Posts Tagged ‘Luhansk’

Russo-Ukrainian War Roundup For July 7, 2025

Monday, July 7th, 2025

A lot of Russo-Ukraine War news bubbled up last week when every other damn thing was happening, so here’s a roundup, much (but not all) from Suchomimus. Plus some bits on Russia’s economy and their continuing friction with various neighbors.

  • Multiple successful Storm Shadow strikes:

    “Storm Shadow and Ukrainian-produced cruise missiles hit a train yard in Yasynuvyata, the officer Headquarters of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army plus drones destroy oil depot in Luhansk. Multiple impacts are seen–at least EIGHT missiles hit the train yard. Many more targeted the office headquarters. Six drones impacted the oil depot….One of Ukraine’s biggest missile strikes of the war so far.”

  • “SAM System Factory Hit By Drones in Izhevsk, Russia – Over 1,300 km From Ukraine. Liutyi drones hit the Kupol Electromechanical Plant which produces Tor and Osa SAM systems for Russia as well as drones, including Shaheds.”

  • Follow-up satellite imagery for the Izhevsk strike:

  • Another Shahed drone factory strike, this one in Sergiev Posad near Moscow.

  • Not a super significant story, but this Russian ammo dump cookoff in Khartsyzk, Donetsk is pretty epic:

  • Colombian volunteers in Sumy?

    Usual Reporting From Ukraine caveats apply.

  • Russia did manage to carry out a massive missile attack against Kiev, but as usual with Russian missile and drone attacks, it’s not clear that anything of military significance was actually hit.
  • There’s always talk that Russia’s economy is about to crack due to the strain from their illegal war of territorial aggression (as well western sanctions), but Putin recently announced that Russia would decrease defense spending next year. Given that there’s no way for Russia to recover material and equipment losses to its forces while continuing the war, he must imagine some sort of end to the conflict is near.
  • And there are some signs that, this time, it’s possible that Russia’s economy really is starting to crack.

    Russia economy meltdown as metal production plummets 23% and recession fears soar…

    The Russian economy is on the brink of recession, with several key sectors showing dwindling productivity, according to analysis. Alexander Kolyandr from the Center for European Policy Analysis took to X to explain that the country’s manufacturing sector was “losing its mojo”, even in military production.

  • More:

    “The country is in a state of stagflation,” the Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (TsMAKP). “Economic dynamics are declining rapidly, and there is a risk of a technical recession in the second and third quarters, but inflation remains high.”

    It’s been less than three weeks since the central bank — supposedly independent from government control — symbolically lowered interest rates: from 21% to 20%. In doing so, it fulfilled a long-standing demand from the Kremlin. It was the first rate cut since September 2022, the year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This marked a break from a long cycle of interest rate hikes aimed at curbing rising prices.

    The situation, however, remains dire. Official inflation still hovers around 10% year-on-year, although several independent institutes estimate the real figure to be above 15%. With military spending still running wild, “risks remain skewed towards inflation,” warned Nabiullina. “Our rate cut approach requires greater caution.”

    The contradiction facing the central bank is a true reflection of the current state of the Russian economy, which has long dropped out of the world’s top 10 in terms of size. By now, even the Kremlin is beginning to acknowledge the obvious: that the economic boom driven by the war industry is coming to an end and that the savings made before the war are no longer enough.

    Maxim Oreshkin, economic advisor to the all-powerful Presidential Executive Office, declared that the emperor has no clothes just before the St. Petersburg Forum: “The model that ensured growth in recent years has largely reached its limit […] We need to advance — not forward, but upward: to the next technological and organizational level.”

  • Despite those well documented losses, Russia is now sabre rattling about Estonia hosting nuclear-weapon capable F-35 NATO aircraft. Why this is an issue when NATO-member Finland also has F-35s on order is unclear. Also unclear is how Russia thinks it could successfully invade a NATO country when it couldn’t digest Ukraine despite previously possessing considerably higher stores of Soviet-era material and equipment which it has now squandered…
  • Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan have reportedly reached agreement on a rail line through the Zangezur Corridor, a move that would cut Russia (and Iran) out entirely.
  • This follows on the heels of a falling out between Azerbaijan and Russia over Azerbaijani nationals being killed in a police raid inside Russia. “All cultural events with ties to Russia were cancelled in protest. A presenter on primetime state television denounced Moscow’s “imperial behavior” toward former Soviet states. On June 30, Azerbaijani authorities arrested two Russian journalists with Russia’s state-funded news agency Sputnik Azerbaijan in Baku. According to media reports, the two were working for the Russian domestic security service, the FSB.” More Azerbaijan arrests of Russian nationals ensued.

    This followed on the heels of the Russian shootdown of an Azerbaijani plane last year, and there’s evidently no love lost between Putin and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev. “The Azerbaijani political scientist and member of parliament Rasim Muzabekov says Baku no longer sees Moscow as an external power in a position to dictate the rules in the Caucasus. He told DW that Azerbaijan had begun to develop its own military and energy infrastructures, and that this, in turn, had annoyed the Kremlin.” No doubt. That’s what happens when you invade much smaller nations on your periphery and get bogged down in a quagmire.

  • These are just the developments I thought worth highlighting. If you know of others, feel free to share them in the comments below.

    Huge Ukrainian Offensive in Luhansk?

    Wednesday, October 12th, 2022

    Weeb Union (not my favorite Ukraine war mapper channel) is reporting a huge Ukrainian offensive just got underway in Luhansk:

    Takeaways:

  • “The reported numbers in this offensive is between 35,000 and 40,000 Ukrainian soldiers over a length of about 50 kilometers.”
  • Goal seems to be full control of the P-66 highway running from Troitske to Kreminna.
  • “They are trying to attack and capture Svatova.”
  • “Svatova is the supply hub of the Russian army here in the Luhansk border.”
  • He postulates this is the last Ukrainian offensive before Russian mobilization reinforcements reach the area. I think he greatly overestimates the effect Russia’s hastily mobilized, ill-equipped and ill-trained new recruits might have on the battlefield.
  • Not seeing any confirmation elsewhere yet. Developing…

    Update: Reporting From Ukraine (which I generally trust more than Weeb Union) also reports a lot of activity in Luhansk, but with a different overall thrust and timeline.

    Takeaways:

  • Russia launched a spoiling attack to prevent Ukraine from advancing on their defensive lines before they were fully repaired, and has some success.
  • Ukraine launched a counterattack south and north of the main Russian spoiling attack, also with some success.
  • They also launched a counter-attack in the center of the line, but with more limited success.
  • He also reports that new Russian conscripts are being put to work building the defensive position, which I can well imagine; any able-bodied adult human should be able to dig a trench. (Unless it’s Texas clay, then all bets are off…)
  • How to reconcile these reports? Both could be right, just looking at different slices of time.

    Multiple Russian Fronts Collapsing

    Wednesday, October 5th, 2022

    Ukraine continues to liberate territory from its Russian occupiers, not only in the Kharkiv/northeast front, but also on the Kherson/southwest front, where the last few days have seen a rapid collapse in Russian lines.

    ISW’s daily brief:

    Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts on October 4. Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River along the T2207 highway, forcing Russian forces to retreat to the south toward Kherson City. Ukrainian forces also continued to push south along the Dnipro River and the T0403 highway, severing two Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northern Kherson Oblast and forcing Russians south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border toward the Beryslav area. Ukrainian military officials noted that the Ukrainian interdiction campaign is crippling Russian attempts to transfer additional ammunition, reserves, mobilized men, and means of defense to frontline positions. Ukrainian forces also continued to advance east of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that battles are ongoing near the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.

    Kreminna seems to be the next big target for Ukrainian forces to take in Luhansk, allowing them to cut a major supply line and directly threaten Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.

    Here’s a detailed description of the collapse of the northern portion of the Kherson front.

    For another idea how rapid that advance have been, here are snapshots of the Deep State war map on 10/1 and 10/4.

    Since most of the bridges over both the Inhulets and Dnipro rivers have been blown up, Russian forces are at significant risk of being cutoff and unable to retreat.

    And just as I was working on this, a Peter Zeihan video on the topic dropped:

    Takeaways:

  • Kherson: “The entire Russian line has crumbled.”
  • “Kherson is the only major city Russia has captured in seven months.”
  • “This is the greatest concentration of Russian forces, and it is the best troops Russia has.”
  • They also have the best equipment. If the Ukrainians capture it, it would be even better than Kharkiv.
  • “I still believe this is Russia’s war to lose. The first year of all Russia’s wars look a lot like this. Bad training, bad coordination, poorly maintained equipment.” Modern warfare seldom gives you an entire year to sort your problems out.
  • “Watch Kherson closely. This could be where the war is decided.”
  • Russia seems to be retreating everywhere save the central front in Donetsk, where they seem to be eking out tiny, meaningless gains of a square kilometer or two a day. That’s not a recipe for success.

    Putin Chooses Mobilization, Sham Referendum, Continuing Humiliation

    Wednesday, September 21st, 2022

    Faced with the continued erosion of Russia’s military position in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has chosen to double-down on failure.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday announced the partial mobilization of military reservists, a significant escalation of his war in Ukraine after battlefield setbacks have the Kremlin facing growing pressure to act.

    In a rare national address, he also backed plans for Russia to annex occupied areas of southern and eastern Ukraine, and appeared to threaten nuclear retaliation if Kyiv continues its efforts to reclaim that land.

    It came just a day after four Russian-controlled areas announced they would stage votes this week on breaking away from Ukraine and joining Russia, in a plan Kyiv and its Western allies dismissed as a desperate “sham” aimed at deterring a successful counteroffensive by Ukrainian troops.

    Before this announcement it was apparent that Russia basically had no reserves, so a mobilization isn’t a surprise. Why admit failure when you can simply get more of your countrymen slaughtered for doubling-down on your own mistake?

    Stephen Green notes that there’s less to this announcement than meets the eye.

    It won’t be easy or fast to call up that many reservists, according to military experts, because Russia basically doesn’t have a reserve.

    A 2019 RAND study noted that “Russia has paid little attention to developing an effective and sizable active reserve system that might be immediately required in the event of a major war.” RAND estimates that Russia has an effective reserve of only 4,000-5,000 men.

    The country’s former army reserve units had been disbanded from 2008-2010 as part of the military’s modernization program, with their equipment — all of it older — going into storage or scrapped.

    That doesn’t mean that Russia can’t conscript, train, organize, and arm 300,000 new soldiers, but it won’t be quick or easy.

    One problem, as Foreign Affairs analyst Oliver Alexander put it, is “effectively readying and equipping these reservists. Russia already has problems equipping its professional armed forces.”

    Then there’s the speed problem. Dara Massicot wrote back in August — weeks before Kyiv’s stunning counteroffensive in Kharkiv — that “Even if the Kremlin pulls all levers available, declaring a general mobilization to call up sufficient armored equipment and trained personnel, that process would still take time.”

    That’s because with something like 80% of Russia’s combat power already fighting in Ukraine, plus wartime losses to their NCO and officer corps, the Russian army will need to train more trainers before anything like 300,000 men can be mobilized.

    Just last month, Putin ordered an increase in the size of the Russian military of 137,000 troops. But as I reported to you then, Putin’s order only meant that “Starting next year, the Russian military will be authorized to find another 137,000 troops.” The country has long had a problem with draft dodgers, one that Putin’s “special military operation” won’t help.

    He also notes the problem of obtaining new equipment. Even the first wave of Russian invasion included troops who were armed with ancient rifles. With the sanctions in place, none of that is going to get any better. Plus the fact that Russia essentially used up all their smart ordinance during the first stage of the war and that sanctions ensure they can’t easily make more.

    Is there a Peter Zeihan video on the topic? Of course there is.

    Some takeaways:

  • Reiterates why everything in the Russia army travels by rail. “The Ukrainians were able to take a couple of re-up depots in eastern Ukraine and Kharkiv a couple weeks ago and the front just collapsed.”
  • “We might be seeing a repeat of that in the Donbas.”
  • “The Russians are now discovering that they’re actually outnumbered locally, and that with all the captured equipment, the Ukrainians actually now have more artillery and more ammo.”
  • “This is the sort of war the the Russians know how to fight: Just throw bodies after it.”
  • The influx of new troops “doesn’t mean that the nature of the war is
    fundamentally changed,” but now they’ll be able to rotate fresher troops in, “and continue fighting the war more or less the way that they have been now, which is to say poorly.”

  • Russia is already crashing demographically, and the main cohort of this war is coming from the men who should be fathering children. “This is a potentially a country killer. Before I thought that this was Russia’s last war. Now I’m certain of it.”
  • Says Ukraine can still win, but they need to do the Kharkiv counteroffensive twenty times over.
  • Says they need to continue hitting Russian logistics nodes. “The one I am most interested in, of course, is Miriapol. Because if the Ukrainians can reach Mariupol, they basically isolate Russian forces throughout southern Ukraine, and then you’re talking about a hundred thousand Russian troops that are just stranded with no hope of resupply at all.” (Assuming his later mention of taking out the Kerch Strait Bridge.)
  • Nor are the sham referendums likely to make any difference either.

    Russian-appointed occupation officials in Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts announced on September 20 that they will hold a “referendum” on acceding to Russia, with a vote taking place from September 23-27. The Kremlin will use the falsified results of these sham referenda to illegally annex all Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine and is likely to declare unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts to be part of Russia as well.

    The Kremlin’s annexation plans are primarily targeting a domestic audience; Putin likely hopes to improve Russian force generation capabilities by calling on the Russian people to volunteer for a war to “defend” newly claimed Russian territory. Putin and his advisors have apparently realized that current Russian forces are insufficient to conquer Ukraine and that efforts to build large forces quickly through voluntary mobilization are culminating short of the Russian military’s force requirements. Putin is therefore likely setting legal and informational conditions to improve Russian force generation without resorting to expanded conscription by changing the balance of carrots and sticks the Kremlin has been using to spur voluntary recruitment.

    Putin may believe that he can appeal to Russian ethnonationalism and the defense of purportedly “Russian peoples” and claimed Russian land to generate additional volunteer forces. He may seek to rely on enhanced rhetoric in part because the Kremlin cannot afford the service incentives, like bonuses and employment benefits, that it has already promised Russian recruits. But Putin is also adding new and harsher punishments in an effort to contain the risk of the collapse of Russian military units fighting in Ukraine and draft-dodging within Russia. The Kremlin rushed the passage of a new law through the State Duma on September 20, circumventing normal parliamentary procedures. This law codifies dramatically increased penalties for desertion, refusing conscription orders, and insubordination. It also criminalizes voluntary surrender and makes surrender a crime punishable by ten years in prison. The law notably does not order full-scale mobilization or broader conscription or make any preparations for such activities.

    ISW has observed no evidence that the Kremlin is imminently intending to change its conscription practices. The Kremlin’s new law is about strengthening the Kremlin’s coercive volunteerism, or what Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called “self-mobilization.”

    The Kremlin is taking steps to directly increase force generation through continued voluntary self-mobilization and an expansion of its legal authority to deploy Russian conscripts already with the force to fight in Ukraine.

    • Putin’s illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory will broaden the domestic legal definition of “Russian” territory under Russian law, enabling the Russian military to legally and openly deploy conscripts already in the Russian military to fight in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russian leadership has already deployed undertrained conscripts to Ukraine in direct violation of Russian law and faced domestic backlash. Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycle usually generates around 130,000 conscripts twice per year. The next cycle runs from October 1 to December 31. Russian law generally requires that conscripts receive at least four months of training prior to deployment overseas, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly denied that conscripts will be deployed to Ukraine. Annexation could provide him a legal loophole allowing for the overt deployment of conscripts to fight.
    • Russian-appointed occupation officials in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts announced the formation of “volunteer” units to fight with the Russian military against Ukraine. Russian forces will likely coerce or physically force at least some Ukrainian men in occupied areas to fight in these units, as they have done in the territories of the Russian proxy Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).
    • The Russian State Duma separately passed new incentives for foreign nationals to fight in Russia’s military to obtain Russian citizenship and will likely increase overseas recruitment accordingly. That new law, which deputies also rushed through normal procedures on September 20, allows foreign nationals to gain Russian citizenship by signing a contract and serving in the Russian military for one year. Russian law previously required three years of service to apply for citizenship.
    • Putin’s appeals to nationalism may generate small increases in volunteer recruitment from within Russia and parts of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. However, forces generated from such volunteers, if they manifest, will be small and poorly trained. Most eager and able-bodied Russian men and Ukrainian collaborators have likely already volunteered in one of the earlier recruitment phases.
    • Local Russian administrators will continue to attempt to form volunteer units, with decreasing effect, as ISW has previously reported and mapped.
    • Russian forces and the Wagner Private Military Company are also directly recruiting from Russian prisons, as ISW has previously reported. These troops will be undisciplined and unlikely to meaningfully increase Russian combat power.

    Putin likely hopes that increasing self-mobilization, and cracking down on unwilling Russian forces, will enable him to take the rest of Donetsk and defend Russian-occupied parts of Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts. He is mistaken. Putin has neither the time nor the resources needed to generate effective combat power. But Putin will likely wait to see if these efforts are successful before either escalating further or blaming his loss on a scapegoat. His most likely scapegoat is Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Russian Ministry of Defense. Reports that Shoigu would accompany Putin while Putin gave a speech announced and then postponed on September 20 suggest that Putin intended to make Shoigu the face of the current effort.

    Part of the mobilization effort seems to be banning airline ticket sales for males between the ages of 18 and 65.

    That decree is every bit as popular as you would expect.

    Takeaways:

  • “Today, people went to the streets from Moscow to the Far East to protest. Even though it only concerned those in reserve, everyone sees where this is going.”
  • “Former Security Minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic called on Russia’s military command to better supply existing units on the ground. He also added that lack of equipment is the main reason why the Ukrainians keep advancing in Kherson.”
  • He thinks the conscripts will work logistics jobs, free up contractors to do the fighting. I remain doubtful that the effective military contractor pool for this war is terribly deep.
  • Neither the mobilization nor the sham referendums change any immediate facts on the ground in Ukraine. It will take many months to take new “recruits” up to even the most basic soldiering standards. Or maybe they’ll just give them three days training and send them into battle with old rifles and old ammunition like they did before, with the same results.

    Either way, it doesn’t solve any of Putin’s immediate problems…

    Successful Ukrainian Counterattack in Severodonetsk?

    Sunday, June 5th, 2022

    Information coming out of the Russo-Ukrainian War can be hard to verify, especially given how untrustworthy the mainstream media have made themselves. But Ukraine seems to have launched a successful counterattack in the key city of Severodonetsk.

    Russia is “suffering huge losses” and losing hard-fought ground in the Ukrainian city of Severodonetsk after invading units started retreating from the key industrial center, Ukrainian officials asserted Saturday.

    The dramatic turnabout, which could not be independently confirmed, represented a rare successful counter-offensive against Russian forces, which had recently been steadily advancing in Ukraine’s eastern territories.

    It was the first time Ukraine claimed to have conducted a large counter-attack in Severodonetsk, a city of 100,000 and the last major municipality in the disputed Luhansk oblast under Ukrainian control, after days of losing ground in the country’s embattled east.

    Russia had “previously managed to capture most of the city,” Sergiy Haidai, the governor of the Luhansk region said in a televised address Saturday, The Guardian reported. “But now our military has pushed them back.”

    Later Saturday, Oleksandr Stryuk, the head of the city’s military operations, said that Ukrainian forces were able to build a line of defense in Severodonetsk, according to The Kyiv Independent.

    Both sides of the war have claimed to have inflicted huge casualties in the fighting for the city — a battlefront that military experts believe could determine which of the two countries has the momentum for a prolonged war of attrition in coming months.

    Here’s a quick Livemap snapshot:

    A more detailed annotated map from Random Guy On Twitter (grains of salt apply):

    There’s some talk on Twitter of Ukrainian forces luring Russia into a trap and using the high ground in Luhansk to rain artillery on Russian positions:

    Here’s Denys Davydov, AKA Ukrainian Map Guy, on the action (usual caveats and grains of salt apply):

    When faced with the task of taking large hostile cities, Russian doctrine has been to bomb them flat with artillery first. Historically, urban warfare has not been a source of happiness for the Russian military. They got torn up badly in Grozny, and seem to have forgotten all the painful lessons learned there.

    Russia may have a hefty supply of old tanks, but it’s supply of competent ground forces absent a general mobilization (which Putin has thus far refused to authorize) is quite finite. Russia has even resorted to forced mobilization of troops in the area it occupies, a desperation tactic likely to make things worse for an army that already suffers from low morale.

    Says ISW:

    The Ukrainian government and military are furthermore discussing the battle of Severodonetsk in increasingly confident terms and are likely successfully blunting the Russian military’s major commitment of reserves to the grinding battle for the city. While Russian forces may still be able to capture Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and Ukrainian forces are likely more degraded than Haidai’s statements imply, Ukrainian defenses remain strong in this pivotal theater. The Russian military has concentrated all of its available resources on this single battle to make only modest gains. The Ukrainian military contrarily retains the flexibility and confidence to not only conduct localized counterattacks elsewhere in Ukraine (such as north of Kherson) but conduct effective counterattacks into the teeth of Russian assaults in Severodonetsk that reportedly retook 20% of the city in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian government’s confidence in directly stating its forces can hold Severodonetsk for more than two weeks and willingness to conduct local counterattacks, rather than strictly remaining on the defensive, is a marked shift from Ukrainian statements as recently as May 28 that Ukrainian forces might withdraw from Severodonetsk to avoid encirclement.

    The fog of war and the paucity of competent in-theater reporting makes things hard to analyze, but at this point in time, it appears that Ukraine is winning the Battle of Severodonetsk.