(Note: This is partially recycled from a previous post in honor of the 30th anniversary of the battle, but the video is new.)
Thirty years ago, on February 26, 1991, units of the American Second Armored Cavalry Regiment engaged the armor of the Iraqi Republican Guard Tawakalna Division in the Battle of 73 Easting.
The furious action lasted twenty-three minutes. The troop stopped when there was nothing left to shoot. Sporadic contact ranged from nuisance machine gun fire to one company-sized counterattack of T-72s and BMP armored personnel carriers. Tanks and Bradleys destroyed enemy vehicles at long range from the dominating position on the ridge. Three Bradleys from first platoon, led by Lieutenant Michael Petschek, encountered and destroyed four T-72s as they moved north to reestablish physical contact with G Troop. Medics treated and evacuated enemy wounded. Crews cross-leveled ammunition. Mortars suppressed enemy infantry further to the east as our fire support officer, Lieutenant Dan Davis, called in devastating artillery strikes on enemy logistical bases. Scouts and a team under the control of First Sergeant Bill Virrill cleared bunkers using grenades and satchel charges, and then led a much-needed resupply convoy through minefields to our rear. A psychological operations team broadcasted surrender appeals forward of the troop and the troop took the first of hundreds of prisoners including the brigade commander. Soldiers segregated, searched, and secured prisoners through the night. Many prisoners cried because they had not expected such humane treatment; their officers had told them that we would execute them. The prisoners were incredulous when our soldiers returned their wallets without taking any of the money that they had looted from Kuwait City. Just after 2200, 1ID conducted a forward passage of lines in Third Squadron’s area of operation to our south.
The morning after the battle, soldiers were exhausted. Many of the approximately fifty T-72s, twenty-five armored personnel carriers, forty trucks and numerous other vehicles that the troop destroyed were still smoldering. Our troop had taken no casualties.
Other sources say Americans suffered a small number of casualties, but it’s unclear whether these occurred during the Battle of 73 Easting itself, or immediately following it but before the larger engagement of the Battle of Norfolk.
Here’s a video on the battle:
In addition to being an overwhelming victory, and part of the larger overwhelming victory of Desert Storm, the Battle of 73 Easting was important for several other reasons.
For one thing, it was the largest tank battle between American- and Soviet-constructed armor since Israeli M-60 Patton tanks faced off against Egyptian T-62s in Sinai campaign of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. All throughout the 70s and early 1980s, various media outlets talked about how much better Soviet military equipment was than American equipment. (I remember a 60 Minutes episode that talked about Soviet equipment being better “all across the board.”) And Soviet equipment was better—on paper, with thicker armor, higher top speeds, etc. And then 73 Easting happened, and M1A1s wiped the floor with T-72s. A lot of that was American troops being much better trained and led than Iraqi troops. But the Republican Guard was the best the Iraq army had, and on paper the T-72 was a match for the M1A1s. In actual combat, the T-72s started blowing up before they realized the Americans were engaging (and destroying) Iraqi armor at the extreme range of the American computerized fire control systems. Soviet armor still used reticules reticles, where the gunner had to manually calculate distance and windage to put shots on target.
In Vietnam, early computerized combat technology was clunky and unreliable. By the time of Desert Storm, the furious onrush of Moore’s Law had rendered technology smaller, more compact, more reliable, and more user-friendly. By pursuing what Jerry Pournelle called the strategy of technology, the United States was producing weapons that were qualitatively superior to those of its communist foes. That technological gap (especially in the form of SDI) was one of the drivers for the end of the Cold War, and it was on full display in Desert Storm. The Soviet Union itself would dissolve later the same year.
The Battle of 73 Easting was also important because it become the most accurately simulated battle ever:
The Battle of 73 Easting has become the single most accurately recorded combat engagement in human history. Army historians and simulation modelers thoroughly interviewed the American participants, and paced the battlefield meter by meter. They came up with a fully interactive, network-capable digital replica of the events at 73 Easting, right down to the last TOW missile and .50-caliber pockmark. Military historians and armchair strategists can now fly over the virtual battlefield in the “stealth vehicle,” the so-called “SIMNET flying carpet,” viewing the 3-D virtual landscape from any angle during any moment of the battle. They can even change the parameters – give the Iraqis infrared targeting scopes, for instance, which they lacked at the time, and which made them sitting ducks for high-tech American M1s charging out of blowing sand. The whole triumphal blitzkrieg can be pondered over repeatedly (gloated over even), in perfect scratch-free digital fidelity. It’s the spirit of Southwest Asia in a digital nutshell. In terms of American military morale, it’s like a ’90s CD remix of some ’60s oldie, rescued from warping vinyl and remade closer to the heart’s desire.
Like Agincourt or Amiens, the Battle of 73 Easting heralded the arrival of a new type of technology to the battlefield, one that every army in the world would henceforth need to take into account.
Tags: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Desert Storm, Iraq, M1A1, Military, T-72, tanks, The Battle of 73 Easting
In other reading I’ve done, I’ve come to doubt that the export version of the T-72 the Iraqi forces had was a decent proxy for the Soviet forces in eastern Europe. Specifically the Soviet forces being equipped with Kontakt-5 ERA. NATO downplayed it’s effectiveness against sabot penetrators until the mid 90s when they got actual performance data and realized it was far more effective than they thought. Apparently, if you can blunt the sharp tip it makes a big difference. Add in that for every degree you can deflect the penetrator you get big dividends in reduced penetration. If the ERA can degrade the penetrator enough, there is a decent chance the tank will survive the first hit.
That’s why the survivability claims of the Armata might have some truth to them. Their active protection system is claimed to have some effectiveness against long rod penetrators. No, it wont stop one cold the way it would an RPG, but the claim is it can degrade the penetrator much like an ERA can. Combined with the ERA doing the same thing, the passive armor might be enough to withstand the first hit.
“Soviet armor still used reticules”
Why were they using ladies drawstring purses?
Reticles are part of an optical system, as in rifle scopes.
Thank you for the post! I can’t believe it has been 30 years – talk about ancient history…
I had the honor of commanding Iron Troop that day. Yes, Ghost and Iron both took some casualties at 73 Easting. I am not certain of Eagle. The Men of Iron were fortunate in having no KIAs that day.
Best,
Dan Miller
Colonel, US Army, Retired
Great article, thank you!
Damn autocorrect… – LP
Welcome to BattleSwarm, Colonel Miller! Feel free to poke around, as I do have a fair number of posts about tanks.
reticule
[ˈredəˌkyo͞ol]
NOUN
historical
1. a woman’s small handbag, originally netted and typically having a drawstring and decorated with embroidery or beading.
2. variant spelling of reticle.
Grammar Nazis of the World, Unite!
Thank you, sir!
You are quite correct about the tremendous differences between IRGC and USA troops. An IRGC tanker had few, if any simulators on which to train tank gunnery. An IRGC gunner was fortunate to fire 4-5 main gun training rounds per year.
A US Army tank crew fired approximately 40 main gun rounds just in individual crew qualification – about 20 twice a year. That does not even count preliminary tables and platoon training and qualification, also done semiannually.
In addition, a US Army Tank Commander/Gunner team “fired” several hundred simulated rounds per year in the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) realistic combat scenarios. In fact, demonstrated proficiency in the UCOFT was necessary (a “training gate”) before a TC/Gunner combo could even fire a live round. Bradley crews had similar training devices and standards.
Then there is maneuver training. Every unit in Germany had a local training area, and US-based units had maneuver areas as well. Tank crews spent days, if not weeks in the field training at crew, Platoon, Company, and Squadron/Battalion level. The culminating event was a Squadron/Battalion rotation at either Hohenfels in Germany or NTC in California. In Germany, that occurred at least once per year for us.
The IRGC was lucky to spend a few days training at any level above the individual tank, and that training wasn’t anywhere near as realistic as what the US Army routinely practiced. A little known fact is that much of 73 Easting occurred at the Iraqi rough equivalent of the National Training Center. The IRGC was quite familiar with that terrain.
The IRGC’s tanks were typically T-72M1s – an export model of the Soviet T-72. It was not quite as good as the Soviet T-72s. That is to be expected. The Soviets weren’t going to send their best to a poor client state. They weren’t toys, though. The T-72M was and is a dangerous weapon in the hands of a well-trained crew.
However, the T-72s did not have thermal sights, and at 73 Easting, that lack proved decisive in the opening moments of many engagements between US tankers and their IRGC counterparts. We could see the “heat lines” of the hotter tank turrets just above their fighting positions. That was enough to target, hit, and kill first, and with devastating effect on Iraqi unit capabilities after the first volley.
In addition, our tank main gun ammunition was deadly. A few days after the battle, I had the opportunity to tour the battlefield as part of the data collection that became the basis for the simulation. I will never forget seeing a particular T-72. From the front, the burned out tank had a hole the size of the sabot that hit it. Moving around to the back, the round went through the turret compartment, ignited the ammunition there, and then traveled into the engine compartment. The round ripped the engine out of the tank, and deposited it about 10 feet behind the tank. The round had kept going – it was not stopped by the engine. I still refer to the T-72 as the “pop top” tank. Hit it with a sabot or TOW round, and the vehicle begins burning, the ammunition usually cooks off in explosive fashion and the turret is thrown into the air.
The IRGC did fight back – it is quite a thing to see a tank main gun firing at you, even when it misses. Same with rifle and machinegun fire. Their fire was generally ineffective due to all of the reasons above. Better-trained IRGC tankers would have been more deadly to us, but I’m OK with winning big, and with few casualties. We don’t like fair fights – we like unfair fights where we destroy the enemy with few, if any losses.
Thank you for the welcome! I’m going to poke around a bit.
Agincourt wasn’t won with a new technology; Crecy and Poitiers were also won with longbows
Fast forward to present when you have a little Internet troll armies explaining why the F 22 or the F 35 we’re not really as good as they are a little Russian stuff is going to run rings around them.
I was in service during the First Gulf War, Although being attached to NATO I was curiously a “non-belligerent“. I think our European allies were a bit startled by how thoroughly Iraqis got chopped up.
I also remember the press, during the Desert Shield build up, nattering on and on about the depth and quality of the Iraqi ground defenses, layer after layer of Barbwire and bunkers and tanks and troops and what not, and similarly about the rings of modern air defenses, with the obvious implication that the US had bitten off more than It could chew and would get bogged down in massive casualties.
Of course there WERE massive and modern ground and air defenses, but few in the press had any real concept of how the US military would actually prosecute a war, or how much this is practiced at Red Flags and the national training center and similar activities. This combined with their natural inclination to want to replay the Vietnam war again completely blinded them (and most others) as to what was about to happen. Which was, to borrow a phrase from an earlier war, The US grabbed the Iraqis by the nose and kicked them in the ass. And they kicked the hell out of them all the time, 24 hours per day, until there wasn’t anything left to kick in Kuwait or southern Iraq.
We now know the reason why the Arabs have lost so many wars in the last 75 years. Not only did they use Russian equipment, but they used the classic Russian strategy of luring the enemy deep into your territory and then waiting for winter.
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