I’ve been writing about China’s bubble economy for over a decade, from the housing bubble to the Ghost Cities and even ghost collateral. And now China’s entire house of cards appears to be trembling thanks to a company called Evergrande, which owes more than $300 billion.
China Evergrande Group, until recently the world’s largest property developer, owns dozens of stalled sites like Sunny Peninsula across China. Buckling under more than $300 billion in liabilities, the company is close to collapse, leaving 1.5 million buyers waiting for finished homes.
That’s $300 billion, with a B. It’s hard to imagine that an American company would ever be allowed to accumulate that much debt (though AT&T is evidently carrying a hefty $167.9 billion debt load).
That’s why Evergrande has reached its Lehman moment:
Instead of Evergrande making the announcement, it was the entity that will soon control the massively overlevered property developer that made it for them: the Chinese government.
According to Bloomberg, Chinese authorities told major lenders to China Evergrande Group not to expect interest payments due next week on bank loans, which takes the cash-strapped developer a step closer the nation’s largest modern-day restructurings, and guarantees that China’s “Lehman Moment” is now just a matter of days, if not hours.
According to Bloomberg, citing unnamed sources, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development told banks in a meeting this week that Evergrande won’t be able to pay its debt obligations due on Sept. 20, and instead most of Evergrande’s working capital in now being used to resume construction on existing projects, the housing ministry told bankers, according to a Bloomberg source.
And since nonpayment of interest and principal will represent an event of default, the company is unlikely to make any subsequent interest, or principal, payments either since it will have already default even though Bloomberg claims that “Evergrande is still discussing the possibility of getting extensions and rolling over some loans.” It won’t, especially since the developer will also miss a principal payment on at least one loan next week, which means it’s game over.
Meanwhile, as reported previously, Chinese authorities are already laying the groundwork for a debt restructuring of the $300 billion company (which recently hired Houlhan Lokey to advise it during the upcoming historic bankruptcy), assembling accounting and legal experts to examine the finances of the group. With senior leaders in Beijing silent on whether they will allow Evergrande creditors to suffer major losses, bondholders have priced in slim odds of a rescue infuriating countless investors and creditors who have mobbed the company’s offices across the country and also gathered at its HQ, demanding the company “return their money.” It won’t happen.
Not only is Evergrande possibly facing complete liquidation, but word came down that the company might make payments on Chinese-owned debt, but stiff foreign debt holders.
But the word this morning is that the Chinese government is now telling them to avoid default on dollar-denominated bonds. After all, if investors worldwide decided that all Chinese debt was potentially toxic, that would leave connected Chinese communists in a world of hurt.
And we can’t have that.
The unusual thing about Evergrande is that they owe money to everyone:
It seems to me that what is interesting about Evergrande is not so much the magnitude of its debt problems but their variety. Evergrande owes money to Chinese banks. It owes money to foreign hedge funds, and foreign investors own its stock. It owes money to suppliers, and to Chinese retail investors in those wealth management products. And it owes apartments to buyers. And the retail investors who bought Evergrande wealth management products were often also Evergrande homeowners, because the products were sold at Evergrande buildings.
It even took out short-term loans from its own employees. Also, it’s evidently stopped paying some employees. I don’t know about you, but for me both those would be signs it was time to look for another job.
More:
When a big company runs out of money, the basic questions are (1) who gets paid and who doesn’t and (2) should the government pay its debts for it? Those questions are interconnected. There is an ordinary way to answer the first question, some waterfall of claim seniority. You look at the company’s capital structure and say “well these people have senior claims and will get paid back, and these people have junior claims and won’t, and these other people are somewhere in the middle and might get some recovery.” And there are complex and subtle questions about the best way to preserve value in the business: Perhaps you have the legal right to stiff customers (perhaps their deposits aren’t particularly senior claims), but if you do that you’ll never get any more customers, so you treat them better than you are legally required to. And the managers of the business and the creditors and the lawyers work together to figure out a plan that maximizes the recovery for everyone.
But if the ordinary process to answer the first question ends up with an answer like “sympathetic ordinary people lose their life savings,” or “politically connected people lose everything,” or “the banking system loses a lot of money and becomes undercapitalized,” or for that matter “housing prices collapse,” then that is a good reason for the government to step in. And if the government is stepping in, there is no particular reason to assume that the ordinary claims of seniority will apply. If the government steps in to rescue small investors or the banking system or housing prices, that doesn’t necessarily mean it will also rescue foreign hedge funds.
Bloomberg’s Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway did an Odd Lots episode with analyst Travis Lundy about this, in which he gives his best guess at a waterfall of repayment. “I think that if you start from the ranking of who ends up coming out well on this, if you had to ask, this is the Communist Party of China who’s the most important stakeholder in this,” he says, and then goes through a list of claimants ordered by, basically, how politically sympathetic they are. This seems like a more reasonable analysis than, like, looking at the corporate structure and legal document to see which claims are more senior.
After the subprime meltdown in 2008, steps were taken to reduce systemic risk in the American and European economies. China? Not so much.
Whatever the ultimately resolution of Evergrande, the Chinese real estate market still seems both way over-leveraged and horribly opaque.
That leads to things like 15 abandoned, never completed Chinese skyscrapers being demolished:
That wasn’t Evergrande, but a dizzying succession of other firms:
The original developer was Kunming Xishan Land and Housing Development and Operation (Group) Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Kunming Xifang). The project covers an area of about 340 acres. It is planned to have residential, commercial and office buildings. It is divided into 4 plots for development and construction, namely A1, A2, A3, and A4. Among them, the A1 and A3 plots are commercial, and the A2 and A4 plots are residential, with a total construction area of approximately 630,000 square meters. Among them, the delivery of four high-rise residential buildings on the A2 plot has been completed, with a construction area of about 136,000 square meters.
In 2012, due to the break of Kunming Xifang’s capital chain, the project was taken over by Yunnan Tin Industry Real Estate Development and Management Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Yunxi Real Estate). The project was renamed Yunxi·Gemdale. In July 2013, due to various reasons, Yunxi Construction of Sikkim Land was suspended. 2014 was originally the delivery time for the A2 plot of Yunxi Jindi, but due to the suspension of the project, the delivery did not begin until March 2015. In addition to the 4 high-rise buildings in the A2 plot that have been delivered, the remaining three plots A1\A3\A4 totaling 15 high-rise buildings have been suspended since the end of 2013.
In order to solve the problems left over from the unfinished project, the government restarted the project through the listing and transfer of the Yunnan Provincial Property Rights Exchange. On December 29, 2020, Yunnan Honghe Real Estate Co., Ltd. obtained the right to develop the project through equity transfer.
According to Sun Zheng, general manager of Xifang Group’s Liyang Star City Phase II Project, on January 6 this year, Yunnan Honghe Real Estate Co., Ltd. acquired 100% of Kunming Xifang’s equity and 23,068,600 yuan of debt at a transfer price of 979 million yuan. At present, West Real Estate is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Honghe Land. In order to maintain the continuity of project development, Liyang Star City Phase II will continue to use West Real Estate as the main development entity.
Got all that? That’s just one development in one city you’ve never heard of. How many other ghost developments are there in China? Hundreds? Thousands?
Another real estate boondoggle: Why Shanghai Tower failed. “The Shanghai Tower is owned by Yeti Construction and Development, a consortium of state-owned development companies which includes Shanghai Chengtou Corp., Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone Development Co., and Shanghai Construction Group.”
And another: “The Story Behind China’s 600-Metre Abandoned Skyscraper.” Goldin Finance 117 was underwritten by Goldin Properties Holding.
Remember that declines in real estate holding values were huge drivers for Japan’s bubble bursting as well as the subprime meltdown that took out Lehman Brothers and Countrywide (among others).
Could China’s house of cards finally collapse in the same way? Very possibly. But remember this caveat:
China's economy can be about to collapse longer than you can remain short.
— Polemic Paine (@PolemicTMM) September 22, 2021
