Posts Tagged ‘Military’

Successful Ukrainian Counterattack in Severodonetsk?

Sunday, June 5th, 2022

Information coming out of the Russo-Ukrainian War can be hard to verify, especially given how untrustworthy the mainstream media have made themselves. But Ukraine seems to have launched a successful counterattack in the key city of Severodonetsk.

Russia is “suffering huge losses” and losing hard-fought ground in the Ukrainian city of Severodonetsk after invading units started retreating from the key industrial center, Ukrainian officials asserted Saturday.

The dramatic turnabout, which could not be independently confirmed, represented a rare successful counter-offensive against Russian forces, which had recently been steadily advancing in Ukraine’s eastern territories.

It was the first time Ukraine claimed to have conducted a large counter-attack in Severodonetsk, a city of 100,000 and the last major municipality in the disputed Luhansk oblast under Ukrainian control, after days of losing ground in the country’s embattled east.

Russia had “previously managed to capture most of the city,” Sergiy Haidai, the governor of the Luhansk region said in a televised address Saturday, The Guardian reported. “But now our military has pushed them back.”

Later Saturday, Oleksandr Stryuk, the head of the city’s military operations, said that Ukrainian forces were able to build a line of defense in Severodonetsk, according to The Kyiv Independent.

Both sides of the war have claimed to have inflicted huge casualties in the fighting for the city — a battlefront that military experts believe could determine which of the two countries has the momentum for a prolonged war of attrition in coming months.

Here’s a quick Livemap snapshot:

A more detailed annotated map from Random Guy On Twitter (grains of salt apply):

There’s some talk on Twitter of Ukrainian forces luring Russia into a trap and using the high ground in Luhansk to rain artillery on Russian positions:

Here’s Denys Davydov, AKA Ukrainian Map Guy, on the action (usual caveats and grains of salt apply):

When faced with the task of taking large hostile cities, Russian doctrine has been to bomb them flat with artillery first. Historically, urban warfare has not been a source of happiness for the Russian military. They got torn up badly in Grozny, and seem to have forgotten all the painful lessons learned there.

Russia may have a hefty supply of old tanks, but it’s supply of competent ground forces absent a general mobilization (which Putin has thus far refused to authorize) is quite finite. Russia has even resorted to forced mobilization of troops in the area it occupies, a desperation tactic likely to make things worse for an army that already suffers from low morale.

Says ISW:

The Ukrainian government and military are furthermore discussing the battle of Severodonetsk in increasingly confident terms and are likely successfully blunting the Russian military’s major commitment of reserves to the grinding battle for the city. While Russian forces may still be able to capture Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and Ukrainian forces are likely more degraded than Haidai’s statements imply, Ukrainian defenses remain strong in this pivotal theater. The Russian military has concentrated all of its available resources on this single battle to make only modest gains. The Ukrainian military contrarily retains the flexibility and confidence to not only conduct localized counterattacks elsewhere in Ukraine (such as north of Kherson) but conduct effective counterattacks into the teeth of Russian assaults in Severodonetsk that reportedly retook 20% of the city in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian government’s confidence in directly stating its forces can hold Severodonetsk for more than two weeks and willingness to conduct local counterattacks, rather than strictly remaining on the defensive, is a marked shift from Ukrainian statements as recently as May 28 that Ukrainian forces might withdraw from Severodonetsk to avoid encirclement.

The fog of war and the paucity of competent in-theater reporting makes things hard to analyze, but at this point in time, it appears that Ukraine is winning the Battle of Severodonetsk.

Memorial Day: Remembering Samuel David Dealey

Monday, May 30th, 2022

This Memorial Day we honor the memory of Navy Commander Samuel David Dealey, AKA The Torpedo Toting Texan, AKA Destroyer Killer, the Medal of Honor winner whose submarine the U.S.S. Harder sank five Japanese destroyers in five days off the Sulu Archipelago during World War II.

Here’s his official Medal of Honor citation:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as commanding officer of the U.S.S. Harder during her 5th war patrol in Japanese-controlled waters. Floodlighted by a bright moon and disclosed to an enemy destroyer escort which bore down with intent to attack. Comdr. Dealey quickly dived to periscope depth and waited for the pursuer to close range, then opened fire, sending the target and all aboard down in flames with his third torpedo. Plunging deep to avoid fierce depth charges, he again surfaced and, within nine minutes after sighting another destroyer, had sent the enemy down tail first with a hit directly amidship. Evading detection, he penetrated the confined waters off Tawi Tawi with the Japanese Fleet base six miles away and scored death blows on two patrolling destroyers in quick succession. With his ship heeled over by concussion from the first exploding target and the second vessel nose-diving in a blinding detonation, he cleared the area at high speed. Sighted by a large hostile fleet force on the following day, he swung his bow toward the lead destroyer for another “down-the-throat” shot, fired three bow tubes, and promptly crash-dived to be terrifically rocked seconds later by the exploding ship as the Harder passed beneath. This remarkable record of five vital Japanese destroyers sunk in five short-range torpedo attacks attests the valiant fighting spirit of Comdr. Dealey and his indomitable command.

Dealey survived that action, but his sub was lost sometime on August 24, 1944 somewhere off the Philippines. “In the final analysis, Dealey had sunk 16 enemy ships, with total tonnage of 54,002 tons (according to the postwar accounting – enough to make him number five among U.S. submarine skippers in World War II.)”

Here’s a video:

These Are The Cope Cages

Sunday, May 29th, 2022

It looks like we finally have an answer to just what the “cope cages” seen on some Russian tanks were meant to accomplish:

The Red Effect guy went back and looked at the original specs for the original factor-manufactured slat armor purpose-built for advanced Russian tanks like the rear of the Armata, and found it was spaced to capture incoming RPG-7 round and prevent effective formation of the penetration jet based on extensive studies of which gap sizes worked best. However, the cope cages added at the last minute before the invasion didn’t follow any of the meticulous research that went into the real slat armor. The result is armor that provides some minimal protection to drone-dropped munitions, but probably won’t do squat against a Javelin, and brings with it some new drawbacks (like a high profile that makes them easier to spot, and impeding easy crew escape.

Russo-Ukrainian War Video Tank Update for May 26, 2022

Thursday, May 26th, 2022

It’s been three months since Russia invaded Ukraine, and there’s more tank news coming out as the main theater has shifted to eastern Ukraine. Here’s a (mostly) video roundup of the news:

  • We hear a lot about Russia has 20,000 tanks (or some other crazy high number) in reserve. This guy went through satellite photos of all Russian tank storage yards and came up with an estimate of 6,000, only 3,000 of which appear as if they could be made battle ready. (A lot of the photos show hulks with their turrets off).

  • Did Russia’s First Tank Army lose 130 tanks in the Battle of Kharkiv alone?

  • Ukraine appears to have knocked out a Russian T-90M tank, the most modern Russian tank that’s actually been fielded:

    (There’s still no sign of Russia’s T-14 Armata in-theater.)

  • Update: As of this writing, Russia has lost 729 tanks in Ukraine, and a total of 4,134 “vehicles” (including helicopters, UAVs, and even towed artillery pieces) in theater.
  • Is Russia demothballing T-62s to send to Ukraine?

    Remember, the Soviets stopped manufacturing the T-62 in 1975, the same year that the Captain & Tennille and “Rhinestone Cowboy” topped the charts and The Rocky Horror Picture Show debuted in theaters…

  • Ukraine has also taken delivery of the Brimstone anti-tank missile from the UK:

  • Not a tank, but built on a T-72 chassis, is the Russian T-2 “Terminator,” which sports duel 30mm auto-cannons for close support of tanks in urban warfare.

    That does look like it would but a world of hurt on urban defensive positions, but won’t be any more immune to NATO-sourced Ukrainian antitank weapons, and they reportedly only have a handful in-theater.

  • Also not a tank: Ukrainian forces take out a thermobaric (AKA “vacuum bomb”) missile launcher:

  • Turns out that the Russian military’s catastrophic performance in Ukraine is not a great advertisement for its weapon systems, and India is canceling some big deals.

  • And in tank news related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. is accelerating it’s delivery of M1A2 Abrams tanks to Poland, to back-fill for the Soviet-era tanks Poland gave to Ukraine.
  • Ukraine Launches Successful Counteroffensive

    Sunday, May 15th, 2022

    Ukraine appears to have won a decisive victory by driving Russian forces from the second largest city of Kharkiv and is now pushing them all the way back to the Russian border.

    The Russian military has likely decided to withdraw fully from its positions around Kharkiv City in the face of Ukrainian counteroffensives and the limited availability of reinforcements. Russian units have generally not attempted to hold ground against counterattacking Ukrainian forces over the past several days, with a few exceptions. Reports from Western officials and a video from an officer of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) indicate that Moscow is focused on conducting an orderly withdrawal and prioritizing getting Russians back home before allowing proxy forces to enter Russia rather than trying to hold its positions near the city.

    Ukraine thus appears to have won the Battle of Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces prevented Russian troops from encircling, let alone seizing Kharkiv, and then expelled them from around the city, as they did to Russian forces attempting to seize Kyiv. Ukrainian forces will likely attempt to disrupt at least the westernmost of the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Belgorod and Russian forces concentrated around Izyum, although Russia is using several GLOCs, including some further away from current Ukrainian positions than any Ukrainian counteroffensive is likely to reach soon. The terrain east of current Ukrainian positions may also favor the Russians attempting to defend their GLOCs, as large water features canalize movement and create chokepoints that the Ukrainians would have to breakthrough.

    Russian troops continued efforts to advance all along the periphery of the Izyum-Donetsk city salient but made little progress. Russian forces attempted a ground offensive from Izyum that made no progress. We had previously hypothesized that Russia might give up on attempts to advance from Izyum, but the Russians have either not made such a decision or have not fully committed to it yet. Small-scale and unsuccessful attacks on the southern end of the salient near Donetsk City continued but made no real progress.

    The main Russian effort continues to be the attempt to encircle Severodonetsk and Lysychansk from the north and from the south. Russian troops attacking from Popasna to the north made no significant progress in the last 24 hours. Russian forces coming north-to-south have failed to cross the Siverskyi Donets River and taken devastating losses in their attempts. The Russians may not have enough additional fresh combat power to offset those losses and continue the offensive on a large enough scale to complete the encirclement, although they will likely continue to try to do so.

    Yeah, about that river crossing. There’s an awful lot of post-battle evidence that was an absolute disaster.

    Attempting to cross a river near Bilohorivka, east of Lyman, a Russian mechanized battalion got blasted out of existence by Ukrainian artillery:

    The better part of a Russian army battalion — 50 or so vehicles and up to a thousand troops — in recent days tried to cross a pontoon bridge spanning the Siverskyi Donets River, running west to east between the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.

    Ukrainian artillery caught them at the river bank — and destroyed them. The rapid destruction of around three dozen tanks and other armored vehicles, along with the bridge itself, underscores Russia’s deepening woes as its troops try, and fail, to make meaningful gains in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.

    “We still assess Russian ground force in the Donbas to be slow and uneven,” an unnamed U.S. Defense Department official told reporters on Tuesday. The Russians’ inability to cross rivers might explain their sloth.

    The Siverskyi Donets, which threads from southern Russia into eastern Ukraine then back into Russia, is just one of several water barriers Russian battalions must cross in order to advance west into Ukrainian-held territory. According to the Ukrainian armed forces’ general staff, the battalion that got caught at the pontoon bridge apparently was trying to strike at Lyman, a city of 20,000 that lies 17 miles west of the doomed crossing.

    The Ukrainian army’s 17th Tank Brigade spotted the bridge, perhaps using one of the many small drones that function as the army’s eyes over the battlefield. The 17th is one of the army’s four active tank brigades. Its line battalions operate T-64 tanks and BMP fighting vehicles. But it was the brigade’s artillery battalion with its 2S1 122-millimeter howitzers that apparently got first crack at the Russian bridge.

    The 17th’s shelling destroyed at least seven T-72 and T-80 tanks, 17 BMPs, seven MT-LB armored tractors, five other vehicles and much of the bridging unit itself, including a tugboat and the pontoon span.

    It’s unclear how many Russians died or were wounded, but it’s worth noting that no battalion can lose three-quarters of its vehicles and remain capable of operations. In one strike, the Ukrainians removed from the battlefield one of the roughly 99 Russian battalion tactical groups in Ukraine.

    Proving that some people (or institutions) don’t learn from their mistakes, Russia compounded their disasterous stupidity by trying the exact same thing again, with the same results.

    Russia has made another failed attempt to cross a Donbas river where an entire battalion was wiped out by Ukrainian artillery – losing more men in the process with survivors forced to swim to safety.

    Putin’s troops were trying to rescue men and vehicles that had got stranded on the wrong side of the Donets River, near Biolhorivka, after the first attempt on May 8 ended with their pontoon bridges being sunk by an artillery barrage that destroyed dozens of armoured vehicles and may have killed more than 1,000 troops.

    But their rescue mission was found out and subjected to the same fate. Fresh satellite images taken near Biolhorivka show yet another sunken pontoon bridge along with half a dozen destroyed or abandoned vehicles.

    Russia has lost more than 70 vehicles and seen two infantry battalions mangled in four days of attempts to bridge the river.

    Here’s some decent drone footage of the aftermath:

    Conducting a river crossing under enemy fire has always been a difficult undertaking, which is why Clausewitz devoted two chapters to the topic. Even the most basic combined-arms operations are difficult to carry out under the best of circumstances. Difficult operations become impossible ones if you’re stupid.

    Ukraine Artillery Gets A GPS Boost

    Wednesday, May 11th, 2022

    The U.S. and other countries are sending M777 155mm howitzers to Ukraine.

    American M777 howitzers could prove a major factor in turning the tide against Russian forces in the ongoing invasion of Ukraine thanks to their precision and power.

    The howitzers are field artillery pieces that Ukrainian forces are already using to shell the Russians and represent an improvement on the equipment that the country’s military previously had.

    The U.S. has begun sending 90 M777 Howitzers, while Australia is sending six and Canada is providing four. The M777s are the towed howitzers currently used by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. They have a maximum range of 15 miles and require a crew of eight to 10 people.

    Illia Ponomarenko, a defense reporter with The Kyiv Independent, tweeted on Tuesday: “M777s are already in Donbas, engaging Russian lines – confirmed!”

    Snip.

    The M777 Howitzers generally fire precision-guided Excalibur rounds that use the Global Positioning System (GPS) to home in on targets and it is expected that Ukraine will have been provided with these rounds. Canada was reportedly providing Excalibur shells, according to an AFP report on April 25.

    Here’s more background on the M777:

    A few brief takeaways:

  • Using aluminum and titanium, they weigh half what the M198 they’re replacing weighed. This means they’re fare more air-portable (at least for the U.S., slung from an Osprey).
  • Each costs about $4 million.
  • Contrary to the article above, the video asserts they only need a crew of five.
  • Fires seven rounds a minute.
  • Excalibur shells cost about $70,000 each. Pricey, but way cheaper than a Tomahawk cruise missile.
  • Here’s a “heavy on dramatic music but light on details” video of an Excalibur round hitting a target 65 klicks away.

    Did Ukraine use their new American-gifted, GPS-guided howitzer shell to take out a Russian general? Peter Zeihan (yep, him again) makes this case in this short video:

    Some of Zeihan’s analysis seems a little bit out there, but this one seems right on the cutting edge of plausibility, as we’re now able to do with artillery shells what once took guided missiles or smart bombs. But I don’t think Americans necessarily had to be involved in the targeting. It’s entirely possible that good signals intelligence pinpointed his location, or even just honed in a promising Russian communication cluster and hit General Valery Gerasimov as a stroke of good luck. Also, I should point out that Gerasimov’s death has not yet been confirmed.

    But yes, it’s quite plausible that we and/or Ukraine can pinpoint the locations of Russian generals in theater and drop precision munitions on their heads from 25 miles away…

    Russia’s Decline And Existential Crisis

    Monday, May 9th, 2022

    The Russian May Day parade has come and gone without Putin announcing either and end to the invasion of Ukraine, or a mass mobilization. So expect more of the same for the immediate future.

    Lots of people have speculated on why Russia invaded Ukraine when it did. One reason floated is that they had to act now before the demographic crash makes such action impossible.

    “One hundred and forty-six million [people] for such a vast territory is insufficient,” said Vladimir Putin at the end of last year. Russians haven’t been having enough children to replace themselves since the early Sixties. Birth rates are also stagnant in the West, but in Russia the problem is compounded by excess deaths: Russians die almost a decade earlier than Brits. Their President is clearly worried that he’s running out of subjects.

    It’s a humiliating state of affairs because Russian power has always been built on the foundation of demography. Back in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville foresaw that Russia would become a world power, because “Russia is of all the nations of the Old World the one whose population is increasing most rapidly”. The only other country with its population potential was the United States. De Tocqueville prophesised that, “Each one of them seems called by a secret design of Providence to hold in its hands one day the destinies of half the world.” A century later, they were the world’s two uncontested superpowers.

    At the beginning of the 20th century, Russia’s population was 136 million, and was still booming, just as those of other European powers started to slow. Germany’s population was 56 million, excluding its colonies, and the threat of ever-larger cohorts of Russian recruits into the Tsar’s ranks haunted Germany’s leadership; historian and public intellectual Friedrich Meinecke fretted over the “almost inexhaustible fertility” of the Slavs while Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg complained that “Russia grows and grows and lies on us like an ever-heavier nightmare”. This pressure was probably the decisive factor in Germany’s 1914 leap in the dark. German Secretary of State Gottlieb von Jagow wrote to the German ambassador in London as the storm was gathering that “in a few years, Russia will be ready … Then she will crush us on land by weight of numbers.”

    In the First World War, it turned out, numbers were not enough to compensate for Russian industrial and organisational inferiority. But by the Second World War, Russia’s numeric superiority had exploded. Despite the horrors of Civil War and Bolshevism, the nation’s population grew at about three times the speed of Germany’s in the opening decades of the century. The army had an endless supply of soldiers, the military infrastructure an endless supply of workers, giving the country a decisive edge in the Forties. Vast spaces and appalling weather helped, but ultimately it was the endlessness of Russian manpower which ground down the Wehrmacht in what was perhaps the most epic military struggle of all time. Field Marshall Erich von Manstein complained as he faced Russia’s armies: “We confronted a hydra: for every head cut off, two new ones appeared to grow.”

    But if demographic prowess buttressed Russian power then, population decline has undermined it in the years since. Most nations have developed out of the high birth and death rates seen throughout most of human history: as mortality and then fertility falls, first the population expands, then it flattens; eventually, it may contract. But in Russia this process has taken place with a vengeance.

    At the time of its dissolution, the Soviet Union was the home of 290 million people, 50 million more than the USA. Today, the Russian Federation has less than half that number — and less than half of the USA’s current total. In large part, this is the result of the loss of non-Russian republics, including Ukraine (which at the outbreak of the current conflict had a population of 43 million). But in the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period, the country also collapsed into an orgy of suicide and alcoholism, particularly affecting the country’s men.

    One journalist in Russia at the time wrote about how “the deaths kept piling up. People … were falling or perhaps jumping, off trains and out of windows; asphyxiating in country houses with faulty wood stoves or in apartment with jammed front door locks … drowning as a result of driving drunk into a lake … poisoning themselves with too much alcohol … dropping dead at absurdly early ages from heart attacks and strokes”. By the early years of this century, life expectancy for Russian men was on par with countries such as Madagascar and Sudan.

    It’s hard to fight for the future when you’re unwilling to show up for it.

    Peter Zeihan (yeah, that guy again) argues that, despite their numerous setbacks, the Russians aren’t going to give up.

    A few takeaways:

  • Russia has always suffered from inferior technology, which is why they were humiliated in the Crimean War.
  • “But they will never stop until they have to, or they are forced to.”
  • “The Russians see this as an existential crisis. They will fight until they can’t.”
  • “This is going to last months, probably years.”
  • Russia’s current goal: “The complete obliteration of all civilian infrastructure” in Ukraine.
  • Russians consider anyone that doesn’t flee a fighter to be shot on sight.
  • They’ve killed at least 50,000, probably closer to 100,000.
  • Zeihan asserts that Russians are trying to plug traditional invasion corridors into Russia. “There are two of those corridors on the other side of Ukraine, one that goes SW into Romania, and one that goes NW into Poland.”
  • Since we know that the Russians intention is not to stop in Ukraine and is to go into multiple NATO countries, we know that that fight between American and Russian forces is destined to happen, and we now know how it will end: The Russians will be obliterated and they’ll be faced with a simple choice: A strategic retreat across the entire line of contact all the way back to Russia, maybe even further, or escalate to involve nukes, since the Russians see this as an existential crisis, that’s a fight we have to prevent. And so the United States specifically, and NATO in general is sending any weapon system that we possibly can that can be carried or put in a truck.

  • “If we can’t kill Russia in Ukraine, nukes come into play.”
  • “If you’re Poland and you’re Romania, you know ultimately the Russians are coming for you that changes your math and that changes the risks you’re willing to take, and if you border Poland or Romania, same general thing.”
  • “If we can get Predators and Reapers into the Ukrainians hands, they can blow up the Kirch Strait bridge, and then all of a sudden the Crimea is completely cut off. And from a war point of view, that would be fantastic because most of the gains the Russians have made have been out of Crimea.”
  • Russia has to win in Ukraine because “This is their last chance.”
  • I have significant doubts that Zeihan’s “plugging historical invasion gaps” is the driver for this conflict, mainly because such terrain gaps can be overcome in a more modern, dynamic geospatial war envelope by use of air, land, heliborn and remote-piloted combatants. Tactically still very significant, strategically less so. I think Russian chauvinism despises the very idea of a free and independent Ukraine, and lot of Putin decisions seem to be driven by ego. Pro-natalist policies like tax and welfare incentives seem a much better way to deal with their looming population crash than a risky invasion. But Putin makes all sorts of stupid calculations. And seeing his army’s performance in Ukraine would cause a sane man to back away from open conflict with NATO.

    But Zeihan’s theory that the U.S. and NATO see this as a once-in-a-lifetime chance to defang Russia short of a direct conflict with NATO countries strikes me as correct.

    Update: 6.8 x 51mm Yes, TVCM No

    Saturday, May 7th, 2022

    In a previous post, I made the assumption that the army’s decision to go with 6.8 x 51mm for its Next Generation Squad Weapons (NGSW) program meant they had selected the True Velocity 6.8 x 51mm TVCM round.

    That appears not to be the case:

    About 3:40 in, he says the army choose not to go with the bullpup and it’s polymer ammo, so presumably TVCM is out of the picture for now. Instead the new round will use bimetallic steel-brass hybrid ammunition manufactured Remington. On the other hand, he says the “Lake City Ammo Plant” is in Utah, when it’s actually in Independence, Missouri, so some grains of salt are in order.

    If you have any additional information, leave it in the comments below.

    Switchbladeapalooza

    Thursday, April 28th, 2022

    Sometimes serendipity writes your blog post for you. I literally had just finished watching this video about U.S. Switchblade drones being sent to Ukraine when an NRO article on the same topic showed up in my in-box.

    It’s an interesting video, but the title is false advertising, as it says nothing about how effective the drones are against helicopters.

    Basically there are two variants of the Switchblade drone:

  • The Switchblade 300: Range 10 km, Endurance 15 min, Weight 5.5 lb (2.5 kg), Speed Cruise: 63 MPH, Dash: 100 MPH and it fits inside rucksack (includes payload, launcher, transport bag), launches from a tube like a knee-mortar, cost of $6,000.
  • The Switchblade 600, a much larger loitering drone designed for harder targets (including armor) with a 1.8 meter launch tube:

    Switchblade 600 represents the next generation of extended-range loitering missiles, delivering unprecedented RSTA support and featuring high-precision optics, over 40 minutes of loitering endurance, and an anti-armor warhead for engaging larger, hardened targets at greater distances.

    As an all-in-one, man-portable solution, Switchblade 600 includes everything required to successfully plan and execute missions and can be set up and operational in less than 10 minutes. Equipped with class-leading, high-resolution EO/IR gimbaled sensors and advanced precision flight control, Switchblade 600 empowers the warfighter with quick and easy deployment via tube-launch, and the capability to fly, track and engage non-line-of-sight targets and armored vehicles with precision lethal effects without the need for external ISR or fires assets.

    Patented wave-off and recommit capability allows operators to abort the mission at any time and then re-engage either the same or other targets multiple times based on operator command.

    Whether it’s from fixed defensive positions, combat vehicles with integrated organic precision fire, or air-launched applications, Switchblade 600 provides field commanders with a multi-mission loitering missile system capable of multi-domain operations.

  • No cost given for the Switchblade 600, but reportedly lower than the Javelin’s $250,000, and it has much greater range.

    Both are suicide drones, diving into their targets.

    The drones are manufactured by AeroVironment, whose CEO fled from the Soviets as a child.

    When he was a young teenager, Wahid Nawabi would go to the roof of his family’s home in Kabul and watch the Soviet helicopters flying in the distance.

    For most of his childhood, Afghanistan had been peaceful and increasingly prosperous. But that all changed after the nation’s democratic government was overthrown by Marxist military officers in 1978 in the Saur Revolution. In December 1979, the Soviet troops invaded, plunging the country into what has become 40 years of war, violence, and instability.

    In 1982, Nawabi and his family fled. Nawabi, then only 14, led his three younger sisters on a harrowing 48-day journey to escape the war-torn country to reunite with their parents in India.

    Because of that experience, Nawabi said he feels a personal connection with the more than 5 million refugees who have fled Ukraine in the wake of this latest Russian invasion. Now as an American and as the chief executive of AeroVironment, a leading provider of military-grade fighter drones, Nawabi said he has a moral obligation to aid the Ukrainian defense effort.

    “We need to help the Ukrainians get their freedom back,” Nawabi told National Review. “I’ve gone through that experience. It’s heart-wrenching for me.”

    Last month, the U.S. government sent 100 of AeroVironment’s Switchblade drones to the Ukrainians, part of a massive weapons package. Switchblades have been described as “kamikaze drones,” because after they lock on to their target, they fly in and explode. The Switchblade 600, which can fly for more than 40 minutes with a 25-mile range, is designed to take down tanks and other armored vehicles. The smaller Switchblade 300, which weighs less than six pounds and can be carried in a backpack, is meant for smaller targets.

    He’s also donated 100 Quantix reconnaissance drones to Ukraine.

    This also gives me an excuse to link this other NRO piece on how drones are changing warfare.

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown the world drones’ power to change the way wars are fought. America should take note.

    The most unlikely hero of the war in Ukraine has been a drone — or, to use the Pentagon’s preferred term, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2, a medium-altitude, long-endurance drone that’s 21 feet long with a 39-foot wingspan, can stay aloft for 24 hours at a stretch. It also carries a lethal punch: a “smart” munition that has been taking out Russian armored and supply columns and helping to grind the Russian ground offensive to a halt.

    Meanwhile, civilian clubs of Ukrainian drone enthusiasts have weaponized their much smaller, commercially made drones — including Chinese-made DJI machines — by flying them above ridgelines and buildings to conduct reconnaissance on enemy units and send the information back to Ukrainian artillery units and other commanders. According to the Independent, Ukrainian officers have even been traveling to Poland to learn how to do the same thing with their military UAVs.

    In short, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is showing the world how drones will change the way wars are fought going forward. The question now is: Will our military realize that UAVs as the airpower weapon of the future, or will the lessons of Ukraine be pushed aside and forgotten?

    A lot of U.S. military organizations are getting into drones in a big way, so I’m betting more the former than the latter.

    There’s a related issue that needs to be confronted first, however. Why are the Ukrainians relying on drones made in Turkey and China instead of American drones? It’s true that we are planning to provide Ukraine with Switchblade “kamikaze” drones, which are small enough to be carried in a backpack and explode when they hit their target, and training a small number of Ukrainians to use them. But there’s much more in the way of drones that the U.S. could be offering Ukraine, and the fact that we are not explains why we’re still behind in realizing the potential of UAVs as an airpower weapon.

    First, our ability to export our best and most valuable drones — e.g., the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper or the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk — is hampered by an international agreement known as the Missile Technology Control Regime, which unaccountably treats unmanned-aircraft technology like ballistic-missile technology. I have written before about how this treaty limits U.S. exports even to allies such as the UAE, who as a result have to rely on Chinese-made UAVs instead.

    Second, there is an association in the minds of voters and policy-makers between drones and the war on terror, which has limited the leeway Pentagon strategists have to embrace the full potential of these revolutionary and disruptive weapons. For example, right now the Air Force is planning to retire an entire fleet of one of our best long-range intelligence-gathering tools, the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 remotely piloted surveillance aircraft, most of which are under ten years old and still in very serviceable shape. The stated reason for their retirement is that they can be shot down by highly advanced anti-ballistic-missile systems. But by flying at altitudes where they are less vulnerable to those systems, they could still serve as the bedrock of an extended intelligence-sharing network, allowing the U.S. and its allies to keep watch over the Black Sea, Iran, the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea, and North Korea. They could even be shared with our NATO allies and Ukraine through a lend–lease agreement designed to create such a network.

    In the future, squadrons of armed UAVs have the potential to be used for close air support and full-scale air campaigns against enemy ground forces on a much larger scale than they have been in Ukraine — and for airborne ballistic-missile defense. But right now, NATO should be flying large U.S.-made and fully weaponized UAVs such as the Reaper from Poland into Ukraine and handing the controls over to the Ukrainians.

    There’s no question that drones are going to be a big part of future warfare, not least because a drone is a lot cheaper than a tank, a helicopter or a fighter aircraft. I would imagine that in 20-30 years, we’re going to see AI-driven autonomous drone swarms unleashed in a combat area to wreck havoc on enemy units. It takes a while for armies to find the proper middle ground between “We can use planes to drop oats to the horses” and Wild Billy Mitchell’s “Airpower will overwhelm all other military units” advocacy.

    The Russo-Ukranian war is giving an awful lot of militaries chances to test out their theories of drone warfare in real combat conditions.