Posts Tagged ‘National Integrated Circuit industry investment Fund Company (ICF)’

Top Chinese Chip Executives Arrested

Saturday, August 6th, 2022

Remember Tsinghua Unigroup, a wholly owned business unit of Tsinghua University and itself owner of Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC) (Previously mentioned here.) Well, it turns out that a bunch of their top executives just got arrested:

  • The video shows a picture of six semiconductor executives, all of whom have reportedly been arrested:
    • Dia Shijing, co-president of Tsinghua Unigroup
    • Lu Jun, president of Huaxin Investment
    • Zhao Weiguo, chairman of Tsinghua Unigroup
    • Ding Wenwu, president of National IC Industry Investment Fund,
    • Zhang Yadong, president of Tsinghua Unigroup
    • Qi Lian, another co-president of Tsinghua Unigroup

    How a company runs with three presidents I couldn’t tell you. Must be a Chinese thing.

  • “In the past few days, several senior executives of the organization behind the semiconductor industry in Mainland china have been taken away by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline, Inspection and Investigation.” Given my knowledge of communist nomenclature, I strongly suspect that this is not the sort of organization you want to enfold you in their tender mercies.
  • “In 2014, the General Office of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology announced the official establishment of the National Integrated Circuit industry investment Fund Company Limited [ICF], also known as the National Big Fund or big fund.” Probably best to think of them like USA’s SMEATECH, but with a whole lot more opportunities for graft.
  • Together two rounds of government funding added up to 320RMB, or about $47.4 billion, which should have driven additional public/private capital investment of some $240 billion divided up between China’s Ministry of Finance and large central Chinese enterprises, most of which are also owned by the state. Even for the semiconductor industry, that’s a lot of cheddar.
  • By some estimates, $100 billion of that had already been spent by 2021.
  • “The two phases of investment cover all aspects of integrated circuits (ICs), including IC manufacturing IC design, packaging and testing semiconductor materials and equipment, and industry ecological construction.”
  • ICF provides overall direction and management, while Huaxin Investment provides management of the second phase of fund investment.
  • “Eight years have passed, but high-end Chinese chips haven’t yet been produced, and the management of the state level chip industry has collapsed.” Reading between the lines, this means TSMC is still kicking their ass. If that’s the standard, then it’s a bit unfair because every other semiconductor manufacturer in the world is in the same boat.
  • On July 28, Xiao Yaqing, head of MIIT, fell from power. “Xiao was the spearhead of the Chinese communist party’s attempt to build a world-class chip industry, and eliminate its dependence on the US.” He supposedly tried to slit his wrists.
  • “The very next day, Xi Jinping immediately appointed a replacement a longtime aerospace official to take over MIIT.” Yeah, that’s really going to help your semiconductor goals.
  • “On July 15, Lu Jun, former deputy director of the China Development Bank Development Fund Management Department, was investigated Lu Jun was involved in many investment operations of the Big Fund, of which he was the sole manager. He was also former president of Huaxin.
  • Yang Zhengfan, another Huaxin executive, was also taken away.
  • Also arrested: Wang Wenzhong of Hongtai Fund and Gao Songtao, both involved with Huaxin and the Big Fund. And that’s probably not all. Evidently a whole network of semiconductor executives are being rounded up.
  • Dia Shijing of Tsinghua Unigroup was among those reported arrested, but Tsinghua Unigroup is saying “Nah, everything’s good here! Go about your business, citizens!”
  • In July 2021, Tsinghua Unigroup announced that it was overwhelmed by 200 billion RMB of debt and filed for bankruptcy because it couldn’t pay its bonds at maturity. Keep in mind that Tsinghua Unigroup, partially owned by Tsinghua University, is itself owner of YMTC, which is (I think) China’s biggest domestic memory chip manufacturer. Tsinghua/YMTC was previously one of China’s biggest semiconductor manufacturing success stories, second only to SMIC, and supposedly “the largest integrated circuit company in China.” They have actual working fabs up and running. And they’re still evidently a money-losing failure.
  • Tsinghua Unigroup has grown through mergers and acquisitions, buying up over 20 companies. This strategy is not unknown among western companies, as GlobalFoundries and NXP are both the results of a similar strategy. But neither of those companies is on the cutting edge.
  • “Tsinghua Unigroup has been using short-term loans rolling over to create long-term loans. These made the group’s cumulative liabilities too large and its financing structure unbalanced.” Yeah, I bet. “Get big quick” worked for a few doctcom era mega-success stories, but I don’t think it works in semiconductors.
  • Zhao Weiguo once boasted he was going to buy TSMC. Also, I’m going to kick Shaq’s butt in the slam dunk contest just as soon as I take time off from dating all these supermodels.
  • China Development Bank extended Tsinghua Unigroup 100 RMB credit between 2016 and 2020. Still a lot of cheddar.
  • I’m skipping over a whole lot of blow-by-blow “who owns what” in the corporate structure. Imagine if Spectre, the Gotti Family, and the Bank of England all had shares in Amway.
  • “Due to debt, Tsinghua Unigroup abandoned its plan to build DRAM memory chip manufacturing plants in Chongqing and Chengdu in southwest China earlier this year.” I bet that left a lot of pissed-off local commissars holding the bag.
  • “When the chip industry becomes a national strategy, but with no real oversight, it becomes a disaster zone of corruption, and a big cake for those in the circle to get rich for themselves.” True of any industry anywhere, but especially true of China, and especially true of semiconductors, where “fake it until you make it” isn’t an option if you’re actually building fabs.
  • “China cannot make high-end chips to this day.” True.
  • “American chip technology is far ahead of the world.” Also true, though with caveats. For semiconductor manufacturing, TSMC is on the cutting edge, with Intel and Samsung within striking distance. For semiconductor leaders, two American companies (Applied Materials and Lam Research) dominate a fair number of technologies, but Tokyo Electron is competitive in many of them, and ASML dominates the stepper market.
  • Skipping over the bits where China stole US (and other) tech, which should be familiar by now.
  • Enter the Trump Administration, “blacklisting and embargoing more than 600 Chinese high-tech companies and high-end manufacturing companies, as well as universities and research institutions.” Pissing off your biggest trade partner is generally not a great plan.

  • Result: Bottlenecks in China’s supply chains.
  • EDA makes software to design chips, and China has no real substitute.
  • SMIC’s supposed 7nm chip breakthrough (which I’m still skeptical of) reportedly copied TSMC technology.
  • Skipping over the coverage of America’s own ill-advised semiconductor subsidies.
  • Semiconductors are still a big item in China most recent Five-Year Plan (and yes, the Chicoms still use Five Year Plans, just like Mama Stalin used to make).
  • “The outside world has not seen the investment of the Big Fund break any bottleneck. However, the earthquake happening in the industry has directly shown people that there is a deep corruption in the Chinese chip industry.” Why should it be different than any other Chinese industry?
  • And just who is going to step up to those jobs running China’s increasingly-unlikely-to-succeed semiconductor moonshot, given that the last batch got rounded up by the Chinese Inquisition?
  • Interesting bit of history: Previous CCP head Jiang Zemin put his own son Jiang Mianheng in charge of developing China’s semiconductor industry, and also managed to make the country even more corrupt than it already was. And here we are.
  • It’s ironic that just as Washington was passing a giant graft bucket of semiconductor subsidies because China was supposedly kicking our ass, China itself was sacking the very people presiding over China’s own bucket of graft for not catching up to the west. The truth is somewhere between.

    China was never going to catch up to western semiconductors because the gap was too large and you need a crazy swarm of free market capitalist entrepreneurs risking private money to eek out important incremental process tweeks to keep Moore’s Law going. China was never going to have that as long as they suffered under Communist rule. And a huge percentage the government money that was sloshed into semiconductors was indeed swallowed up by graft and diversion of funds. But all that money does appear to have helped China close the gap some. Granted, a lot of that was via systematic IP property theft, but it got them into the game.

    Ultimately it wasn’t nearly enough, just as the prophecy foretold.

    Is China’s semiconductor industry a giant pit of graft, disappointment and failure? Yeah, but probably less than most of the rest of the economy.

    China’s Semiconductor Play

    Saturday, June 23rd, 2018

    This is interesting:

    Beijing is set to announce a new fund of about 300 billion yuan ($47.4 billion) for the development of China’s semiconductor industry, The Wall Street Journal reported Friday, citing sources familiar with the matter.

    The government-backed China Integrated Circuit Investment Fund is heading up the new investment vehicle, the report said. The fund was not available for comment outside of Beijing business hours.

    The 300 billion yuan fund would go toward improving China’s ability to design and manufacture advanced microprocessors and graphic-processing units, among other initiatives, the Journal said, citing one source. The size of the fund and other details could change, another source told the newspaper.

    Last week, Chen Yin, spokesman and chief engineer of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, said the fund welcomes foreign investment.

    “The second phase of fundraising is underway, and we welcome foreign companies to participate in this round of financing,” Chen said at a news conference in Beijing, according to a report from state-run English-language newspaper China Daily.

    Beijing is seeking to develop domestic technological innovation in areas such as robotics and semiconductors through an initiative called “Made in China 2025.” One of the U.S. trade delegation’s aims in talks with China this week was to ask Beijing to stop subsidies of that program. The visit ended Friday with little apparent progress in resolving a trade dispute between the two countries.

    Should we worry? About that, no. Semiconductors are a very complex and expensive game to play. China is already in the game, and goodly portion of any semiconductor spending in China goes into the pockets of American and Japanese fab equipment suppliers like Applied Materials, LAM Research and Tokyo Electron. China has a native semiconductor equipment industry, but it’s hardly setting the world afire.

    Tsinghua Unigroup is already in the process of building three fabs at a cost of $70 billion, focused on the memory business. Samsung is currently the top player in this space, followed by Hynix and Micron, and right now that space is pretty profitable.

    In China the question is always how much of that investment is real, and how much is illusion. A lot of those “under construction” fabs never materialize, either unable to attract investors or having their funds magically siphoned off to some other enterprise. Also, memory chips are an extremely volatile business: In boom times (like now), they make money hand-over-fist. During busts (which are always around the corner), memory fabs barely break even, which is a big problem if you’re trying to earn back your $10 billion investment in a cutting edge 300mm fab.

    A bigger concern for any foreign investor who helps build a fab in China to serve the Chinese manufacturing market is the blatant intellectual property theft, and China retaliating when a foreign manufacturer blows the whistle:

    Three weeks ago, Micron and South Korean chipmakers Samsung and SK Hynix all reported that the Chinese government had launched antitrust probes into their firms, and accused them of setting artificially high prices for memory chips.

  • Yes, but: American companies and the U.S. government have long been suspicious about the link between China’s anti-monopoly policies and its industrial goals.
  • “They want access to the intellectual property. They need us to teach them how to do it. Once they have the industry, they want to push us out,” an industry source familiar with China’s investigation into Micron tells Axios.
  • The price hikes, the source says, are largely due to a boom in demand for memory chips in everything from smartphones to autonomous vehicles. China’s investigation is “a clear indication that they’re not ready to make [semiconductors] work,” says the source.
  • Micron’s fight to protect its IP is not new. Other U.S. firms have run up against the same Chinese antitrust policies or regulations and have been forced to strike deals with Beijing.

  • The New York Times’ Paul Mozur dove into the story a heist of Micron’s crown jewel — its chip design — in Taiwan, where the company keeps its trade secrets.
  • Qualcomm tangled with China: “To get back in Beijing’s good graces, the company agreed to lower its prices in China, promised to shift more of its high-end manufacturing to partners in China, and pledged to upgrade the country’s technology capabilities,” the New York Times’ David Barboza reports.
  • The same thing has happened to IBM and Apple and others.
  • “‘I’m not sure who’s fought China and won, just like I’m not sure who’s fought a casino and won in the long run,” says Bruce Mehlman, who was an assistant secretary of commerce for technology policy under the Bush administration and now lobbies for several tech companies.
  • Worth noting: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all have thriving semiconductor industries, too. The difference is, these countries accept competition, whereas Beijing wants to give its national champions the advantage, Jimmy Goodrich, vice president of global policy at the Semiconductor Industry Association, says.
  • The bottom line, per the industry source: “We’re all dependent on China because everything is assembled there.”
  • This is a bigger problem, and will remain a bigger problem until American companies commit to building the infrastructure for a full-blown American flexible manufacturing supply chain to rival China’s.

    All that said, IP theft only gets you so far in semiconductors. By the time you’ve stolen all the IP you need for a current generation chip, chances are good your rivals have already started to fab the next generation of product. And it’s not just the chip design you need to steal; you also need to steal the hundreds, if not thousands, of process step tweaks you need to properly fab 50 layer, 7nm node chips at acceptable uniformity across 300mm wafers. Screw up any one of those steps and your wafer yields crash and you’re making really large, expensive coasters.

    Equally challenging for China is hiring qualified semiconductor engineers in China, people with the knowledge and experience to correct process steps to improve yields. There aren’t nearly enough being produced domestically, so China has recently started setting up satellite offices in America and Japan.

    Tawain, on the other hand, has all the pieces to the puzzle (save, once again, semiconductor equipment manufacturing), with TSMC dominating the global foundry market. Foundries don’t design their own chips, they manufacture chips designed by others, and TSMC’s mastery of process control is probably second only to Intel’s. This is one reason defending Taiwan is in America’s national interest.

    The Trump Administration should continue to push China on the intellectual property issue, and if the cost of doing business in China is giving away your intellectual property, foreign companies should refrain from manufacturing in China. (Alas, a resolution that’s easier said than done…)