Russia has begun using its new T-14 Armata battle tanks to fire on Ukrainian positions “but they have not yet participated in direct assault operations,” the RIA state news agency reported on Tuesday, quoting a source close the matter.
RIA said that the tanks have been fitted with extra protection on their flanks and crews have undergone “combat coordination” at training grounds in Ukraine.
The T-14 tank has an unmanned turret, with crew remotely controlling the armaments from “an isolated armoured capsule located in the front of the hull.”
The tanks have a maximum speed on the highway of 80 kilometres (50 miles) per hour, RIA reported.
In January, British military intelligence reported that Russian forces in Ukraine were reluctant to accept the first tranche of the tanks due to their “poor condition.”
It also said that any deployment of the T-14 would likely be “a high-risk decision” for Russia, and one taken primarily for propaganda purposes.
“Production is probably only in the low tens, while commanders are unlikely to trust the vehicle in combat,” the British military said.
“Eleven years in development, the programme has been dogged with delays, reduction in planned fleet size, and reports of manufacturing problems.”
Here’s a brief overview video:
The T-14 has had more than its share of developmental problems, and there are plenty of articles and videos detailing its shortcomings. Lazer Pig’s “The T-14 Armata tank sucks” is a long example of the genre.
If your interest level doesn’t support viewing a full hour of Armata-bashing, here are some takeaways:
“The T14 combines all the ultimate Russian technology previously introduced onto NATO tanks 25 years ago in a way that only a country trying to inflate the share prices of Raytheon would understand.” (Raytheon makes Javelin.)
“It does away with all the unnecessary ERA systems of the T90, which cannot protect the tank against missiles that were invented in the 80s, and instead replaces them with an active protection system that can almost defend the tank against missiles that were invented in the 90s.”
“An auto loader famous for jamming that now cannot be accessed and cleared when it does jam, is somehow heavier and slower than the tank it has replaced, and comes combined together in a package so expensive the company that made it immediately went bankrupt. The country that bought it cannot afford it and it has about as much export potential as English whiskey.”
“For a while, every idiot with even the vaguest sense of military interest was banging on about this tank as if Stalin had come back to life and had personally forged the hull from his own ball sack. And that all tanks across every nation in the world had just been rendered obsolete.”
Sections on repeated post-Soviet tank design failures, like the T-95 and Black Knight, and coverage of Russian brain drain, omitted.
The weird, Tiger-2 derived engine is unreliable.
The driver’s vision sucks.
No crew access to the turret internally.
The autoloader is slower than the manual fire rates on T-80s, T-72s and Abrams.
“The qualifying time for [an Abrams] loader to pass training is seven seconds, and the best crews claim they can reload in about four to five seconds. Meaning a good Abrams can fire twice before the T-14 has reloaded.”
“Ukrainian hackers found that most of the electronic systems on board, including the digital sights, the night vision, the infrared, were all in fact western imports. Most notably, these were last generation French optics from Leclerc MBTs left over from when they were all upgraded to ICONE in 2009.”
Current Russian tank optics are actually available to the general public. “They’re not even the best that are currently available. If you’ve got a spare five grand, you can go into any high-end spy gadget store and buy a drone that will give you better night vision and IR tracking capabilities than the latest generation of modern Russian tanks.”
China reportedly found out that none of the tank’s systems actually worked. “The soft kill defense systems were simply smoke screens, and the hard kill systems designed specifically to stop the Javelin and the TOW missile could not detect if either of these systems had been fired at the tank, and relied entirely on the crew being able to notice a missile traveling at the speed of sound flying towards them.”
“To top it off, there was no evidence of the supposed electronic warfare systems that could render guided missiles and mines inert.”
“Nothing in the Armata is new.”
The idea that western tanks need to catch up to the Armata is laughable. “By the time the Armata enters service, it will already be outdated.”
“Everything the Armata is has been done before, and in many cases has been done better.”
“Russia is not an equal to the United States and NATO, it’s an equal to North Korea, both technologically backwards nations.”
Will all those problems still be present when the Armata engages enemy armor in Ukraine? Some certainly will. I doubt Armata electronics or optics can compare to those on western vehicles, and I bet that its active protection package is miles behind Trophy (which I don’t think will be on any Ukrainian tanks anyway). But I do suspect they’ve had enough time to improve the reliability of the engine, and I’m guessing the armor and autoloader improvements will improve survivability for the tank crew.
Can the Armata take out Ukraine’s legacy Soviet tanks? Almost certainly. Can it take out Challenger 2s, Leopard 2s, and M1A2 Abrams? If it’s able to close in and get off the first shot, probably. But I’m guessing it will find the opportunities to do so few and far between.
Back in November, I put up a post on Ukrainian forces crossing the Dnipro River for a probing raid. Since then I’ve noticed a persistent trickle of hits to the post, presumably off social media posts of further activity. Today came more concrete evidence that Ukrainian troops are landing and operating on the eastern/southern bank of the Dnipro.
Ukrainian soldiers have crossed the Dnipro River for the first time since the early days of the invasion and built positions that could be used to launch attacks deeper into Russian-occupied territory, analysts have said.
The crossing of the Dnipro River, which has marked the front line since Russian forces retreated from Kherson city in November, comes days after reports of a partial Russian retreat in the area.
It comes as Ukraine is widely expected to launch a counteroffensive, which analysts have said may be aimed at pushing 100 miles south of the Dnipro River at least as far as Crimea.
The US-based Institute for the Study of War said that video and photos have generated the first “reliable geolocated imagery of Ukrainian positions” south of the river.
“The extent and intent of these Ukrainian positions remain unclear, as does Ukraine’s ability and willingness to maintain sustained positions in this area,” it said.
Several Russian military bloggers used geolocation techniques to pinpoint Ukrainian military positions around the village of Oleshky, south of the Dnipro River.
Russian military blogger “Thirteenth”, who has more than 100,000 followers, posted a video that he said showed Ukrainian special forces using fast small boats to land on the river bank, where “they have been hanging out for a couple of weeks”.
Another, Rybar, which has links to the Russian security services and has more than 1 million subscribers, posted a lengthy blog on the “foothold” the Ukrainian forces have secured.
Suchomimus has the video and geolocation north of Oleshky, near both Dachy and Dachi (enjoy the confusion) near the Antonovsky bridge.
“Both have little Russian presence in them, with Ukrainian forces now there in some number, with a claim being that Ukrainian troops Advanced alongside the E97 [road] south towards Oleshky.”
These landings have evidently been going on since April 20.
“It’s looking like a decent amount of troops, though most likely without vehicle support, are operating along this area of Kherson along the Dnipro.”
Suchomimus suggests that it may be an attempt to secure both sides of the Antonovsky bridge and repair the dropped spans, but I’m not so sure. Without a sustained effort to push Russian troops out of artillery range, if would be very difficult to repair and maintain the bridge as a crossing point. I also question his assertion that it would be easier to repair those than throw up a pontoon bridge. True, Russia has proved inept at building them quickly (as it has in so many things), but in World War II the U.S. army could throw them up at 50ft an hour or so.
“This could be anything. It could be recon. Could be special forces. Could be a diversion. Could be harassment of Russian forces.” Or a probing raid to map and exploit Russian weaknesses.
It’s unclear how much special forces or infantry could accomplish on their own without vehicle support, but they would have enough artillery (at least initially), drone and possibly air support for a probing raid to cause panic and confusion among Russian forces, especially as part of a broader spring counter-offensive.
Rheinmetall has a new “GameChanger” drone (so they say) with an official “Rheinmetall Combat Drone” moniker that only a German company could love. I don’t see it as an actual gamecharger, but it is pretty interesting: a fixed-wing drone that can drop three other quadcopter drones (or, technically, loitering munitions), each of which can then be guided to the target.
The Rheinmetall Combat Drone is based on the German arms maker’s Luna NG reconnaissance drone and can carry the Hero-R type loitering munition.
“The Rheinmetall Combat Drone is the game changer for protecting your troops and fighting tactically relevant targets,” the company stated.
“Effectors as payloads transform the multipurpose drone from a sensor-to-shooter system into a highly efficient means of reconnaissance with com/network relay and SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) capabilities.”
The NG is the latest in the Luna family of reconnaissance drones, with an endurance of 12 hours and a data link range of 100 kilometers (62 miles). Satellite Communication would provide it with increased range.
The robust fiberglass composite drone has a take-off weight of 40 kilograms (88 pounds) and a service ceiling of 5,000 meters (16,404 feet).
The runway-independent vehicle can be launched with a rope hoist catapult and landed with a parachute and has stealth features with low acoustic, thermal, and radar signatures.
There’s an official video, but Rheinmetall has disabled embedding. So here’s a random Ukrainian guy (judged entirely from the trident on his hat) who’s evidently offering commentary on the drone, and has thus embedded most of the Rheinmetall video into his own. The relevant portion starts around 1:42 in.
Rheinmetall is a very solid MilTech company, but they tend to publicize things well in advance of commercial availability. (They’re hardly alone in this.) As such, I wouldn’t expect released versions to show up in the Russo-Ukrainian War. But they might send a few there for field testing.
I can see use cases for this weapon, especially for hunting down high value targets deep behind enemy lines. But this is sort of like the Cadillac Escalade of drones, while Ukraine’s flying yeet of death is more like an electric scooter: much shorter range, much more annoying, and much more cost effective for their intended task.
The Russo-Ukrainian War is probably cramming decades of drone development into white hot years of combat evolution (as wars tend to do), and every world military needs to be paying attention.
That’s the assertion of Reporting from Ukraine, who says that the counterattack is happening in Zaporizhzhia:
Reporting from Ukraine is pretty rah-rah for Ukraine, always putting a positive spin on things (“Ukrainian troops successfully withdrew from northern Bakhmut”), but he’s good on reporting the nitty gritty details of tactical movement and seems to have direct sources in the Ukrainian military.
Takeaways:
He’s seeing Ukrainian forces advance all across the Zaporizhzhia front.
“The freshest reports suggest that Ukrainians breached the Russian defense in the trenches in front of Novodanylivka and got closer to Nesterianka and Kopani from the east.”
“Ukrainian presence was also noted in the southern part of Kamianske, which means that Russians highly likely abandoned Piatykhatky as well.”
“Ukrainian Head of Melitopol reported that Russians announced an urgent evacuation from all settlements between Vasylivka and Tokmak, in fear that this may very soon become the most active battleground.”
“In order to prevent the accumulation of a critical amount of heavy equipment in the region, Russian forces started to actively use guided air bombs. These bombs weigh from 500 to 1500 kilograms and have a range of up to 40 kilometers, which poses a significant threat to Ukrainian plans. The craters from the explosions are enormous and can reach up to 50 meters in diameter.” I’m guessing these might be KAB-1500Ls.
“Ukrainians are trying to reciprocate the damage and are also identifying and destroying Russian warehouses with ammunition and equipment.”
“It looks like the same action is going to take place very soon in the Orikhiv direction because Russian reconnaissance recently reported that Ukrainians are actively demining significant clusters of land. Another indicator of the imminent Ukrainian offensive actions here is the fact that certain elements of the 71st Jager Brigade and 46th Assault Brigade recently arrived at Orikhiv, according Russian sources.”
“[The] Ukrainian 72nd Mechanized Brigade conducted a series of assaults in the vicinity of Vuhledar.”
“The intensification of fighting along the whole southern line has been noted by many analysts, but today, the Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense finally confirmed that the counteroffensive operation has started.”
Well, sort of: “She stated that it is incorrect to wait for a specific date because counteroffensive is a long process and it is only the culmination that happens quickly, but no one can predict when the culmination will happen, as it depends on the conditions on the ground.”
“Right now, Ukrainians are testing Russian defenses, letting the newly formed assault units gain combat experience and, for the most part, follow the path of lowest resistance – meaning they push where they can, leaving the strongest positions for later. Russian analysts are predicting that Ukrainians will make at least two huge attacks during the last week of April to test new tactics and then launch a full-scale counteroffensive during the first half of May.” Sounds like probing attacks for now, but I can see Ukraine moving quickly to exploit any gaps or pushing hard if there’s a sudden Russian line collapse.
Institute for the Study of War also has a similar confirmation-that’s-not-quite-a-confirmation: “Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions. Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces will never preemptively announce when the counteroffensive starts and reiterated that Ukrainian forces aim to liberate all Ukrainian territory.”
Deep State shows some small recent-ish Ukrainian gains there:
— Geoff' The Frenchy Fella – War News 🇺🇦 (@Geoff_WarNews) April 20, 2023
So it’s hard to say for sure that this push is the much-anticipated Big Spring Counteroffensive. It could be a probing raid, or it could be a faint, with the main blow scheduled to fall elsewhere. Certainly Zaporizhzhia is the front section that has the most promise to split Russian forces in half and cut Russian forces in Kherson and Crimea off from resupply. Russia has to know this, and has been extending defense trenches throughout the area, but continues to throw troops into the Bakhmut meat-grinder rather than (as far as observers can tell) seriously reinforcing the area. Maybe Russia has reinforced it more than we know, but maybe not. It would be very far from the first time Russia made a stupid, obvious mistake in this war.
Maybe it’s more accurate to say that a counteroffensive is underway.
You know that “creating more public roads just creates more traffic” talking point trotted out by people who want to ban your car?
Yeah, not so much.
The first two thirds of the video covers other topics, like how economies of scale don’t necessarily drive down prices uniformly, and as you scale, you incur new costs that might make a product less profitable. (One example is China’s overbuilt high speed rail network.)
The last portion deals with the “roads create traffic” myth, directly delving into the study the anti-road types cite:
“What [building new highways[ doesn’t do is create entirely new demand.”
“New roadways, especially interstates, tend to be more direct, and can take a larger volume of traffic than alternative routes through urban areas.”
“The study itself has also been widely criticized for making assumptions that other economists were not able to replicate in follow-up studies.”
“Its methodology was also questionable. It measured interstate kilometers traveled. Building out more interstates might make people use those roads more, but that doesn’t mean that there are more cars overall, because a lot of that traffic would have been taken away from non-interstate roads, which were not measured in the study.”
“More roads won’t create more congestion unless they are designed very poorly, and reducing the supply of roads won’t ease congestion, either.”
The original study authors didn’t even suggest reducing roads; they were in favor of congestion charges.
Here’s a video where Ex-LA Sheriff Alex Villanueva discusses how the Homeless Industrial Complex racket works there.
Five people a day die on the streets of LA in the gutter like a dog. Five a day. Like, five on drugs from overdosing overdosing on drugs, from illnesses that are treatable. But if you’re not being treated, like, for example, you’re insulin dependent type one [diabetes]. Without insulin you die. That’s what happens, because these are people are not in a state of mind to actually accept and seek medical care for a problem, so it goes untreated they die, or they overdose and they die, or they do both and they die. I think in 2020-2021, they registered, I think, over 1,800 deaths of that type on the street, which is mind-boggling, but it’s consistent.
“If you don’t pay attention, people are going to die. So the people, the activists, they want to get in the way. ‘Don’t touch them, you’re criminalizing poverty!’ or this or that. Yet they have no answer. And their solution is just to let people die on the street. That’s not a solution.”
“The [homeless] count is getting bigger, not smaller.”
“There’s a perception in the entire nation that, if you’re homeless and you like to use drugs, go to LA. Until that train stops, it doesn’t matter what you do locally in LA. You can’t defeat 49 other states sending all their homeless their derelicts their drug addicts to LA.” I don’t know, a lot still seem to be going to San Francisco. And we need to do more to spread the word to Austin’s drug addicted transients in hopes they move there.
When he started trying to clean things up, he got immediate pushback from the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. They had “no desire whatsoever” to work with him.
“They’re not doing anything about it because the homeless industrial complex is alive and well. Look at the career arc of Holly Mitchell, supervisor. Karen Bass, mayor. Community organizers. Now they’re running non-profits. Now they’re receiving contracts from the county, from the city. Now they’re in public office. Those two in particular prime example of it, and that’s the wave of the future.”
“You’ve got a whole community of people that are in the 501c3s, the non-profits, and uh Boards of Directors, CEOs. The amount of money is pouring into the nonprofits is just incredible. There’s no governance, there’s no oversigh, there’s no accountability on the results. They just keep shoveling money at them, and the problem keeps getting worse and worse.”
“This has become a system for people to to get in and get involved, and actually build a career and build a path to politics. The top 10 CEOs of non-profits eight hundred thousand dollar a year. They were making more than twice what I was making as sheriff, and the size of my operation dwarfed all of them probably combined. But that tells you the influence the money involved.”
“From 2011 to 2021, L.A. County spent 6.5 billion dollars on homeless initiatives. The homeless count went from 39,000 to over 80,000. it doubled in size.”
“It’s engulfing every corner of life in L.A County.”
The big advantage that Carl-Gustav offers is that it’s much cheaper per round than smart munitions like Javelin.
“In the case of Ukraine [they’re] using these things for against everything from guys behind cover to light armored vehicles, soft skin vehicles and, of course, main battle tanks.”
Used by more than 40 countries.
Carl-Gustav can’t fill the top attack role NLAW and Javelin use against tanks. “But it can cripple a main battle tank. And with some of these advanced warheads, it can affect a not just a mobility kill, but an outright Kill, at least from the rear.”
“And if you blow off a track, the thing isn’t moving and it can then be killed perhaps another way, or the crew will simply abandon it.”
There are 15 different types of shells, including smoke and illumination.
They’re also working on guided munitions.
They’re also working on a confined-space munition with reduced back-blast, which sounds really useful for urban warfare.
Models produced are M1 (starting 1946) through M4 (2014).
A wide variety of rounds, including antipersonnel and two-phase charge designed to defeat reactive armor.
Most of NATO uses it, including the U.S., UK, Germany, Poland and all three of the Baltic states.
Ukraine managed to take out a T-90 with it.
Whether it’s better than an RPG-7 probably comes down to training and use case. The RPG-7 looks to be a lot more portable, but I’m betting the average Carl-Gustav build quality is better.
How severe? How about $105 billion drop in loans in just two weeks.
“This credit crunch greatly increases the chances that America is going to have a deflationary recession or depression at some point in 2023. And, in fact, we could already be in it.” Ya think?
“We’re going to see the unemployment rate start to spike in America in the second half of 2023, In fact, we’re already seeing a big increase in unemployment claims data from the Federal Reserve shows that continued unemployment claims has surged since September.”
“We’re seeing a big surge in mortgage defaults right now across America, particularly on what’s called FHA mortgages. FHA mortgages are these first-time home buyer loans that the US government sponsors and allows people to only put three to five percent down. Well, these loans now have a 12% default rate in the most recent month of February 2023.”
Debt-to-income ration is now higher than it was at the pre-subprime meltdown peak in 2008.
“The Biden Administration has been very aggressive in wanting to expand mortgage access to low-income borrowers who can’t afford these mortgages. And they do this under the guise of expanding the benefits of home ownership to everyone, but really what they’re doing is they’re saddling at-risk economic households with a lot of debt near the peak of a housing bubble.”
“When banks tighten the belt and businesses can no longer get loans, businesses have to shut down, or what businesses have to do is, they have to start liquidating their holdings and taking whatever cash they have and use it to pay expenses. This is actually a concern of mine.”
“This bank credit crunch which is occurring right now could cause even more bank runs in the future” as people pull money out of the bank to cover expenses.
Quantitative tightening is back on.
“Mortgage application demand is on par with what we saw basically in the worst of the last housing crash in 2008, 2009, 2010, and so, no, there is no recovery.”
“The regular home buyer is still out of the housing market and is not returning.”
“The money supply in America is contracting…every other time in history it contracted, which was four times, we had a depression, a panic and a banking crisis.”
Cheerful enough. But if you’re a car dealer, things are even worse:
Banks are cutting off backing loans and providing credit to dealerships.
Not just used car dealers, but even national brand, nameplate dealerships.
This all started back in 2020, when banks started lending way too much money on cars that simply aren’t worth it, to consumers that simply couldn’t afford these payments, and shouldn’t have got the car in the first place…Let’s fast forward to 2023. We’re seeing record high repossession rates, and we’re seeing record high portfolio sell-offs, where people are just liquidating their paper because they don’t want to take on the risk of all these really bad auto loans, because they owe too much money. People are not making payments and they see the value of cars going down.
The fewer banks dealers can pit each other against for loan terms, the higher the interest rate consumers have to pay.
Dealers (not the banks) are also the ones who get screwed if a customer misses their first through third car payment.
Texas car dealer: “He was floored because he sells a lot of trucks between $45- and $65,000 trucks. Four of his banks told him that they’re no longer lending over twenty five thousand dollars.” (Previously.)
“I promise you this: it’s only gonna get worse.”
But wait! It gets worse!
“Capital One is going to start pulling their floor plans from dealers.”
“Floor plans” are the lines of credit dealers use to purchase cars to populate their lots, even the big nameplate dealers.
“Dealers are overexposed right now. They have paid way too much for their inventory and now they are having a hard time selling it.”
“It is so much harder now than it has been in the last two years to get people approved for loans to be able to sell these vehicles.”
“[Banks] do not want to get stuck holding the bag on these cars.”
“Dealers have been stupid. They have overpaid and they have too much inventory right now.”
“Some of these dealers, if they’re having cars 60, 90 days and maybe they’re getting a little bit behind on their payments [the] floor plan company will actually go to these dealers lots and they will take these cars that have been sitting too long, they’ll take them to the auction.”
“If they didn’t have the cash, the liquidity, to begin with, then they have to start liquidating cars, and they have to liquidate them fast to be able to pay their flooring lines…if they lose these flooring lines, they might as well not be in business, they don’t have the cash to be able to buy more inventory to be able to sell it to make more money.”
Banks pulling their floor lines could potentially crash the whole car market.
Things are going to get worse for car dealers before it gets better, and six months from now might be a great time to buy a car, assuming you’re not too busy shooting starving looters trying to steal your canned goods…
As Russia enters the 14th month of its 72 hour campaign to take Kiev, there are signs that its meat-grinder approach to combat is depleting the exact resources it needs to win.
First up: Anders Puck Nielsen on Russia’s likely manpower shortage:
He looks at various how and low counts for determining Russian casualty rates, then builds his arguments around one in the middle.
There is a rule of thumb that is often mentioned, that for every dead soldier there are three wounded. So if we take some round numbers, and remember it’s not actually important if they are a little bit off. It doesn’t change the point that I am getting to if you think real the number is a little lower. But say that on average about 500 Russian soldiers have been killed every day since the mobilization in September, when Russia also really started to have very big attrition numbers. And if we then make a conservative estimate and say that for every dead soldier, there have been two wounded, then we get that the Russian fighting force has been decreased by about 1500 soldiers every day. Then we can divide 300,000 by 1500, and we get that they have soldiers for about 200 days, until the Russian army will have consumed all those mobilized soldiers. This is not exact science. It’s just a rough estimate to illustrate Russia’s manpower problem. Putin announced the mobilization on 21 September, and incidentally 200 days after that is about now. It’s on 9 April 2023.
“Putin probably should have announced the second wave of mobilization months ago, but he didn’t. So that is why military analysts are talking about a Russian manpower shortage.”
“Those 300,000 soldiers that Russia mobilized in the fall are probably not there anymore.”
Second up is a report that both sides are rationing artillery shells in advance of Ukraine’s anticipated counteroffensive.
Artillery units on both sides of the line, despite the continued duels, are reportedly dialing back fire missions to save up ammunition for the long-awaited Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Russian milblogger Alexander Khodakovsky claims that those Russian units not involved in ongoing offensives have had ammunition supplies seriously curtailed. Khodakovsky attributed the rationing to concerns about the potential offensive.
At the same time, a frontline account from the Washington Post highlighted Ukrainian artillery crews similarly conserving shells. While embedded with an artillery platoon in Ukraine’s 56th Motorized Brigade, Isabelle Khurshudyan and Kamila Hrabchuk reported the unit’s 152mm howitzers used to fire more than 20-30 shells a day. That number has dwindled to fewer than three.
The nearby units equipped with NATO 155mm caliber guns are reportedly facing less of a shortage than the Warsaw Pact-era guns. Citing an anonymous Ukrainian military official, the report claimed Ukraine is still firing 7,700 shells a day. Russian shelling reportedly dwarfs even that figure. Ukraine’s incredible artillery consumption remains a concern for NATO as Western production lines struggle to keep supplies moving.
Russia’s grinding style of combat requires a fresh supply of bodies and artillery shells to function, and those are the things (along with money, high tech munitions and global sympathy) that Russia seems to be running short on…
