is not a traditional bank and does not transfer funds. Rather, it acts as a secure messaging system that links more than 11,000 financial institutions in over 200 countries and territories, alerting banks when transactions are going to occur. (For instance, American banks have a unique SWIFT code that customers use for incoming wire transfers in U.S. dollars.)

    In 2021, SWIFT said it recorded an average of 42 million messages per day, an 11 percent increase from the year before. In 2020, Russia accounted for 1.5 percent of transactions.

    For the U.S. and its European allies, cutting Russia out of the SWIFT financial system would be one of the toughest financial steps they could take, damaging Russia’s economy immediately and in the long term. The move could cut Russia off from most international financial transactions, including profits from oil and gas production, which accounts for more than 40 percent of the country’s revenue.

    “But doing so, which some financial analysts have likened to a ‘nuclear option,’ would be an unprecedented move against one of the world’s largest economies.”

    No, a financial sanction for one nation invading another is not a “nuclear option.” When it comes to war, the nuclear option is literally the nuclear option.

  • A history of how Obama and Biden dismantled sanctions and deterrence against Putin’s Russia. “It’s no surprise that Putin invaded during Obama’s and Biden’s presidencies instead of Trump’s.” (Hat tip: Director Blue.)
  • Ben Shapiro dings the soft, materialist West:

  • Putin’s Big Ukrainian Adventure isn’t doing wonders for the Russian stock market.

  • Two final pieces from the Newspaper of Record: “Biden Announces He Will Move To Unfollow Putin On Twitter.”
  • “Biden Warns Russia That If They Don’t Stop He Will Deploy Deadly Trans Admiral.”
  • Though Russian forces are quite formidable on paper (especially now that Russia has reportedly achieved air superiority over most of Ukraine), a whole lot of variables are at play in this war. How well maintained is all those old Soviet weapons Russian has lying around? How much of it has been modernized? How long can they sustain this rapid pace of operation? How much has Soviet doctrine changed following what they learned in Grozny? Soviet/Russian experience in counter-insurgency operations has generally not been a happy one. How stiff a resistance can Ukraine put up against the Russian invasion?

    Finally, what is Putin’s real goal: Ukraine acquiescing to his previous territorial conquests, Findlandization and agreement never to join NATO, incorporation of all Russian-speaking areas into Russia proper, installing a Russian-friendly puppet government, or actual outright conquest of all of Ukraine? Which he’s aiming for will determine how much pain he’s willing to let Russia endure and how difficult the military task will be.

    More to come, I’m sure.

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    5 Responses to “Russo-Ukrainian War Update for February 24, 2022”

    1. ruralcounsel says:

      Sit back and pop the popcorn (hopefully you stocked up before the price increases hit) because this is going to be interesting.

      And if we in the US are smart, we’ll keep our noses out of it completely, even though we are partially responsible for starting it.

      This is a problem for the Europeans to deal with. We really don’t have a dog in this fight. Think of this as Ukrainian Nazi’s fighting Russian Bolsheviks. It’s a shame they both can’t lose.

    2. "Unprovoked" says:

      National Review calls this attack “unprovoked.”

      Nope. Western weakness is provocative all by itself. Weakness invites aggression. But a lot of US and EU “leaders” have been poking the bear, too. NATO expansion? Maybe not a great idea. Now they act shocked when it finally bites them in the ass.

      The only good thing that will come of this will be that it will lay bare exactly how feckless and callow Western leaders really are.

    3. Howard says:

      I’ve seen very little evidence of an Iron Dome kind of setup. Which … wait, why? Why *doesn’t* Ukraine have something like that? I mean, really, why? Am I missing something obvious? Clearly the need is there.

      Methinks Israel is about to get even richer. I mean, compare:
      – recent visions coming out of Ukraine
      – videos 12 months ago showing the skies above Israel
      … and the difference is *stark*.

      After Russia’s attack on Ukraine, I think every country that wants an Iron Dome is going to beat a path to Israel’s door (and jockey with each other for position in line) so they can by something – anything – similar to Iron Dome. It doesn’t even have to *be* Iron Dome per se if Israel won’t / can’t sell that. It just has to be similarly effective.

      Seriously, anyone with a strong geopolitical foe / bully nearby … why wouldn’t they want to buy this, in a money-is-no-object kind of way? Feels almost existential. Am I getting carried away?

    4. Howard says:

      Major spike in radiation spotted at Chernobyl. Because of course, it’s 2020-two …

      https://www.saveecobot.com/en/radiation-maps#11/51.3825/30.0407/gamma/comp+cams+fire

    5. philk57 says:

      I don’t think that the EU would go along with shutting down the Swift system as they still need to buy gas from Russia. Shutting down Swift would have a bunch of folks in cold houses.

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