Posts Tagged ‘Beijing’

“Beijing Mini-Me” Xiongan Is China’s Largest “Rotten Tail” Project

Sunday, January 22nd, 2023

Due to issues of politics, congestion, or just plain corruption, nations get the bright idea to build brand new capital cities far away from existing urban areas. Sometimes it works out (as with Washington D.C.), and sometimes it doesn’t. China’s Xi Jinping is trying something different with Xiongan, which is being built not so much a replacement to Beijing but as sort of “mini-me” Beijing to relieve overcrowding by offloading functions to the new built-from-scratch city in Hebei* province.

About 60 miles south of the center of Beijing, a new city is being built as a showcase of high-tech ecologically friendly development. Its massive high-speed rail station and “city brain” data center have been heralded by Chinese state media as evidence of the speed and superiority of China’s growth model—not least because the city is a “signature initiative” of Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Commies (and their American fans) do love their high speed rail projects. Never mind that high speed rail in China has mostly been a trillion dollar, money losing sinkhole.

Xiongan New Area is also a test for whether China can boost domestic innovation and climb into the ranks of advanced nations in the face of slowing economic growth and efforts by the United States and others to restrict its access to advanced technology.

Xiongan offers a window into what Xi’s vision of state-led innovation looks like on the ground. Xi has called the city his “personal initiative” and a qiannian daji, or “thousand-year plan of national significance.”

You know who else had a thousand year plan?

Sorry, I just can’t resist a good Hitler meme when you pitch a slow ball right over the center of the plate…

The plan for Xiongan, which was formally unveiled in 2017 to relieve pressure on Beijing and promote the “coordinated regional development” of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, has faced financial struggles due to the huge investment costs—even more of a problem given China’s mounting real estate crisis. Overall, the new area encompasses about 650 square miles, with a planned population of around 3 million; currently, the three counties comprising the zone have around 1.4 million long-term residents. As of September 2022, 400 billion yuan (about $57 billion) in completed investment had been reported in the city overall.

While Xi has stacked the new Politburo Standing Committee with officials loyal to him, he has also elevated those with strong science and engineering backgrounds. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress last October, Xi declared that “innovation will remain at the heart of China’s modernization drive” and that China has “worked hard to promote high-quality development and pushed to foster a new pattern of development.” Nevertheless, a confluence of factors including COVID-19 lockdowns and trade tensions is contributing to overall slower growth in China.

In Xi’s vision, however, party control is not a hindrance to innovation. Rather, Xi’s vision of innovation is one in which the state and party play a leading role. Xi has led a crackdown on private technology firms such as Alibaba but has also promoted policies, such as his Made in China 2025, that aim to boost research-and-development spending and subsidies to give Chinese firms competitive advantages in industries including biotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors.

We know from experience that this approach almost never works, because the profit motive of capitalism is always a superior discovery mechanism for innovation than top-down bureaucratic mandates. We know that the state-led approach has already been a colossal failure for semiconductors even before the sanctions came down, and it’s a good bet that it’s been just as colossal a failure in all the other areas mentioned.

Xi’s policies favor “hard tech” over software-based platform app companies. The first party secretary of Xiongan was Chen Gang, who oversaw Beijing’s Zhongguancun high-tech park before being transferred to Guizhou, where under Xi ally Chen Miner he helped turn the southwestern province into a center of big data and cloud computing.

The approach to innovation in Xiongan involves embedding technology within the fabric of the city as well as innovation processes within the party-state. Xiongan Group was created as the investment vehicle for the area’s overall development, under the control of Hebei province but backed partially by loans from China Development Bank. The first central state-owned enterprises to begin construction of offices in the new area were China Satellite Communications Co., the energy giant China Huaneng Group, and Sinochem Holdings. Others now include the big three telecoms and China State Grid, as well as China Mineral Resources Group, a conglomerate set up last year to centralize China’s coal mining industry. These state-owned enterprises could use Xiongan as a test bed for new technologies. Research institutes and satellite branches of several Beijing universities are planning to open in the area around 2025. The relocation of these major units and their thousands of employees will determine how quickly Xiongan’s development proceeds.

Even as China’s economy has slowed during COVID-19 lockdowns and the global downturn, construction of the first phase of Xiongan has marched on: A huge high-speed rail station to connect the city with Beijing opened in 2020, followed by residential slabs, massive underground utility corridors, and the city brain data center, which will serve as the nerve center of the city’s digital systems. The first section, Rongdong, has been mostly completed, with housing for 170,000 people. Media reports of new schools opening show the effort to build high-quality public amenities to attract residents to the city: Branches of Beijing institutions such as Shijia Primary School and Tsinghua University High School are among the new educational institutions being built in Xiongan.

The Foreign Policy piece is OK as a sort of sanitized, high level overview, but lacks several key words (“shoddy,” “rotten,” “unsafe,” “tofu dregs,” etc.) that reflect the grittier reality of Xi Jinping’s dream:

Takeaways:

  • “This is arguably the world’s biggest rotten tail project.”
  • “The project, which was billed as a Millennium Project and a major national event, fell apart after only five years.”
  • “According to the official website of Xiongan New Area, in 2021 the area arranged more than 230 key projects with a planned investment of more than 200 billion RMB. In 2022, 232 key projects were arranged with an investment of another 200 billion RMB and the cumulative total investment has exceeded 700 billion RMB, i.e. nearly 100 billion US dollars.”
  • Add area rail and road infrastructure investments and the total rises to $150 billion.
  • “Located 105 kilometers from both Beijing and Tianjin, the new area is positioned to decongest Beijing’s non-capital functions and will host administrative and institutional units, corporate head offices financial institutions, universities, research institutes and other organizations evacuated from Beijing.” I bet workers who have already gone through the expensive and difficult process of buying their own condos in Beijing will just love being forced to move an hour away.
  • “The initial planning area is about 100 square kilometers, with plans to slowly expand to an eventual area of about 2,000 square kilometers.” 2,000 square kilometers works out to about 772 square miles, or larger than Houston, one of America’s most sprawling cities.
  • “Average folks have wondered why did the central government put this new area…in a sparsely populated and heavily polluted poor rural area.”
  • The idea seems to be to bring Beijing, Tianjin and Xiongan into a single economic circle with a population of 130 million.
  • Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each decreed creation of their own special areas, and Xi is following in their footsteps.
  • After the new area was announced, “real estate speculators from all over the country flocked overnight. The local property price soared from 4 000 RMB per square meter to 40,000 RMB, catching up with the first tier cities such as Beijing and Shanghai.”
  • There was an explosion of construction, but then it stopped.
  • “For more than five years, the large-scale construction of the Xiongan New Area didn’t move. The streets were empty, and people from outside had left one after another.”
  • A high speed rail station said to be the largest in Asia the size of “66 soccer stadiums” has only one train a day.
  • “In August 2021, the CCP issued a regulation that downgraded Xiongan to a regional level jurisdiction.” So instead of being it’s own special area, it’s now run by Hebei province, which means “this ‘Millennium Project’ is no longer possible, and the central government has simply dumped this hot potato on the local government.”
  • Official use words like “expedite, start construction, registering land, basically confirmed, etc didn’t explain any more specific progress. This actually allowed the public to read its true meaning, that is there is no substantial progress.”
  • The same pagoda seems to have been constructed several times.
  • “No one wants to go there at all. Even if you force them out of Beijing, they still don’t want to go there. There are no actions from the universities either.”
  • Chinese people think the area has bad “Feng Shui,” and it’s in a low-lying area near a lake that used to be flooded. The local lake and river also have very poor water quality. “However, the [water] treatment project hasn’t yet been completed.”
  • “Xiongan New Area is like building a mansion in a garbage dump, and people don’t want to live there.”
  • “More than five years later, no decent state-owned enterprises have really moved to Xiongan.”
  • “Given China’s objection to objective reality, the only way to make people move to Xiongan is by force. This is what happened in 2017, when the Beijing government forcibly evicted the so-called low-end population and people took to the streets in protest.”
  • Shenzhen New Area benefited from China’s opening, foreign investment and proximity to Hong Kong. “The dysfunctional mechanism of the CCP which had suppressed economic momentum for decades was released at the moment when the country opened its doors, so that Shenzhen could rise with the momentum.”
  • By contrast, Xiongan suffers from global economic headwinds and local finances are “very poor.”
  • Banks poured money into the area, accompanied by corruption. Natives forced out of their homes got low compensation and the new homes were shoddy. Many still haven’t found new homes.
  • “Videos provided by local residents show that the most common problems with homes are water leaks cracked exterior walls and sinking floors in some homes water leaked all over the floor.” A video shows a stairway turning into a waterfall during heavy rain.

    • It’s hard to find on Google maps, but I think this spot shows the same cookie cutter buildings seen in the video.

    Ghost city, tofu dregs, rotten tail; parts of Xiongan seem to check all three boxes.

    *Note: Hebei Province is completely different from Hubei Province further south…

    Tags:, , , , , , , , , , ,
    Posted in Communism, Economics, Foreign Policy | 9 Comments »

    China’s High Speed Rail Network Is A Trillion Dollar Debt Sinkhole

    Monday, June 13th, 2022

    Lefty sorts are always whining that other countries have high speed rail networks and we don’t. Many point to China’s extensive network of high speed rail as what we should be doing.

    Tiny problem: China’s high speed rail network is a giant, unprofitable sinkhole of $1.8 TRILLION worth of debt.

    Some take-aways:

  • The average operating loss for the system is $24 million per day.
  • The official amount for China National Railway debt for high speed rail is $900 billion, but since roughly half of the debt comes from local governments, the total is probably closer to $1.8 trillion.
  • For comparison sake, $1.8 trillion is about South Korea’s entire yearly GDP.
  • “Shanghai, the richest city in China, has a total GDP of $600 billion in 2020, which means that even the whole year of Shanghai’s GDP won’t be able to cover the debt of China National Railway.”
  • It’s extensive: 37,900km, nearly double the length from 2015.
  • Return on high speed rail investment is only about 2%, and the bulk of bond payments for loans are coming due over the next few years. “Cash flow from railway transportation revenue isn’t enough to cover the operating costs, let alone the ability to pay the debt and interest.”
  • Local government debt levels are around 100%.
  • “More than 85% of the funds raised through urban investment bonds are earmarked for repaying old debts with new ones.”
  • Even the most profitable high speed rail stretch, Beijing to Shanghai, only earns a return on investment of 5%.
  • Japan’s successful high speed rail network serves three metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka) that have 55% of that nation’s population.
  • “A professor at the School of Economics and Management of Beijing Jiaotong University concluded that the operating costs are only just covered when the transport density of a high-speed rail line reaches 36 million passenger kilometers per kilometer. In China the average transport density is only about 17 million passenger kilometers per kilometer.”
  • High speed rail can’t transport heavy freight.
  • “The Lanzhou Uramuchi HSR in western China can run more than 160 trains per day. In reality, this route only runs four trains per day.”
  • High speed rail occupancy rate is only 30%, and is still too expensive for most Chinese to use.
  • High speed rail construction has squeezed out much-needed construction of regular rail. “China’s rail freight capacity can’t meet market demand. China’s market share of road freight turnover has risen rapidly to 49% market share in 2016.” China rail has jacked up freight costs to make up for losses on high speed rail.
  • China’s freight trucks get overloaded all the time.
  • China’s containerized shipping accounts for 40% of global trade, but “the proportion of China’s sea rail intermodal transport volume in 2017 was only about 2.5 percent.” 84% of port containers go out by road.
  • So why all the money poured into high speed rail? Opportunities for corruption.

    Officials see the high-speed rail project in which China is involved as a lucrative opportunity. China’s former minister of railways, known as the father of high-speed rail, was sentenced to death for corruption. Emerging industries such as high-speed rail, which offer both substantial commercial value and political achievements for local officials, have enormous room for corruption. In a systemically corrupt environment white elephant projects, that is a large project that falls significantly short of its goals, and the costs of upkeep outweigh its usefulness, are favored by many officials and businessmen looking to make a fortune. The vast majority of high-speed railways around the world can’t make ends meet on passenger revenues alone to cover their construction and operating costs. Most operate at a loss.

    In light of all that, why do American leftists keep complaining about America’s lack of high speed rail? Simple: It’s the corruption, stupid. High speed rail construction offers boundless opportunities for graft and corruption, and refusing to build any keeps them from getting their snouts into another giant trough of taxpayer money…

    (I didn’t expect this past week to become a string of “China’s economy is smoke and mirrors all the way down” posts, but I keep running into more examples.)

    • Tags:, , , , , , , , , , , ,
    Posted in Communism, Economics, Foreign Policy, video, Waste and Fraud | 17 Comments »

    Is China Screwed? (Part 2)

    Tuesday, April 19th, 2022

    There more you start poking around online, the more you turn up reasons why China is screwed.

    The first installment in this series was popular. Well, there’s a lot more reasons why China is screwed.

    It’s screwed all the way down.

    First up: Demographics:

    Takeaways:

  • Remember all that talk of an “Asian Century?” Yeah, not so much.
  • “China will soon run out of people.”
  • China’s population pyramid is about to shift from a huge bulge of people in their prime earning years to one where that bulge is disproportionately elderly.
  • “Everything that made China what it is today has relied on a large, young, and productive workforce. Now, that workforce is about to succumb to biology just as every other generation has in every other country, ever.” Their demographic dividend is running out.
  • “China’s working-age cohort grew from 58% of the country in 1978 to 74% in 2010. But in less than twenty years, the UN predicts that number will be roughly back where it was in ‘78. By then, China will have twice as many seniors as children under 15.”
  • “Per capita wealth remains low, on the level of Mexico, the Maldives, and Kazakhstan. That means this mass of retirees won’t just contribute less to the economy, but will also require immense financial support — the kind China’s fractured pension and healthcare system isn’t remotely prepared for.”
  • “Unfortunately for China, the One-Child Policy has set the cultural expectation firmly at one.”
  • Replacement fertility: 2.1 children per woman. China’s official fertility rate: 1.6. “Yi Fuxian, a scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison [estimates] the true number at 1.18.”
  • “China’s preference for male babies means that between 2020 and 2060, there will be roughly 3 single men for every 2 single women.”
  • “China’s 2020 Census, [tallied] 14.65 million births the previous year — the lowest level since 1961.”
  • Japan, which is also aging, provides a best case scenario. “With a median age of 48.6, Japan is the 2nd oldest place on earth. Today, its share of the world’s manufacturing exports has fallen from 12.5% to just 5.2. Japan did not fade into global irrelevance. It’s still a great power. But it never fulfilled what once seemed certain: its rise to rival the U.S. as a superpower. And it never will.”

    • That’s part 1. Part 2 focuses on China’s out of control property market:

  • It starts off talking about the ghost cities, especially Ordos.
  • “Ordos does have an interesting story to tell. Just, not the one you might expect. The missing context, at the time, was far stranger than what the unimaginative pessimists concocted: Nearly all of these half-finished homes have owners — the vast majority of which have no intention of ever moving in.”
  • “All over China are millions of empty, some unfinished, but almost universally sold homes — not just in far-flung corners but also in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Over one-fifth of all urban homes — 65 million in all — sit vacant.”
  • Skipping over description of basic CIGNx = GDP economics.
  • China relied on “a surplus of cheap labor, which means, by definition, wages are low. You can only compete with the entire rest of the world for so long — and neither do you want to. Low-value manufacturing has long since moved South, to places like Vietnam, Laos, and Bangladesh.”
  • All the long-hanging fruits of infrastructure spending have already been built.
  • “Individually, Chinese consumers really don’t spend very much — just 32% of GDP — less than half that of the US, and far below countries like Japan and Germany. Worse, this number has actually been decreasing over time.”
  • “Chinese consumers are spending, but only on one thing, something not considered ‘consumption’: houses!”
  • China’s home ownership rate “is among the highest in the world — 90% — to much of the developed world’s mid-60s. It gets much weirder, still. If you can believe it, the majority of recent purchases have been 2nd and 3rd homes. In 2018, for instance, 87% of new home buyers already owned at least one.”
  • “Because the government tightly controls how much cash is allowed to leave the country, Chinese people simply don’t have a lot of options, and of them, housing is seen as the only sure thing.”
  • Also, given the sex imbalance mentioned above, for men, home ownership = marriage.
  • “For all of these reasons, prices have risen to extreme levels. In Shenzhen, Beijing, and Shanghai, it takes 40 years of the average income to afford a home.”
  • Most are bought before construction even begins.
  • And here’s where the demographics above provide a double whammy. “The majority of homebuyers, meanwhile, are aged between 20-50 — precisely the segment China will soon lose.”
  • One huge reason for the bubble: Local governments using their control of land to balance their budgets:

    They created what are basically state-owned shell companies called “Local Government Financing Vehicles”. They gave these LGFVs free valuable land, which they then used to take out loans that local governments themselves couldn’t. The trick is that because their debt is hidden, local governments appear far healthier than they really are, while at the same time, meeting the quotas set by Beijing. Following the 2008 crisis, LGFVs transformed from a little quirk of its financial system to the backbone of local economies. If these ‘financing vehicles’ default on their loans, or if housing prices fall too steeply, local governments now have just as much to lose as homeowners. If a local government stops taking out loans, it instantly loses over a third of its revenue, causing a different kind of doomsday. So while the central government may direct local officials to control their debt, the best they can really do is feign cooperation.

  • Flu Manchu only temporarily halted home price rises, and they’re still soaring.
  • “Solutions are far too costly to assume their implementation.”

    • There are a lot more videos of China suckage, but I’ll have to split this up and get to those another time.

    Tags:, , , , , , , , , ,
    Posted in Communism, Economics, Foreign Policy | 9 Comments »