Given that we’re selling them to Poland but not to Turkey, the F-35 has been much in the news as of late, but frequently for the wrong reasons, mainly a long list of problems:
The F-35’s logistics system currently has no way for foreign F-35 operators to keep their secret data from being sent to the United States. The spare parts inventory shown by the F-35’s logistics system does not always reflect reality, causing occasional mission cancellations. Cabin pressure spikes in the cockpit of the F-35 have been known to cause barotrauma, the word given to extreme ear and sinus pain. In very cold conditions — defined as at or near minus 30 degrees Fahrenheit — the F-35 will erroneously report that one of its batteries have failed, sometimes prompting missions to be aborted. Supersonic flight in excess of Mach 1.2 can cause structural damage and blistering to the stealth coating of the F-35B and F-35C. After doing certain maneuvers, F-35B and F-35C pilots are not always able to completely control the aircraft’s pitch, roll and yaw. If the F-35A and F-35B blows a tire upon landing, the impact could also take out both hydraulic lines and pose a loss-of-aircraft risk. A “green glow” sometimes appears on the helmet-mounted display, washing out the imagery in the helmet and making it difficult to land the F-35C on an aircraft carrier. On nights with little starlight, the night vision camera sometimes displays green striations that make it difficult for all variants to see the horizon or to land on ships. The sea search mode of the F-35’s radar only illuminates a small slice of the sea’s surface. When the F-35B vertically lands on very hot days, older engines may be unable to produce the required thrust to keep the jet airborne, resulting in a hard landing.
Let’s look at a couple of these in more detail:
The U.S. Navy’s and Marine Corps’ F-35s become unpredictable to handle when executing the kind of extreme maneuvers a pilot would use in a dogfight or while avoiding a missile, according to documents exclusively obtained by Defense News.
Specifically, the Marine short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing variant and the Navy’s carrier-launched version become difficult to control when the aircraft is operating above a 20-degree angle of attack, which is the angle created by the oncoming air and the leading edge of the wing.
Pilots reported the aircraft experiencing unpredictable changes in pitch, as well as erratic yaw and rolling motions. The documents identify the issue as a category 1 deficiency and define it as something that limits the aircraft’s performance in such a way that it can’t accomplish its “primary or alternate mission(s).” In this scale, category 1 represents the most serious type of deficiency.
A Lockheed Martin executive told Defense News in a statement that he expects the issue to be resolved or downgraded soon as a result of software fixes.
“We’ve implemented an update to the flight control system that is planned for integration in the third quarter of this year — and we expect this item to be resolved or downgraded,” said Greg Ulmer, Lockheed Martin vice president and general manager of the company’s F-35 program.
Like almost all modern fly-by-wire fighter jets, flight control and trim surfaces are automatically changed by advanced avionics software to maintain flight stability. The Marine VTOL (F-35B) and Naval carrier (F-35C) variants have always had more problems than the base Air Force model, a fairly predictable consequence of building plane for disparate mission roles on a single platform.
At extremely high altitudes, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ versions of the F-35 jet can only fly at supersonic speeds for short bursts of time before there is a risk of structural damage and loss of stealth capability, a problem that may make it impossible for the Navy’s F-35C to conduct supersonic intercepts.
The Defense Department does not intend to field a fix for the problem, which influences not only the F-35’s airframe and the low-observable coating that keeps it stealthy, but also the myriad antennas located on the back of the plane that are currently vulnerable to damage, according to documents exclusively obtained by Defense News.
The F-35 Joint Program Office has classified the issues for the “B” and “C” models as separate category 1 deficiencies, indicating in one document that the problem presents a challenge to accomplishing one of the key missions of the fighter jet. In this scale, category 1 represents the most serious type of deficiency.
Both deficiencies were first observed in late 2011 following flutter tests where the F-35B and F-35C both flew at speeds of Mach 1.3 and Mach 1.4. During a post-flight inspection in November 2011, it was discovered the F-35B sustained “bubbling [and] blistering” of the stealth coating on both the right and left sides of the horizontal tail and the tail boom.
During similar tests of the F-35C in December 2011, “thermal damage” that compromised the structural integrity of the inboard horizontal tail and tail boom were apparent.
Vice Adm. Mat Winter, who leads the F-35 program on behalf of the Pentagon, told Defense News that the department has taken steps to mitigate the problem with an improved spray-on coating, but added that the government will not completely fix it — instead accepting additional risk.
As justification for the decision, Winter noted that the issue was documented while the jet was flying at the very edge of its flight envelope. He also said the phenomenon only occurred once for both the B and C models, despite numerous attempts to replicate the conditions that caused the problem.
Race conditions and intermittent bugs are frustratingly difficult to track down in ordinary code, so it must be several orders of magnitude more frustrating when they appear on a $100 million piece of hardware. But the fact this issued showed up in 2011 and not since suggests that the issues may have been fixed along the way.
Everyone agrees that the F-35 is a marvel of engineering that contains amazing technical advances, but the $1.5 trillion program was almost cancelled in 2011 due being “bloated, over-budget and behind-schedule program.” But thing to remember is that pretty much all U.S. fighter aircraft programs are bloated, over-budget and behind schedule. (Well, at least since World War II; the first P-51 prototypes rolled off the assembly line 102 days after the order had been placed…)
None of which kept House Democrats from demanding an extra dozen planes more than the Pentagon asked for in the 20/21 defense budget.
A bigger long-term issue is how long before drones make the F-35 obsolete.
Already, commercial firms are creating drones that use a variety of sensors to autonomously execute tasks ranging from agricultural spraying to ocean surveillance to air freight. With minor modifications, these drones can become improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that actively hunt U.S. forces. Because the systems are commercial, they are available to almost anyone.
Even small numbers of intelligent, mobile IEDs would be a major problem for U.S. forces — yet tech trends indicate we could face tens of thousands of such drones on the battlefield.
We’re several years past the ability to 3D-print a drone in a single day; researchers are now refining prototype systems that can print 25 to 100 times faster than that. A single small facility with only 10 such printers will soon be able to produce 1,000 drones a day. These will be autonomous weapons that can attack with precision to destroy vehicles, parked aircraft, fuel, and ammunition stores.
Snip.
When fully operational, the F-35 will bring a leap in capability. However, a creative enemy might choose not to fight the F-35 in the air but instead send cheap drones to hunt them at their air bases. These relatively inexpensive drones will rely on sheer numbers. If an enemy prints 1,000 a day, he doesn’t care if 500 suffer in-flight failures. Nor does he care you shoot down another 300 near your airfield. He still has 200 hunting a couple of dozen F-35 revetments. If those are not available, the drones can autonomously switch their aim points to radar antennae, fuel points, or ammunition sites.
The United States cannot overcome swarms of autonomous weapons by increasing our production of old weapons.
The author vastly overstates how easily combat-ready drones can be produced. You can 3D print drone parts, but right now you still need humans to assemble them. Factories still need to be set up and supplied, and are themselves subject to attack. The “1000 drones a day” factory is a fantasy unless we’re already three years into a total war economy, and the sort of drones that could theoretically be produced that way aren’t going to have the range to reach air bases in the rear. Cheap drone swarms will be more effective taking out ground troops near the front line or soft targets in the rear for the immediate future. But the time is coming when aerial combat drones will simply be more cost effective than an F-35. If ten $1 million drones, each non-stealthy but capable of high speed maneuvering that would kill a human pilot, can take out one $100 million F-35, or even just force it to expended all it’s air-to-air ordnance before retreating in critical battles, a lot of the advantage of having an F-35 is going to be nullified.
Jerry Pournelle once said that “USAF will always retire hundreds of Warthog to buy another F-35. Always, so long as it exists. And it will never give up a mission.” But the days of high performance manned jet fighters may be coming to an end. Probably not in the next 10-20 years, but long before the projected end-of-life date of 2070. 51 years is a longer span of time than that between the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Gulf War. And there were no World War II planes flying combat missions in the Gulf War.
