Ukraine continues to liberate territory from its Russian occupiers, not only in the Kharkiv/northeast front, but also on the Kherson/southwest front, where the last few days have seen a rapid collapse in Russian lines.
Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts on October 4. Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River along the T2207 highway, forcing Russian forces to retreat to the south toward Kherson City. Ukrainian forces also continued to push south along the Dnipro River and the T0403 highway, severing two Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northern Kherson Oblast and forcing Russians south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border toward the Beryslav area. Ukrainian military officials noted that the Ukrainian interdiction campaign is crippling Russian attempts to transfer additional ammunition, reserves, mobilized men, and means of defense to frontline positions. Ukrainian forces also continued to advance east of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that battles are ongoing near the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.
Kreminna seems to be the next big target for Ukrainian forces to take in Luhansk, allowing them to cut a major supply line and directly threaten Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.
Here’s a detailed description of the collapse of the northern portion of the Kherson front.
For another idea how rapid that advance have been, here are snapshots of the Deep State war map on 10/1 and 10/4.
Since most of the bridges over both the Inhulets and Dnipro rivers have been blown up, Russian forces are at significant risk of being cutoff and unable to retreat.
And just as I was working on this, a Peter Zeihan video on the topic dropped:
Takeaways:
Russia seems to be retreating everywhere save the central front in Donetsk, where they seem to be eking out tiny, meaningless gains of a square kilometer or two a day. That’s not a recipe for success.
Tags: Dnipro River, Foreign Policy, Inhulets River, Kherson, Kreminna, Luhansk, Lysychansk, Military, Peter Zeihan, Russia, Russo-Ukrainian War, Severodonetsk, Suchomimus, Ukraine, video
Zeihan isn’t a military authority of any stripe. I’d take his assessments of what is going on in this war down at the operational/tactical level with several huge, heaping spoons of salt. Economics/politics? I think he may have some expertise, but the rest of his stuff? Nope.
This war wasn’t “Russia’s to lose” back in March. All that they could have done then was to eke out a withdrawal and then claim they did it because they’d met their goals of “de-Nazifying” Ukraine. Unfortunately, they chose to double- and triple-down, and here we are in August with all the implications of Russian military corruption and incompetence playing out before us.
I want to point out something, here: The Russian Army has known that a mobilization order was likely coming. Since, what? February?
Look at the chaos going on with the mobilization. Guys without uniforms; men out on railroad sidings with ancient AK47s issued to them without proper paperwork and no ammo. Even with more than six months warning, this is what you get.
Think about that. This isn’t a “come as you are” affair; this is the sort of thing you get from Russia and Russians when you give them more than enough warning to get ready and deal with things.
1.5 million missing uniform sets. Weapons issued without accountability; there are videos of guys with AKs saying that their weapons are not “assigned” against their military IDs, which is illegal under Article 222 of the Russian Criminal Code. Basically, weapons were handed out without a single piece of documentation as to who was given what, so… Getting those AKs back is going to be a little challenging. Not to mention… AKs. 7.62X39 weapons, when the standard has been 5.45X39 since the late 1970s.
Watch this thread:
https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1577752565839806472
That’s the aftermath of initial call-up for mobilization: They’re sitting, unorganized, without units, on a rail siding somewhere outside Belgorod, without orders or any sort of support. Buying their own food.
Then, for contrast, see the Finns doing the same thing:
https://twitter.com/jmkorhonen/status/1577412411463962624
No, Russia culminated back in March. Right now, it’s just a question of where the rubble is going to land, when all those chunks of it they’ve been keeping in the air finally come down. I think that the story of this fall is going to be Russia finally figuring out it’s lost this war, and then lashing out with God alone knows what. It’ll be ugly; they’ve more than earned that.
If we head into the winter with Russia getting its butt kicked everywhere, exactly how will this be “Russia’s war to win”?
Russia lacks the demographic heft they’ve used in the past, their economy is corrupt and unable to make effective weapons of war, their society is atomized, so no one give a damn about “Holy Mother Russia”, there best troops are slated to be captured, or fleeing in defeat.
And if they just give Putin a 9mm retirement package and GTFO of Ukraine, their costs all go away.
This is entirely Ukraine’s war to win
When was the last time Russia launched a war where all the fighting was intended to happen in the other country, that lasted for any length of time?
“Country resisting invasion, needing time to rally” is a far different story than “country launching invasion, but needs a year+ to get its act together”
Unlike Russia being invaded, in Ukraine Russia can make the pain end at any point, by getting out.
So, what’s the response of teh people being called to “sacrifice for Mother Russia”? “Mother Russia doesn’t need our help! Get out of Ukraine and all is good.”
Which conquered parts of Ukraine will Russia be able to supply this winter? Which parts will kill any Russian soldiers there, and then go over Ukraine so they can get food?
Winter is not teh invaders’ friend. And this time Russia is the invader
I use to watch Soviet exercises from afar for years, read their documents, and study their ‘correlation of forces’ approach to employing battlefield nuclear weapons. I do NOT think the Russians are significantly different than their predecessors.
Barring a change in leadership in Ukraine, Russia, or here, I honestly expect an airburst nuclear weapon in western Ukraine. Coincident with a campaign to explain who started the war. and who attacked the pipeline.
China probably wants the precedent established – and a round eye face put on it.
Could be wrong, but I give it a 70/30.
If one limits the discussion to wars outside of the active boundaries of the statei think history is less kind to Russian efforts here. The successes in chechnya and Syria are backdropped by relative isolation and complete disinterest from the West. I do understand the “theirs to lose” comment because of the relative industrial and manpower base between the two Nations. I think in this conflict that advantage needed to be exploited completely early on to be successful and Russia’s relative advantages there could have been used to maintain and consolidate. Russia has clearly lost the momentum, due in large part to the introduction of more powerful Western artillery, and may have already lost the overall war. it wouldn’t surprise me if Ukraine went for Crimea before undertaking a push further to the east.
All the previous comments are very valid and insightful. Recalling the sessions from my IOAC, FAOAC, and CGSC, what I’ve seen of Russian forces in Ukraine indicates that they are not currently equipped and probably not trained for a nuclear battlefield environment.
Could be that Big Red doesn’t care about troop protection, so having Ivan return home glowing in the dark isn’t a factor in their force correlations. I also recall that the prevailing winds are west to east in that area of the world. Not exactly optimum fire planning.
Could be that if Putin sees that he must withdraw from Ukraine, he’ll salt the earth as he leaves and call it Peace.
We live in interesting times.
Just spitballin’.
Aye, normally western winds. However, fallout is related to type of ‘physics package’ and height of burst. ( ex. https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/ ) # of casualties (immediate) on where detonated.
If the SAS and friends have set up shop in the wilderness N/W of Yavoriv, for example, collateral casualties would be … Well, I really don’t think ‘collateral casualties’ matters as much to Vlad after CIA tossing the Ukraine under the bus as responsible for killing the daughter of a big wig in Russia.
The cabal (Davos/Deep State) may get what they think they want near term. I very much doubt it’ll end up where they think it will (think Robespierre).
We were told that the “glasnost revelations” about Stalin — the famine the purges, the gulags — shocked Russians to the core. Evidently the idea of Russian nuclear bombs falling on the sacred capital of Old Russia is less disillusioning to them. Shows again how civil wars are the most vicious of all.