I said I might be putting up some segments from the latest Joe Rogan interview with Elon Musk, and this segment, where he talks about the California homeless industrial complex, sounds like he’s been reading BattleSwarm.
I’ve elided some of Musk’s verbal tics (“likes,” “uhs” and repeated words) in the interest of clarity and readability.
Joe Rogan: “And then you guys [California] spent $24 billion on the homeless and it got way worse.”
Elon Musk: “Yes. Like the homeless population doubled or something.”
EM: “People don’t understand the homeless thing because it it sort of prays on people’s empathy.”
EM: “The homeless industrial complex is really, it’s dark, man. [That] network of NGOs should be called the drug zombie farmers.”
EM: “When you meet somebody who’s totally dead inside shuffling along down the street, with a needle dangling out of their leg…”
EM: “Homeless is the wrong word. ‘Homeless’ implies that somebody got a little behind in their mortgage, payments and if they just got a job offer, they’d be back on their feet.”
EM: “You see these videos of people that are just shuffling, they’re on fentanyl. They’re taking a dump in the middle of the street, and they’ve got like open sores and stuff. They’re not like one job offer away from getting back on their feet.”
EM: “This is not a homeless issue. Homeless is, it’s a propaganda word.”
EM: “These sort of charities, [they] get money proportionate to the number of homeless people, or number of drug zombies.” So their incentive structure is to maximize the number of drug zombies, not minimize it.
EM: “That’s why they don’t arrest the drug dealers, because if they arrest the drug dealers, the drug zombies leave.”
JR: “So they’re in coordination with law enforcement on this?”
EM: “Yeah.”
JR: “So how do they how do they have those meetings?”
EM: “They’re all in cahoots. When you find this, it’s such a diabolical scam.”
EM: “San Francisco has got this tax this gross receipts tax. It’s not even on revenue, it’s on all transactions, which is why Stripe and Square and and and a whole bunch of financial companies had to move out of San Francisco…you’re taxed on any money going through the system in San Francisco. So Jack Dorsey pointed this out, and they had to move Square from San Francisco to Oakland, I think. Stripe had to move from San Francisco to South San Francisco, different city.”
EM: “That money goes to the homeless industrial complex. So there’s billions of dollars that go, as you pointed out, billions of dollars every year that go to these non-governmental organizations that are funded by the state. It’s not clear how to turn this off. It’s a self-licking ice cream cone situation.”
EM: “So they get this money, the money is proportionate to the number of homeless people, or number of drug zombies.”
EM: “When you add up all the money that’s flowing, they’re getting close to a million dollars per homeless drug zombie. It’s like $900,000 or something, some crazy amount of money, is going to these organizations. So they want to keep people just barely alive. They need to keep them in the area, so they get the revenue. So that’s why they don’t arrest the drug dealers, because otherwise the drug zombies would leave. But they don’t want [them] to have too much, if they get too much drugs and then they die. So they’re kept in this sort of perpetual zone of being addicted, but just barely alive.”
So the homeless industrial complex is farming homeless drug zombies as a cash crop in San Francisco. Once you understand this, a whole lot of otherwise inexplicable policies start to make sense. The shocking revelation here, that local law enforcement is in on the deal and that’s why they don’t arrest the drug dealers, makes sense, but I’d really like to see supporting evidence for it.
This is the sort of thing Republicans in congress should hold hearings on and get sworn testimony on the records. I’d also like to see DOGE-level forensic audits of the government agencies sending the money, and the NGOs spending it, to find out where all the zombie drug farming money is going…
Our 2-year investigation has concluded that Block has systematically taken advantage of the demographics it claims to be helping. The “magic” behind Block’s business has not been disruptive innovation, but rather the company’s willingness to facilitate fraud against consumers and the government, avoid regulation, dress up predatory loans and fees as revolutionary technology, and mislead investors with inflated metrics.
There’s also a negative side.
Even the summary is pretty breathtaking in the rang of allegations:
Most analysts are excited about the post-pandemic surge of Block’s Cash App platform, with expectations that its 51 million monthly transacting active users and low customer acquisition costs will drive high margin growth and serve as a future platform to offer new products.
Our research indicates, however, that Block has wildly overstated its genuine user counts and has understated its customer acquisition costs. Former employees estimated that 40%-75% of accounts they reviewed were fake, involved in fraud, or were additional accounts tied to a single individual.
Core to the issue is that Block has embraced one traditionally very “underbanked” segment of the population: criminals. The company’s “Wild West” approach to compliance made it easy for bad actors to mass-create accounts for identity fraud and other scams, then extract stolen funds quickly.
Even when users were caught engaging in fraud or other prohibited activity, Block blacklisted the account without banning the user. A former customer service rep shared screenshots showing how blacklisted accounts were regularly associated with dozens or hundreds of other active accounts suspected of fraud. This phenomenon of allowing blacklisted users was so common that rappers bragged about it in hip hop songs.
Block obfuscates how many individuals are on the Cash App platform by reporting misleading “transacting active” metrics filled with fake and duplicate accounts. Block can and should clarify to investors an estimate on how many unique people actually use Cash App.
CEO Jack Dorsey has publicly touted how Cash App is mentioned in hundreds of hip hop songs as evidence of its mainstream appeal. A review of those songs show that the artists are not generally rapping about Cash App’s smooth user interface—many describe using it to scam, traffic drugs or even pay for murder…
“I paid them hitters through Cash App”— Block paid to promote a video for a song called “Cash App” which described paying contract killers through the app. The song’s artist was later arrested for attempted murder.
Cash App was also cited “by far” as the top app used in reported U.S. sex trafficking, according to a leading non-profit organization. Multiple Department of Justice complaints outline how Cash App has been used to facilitate sex trafficking, including sex trafficking of minors.
There is even a gang named after Cash App: In 2021, Baltimore authorities charged members of the “Cash App” gang with distribution of fentanyl in a West Baltimore neighborhood, according to news reports and criminal records.
Beyond facilitating payments for criminal activity, the platform has been overrun with scam accounts and fake users, according to numerous interviews with former employees.
Examples of obvious distortions abound: “Jack Dorsey” has multiple fake accounts, including some that appear aimed at scamming Cash App users. “Elon Musk” and “Donald Trump” have dozens.
To test this, we turned our accounts into “Donald Trump” and “Elon Musk” and were easily able to send and receive money. We ordered a Cash Card under our obviously fake Donald Trump account, checking to see if Cash App’s compliance would take issue—the card promptly arrived in the mail.
Former employees described how Cash App suppressed internal concerns and ignored user pleas for help as criminal activity and fraud ran rampant on its platform. This appeared to be an effort to grow Cash App’s user base by strategically disregarding Anti Money Laundering (AML) rules.
The COVID-19 pandemic and nationwide lockdowns posed an existential threat to Block’s key driver of gross profit at the time, merchant services.
In this environment, amid Cash App’s anti-compliance free-for-all, the app facilitated a massive wave of government COVID-relief payments. CEO Jack Dorsey Tweeted that users could get government payments through Cash App “immediately” with “no bank account needed” due to its frictionless technology.
Within weeks of Cash App accounts receiving their first government payments, states were seeking to claw back suspected fraudulent payments—Washington State wanted more than $200 million back from payment processors while Arizona sought to recover $500 million, former employees told us.
Once again, the signs were hard to miss. Rapper “Nuke Bizzle”, made a popular music video about committing COVID fraud. Several weeks later, he was arrested and eventually convicted for committing COVID fraud. The only payment provider mentioned in the indictment was Cash App, which was used to facilitate the fraudulent payments.
We filed public records requests to learn more about Block’s role in facilitating pandemic relief fraud and received answers from several states.
Massachusetts sought to claw back over 69,000 unemployment payments from Cash App accounts just four months into the pandemic. Suspect transactions at Cash App’s partner bank were disproportionate, exceeding major banks like JP Morgan and Wells Fargo, despite the latter banks having 4x-5x as many deposit accounts.
In Ohio, Cash App’s partner bank had 8x the suspect pandemic-related unemployment payments as the bank that processed the most unemployment claims in the state, even though the latter bank processed 2x the claims as Cash App’s, according to data we obtained via a public records request.
The data shows that compared to its Ohio competitor, Cash App’s partner bank had nearly 10x the number of applicants who applied for benefits through a bank account used by another claimant – a clear red flag of fraud.
Block had obvious compliance lapses that made fraud easy, such as permitting single accounts to receive unemployment payments on behalf of multiple individuals from various states and ineffective address verification.
In an apparent effort to preserve its growth engine, Cash App ignored internal employee concerns, along with warnings from the Secret Service, the U.S. Department of Labor OIG, FinCEN, and State Regulators which all specifically flagged the issue of multiple COVID relief payments going to the same account as an obvious sign of fraud.
Block reported a pandemic surge in user counts and revenue, ignoring the contribution of widespread fraudulent accounts and payments. The new business provided a sharp one-time increase to Block’s stock, which rose 639% in 18 months during the pandemic.
As Block’s stock soared on the back of its facilitation of fraud, co-founders Jack Dorsey and James McKelvey collectively sold over $1 billion of stock during the pandemic. Other executives, including CFO Amrita Ahuja and the lead manager for Cash App Brian Grassadonia, also dumped millions of dollars in stock.
With its influx of pandemic Cash App users, our research shows Block has quietly fueled its profitability by avoiding a key banking regulation meant to protect merchants. “Interchange fees” are fees charged to merchants for accepting use of various payment cards.
Congress passed a law that legally caps “interchange fees” charged by large banks that have over $10 billion in assets. Despite having $31 billion in assets, Block avoids these regulations by routing payments through a small bank and gouging merchants with elevated fees.
Block includes only a single vague reference in its filings acknowledging it earns revenue from “interchange fees”. It has never revealed the full economics of this category, yet roughly one-third of Cash App’s revenue came from this opaque source, according to a 2022 Credit Suisse research report.
Competitor PayPal has disclosed it is under investigation by both the SEC and the CFPB over its similar use of a small bank to avoid “interchange fee” caps. A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request we filed with the SEC indicates that Block may be part of a similar investigation.
Block’s $29 billion deal to acquire ‘buy now pay later’ (BNPL) service Afterpay closed in January 2022. Afterpay has been celebrated by Block as a major financial innovation, allowing users to buy things like a pair of shoes or a t-shirt and pay over time, only incurring massive fees if subsequent payments are late.
Afterpay was designed in a way that avoided responsible lending rules in its native Australia, extending a form of credit to users without income verification or credit checks. The service doesn’t technically charge “interest”, but late fees can reach APR equivalents as high as 289%.
The acquisition is flopping. In 2022, the year Afterpay was acquired, it lost $357 million, accelerating from 2021 losses of $184 million.
Fitch Ratings reported that Afterpay delinquencies through March 2022 had more than doubled to 4.1%, from 1.7% in June 2021 (just prior to the announced acquisition). Total processing volume declined -4.8% from the previous year.
Block regularly hypes other mundane or predatory sources of revenue as technological breakthroughs. Roughly 31% of Cash App’s revenue comes from “instant deposit” which Block says it pioneered and works as if by “magic”. Every other major competitor we checked provides a similar service at comparable or better rates.
On a purely fundamental basis, even before factoring in the findings of our investigation, we see downside of between 65% to 75% in Block shares. Block reported a 1% year over year revenue decline and a GAAP loss of $540.7 million in 2022. Analysts have future expectations of GAAP unprofitability and the company has warned it may not be profitable.
Despite this, Block is valued like a profitable growth company at (i) an EV/EBITDA multiple of 60x; (ii) a forward 2023 “adjusted” earnings multiple of 41x; and (iii) a price to tangible book ratio of 13.1x, all wildly out of line with fintech peers.
Despite its current rich multiples, Block is also facing threats from key competitors like Zelle, Venmo/Paypal and fast-growing payment solutions from smartphone powerhouses like Apple and Google. Apple has grown Apple Pay activations from 20% in 2017 to over 70% in 2022 and now leads in digital wallet market share.
In sum, we think Block has misled investors on key metrics, and embraced predatory offerings and compliance worst-practices in order to fuel growth and profit from facilitation of fraud against consumers and the government.
We also believe Jack Dorsey has built an empire—and amassed a $5 billion personal fortune—professing to care deeply about the demographics he is taking advantage of. With Dorsey and top executives already having sold over $1 billion in equity on Block’s meteoric pandemic run higher, they have ensured they will be fine, regardless of the outcome for everyone else.
That’s just the high level summary. There’s a whole lot more detail in the report.
I have never once used Cash App. I have an ancient Square Reader floating around in a bag somewhere, but I never actually ran any transactions on it. I do have PayPal, because I pretty much have to in order to buy or sell on eBay (though I’ve gotten to the point I do almost no selling there). I don’t even use Apple Pay, despite having a MacBook Pro and iPhone.
Speaking of fees, here Louis Rossmann rants about how Square refuses to return fees for refunds:
Anyway, if you’re using Square or CashApp, maybe it’s a good time to look into alternatives…