Thermoclines of truth, where valid information can’t make it to the top of organizations because telling unpleasant truths is discouraged, has been an ongoing concern of the blog. Simon Whistler and his crew have taken a look at the Russian military, and it appears that it’s thermoclines of truth (and endemic corruption) all the way down.
He starts out with a discussion of the current state of the war:
“Once upon a time, the Russian military was supposed to be the second most powerful on Earth. Today, the Russian military isn’t even the most powerful military in Ukraine.”
“From the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the nation’s armed forces have been subjected to a strange humiliation ritual, partly because of the cunning and innovation of their Ukrainian rivals, but partly because of the sheer bumbling idiocy of their own commanding officers.”
“Russia’s consistent ability to find its way into new and catastrophic blunders also definitely doesn’t hurt. As painful as the last several years have been for the Russian military, the situation has deteriorated even further in 2026. Russia is losing troops at an unprecedented rate, expending more lives, more munitions, and more state wealth. Even as they capture less and less territory each month, his battlefield commanders are making increasingly poor decisions, and they’re openly lying to their higher-ups when their attacks inevitably fall apart.”
“In the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin and his inner circle are being fed a constant stream of false victories when on the front lines, Russia’s spring and summer offensive has fallen flat on its face.”
“But however incompetent the Russian military might seem, the reality is even worse. Because underneath Ukrainian victories and underneath obvious blunders by Moscow, the Russian military has built a hidden corrupt machine where every battlefield catastrophe puts rubles into Russian pockets.”
“As the time of writing, Russian forward progress on the battlefield has basically halted in an overall sense. But Russia is still pushing forward in some areas just as it is being pushed back in others.”
“The graft and exploitation we’re going to describe today isn’t an accident. It exists because of the war in Ukraine. It feeds off the war in Ukraine. And the people who benefit most from the exploitation are the same people with the greatest incentives to ensure that the war continues even after any honest outside appraisal would suggest that Russian gains aren’t even close to being worth the cost.”
“Just a few short months ago, Russia was moving assets into position for what was intended to be a major push centered on the city of Sloviansk in the partially occupied Donetsk oblast. Taking Sloviansk wasn’t going to be easy for the Russians.”
“But even before there was time for the spring offensive to get underway, Ukraine revealed what’s turned out to be a decisive advantage. a new arsenal of mid-range drones, including an American-made model called the Hornet, plus the tactical advances to use those drones effectively. Dubbed the Martian 2 by Russian soldiers, the Hornet is piloted partially by artificial intelligence, and it’s completely impervious to Russian jamming because it navigates by using that AI to read the terrain visually instead of relying on GPS or remote control. The onboard AI can identify targets and even handle the final kill process all by itself. Flying at a range of over a 100 km, they’re practically silent until just before impact.”
“They’re extremely cheap, and they’ve been used by Ukraine less to target Russian troops at the front, and more to target the staging operations that would have created the foundation of a successful offensive. Russian forces have been unable to protect their ammunition stockpiles, their fuel trucks, or their encampments and training grounds away from the front lines.” More on how Ukraine is hammering Russian logistics here.
“Nor is the Hornet the only drone in Ukraine’s arsenal. Recently, Ukraine’s 412th Nemesis Brigade unveiled the Morrigan, another mid-range strike drone that’s optimized to operate significantly behind enemy lines. Those drones have allowed Ukraine to completely diffuse the spring offensive before it ever really got going.”
“Even more important, Ukraine has achieved those results without putting its soldiers at greater risk. Ukraine’s forces are chronically undermanned and perpetually exhausted. And Kiev does not have the ability to go head-to-head with the full strength of a Russian offensive in any one area, but instead it’s completely destroyed the infrastructure Russia needed to create an offensive that wouldn’t collapse under its own weight.”
“As a result, Russian forces near the front are badly isolated, cut off from easy reinforcement and resupply, while the bulk of the killing takes place away from the front lines where Russian troops naturally have their guard down. Ukraine has even expanded its strikes to target the highway network leading across occupied territory and into Crimea where the impact of Ukraine’s bombardment has gotten so bad that the entire region is on the brink of economic collapse. Fuel trucks, trains, and even ferries are unable to reach Crimea. The existing fuel storage infrastructure there has been destroyed and the problem’s only getting worse with fuel shortages now starting to spread across the Donbas.”
“According to the latest frontline reports, mobile drone defense teams are now at risk of running out of fuel. A crisis that would clear the way for even deeper Ukrainian strikes.”
“Better yet for Ukraine, targeting efficiency is improving constantly, to the point that it now takes only a few minutes for Ukrainian forces to spot a new moving target, get a drone on site, and destroy it.”
“Over the last several years, Russia and Ukraine have been engaged in a cycle of mutual innovation, with one side working out new solutions to battlefield problems and gaining a temporary advantage until the other side counters with innovations of their own. This time, however, Russia hasn’t been able to innovate a solution to the new problems that Ukraine has posed.”
“Russian troops are overextended and they have no choice but to hold their positions on the front when really their manpower is needed to defend the territory that Russia has already captured.”
“In the air, Russia still hasn’t found a way to meaningfully engage its air force in the conflict. Besides the use of strategic bombers and MiG-31 fighters to launch long-range cruise missiles, Russia can’t risk using some of its most valuable reconnaissance and command aircraft after Ukraine proved able to use American-made Patriot missiles to bring them down. And the supposedly world-class Su-57 fighter jet is still almost completely absent from contested airspace.”
“Russia’s aerial problem is expected to get even worse by early 2027, when Ukraine will take possession of its first Swedish-made Gripen fighter jets along with a long-range missile, the Meteor, that will have the range to strike Russian strategic bombers as they conduct those missile launches over the water.”
Snipping discussion of the poor state of Russia’s Black Sea fleet and the most recent St. Petersburg strike that we’ve covered in various LinkSwarms.
“Russian air defenses on the home front appear to be on the verge of complete collapse. Ukrainian long-range drones now regularly impact targets that were once unthinkable. From the Baltic Sea oil terminals at Primorsk and Luga to sensitive or highly specialized defense industrial centers located deep in the Russian heartland. Even Moscow has been targeted successfully.
“According to the chief designer at Ukraine’s leading missile innovator Firepoint, a new line of ballistic missiles will soon be operational and capable of hitting Moscow directly.”
“Russia hasn’t been able to meaningfully address the [air defense] problem.”
“As for its attempts to prevent Ukrainian long-range strikes, Russia seems to be unable to hit the command and control centers or the drone stockpiles that enable the campaign. So instead, Russia tries to deter Ukraine by launching long-range strikes of its own, often targeting population centers, energy infrastructure, or dual use facilities instead of going after the Ukrainian military.”
“Just as important [as Ukraine’s strikes], if not even more so, is the incredible consistency with which Russia manages to shoot itself in the foot. Moscow’s original sin, so to speak, is one that the rest of the world has gotten very familiar with. A supreme overconfidence that’s been helping Russia defeat itself from the very beginning. Despite the alternative storylines pushed out by Russian bot farms and repeated, no doubt, in this very comment section [aside: “Hello there, robots”], the idea that Kiev would fall in three days was very much a Russian invention.”
“But much more important than Russia’s original mistake was the fact that Moscow still hasn’t learned its lesson. Military planners and strategists all up and down the Russian military, from the unit level on the battlefield to Vladimir Putin himself, still base their decisions and expectations on an aggrandized version of the Russian military that simply does not exist.”
“Over time that problem is fused with another one. The fact that Russian leaders, again from the unit level all the way to the top, simply refuse to give each other honest assessments of what’s happening. At a certain point, those leaders realized that they could get away with reporting advances, victories, and other good news that didn’t actually exist.”
“The problem often starts small on the front lines. A Russian army captain sends a small unit to plant a flag and takes a few selfies in a contested area before that unit is annihilated in drone strikes. And then the captain sends those selfies to his major, claiming that today his forces took the territory in the picture. That same day, the major gets several similar reports from other captains. So he reports to his colonel that the front line has moved up by a few hundred meters when in reality most of the forces under his command have not moved at all.”
“That’s a throwaway example, of course, but you get the idea. And that news then travels up the chain until it reaches somebody like chief of the general staff of the Russian armed forces, Valery Gerasimov. We put the spotlight on Gerasimov in particular, because this is how you get statements like the one he made this past April, when he claims that Russia had captured a total of 80 settlements and over 1700 square kilometers since the start of the year. According to independent war monitors, Gerasimov tripled the amount of territory that Russia had actually taken. And of course, he failed to measure the territory that Russia had lost.”
“Don’t just take it from us, though. Even Russia’s milblogger class was calling bullshit in the aftermath.”
“But those institutional miscommunications, combined with the Russian military’s inflated perception of itself, combine to form a third problem, a demand for forward progress at all costs.”
“At this point in the war, commanders and higher-ups have gotten very used to the idea that their troops are consistently moving forward, consistently taking territory, and consistently getting Russia closer to victory. But now that lie has become too big to fail. And if individual Russian commanders were to report results that don’t align with that lie in places Russia wasn’t expecting, then they are at risk of being demoted, relieved of duty, or even worse.”
“As a result, each level of Russian leadership places immense pressure on the next level below them, all the way down to the frontline soldiers. Because their commanders need to deliver forward progress. And because their commanders won’t get into any real trouble if they sacrifice more lives in exchange, those frontline troops are at immense risk of being ordered forward into incredibly risky assaults.”
“Of course, it’s not unusual that a soldier on the front line of a major war would face some risk. But there’s a difference between being asked to advance as part of a coordinated push on a well-defined, well-scouted target and being told to sneak into a zone where there’s been no prior scouting and where Ukrainian surveillance and kamikaze drone coverage is expected to be overwhelming. Those are the kinds of situations that Russian soldiers are being ordered into. Not because there’s any expectation that they would succeed, but because their attempt gives their commanders enough plausible deniability to report success.”
Sometimes it works. “But the costs of munitions, funds, supplies, and especially human life are so much greater than the value of what Russia’s actually capturing.”
“Nor does Russia particularly care which soldiers get sent to the meat grinder. More and more sources from within the Russian military report the troops are sent into assault units regardless of their other qualifications, including skilled recruits who could make meaningful contributions to enhance Russia’s overall situation. Soldiers with experience in electrical work, logistics management, and even the medical field, have been reassigned against their will to assault brigades, often without explanation. At times, those reassignments come after they were recruited into the military on the promise that they’d be working with their advanced skill set.”
“Sometimes the reassignments appear to be random, but at other times they’re used as punishment. Soldiers who disobey orders, try to desert, or otherwise anger their commanders are highly likely to be reassigned to units where they’ll be used as cannon-fodder.”
“But let’s circle back to Ukraine’s mid-range drone campaign, because that makes this problem even worse. At the best of times, Russian troops were being sent forward into these high-risk assaults with at least a few things going for them: A little bit of training and prep time, a decently well supplied sustainment infrastructure to keep them alive, a possibility of MedEvac if they’re wounded, and a possibility that reinforcements would soon join them if they survive.”
“Today, though, that entire support infrastructure has been torn to shreds. Yet, the expectation of forward progress still remains. So, these soldiers are still ordered forward, but they’re overexposed, under-supplied, and isolated compared to what was already a bad situation. When they’re wounded, they aren’t evacuated. They die slow, horrific, predictable deaths. To the point that instead of the usual ratio of killed to wounded in modern war, one killed for every three wounded, Ukrainian assessment suggests that Russia’s balance looks more like two soldiers killed for every one wounded.”
“Even worse, the soldiers who are wounded will often be sent back to combat. Every so often, video footage emerges from the front lines depicting soldiers on crutches or in wheelchairs bearing visible shrapnel wounds or dealing with limbs that won’t work like they’re supposed to, forced back into assault units where their death is all but certain.”
“And all of that would be bad enough if Russia wasn’t so insistent on hobbling its soldiers even further. Take the example of frontline drone equipment. According to Russian milblogger sources, the Kremlin recently ordered most combat units to start giving up drones of various models, sending them back to be reassigned to Russia’s dedicated drone forces. That’s despite the fact that the Russian drone forces are not properly dispersed along the front line, and they’re not part of any efficient decision-making infrastructure that would allow them to support Russian troops in real time. So where a Russian platoon might once have been able to use small FPV drones to scout their surroundings or strike Ukrainian targets, they now have nothing. They’re operationally blind and beholden to another branch of the military for support.”
“On paper, Russia has started to fix the issue. Officials in Moscow say that Russia is now producing record numbers of FPV drones. According to the milbloggers, however, these replacement drones are unreliable, ineffective, and of a dangerously low construction quality. Similarly, Russian troops are still reeling from the decision to cut off access to Telegram a couple of months ago, demanding that Telegram be replaced with the state-run Max app, despite the fact that it is insecure, incomplete, and extremely buggy. Maybe Vladimir Putin vibe coded it. The same could be said for the loss of Starlink, a western controlled connectivity service that Russia chose to remain dependent on instead of dedicating the appropriate resources to build its own alternative.”
“If we were to end this episode right now, the situation we’ve described would already be bad enough. A Russian military that’s completely failed to address Ukrainian combat innovations and one that’s consistently made decisions that puts its troops at extreme unnecessary risk. But all too often, when a country or a fighting force seems to suffer from issues so comprehensive and so obviously stupid, that they seem to resist understanding, it’s important to ask another question. Who’s getting paid?”
“If Russia’s obvious incentives are to increase the combat potency of its troops, make legitimate gains on the battlefield, and eventually win the war, then who benefits inside Russia from making sure that that doesn’t happen? To answer that question, we’re going to invite you to think about the war a bit differently for just a minute.”
“Take away the people, the guns, the tanks, the drones, and the territory, and think about Russia’s invasion as a flow of money. That money is being sent from within Russia and funneled into Ukraine. Sent in the form of military equipment, fuel supplies, and direct payments made to Russian soldiers. Then some of that money flows back into Russia as those soldiers paychecks travel to bank accounts or are sent to their families.”
“That flow of funds is partially regulated, but it’s happening in and around an active combat zone, which means monitoring is difficult, and financial transfers have to happen with limited internal oversight or anti-corruption protections. Not to mention that the Russian state isn’t exactly the best at internal oversight.”
“Transactions happen on the aggregate scale of tens of billions of rubles, meaning that even relatively large amounts of missing cash can easily be dismissed as just a rounding error.”
“If you were a person interested in taking money that you could reasonably obtain somewhere within the Russian economy, then the war is the perfect place to do it. You’ve just got to figure out where you can get in the way of the regular flow of funds, whether those funds are headed into the conflict zone or traveling out.”
“Take another look at the problems the Russian military is dealing with and the specter of internal corruption is everywhere.”
“We’ll start with a few examples at the top from people who exert immense power within the Russian armed forces. Take Roman Demurchiev, a major general who serves as deputy commander of Russia’s 20th Combined Arms Army. Over the span of several years, he engaged in regular shakedowns of his subordinates worth the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of US dollars, some of which he passed up to his superiors who expected additional payouts. As he once texted to one of his subordinates, quote, “War is war, but don’t forget about the cash. Get yours. Delete this message later.'”
“Or take the former deputy defense minister Ruslan Tsalikov, who was brought up on bribery, money laundering, and conspiracy charges that alleged he created a gang to steal from the Russian state budget. He was brought down during a wave of prosecutions that surrounded former defense minister Sergey Shoygu.”
“But even though Russia does occasionally prosecute corrupt officials, the Kremlin’s track record dovetails in a very troubling way with the problem we’ve already mentioned. Commanders only tend to come under real scrutiny when they’ve already failed in some way that requires their removal, usually due to battlefield setbacks. From Vladimir Putin’s perspective, the nice thing about everybody in the Russian leadership being so corrupt, is that when it’s time to remove them, it usually doesn’t take very long to dig into their finances and bring legitimate, damning charges against them.”
“But if these commanders understand that they’ll only be scrutinized after they’ve been found to have committed battlefield screw-ups, then they’re heavily incentivized to ensure that their screw-ups don’t become common knowledge. So they push their subordinates harder and they push their subordinates harder still until frontline soldiers are fighting and dying to create an illusion of frontline progress so their commanders can save their skins.”
“Or take another problem we’ve already mentioned, the cheapy and ineffective FPP drones that are being flooded toward the Russian front lines. That decision was the work of Yuri Vaganov, the commander of the Russian unmanned systems forces who was appointed in late 2025. But here’s the thing about Vaganov. He has got zero military experience, zero military education, despite now holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Instead, he owns a very large drone company, the same drone company that’s now guzzling down rubles from state contracts and mass-producing the FPV drones that Russian soldiers are expected to use. Interesting, isn’t it? In essence, this single aspiring oligarch has worked out a way to position himself within both the Russian military itself and the Russian defense industrial complex so that he could give himself a monopoly over drone procurement in the biggest drone war that the world has ever seen.”
“For Russian soldiers, his appointment is a life-threatening catastrophe. But for Vaganov himself, the incentives will be to cut corners, inflate costs, and otherwise pillage as much of Russia’s drone budget as possible.”
“But let’s talk about the other way that money flows through the Russian side of this war, into soldiers pockets, and then ideally back to their bank accounts or to their families. That’s where lower level commanders get their opportunity, because they wield the power to decide who lives and who dies. Take an article published this April by The Economist, where a dozen Russian contract soldiers describe a system where low-level infantrymen will bribe their commanders for a position away from the front and then spend a high share of their remaining wages financing their commander’s lifestyle while carrying out unpaid labor on the side.”
“As one soldier in that article described, troops often start giving up a portion of their paychecks to buy decent drones or body armor or other assets that might, you know, keep them alive. But then also, quote, ‘You’ll pay forever so they don’t send you to the meat grinder.’ Other Russian commanders have purportedly forced troops to pay exorbitant sums to stay alive and sometimes just to avoid being shot on the spot.”
“According to recent reports by exiled Russian journalists, low-level commanders operate more like gang leaders than actual military personnel, in increasingly sophisticated structures that are informed by the high proportion of ex-convicts that now swell the Russian ranks. Often when new troops arrive, commanders confiscate their bank cards and ping codes and threaten violence against those who don’t comply. And when those soldiers are killed, they’re formally reported by their commanders as missing. A change that ensures that money will continue flowing to their accounts.”
“Think of frontline soldiers as a pure revenue stream, and even some of Russia’s most asinine decisions start to make sense. When a soldier is wounded in combat, that soldier still receives a paycheck. And if they can be kept on the front lines, then the process of extortion can continue.”
“When a higher skill Russian recruit shows up in one of those units, commanders know that they’re likely to have more money, partly because they’re going to be paid on a better contract, and partly because they probably have some form of savings squirreled away from their civilian life. Trap those soldiers in an assault unit, and there’s no limit to what they might be willing to pay in order to avoid the meat grinder. But if they seem as if they’ll cause trouble, then the meat grinder is right there for their commanders to use.”
“Those incentives also help explain increasing reports of physical torture of Russian soldiers by their own commanders on or near the front lines, including soldiers who’ve already been wounded. Our own Warfronts team has encountered footage of Russian troops who’ve had multiple limbs amputated due to combat wounds who were then cling-wrapped onto trees and extorted further. Videos like that can be sent to a soldier’s family who will then ends up paying even more to spare the life of a person who’s locked into conscription or contract by the Russian state.” The Western tradition of military service demands leaders who will do just about anything for the men serving under them, while Russian officers torture their subordinates for money.
“Quoting researcher Alexandra Arapova [Russian families] are saying that literally we paid everything to have our father, brother, husband not to be killed. In many cases, superiors, they use torture to take money from the soldiers.”
“As for the scale of the brutality, we can’t know for sure, but judging by the available information, this kind of treatment is everywhere. One Russian exile outlet, Radio Echo, obtained accounts from soldiers like these, and over a 6-month period in 2025, Radio Echo indicated that they had received almost 12,000 complaints of corruption and violence by Russian commanders against their own men.”
“It’s here that we find the real root of Russia’s ongoing military incompetence. Where Ukraine has spent the last four years learning, adapting, and innovating on the battlefield, Russian generals, defense industrial elites, and low-level battlefield commanders have been building a deeply corrupt machine at every level of the Russian armed forces. That machine exists to extract wealth for the direct and personal benefit of people lucky enough to wield power at the expense of frontline soldiers who aren’t so fortunate.”
“In a system like that, where officials aren’t just personally corrupt, but can safely assume that corruption is all around them, reform just isn’t a goal, even if it saves lives. Reform, there is a danger, even an enemy. Because if Russia were to ever fix the incompetence that runs through its armed forces, then it would destroy the machine that Russian incompetence is built to serve.”
“Right now, that status quo demands constant reports of forward progress, by any means necessary. And the Kremlin is willing to pay every ruble in Russia in order to make that happen.”
“But Vladimir Putin’s military is overrun with people who don’t particularly care about conquering Ukraine as long as they know they’ll be set for life in the post-war Russia that comes next. Russian incompetence is getting worse because it’s becoming streamlined and because the Russian leadership has proved that corruption will go unchecked as long as forward progress continues.”
“The incompetence is the point because the longer this situation lasts, the longer this vast corrupt machine can go on making a profit.”
Thermoclines of truth and endemic corruption are the horrifying reality for Russian soldiers, and also a big reason why Ukraine has a real chance to win.
We previous touched on Putin’s thermocline of truth here.
In this week’s LinkSwarm, I briefly touched on how Ukraine is absolutely hammering Russia’s logistics behind the front lines. So here are a couple of videos that go into more detail. First up: Task & Purpose.
“Right now, Ukraine is hammering away at Russia’s logistics in a big way.”
“Over the past several months, Ukrainian forces have been expanding what are being called middle strikes. Drone attacks against Russian logistics, air defenses, command posts, and support areas dozens of miles behind the front line. These attacks have been reported as typically happening between about 30 and 180 km behind the line of contact, which means roughly 19 to 112 miles.”
“They’ve branded this new campaign as ‘The Logistics Lockdown,’ and Kiev says it is allocating another five billion Hryvnias, or about $13 million, to expand their middle strike capabilities against Russian logistics, warehouses, equipment, command posts, and supply routes.”
“These middle strike drones are being used to hit the stuff that keeps the front line alive.”
“Ukrainian units are using systems like the Chaklun-B, B2, and Decrotia drones to hit Russian targets far from the trenches.”
“If a drone can reliably reach 80, 100 or 150 km behind the front, Russia has to reconsider where it places things that used to feel far enough in the rear. Fuel depots, ammo dumps, repair facilities, all those things that we’ve already mentioned may now have to be pulled back, dispersed, hardened, or used for shorter periods of time before relocating.”
“The farther you pull back, the more that you complicate logistics.”
“This is becoming a significant problem for Russia, especially in occupied southern and eastern Ukraine, where these routes connect Russia with occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea. The Institute for the Study of War says that these Ukrainian strikes are hampering Russia’s ability to move personnel and material along key arteries like the M14 Highway from Rostov to Crimea.”
“More recently, Ukraine’s 412th Nemesis Brigade used a so-called new secret strike drone against the R-280 highway, also called by Russian occupation authorities, the Novorossiya route.” Novorossiya is in Russia’s extremely far east, so I think this is probably a joke. “This route runs through occupied Mariupol, Melitopol, and Simferopol, linking occupied southern Ukraine with Crimea and serving as a key logistics corridor for Russian military equipment and supplies. They claimed that these new strike drones destroyed dozens of trucks and fuel tankers and forced Russia to limit heavy equipment movement along the highway.”
“There are also reports about a drone called Hornet. Defense Express reported that Ukrainian forces have used Hornet strike drones against Russian logistics routes at depths of roughly 50 to 150 km. and they describe the system as a fixed-wing UAV associated with visual navigation and target detection or target capture algorithms.”
“If they’re using onboard terminal guidance through AI chips with cameras, then you really can’t jam them through the typical GPS spoofing or GNSS spoofing. So, these might be kind of a secretish weapon that they’re now using AI to guide to the target.”
“But whether the drone is Hornet, Decrotia—” I don’t which drone this is; the drone they’re showing on the screen is usually referred to as Shark; if you know what a “Decrotia” drone is, or how to properly spell it, feel free t0 share in the comments. “—Chaklun-B, B2, or something still being kept out of public view, it doesn’t really matter.”
Skipping over the section on fiber-optic drones, well-covered and I would be flabbergasted if they’re using them for such long strikes.
“Ukraine is showing what happens when cheap and medium-range drones start focusing on boring logistics trucks and support sites far from the front.”
“Logistics wins wars. So Ukraine is trying to and they’re succeeding in making Russian logistics slower, farther away, more expensive, and just more stressful. And if Russia wants to keep attacking and hold on to the ground that it has taken, it still has to solve the same basic problem that every army has always had to solve ever. Getting the right stuff to the right people at the right time.”
From Task & Purpose to the guy who used to present the Task & Purpose videos, here’s Cappy Army on the same topic.
“Ukrainian forces launched a new logistics lockdown campaign that’s systematically crippling Russian supply lines. Ukraine’s focused on destroying Russian supply trucks and disrupting logistics in a new approach that’s now causing severe problems for the Kremlin. As we’ll see today, I want to examine why this approach has experts licking their finger and saying the strategic winds are now blowing in Ukraine’s favor.”
“The reason why Russia’s supply lines are suddenly collapsing is because of a key concept called Battlefield Air Interdiction, or BAI. It refers to the broader military campaign of using air power or drone strikes to isolate the battlefield. It’s the strategy to destroy transportation arteries. BAI is about denying the enemy the use of crucial logistics lines to sustain immediate frontline operations.”
“Abstract concepts like BAI become reality when you look at the highways leading from Russia into Ukraine. They are just lousy with charred husks of Russian armored vehicles that now sit by the side of logistics roads. Footage has been flooding social media showing Ural heavy recovery trucks destroyed with their tires melted by drone strikes. Open source analysts have counted over 200 strikes just on Russian logistics vehicles.”
He too highlights the importance of attacks on the R-280 highway. “Ukraine has increased the rate of these attacks by five-fold in just a few months.”
“How were they able to do such a feat in mass production? Zelensky announced that they’re already mass-producing attack drones in four European countries, Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, and there are plans to expand drone production into Norway and Sweden soon.” Plus expanding domestic production.
Medium range is also where soldiers rotate to and from the front-lines to decompress. “Middle- range strikes remove any feeling of safety for Russian troops. Ukraine now fires over 160 of these middle-range strikes per month, hitting logistics and ammo depots. They hit drone control points and command posts. It’s hard to appreciate how massive this change really is when you think about four times the amount of strikes compared to February.”
“The new mid-range drones have a payload of about 220 lb, 10 times more powerful and accurate than artillery shells.” The drones shown on screen are the FP-2 Fire Point, the AN-196 Liutyi, and the Peklo, none of which go all the way up to 220 pounds. But the new drones are now cost effective for going after logistics trucks.
“The middle range is the priority right now. Because Ukraine is hitting everything that’s feeding Russia’s front line, that constant pressure is causing some serious problems for the Russian army.”
“Ukrainian drone operators say that before middle-range strike campaign went into full gear, Russia was holding large portions of their supplies and ammunition in the range of between 60 to 80 km back from the front line. But now they’ve had to push all of their supplies twice the distance away to 120 km away. When you’re talking about having to feed Russian artillery teams to match their rate of fire of about 10 to 15,000 rounds a day during surge fighting, every additional kilometer moved back from the front is a huge cost.”
“The US government just signed off on a $370 million deal authorizing sending JDAM extended range glide bomb kits to Ukraine. It would send 1,500 of these glide bombs to Ukrainian fighter jets to fire at targets up to 75 kilometers away with 500 pound bombs. This is the kind of weapon system you send to support offensive operations.”
Back to the M-14 attacks. “The attacks have forced Kherson Oblast’s occupation head Vladimir Soldo to sign a decree restricting the movement of civilian vehicles to only Russian military vehicles here. As a result, Russia’s having an even harder time resupplying its entire southern grouping of forces. A Russian affiliated mil-blogger complained that restricting civilian trucks makes it more difficult for them because now Ukraine knows every vehicle on the highway is a military target. They don’t have to worry about hitting civilians if there are no civilians.”
“Artillery once accounted for 70% of casualties on the battlefield. It’s drones that now account for at least 70% of battlefield deaths.”
“Everyone was shocked when Ukraine’s 129th heavy mechanized brigade went on the offensive, assaulting the town of Odradne in Kharkiv. Armored vehicles pushed forward under artillery fire. Drone strikes blasted Russian soldiers out of trenches. Ukrainian infantry cleared out fortified fighting positions. When it was all said and done, it recaptured the town and 22km with it.”
“And it wasn’t a one-off. Ukraine’s ground forces recaptured 400km largely from the southern sector of Zaporizhzhia. Further east, soldiers retook the city of Kupyansk just when it looked like it was about to fall to Russia. These are just a few of the mounting signs that the momentum of the war is shifting.”
“The clearest indication of a shift came in April when the war hit a major milestone. Moscow lost more territory than they gained for the first time in two years, a net negative of 116km.”
“Russia’s forces [are] slowly losing the ability to sustain the war at the same intensity and momentum.”
There are signs Ukraine is preparing for a new offensive. “The Ukrainian army has started switching from a system of loose brigades with little coordination to a new command level of army corps. The concept puts about five brigades or 80,000 Ukrainian troops, all their drone units, artillery guys, infantry, intelligence officers under one unified command for the first time. The new roughly 18 to 20 something different corps, each report to one of four regional commands. It’s a clear sign that Ukraine is preparing to regain operational maneuver warfare capability.”
“What it means is Ukraine is finally moving away from the old Soviet era model to a NATO style command. This allows for joint planning between brigades for the first time.”
“The old brigade-centric army was good for holding front lines and plugging gaps. Now they will be able to coordinate assault actions. Ukraine is now offense maxing their army’s organization. Another indicator that Ukraine is preparing for localized counterattacks is that in 2026, Ukraine started building two new mechanized brigades, the 160th and the 50th. They’re converting old light infantry formations into mechanized units that ride into battle.”
Skipping over Clausewitz on the importance of morale. “When the Ukrainian war became longer than World War II and less than 1% of territory had been captured since 2023, this was a major turning point in the minds of many Russian troops.”
“Manpower and recruitment are becoming a problem for the Kremlin. Ukraine has come up with the new way to reduce the manpower advantage. They came up with a campaign to kill or wound 50,000 Russian troops per month. Then they gamified it so soldiers get points for every confirmed kill.” We covered the Gamification of the Russo-Ukrainian War here.
“Now evidence shows that the casualty rate is creeping up and retention and recruitment is creeping down. Russia is now struggling to match this rate with fresh recruits. Most open-source analysts have concluded that they’re losing more than they’re recruiting. Most analysts put the numbers at somewhere around 30,000 troops being recruited per month and roughly 35,000 lost each month.”
“This kind of high casualty rate has a negative impact on troops morale.”
“A 24-year-old Russian soldier was fighting in the Donbas last year and he deserted from his unit and spoke to the New York Times about it, saying they spent a month trying to establish a foothold in a small town outside of Pokrovsk, and his unit would move in and then they would get wiped out by Ukrainian drones. Then his commander ordered them to try something different, to start infiltrating in two-man teams to slip through. They eventually had some success with this, and then he deserted to avoid being sent on more assaults.”
Ukraine is also having manpower issues, “and this has led to widespread use of robotic ground systems. In April, Ukraine seized the battlefield position without humans on the ground for the first time of the war, and an estimated 20,000 missions were conducted by ground robots.”
Ukraine seems to winning the technology war. A “one-two punch of the Kremlin blocking telegram messaging apps for many Russian troops because they were unable to monitor it. But it has kneecapped Russian soldiers communications.”
“Then the second punch was Starlink was turned off for Russia by Elon Musk…After access was cut off, Russian commanders were forced to rely on inaccurate maps. They deployed with no means of communication or the ability to use their drones.”
“European countries have agreed to send $100 billion for Ukraine through 2027 to keep their war economy running. When Viktor Orban was defeated in his election recently in Hungary, it unlocked this because he was cock-blocking/vetoing for the deal for years.”
We’ll see if Ukraine can turn their technological advantage in mid-range strikes into more offensive gains.
Since August, Russian forces (including a large contingent of Wagner Group mercenaries) has been assaulting the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut in the Dunba with almost monomaniacal focus, despite very little to show for their efforts. Despite small successes for Russia (a few streets here, an industrial area there, even capturing a garbage dump on the edge of town was listed as a major Russian achievement a few weeks ago) almost all of Bakhmut has remained stubbornly in Ukrainian hands.
However, over the last day or two, tentative reports having come in that not only have Russian attacks slacked off, but that Ukrainian forces have recaptured not only just about all the hard-won territory Russia had gained in the city itself, but that some outlying areas were liberated after months of control. At the same time, there are numerous, persistent reports that Russia is running low on artillery shells in the region. (To be fair, repeated predictions that Russia must be running low on dumb ammunition of various types have failed to pan out heretofore.)
Here Suchomimus reports that Russia has been pushed out of the industrial areas of Bakhmut in the east, and that Ukraine has recaptured most of the town of Opytne to the immediate southeast.
Russian forces’ rate of advance in the Bakhmut area has likely slowed in recent days, although it is too early to assess whether the Russian offensive to capture Bakhmut has culminated. Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut area have managed to slightly slow down the pace of the Russian advance around Bakhmut and its surrounding settlements, with one claiming that Ukrainian forces pushed back elements of the Wagner Group to positions they held days ago. Ukrainian social media sources previously claimed that Ukrainian forces completely pushed Russian forces out of the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut around December 21. ISW has also assessed that Russian forces made slightly fewer overall advances in the Bakhmut area in November and December combined as compared to the month of October.
Russian forces will likely struggle to maintain the pace of their offensive operations in the Bakhmut area and may seek to initiate a tactical or operational pause. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on December 24 that Russian forces currently lack the necessary stockpile of artillery munitions to support large-scale offensive operations and that sustaining defensive operations along the lengthy frontline in Ukraine requires the Russian military to expend a significant number of shells and rockets daily. The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force released an interview on December 24 with a Ukrainian servicemember in the Bakhmut area detailing that Russian forces have been conducting an extremely high pace of assaults on Ukrainian positions in the area with little corresponding progress. The Wagner Group’s reported heavy losses in the Bakhmut area in recent weeks have also likely strained Russian forces’ current operational capabilities in the area.
The Russian military’s personnel and munitions constraints will likely prevent it from maintaining the current high pace of offensive operations in the Bakhmut area in the near-term. Russian forces previously allocated significant resources in a meat-grinder effort to seize Severodonesk and Lysychansk in spring–summer 2022. Russian forces culminated after capturing Lysychansk in early July and failed to capture neighboring Siversk to the east or Slovyansk to the northeast. The Russian military’s fixation with conducting a highly attritional campaign to achieve the tactical objectives of capturing Severdonetsk and Lysychansk ultimately undermined the Russian military’s ability to achieve its larger operational objective to envelop Ukrainian forces in a cauldron along the E40 highway and eventually drive to Donetsk Oblast’s western administrative borders. Russia’s relentless and costly push on Bakhmut may also degrade Russia’s ability to pursue long-term objectives in the Donbas theater.
Another sign Russia may be running out of shells in Bakhmut: A tweet from Wagner Group saying just that, while also calling the Chief of Russian General Staff a “faggot.”
Russian mercenaries from Wagner insult the Chief of Russian General Staff with obscene words and complain that they have no ammunition pic.twitter.com/7LYvN2MzHr
As usual with Ukraine news, all this is very tentative, and could be reversed to tomorrow. But right now it looks like Ukraine has the upper hand in Bakhmut.
A lot of questions have popped up about the much-talked about Ukrainian counteroffensive for Kherson, among the biggest of which is “Where is it?”
Anders Puck Nielsen, a military analyst at the Royal Danish Defence College, has some answers. What Ukraine is doing right now is not a traditional counteroffensive, but a prolonged attrition strategy to degrade Russian logistics and forces.
Some takeaways:
Usually you want some level of operational secrecy, but Ukrainian officials have been talking up the “Kherson Offensive” since at least June.
“I think it was meant as a kind of trap. It was not enough for Ukraine to liberate Kherson, but they also wanted to take out a lot of Russian soldiers in the process.”
“This area west of Dnipro is probably the one area in the whole operational theater where Ukraine has all the advantages, and Russia has all the disadvantages. So it is better for Ukraine to fight as many Russians as possible in this area than it is to fight them later on somewhere else.”
Putin was faced with withdrawing or reinforcing. “And of course Putin was not going to give up Kherson without a fight, so Russia started pouring reinforcements into the area.”
The phrase that describes Ukraine’s strategy is “accelerated attritional warfare.”
Ukraine’s strategy: “To cause the Russians to have as many casualties as possible rather than defending specific pieces of terrain. And then what we see around Kherson is that Ukraine has figured out a way to accelerate that attrition among the Russians by luring them into a trap where they send reinforcements into an essentially undefendable area.”
So the frontline isn’t moving, but “the Ukrainians expect them to run out of supplies eventually, and then it will be easy.”
“I talked about the bridges, and how Ukraine can target the Russian logistics by destroying the bridges. And I also talked about how this war seems to have entered into what can be called the third phase of the war.”
Phase 1: Russia invades, tries to take Kiev, and fails, because their logistics suck. Advantage Ukraine.
Phase 2: Russia grinds out gains in Dobas, with logistics adequate to the task. Advantage Russia.
Phase 3 (current): Ukraine starts degrading vulnerable Russian forces in the south. “So they are going very hard after the Russian logistics systems. And that is what the attacks in Crimea and other places long behind the frontlines are about.”
“But the point of the attacks is exactly to make the Russian logistics as complicated as possible. To make the supply lines as long as they can possibly be. Because Russia now has to pull the ammunition depots even further away from the frontline, and they have to use trucks instead of railroads and stuff like that.”
“And the supply lines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts are actually beginning to look very much like they did in northern Ukraine in phase one of the war.”
“That accelerated attrition [and] the sustained attacks on the Russian supply lines will mean that Ukraine can be in a pretty good position after the battle of Kherson. They will have all the territory west of the Dnipro. And it will be very easy to defend afterwards, because Russia is not going to come back across the river once they have lost that foothold. And then Ukraine will have freed up all those forces from the Kherson area that they can redeploy for a new counteroffensive somewhere else. So that could for example be an attack from the north down toward the Melitopol area. And Russia would be in a really tough position for such a fight. Because they don’t have more forces they can move from the Donbas area, because they already did that for the battle for Kherson. And they don’t have good logistics because Ukraine will have been hitting the infrastructure for months.
Conclusion: There’s no guarantee of Ukrainian success, but it’s hard to see what Russia can do to counter this strategy. “After that Ukraine will redeploy and make a new counteroffensive somewhere else. Perhaps a Christmas offensive or something like that.”
Winter offenses are always a hard sledding in this part of Europe, but the rest of his analysis accords pretty closely with what we’ve been seeing.
Ukraine appears to have won a decisive victory by driving Russian forces from the second largest city of Kharkiv and is now pushing them all the way back to the Russian border.
The Russian military has likely decided to withdraw fully from its positions around Kharkiv City in the face of Ukrainian counteroffensives and the limited availability of reinforcements. Russian units have generally not attempted to hold ground against counterattacking Ukrainian forces over the past several days, with a few exceptions. Reports from Western officials and a video from an officer of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) indicate that Moscow is focused on conducting an orderly withdrawal and prioritizing getting Russians back home before allowing proxy forces to enter Russia rather than trying to hold its positions near the city.
Ukraine thus appears to have won the Battle of Kharkiv. Ukrainian forces prevented Russian troops from encircling, let alone seizing Kharkiv, and then expelled them from around the city, as they did to Russian forces attempting to seize Kyiv. Ukrainian forces will likely attempt to disrupt at least the westernmost of the ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Belgorod and Russian forces concentrated around Izyum, although Russia is using several GLOCs, including some further away from current Ukrainian positions than any Ukrainian counteroffensive is likely to reach soon. The terrain east of current Ukrainian positions may also favor the Russians attempting to defend their GLOCs, as large water features canalize movement and create chokepoints that the Ukrainians would have to breakthrough.
Russian troops continued efforts to advance all along the periphery of the Izyum-Donetsk city salient but made little progress. Russian forces attempted a ground offensive from Izyum that made no progress. We had previously hypothesized that Russia might give up on attempts to advance from Izyum, but the Russians have either not made such a decision or have not fully committed to it yet. Small-scale and unsuccessful attacks on the southern end of the salient near Donetsk City continued but made no real progress.
The main Russian effort continues to be the attempt to encircle Severodonetsk and Lysychansk from the north and from the south. Russian troops attacking from Popasna to the north made no significant progress in the last 24 hours. Russian forces coming north-to-south have failed to cross the Siverskyi Donets River and taken devastating losses in their attempts. The Russians may not have enough additional fresh combat power to offset those losses and continue the offensive on a large enough scale to complete the encirclement, although they will likely continue to try to do so.
Yeah, about that river crossing. There’s an awful lot of post-battle evidence that was an absolute disaster.
Attempting to cross a river near Bilohorivka, east of Lyman, a Russian mechanized battalion got blasted out of existence by Ukrainian artillery:
The better part of a Russian army battalion — 50 or so vehicles and up to a thousand troops — in recent days tried to cross a pontoon bridge spanning the Siverskyi Donets River, running west to east between the separatist provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine.
Ukrainian artillery caught them at the river bank — and destroyed them. The rapid destruction of around three dozen tanks and other armored vehicles, along with the bridge itself, underscores Russia’s deepening woes as its troops try, and fail, to make meaningful gains in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.
“We still assess Russian ground force in the Donbas to be slow and uneven,” an unnamed U.S. Defense Department official told reporters on Tuesday. The Russians’ inability to cross rivers might explain their sloth.
The Siverskyi Donets, which threads from southern Russia into eastern Ukraine then back into Russia, is just one of several water barriers Russian battalions must cross in order to advance west into Ukrainian-held territory. According to the Ukrainian armed forces’ general staff, the battalion that got caught at the pontoon bridge apparently was trying to strike at Lyman, a city of 20,000 that lies 17 miles west of the doomed crossing.
The Ukrainian army’s 17th Tank Brigade spotted the bridge, perhaps using one of the many small drones that function as the army’s eyes over the battlefield. The 17th is one of the army’s four active tank brigades. Its line battalions operate T-64 tanks and BMP fighting vehicles. But it was the brigade’s artillery battalion with its 2S1 122-millimeter howitzers that apparently got first crack at the Russian bridge.
The 17th’s shelling destroyed at least seven T-72 and T-80 tanks, 17 BMPs, seven MT-LB armored tractors, five other vehicles and much of the bridging unit itself, including a tugboat and the pontoon span.
It’s unclear how many Russians died or were wounded, but it’s worth noting that no battalion can lose three-quarters of its vehicles and remain capable of operations. In one strike, the Ukrainians removed from the battlefield one of the roughly 99 Russian battalion tactical groups in Ukraine.
Proving that some people (or institutions) don’t learn from their mistakes, Russia compounded their disasterous stupidity by trying the exact same thing again, with the same results.
Russia has made another failed attempt to cross a Donbas river where an entire battalion was wiped out by Ukrainian artillery – losing more men in the process with survivors forced to swim to safety.
Putin’s troops were trying to rescue men and vehicles that had got stranded on the wrong side of the Donets River, near Biolhorivka, after the first attempt on May 8 ended with their pontoon bridges being sunk by an artillery barrage that destroyed dozens of armoured vehicles and may have killed more than 1,000 troops.
But their rescue mission was found out and subjected to the same fate. Fresh satellite images taken near Biolhorivka show yet another sunken pontoon bridge along with half a dozen destroyed or abandoned vehicles.
Russia has lost more than 70 vehicles and seen two infantry battalions mangled in four days of attempts to bridge the river.
Here’s some decent drone footage of the aftermath:
Conducting a river crossing under enemy fire has always been a difficult undertaking, which is why Clausewitz devoted two chapters to the topic. Even the most basic combined-arms operations are difficult to carry out under the best of circumstances. Difficult operations become impossible ones if you’re stupid.
It’s been almost a month since we did the last general Ukraine-Russo War update, so let’s catch up. The biggest change is that Russia has given up on trying to take Kiev and has withdrawn all their forces in the northwest:
And here’s a timelapse map of the ebb and flow of the war:
Keep in mind the usual caveats (the map is not the territory, the difficulty of sifting truth from propaganda, etc.), but it does appear that not much has changed in the overall contours of the war since Russia’s withdrawal from the northwest. But ISW is reporting that Russia has instituted combined arms offenses, something we didn’t see much of during the opening stages of the war, and have reported minor but steady advances by Russian forces.
Here’s a roundup of war news, some of it several weeks old but potentially still of interest.
Storage tanks at a major oil depot in the Russian city of Bryansk exploded early on Monday. Was Ukraine responsible?
Before you answer, consider first that this is only the latest disaster to afflict Russian critical infrastructure near the Ukrainian border. Another oil depot on Belgorod was targeted by a Ukrainian helicopter strike in early April. Prior to that, Russian railway lines near the border were sabotaged. A Russian missile research center and a chemical plant also recently suffered explosions.
These incidents all appear to fit well with Ukraine’s military strategy.
Bryansk, 62 miles from the Ukrainian border, is beyond the range of most drone systems in Ukraine’s possession. Unconfirmed video from the Bryansk incident indicates the sound of a missile in the terminal attack phase. Considering this noise and Bryansk’s relative distance from Ukraine, short-range ballistic missiles may have been responsible. Regardless, the explosion will disrupt energy replenishment efforts for Russian military forces in Ukraine.
The explosion also dilutes Putin’s credibility in claiming that his war on Ukraine is not a war, but rather a limited “special military operation.” When stuff keeps blowing up in Russian cities, it’s hard to convince the residents of said cities that Russia isn’t at war.
That takes us to Ukraine’s evolving military strategy. With Russia forced to scale back its goals in the conflict, Ukraine has escalated its offensive operations in what’s known as the “deep battlespace.” This involves targeting of Russian logistics and command and control units deeper behind the front lines. Employing Western-provided drones and highly mobile small units, Ukraine is degrading and demoralizing Russia’s war machine.
It’s not a wild leap to expect that Ukraine is now applying these same tactics over the border inside Russia. This is likely a result of British training of the Ukrainian military.
Don’t start none, won’t be none…
More structure hits inside Russia:
Another video of derailed train carrying Russian armor, allegedly just outside of Bryansk pic.twitter.com/D8Nb1mB5Vp
The slickly produced video opens with an unlikely scenario. The year is 2023. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is the president of Belarus. And Belarus has been invited to join the European Union.
“Fantasy? Not at all. The war Vladimir Putin started against Ukraine gives us a unique chance to change history,” the narrator says. “Russia is already losing. And without our bases, railways, and borders, Putin’s defeat will be significantly hastened.”
The video calls on Belarusians not only to demonstrate against the war, but also to deny Russia the assets they need to prosecute it from Belarusian territory. “Blockade the aggressor at bases and supply routes. Deny them food, fuel, and freedom of movement,” it says.
In fact, this is more than a call for action. It is actually describing something that is already happening. Since Putin’s Ukraine War began on February 24, at least 52 Belarusians including 30 railway workers have been arrested on charges of treason, terrorism and espionage for disrupting the movement of Russian troops and military hardware, according to the Belarusian human rights group Viasna.
Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s autocratic regime in Minsk is so concerned with what has become known as “The Rail War” that it has also declared the Telegram channel of the “Association of Railway Workers of Belarus” an extremist organization.
This railway rebellion is the most dramatic example of how Putin’s war against Ukraine is changing the political dynamic in Belarus. Lukashenka’s slavish submission to Putin, allowing the Kremlin leader to use his country as a staging ground for Russia’s assault on Ukraine, has unnerved and angered this nation of 9.4 million people.
The only thing being Mussolini to Putin’s Hitler is going to get you is being strung up by your heels.
The Ukrainian battlefield of Putin’s War is incredibly lethal. In the sixty days since Putin’s three-to-four day invasion of Ukraine started, Russia has had 1,700 vehicles or major pieces of equipment destroyed and another 1,200 captured. Tanks losses numbered 560 destroyed and 214 captured, while losses of infantry fighting vehicles/armored personnel carriers come to 930 destroyed and 330 captured. These are not estimates; these are floor numbers that have been counted and geocoded. By the same methodology, Ukraine has lost at least 200 tanks destroyed and 70 captured, along with 790 infantry fighting vehicles/armored personnel carriers destroyed and 90 captured. No one really knows how many vehicles have been lost to combat damage or wear-and-tear….
By way of scale, Russia entered the war with about 120 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG)) representing approximately 75% of the Russian Army’s combat power as well as the cutting edge of that power. Keep in mind that this is not a Russian Army affair; there is Naval Infantry from as far away as Vladivostok as well as troops of the Rosgvardiya, or the National Guard of Russia….
The tank losses alone represent all the tanks in 70 BTGs.
This lethality is why the Ukrainian government has been screaming for more weapons from anyone who has them. Not just munitions, like Javelin or Starstreak, but tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery.
Snip.
As incredible as it may seem, Ukraine now outnumbers Russia in the number of tanks on the battlefield.
Thanks to European resupplies, Ukraine’s military now has more tanks on the battlefield than Russia does two months into the war, according to the Pentagon.
The delivery in recent weeks of Soviet-era T-72 tanks to Kyiv from the Czech Republic and other European Nato allies has effectively eroded Russia’s advantage, experts have claimed.
“Right now, the Ukrainians have more tanks in Ukraine than the Russians do, and they certainly have the purview to use them,” an unnamed senior US defence official told reporters on Thursday.
Ukraine’s armed forces have previously claimed Russia has lost more than 680 of its tanks, the majority of which were destroyed, while some changed hands after being found abandoned.
So that’s from the Pentagon. May be true, may not be true. It’s possible Russia has cannibalized other units or (some two months into the conflict) refurbished mothballed tanks.
Talk about timing! This piece, published April 10, argues that Ukrainian anti-ship missiles will make the Black Sea unsafe for Russian warships.
The way I see it (and I am in good company), the Russians will not only be lucky not to be routed from all their gains made since February 24, but are at serious risk of losing the Donbas—Luhansk and Donetsk—and Crimea, as well as having most of their current army destroyed. Talk of some sort of possible Grand New Russian Offensive in the east seem fantastical to me and others who put the big-picture together: with which troops, and of what quality (what elite unites haven’t sustained significant casualties?), and with what equipment? Will it be the remaining equipment that has already proven ineffective and easily destroyed especially by Ukraine’s western-supplied anti-tank and anti-air missiles? The units shattered and barely functional or not functional that managed to escape from Ukraine’s counteroffensives? Non-shattered but non-elite units that have also been deployed for months and are still exhausted? Conscripts almost finishing their terms? New conscripts who have never seen combat??
Yet as major Russian ground fronts have collapsed, attention is drawn away from an area where, with not much additional assistance from the West or perhaps even with aid already just now promised, Ukraine can easily achieve a resounding victory that would combine massive substantive defeats for the Russians with tremendous symbolism and loss of prestige for Russia in addition to greatly affecting the way ground combat plays out in the south and east.
I am talking about the near-annihilation of the Russian Navy presence in the Black Sea, including almost the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet.
Snip.
Russia has cannibalized its other three fleets (Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, and Pacific Fleet) and its one flotilla (the Caspian Flotilla) to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet and support its Ukraine effort, and, with Turkey closing the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to the Mediterranean in early March to incoming military vessels under the 1936 Montreux Convention, that Caspian Flotilla is the only possible source of reinforcements to what is in the Black Sea, coming in though canal from the Caspian Sea, as other possible reinforcements coming in from the Mediterranean are now blocked.
As far as sizable surface ships in the Black Sea, by mid-March there were only twenty-one, according to a “senior defense official”: just twelve naval-combat-focused ships along with nine amphibious assault ships, accompanied by numerous far smaller patrol and support boats and, of course, submarines that are harder to track.
But that total was before the daring Ukrainian strike on the morning of March 24, which mysteriously destroyed a large Russian amphibious ship, the now sunk Alligator class Saratov,docked in the eastern Ukrainian Russian-occupied port of Berdyansk. Two other large amphibious ships, the Caesar Kunikov and Novocherkassk, were damaged and fled the port.
So scratch one, Russia is down now to just twenty major surface vessels.
That is not a large number.
I had finished a version of this section before yesterday’s information that the UK and U.S. would be sending anti-ship missiles to Ukraine. But, for now, keep that low number of major Russian surface ships in mind when considering following:
For starters, as my old War Is Boring editor David Axe notes in detail, Ukraine has been developing its own anti-ship cruise missile, the Neptune, since 2013. It began testing in 2018, and has since tested successfully repeatedly. The system has a range of 174-180 miles (280-300 km) and operates as a sea-skimmer, flying low and close to the water to make it almost undetectable until just before it hits its target. It was scheduled to be deployed this month with a full division of six launchers, seventy-two cruise missiles (more than three for each remaining major Russian surface vessel), and accompanying radar systems. But Russia’s seems to have derailed this timetable, and it is unclear when it will be able to safely deploy its system and have it and its crews be operational. Details are few and far between as Ukraine obviously would want to keep Russia guessing.
Secondly, this must have been part of the discussion over the past month between Ukraine and NATO nations, and taking into account the issues with the Neptunes, NATO has been working to arm Ukraine with anti-ship missiles for weeks. Reports from early April indicated United Kingdom Prime Minister Boris Johnson has been keen to arm Ukraine with anti-ship missiles, that these would most likely be truck-mounted versions of its U.S.-supplied Harpoon missiles, its version having a range of 80 miles (128 km) and also capable of hitting land targets (Ukraine has actually been asking for these for some time).
Snip.
Russian Naval forces are hardly concentrating along the Turkish coast of the southern Black Sea: they are mostly, perhaps virtually all, off the coast of Ukraine to varying degrees in the northern half of the Black Sea or Sea of Azov, trying to offer support and, presumably, debating whether or not to launch amphibious assaults, particularly on Ukraine’s main port in its West, Odesa (the fact that they have not yet shows how confident they are in such an assault’s chances of success; Putin may not care much about throwing his soldiers’ lives away recklessly, but his larger naval vessels are expensive and take time to construct)…
Ukraine would have excellent coverage with many of these systems. For most of these systems, many, perhaps even all, of Russia’s twenty remaining large warships in the region—including Russia’s most powerful naval ship, the Slava class cruiser Moskva—are well within striking range from Ukrainian-controlled territory. Even if Ukraine will receive only Harpoons, though they have much smaller range than the Neptunes, they should effectively prevent any Russian naval assaults if the Russians are smart (but they are not). After such Harpoons would arrive, they would still secure Ukrainian coastline and push Russian naval operating areas far from Ukrainian-controlled coastal territory (unless Russia is stupid and keeps its ships within range, inviting their destruction) all while, presumably, the Neptune rollout, training, and deployment finishes, possibly in just a few weeks if the invasion has not derailed Ukraine’s timetable.
At this crucial moment, when Russia is desperate to turn the tide in the face of its massive failures, the soon-to-arrive unspecified anti-ship missiles have effectively killed any realistic Russian hope of a successful naval assault on Odesa or elsewhere on the Crimea-to-Moldova (where Russia illegally has some military forces in another breakaway region, Transnistria) corridor. These missiles will either prevent any assault from happening or virtually doom any would-be assault. This new round of aid with these anti-ship missiles has, thus, basically closed the gap between the Russians collapsing on three fronts and the Neptunes’ presumed deployment.
If (and hopefully when) Neptunes can be eventually deployed, a large portion of the entire Black Sea, including both the west and east coasts of Russian-occupied Crimea—where many of Russia’s naval vessels are based and resupplied—as well as the Sea of Azov, would be vulnerable.
A Russian warship that was damaged by an explosion on Wednesday has sunk, Russia’s defence ministry has said.
Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, was being towed to port when “stormy seas” caused it to sink, according to a ministry message.
The 510-crew missile cruiser was a symbol of Russia’s military power, leading its naval assault on Ukraine.
Kyiv says its missiles hit the warship. The United States says it also believes it was hit by Ukrainian missiles.
Moscow has not reported any attack – it says the vessel sank after a fire.
The blaze caused the explosion of the warship’s ammunition, Russia says, adding that the entire crew were later evacuated to nearby Russian vessels in the Black Sea.
How bad is the truth when the lie is “No, we screwed up and sunk our own ship through gross incompetence!”
Ukraine not only shot down a Russian Su-35 fighter, they recovered the long-range targeting system and are turning it over to the U.S. for analysis. And the Chinese use the same system…
Thread: “Where is the Russian Army artillery ammunition they are fighting their “Donbas Set Piece Battle” with?”
Congress is asking the Pentagon whether the Defense Production Act, or DPA, should be invoked to ensure supplies of Javelin anti-tank missile systems, as well as Stinger surface-to-air missiles, continue to flow to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have used both of these weapons to great effect in their ongoing defense against Russia’s onslaught. At the same time, questions are growing about the U.S. defense industry’s ability to meet increased demand for these missiles, not just from Ukraine, but in the event that the U.S. military needs to acquire more of them quickly during a major future conflict.
“To produce more of the Javelins, Stingers – all the stocks that we are using and diminishing and running low on and our allies, as well – shouldn’t we be applying the Defense Production Act?” Sen. Richard Blumenthal, a Connecticut Democrat, asked Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at a Senate Armed Services Committee budget hearing today.
This is a stupid question. Production for high tech weapons is dependent on a wide variety of high tech components, any of which might be from outside the country, and which might or might not have considerable production lead times. If they used custom, MilSpec chips, the wait time right now is about 26 weeks on average, and the fab may or may not be based in the U.S. Optical components may also have long lead times.
Another day, another Russian general whacked. “The authorities confirmed the death of the deputy commander of the 8th Army, Major General Vladimir Petrovich Frolov. About it informs press office of the governor’s office.”
Russian troops demoralized?
BREAKING: Demoralised Russian soldiers in Ukraine have accidentally shot down their own aircraft, sabotaged their own kit and refused to carry out orders, Sir Jeremy Fleming, director of the UK spy agency @GCHQ, will reveal in a speech in Australia on Thursday. 1/
It seems these Russian soldiers truly thought that. This entire war is being fought on propaganda – for false pretenses. Its not only Putin who doesn’t know what’s going on. This mayor, Ivan Fedorov, said the soldiers were completely unprepared and clueless.
well we’re here to help the Russian speakers snd he said 95% of us speak Russian and we’re fine. They said they heard that the World War II veterans of the town had been beaten in the patriot day and he said au contraire they’re venerated and there’s not very many of them left.
Putin’s call for more troops has not had the desired effect so far of inspiring Russians to enlistment offices. It’s certainly not convincing veterans to return for more of the “special military operation” non-war that Putin’s not winning, even if he isn’t quite losing it yet:
Yelena’s son, Pavel, was serving in the Far Eastern Amur region when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24. Almost immediately, his unit was sent to the front, and he served almost 40 days in combat. Then his unit was sent back to Russia to regroup, Yelena told RFE/RL’s North.Realities. When his unit was preparing to return to Ukraine, Pavel refused.
“If he doesn’t want to go back, am I supposed to push him, to tell him, ‘Grab your weapon and go,’” Yelena said. “Those who haven’t been there have no right judge those who have.”
Yelena’s son is one of a significant but unknown number of Russian contract soldiers who have refused to either fight in Ukraine in the first place or who have fought and do not want to return.
Lawyer Pavel Chikov, founder of the Agora legal-aid NGO, has written on Telegram that more than 1,000 military personnel and National Guard troops from at least seven regions have refused to go to Ukraine.
Monday’s front pages are dominated by stories of alleged atrocities carried out by the Russian military on civilians in Ukraine.
Under the headline “Horror in Bucha”, the Guardian reports mass graves have been found in the town north-west of the capital Kyiv, as well as evidence of the killing of civilians in the nearby towns of Irpin and Hostomel.
The attacks have led Ukraine’s foreign minister to brand Russia being as being worse than infamous terrorist group Isis, the Metro reports.
The paper says the atrocities were “evidenced in pictures too horrific to print”, including the public execution of handcuffed people and civilians who had been driven over by tanks.
The Daily Mirror leads with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s accusations that the deaths amount to genocide and that the Russian military was attempting an “elimination of the people” of Ukraine.
The paper adds the executions apparently carried out by retreating troops led to 300 civilians being killed in Bucha alone.
The Times reports world leaders have demanded Russian President Vladimir Putin should face more stringent sanctions and be prosecuted for war crimes.
The paper says its reporters visited the sites of two “execution-style” massacres in Bucha, where Russian troops were also accused of rape and of booby-trapping dead bodies with explosives.
Some 280 dead bodies were found littering the streets of Bucha, near Kyiv, after the Russians left. Video is graphic, be aware. pic.twitter.com/DBP4lSaB9e
“Exiled oligarch calls on other Russian tycoons to break with Putin. Mikhail Khodorkovsky says they must denounce the invasion of Ukraine if they want to be above suspicion of collaborating with the Kremlin.” Good luck with that, but I wouldn’t bet the hastily privatized collective farm on it…
Especially when they turn up dead.
It is not the same report as days ago, Vladislav Avayev on 18th April https://t.co/xWqkRPuiVf
Well, I didn't see this coming: the vice-president of Gazprombank apparently left Russia, joined Ukraine's territorial defense forces, called the war an international crime and claimed that the recent death of former Gazprombank deputy president Vladislav Avayev was a murder. https://t.co/cdHDO30sQf
“Russia’s 331st Guards Parachute Regiment is considered ‘the best of the best’, but BBC Newsnight has been tracing the casualties as the unit battles through Ukraine.”
You know my summary above about how Russia has abandoned Ukraine’s northeast? Well, they reportedly plastered Sumy with an artillery barrage today, so take all generalities with a grain of salt.
I totally want these:
Mriyas and Javelins: new Ukrainian toys. I bought a Mriya for my kid, because every child needs to have a Dream pic.twitter.com/h4hkfMVaEp
Ukraine is often depicted as David up against Russia’ Goliath, but this analyst argues the situation is closer to the reverse when it comes to in-theater manpower:
Some takeaways:
Russia didn’t anticipate Ukraine undertaking mass mobilization, and now finds itself outnumbered. “There’s a fair chance the number will get even more lopsided.”
Estimates for losses on each side are hard.
Guestimate: 11,000 Russians dead, 9,000 Ukrainians.
Add in captured troops and those wounded enough to be out of combat yields about 39,000 Russians out of action. “That’s a lot. It’s about 21% of the Russian starting force.”
Not referenced in the video, but: “Pentagon officials say a 10 percent casualty rate, including dead and wounded, for a single unit renders it unable to carry out combat-related tasks.” Though I’ve seen higher numbers (20-30%) elsewhere.
Ukrainian losses are probably around 6%.
“Russian losses have a higher percentage of professional soldiers.”
Offensive operations produce higher casualties than defense.
“Ukraine is vast. It’s bigger than France. [It] had more than 40 million people before the war.”
By March 15, Ukraine had hit its planned reserve call-up troop level of 130,000. Add in volunteers, foreign fighters, National Guard, etc., Ukraine may have as many as 400,000 troops (with various levels of training) under arms.
Ukraine could potentially have 750,000 troops under arms by July.
“Russia is unable to seriously increase the number of its troops in Ukraine. That is because Russia is evidently fearful of sending its conscripts into battle.”
After a small number of conscript units got mauled, Putin promised that no more conscripts would be sent.
The “Russia has a million man army” figure is misleading. Ground troops only total some 360,000 troops across the entire country, many of which are conscripts.
Russia can’t afford to pull every single competent ground troop from every corner of its country and send them to Ukraine. He could maybe get another 10-20,000 professional troops, but those would only be compensating for existing losses.
Russia has 35,000 local fighters in Donbas, but they’re not equipped to go on big offensives.
Belarus is unlikely to get involved, and may be more trouble than it’s worth, because their army is heavily made up of conscripts. “Fewer than 10,000 troops.” And the political repercussions could be costly.
But for Russia to have some chance of continuing to push inside Ukraine under the present conditions – where arms aid is flowing into Ukraine, and where morale issues are widespread within the Russian army – many more soldiers are an absolute must. If Russia does decide to send in conscripts or even the national guard, those would likely be kept back, to keep securing the taken areas. But for that the frontline needs to fully consolidate, without so many Ukrainian pockets of resistance. And still, the domestic political fallout of such a move might be deeply destabilizing.
Russia currently seems to be unwilling to increase its numbers in Ukraine above 200,000.
“For Ukraine, this war IS what the great patriotic war was for the Soviet Union in 1941.”
“With time, further troops and more weapons, Ukraine’s army may try to pressure even those consolidated Russian positions in the east and south.”
If there’s a flaw in this analysis, it’s that Putin could change his mind about using conscripts in a heartbeat. But Russia has had huge problems feeding and resupplying it’s existing army. Until that problem is fixed. more conscripts would mean throwing more badly-trained and ill-equipped troops into the meat grinder.
Despite last week’s announcement that Russia was going to confine operations to the eastern part of Ukraine, there seems to be a lot of activity around Kiev, possibly of “one last push” variety, though Ukrainian forces have retaken Irpin, and Russian forces have reportedly finally taken Mariupol.
Vladimir Putin has already declared the ‘end’ of the war in Ukraine, officials in Kyiv have claimed, matching the same date Russia celebrates defeating the Nazis in World War Two.
The general staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said Russian propaganda ‘imposes the idea that the war must be completed before the 9th of May 2022’.
Russia holds an extravagant victory day parade in Moscow’s Red Square on that date every year to mark Nazi Germany’s surrender and the end of the Second World War.
In a Facebook post, the general staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said: ‘According to the available information, among the personnel of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, propaganda work is constantly being carried out, which imposes the idea that the war must be completed before the 9th of May 2022.’
Ukrainian forces retake control of irpin, which is northwest of Kiev right at the edge of Hostemel Airport.
Ukrainian intelligence is warning that Russia may attempt to bifurcate the country. This is could very well be part of a pivot to a less ambitious strategy that Moscow is framing as their original intent, which is a lie.
Still, this makes sense as trying to secure a large part of Donbas, or more realistically from the Dnipro River to the south to somewhere east of the Vorskla River to the north, is a far more attainable goal than taking the entire country or even half of it. This would be sold by Putin as a measure to provide security to the newly-recognized (by Russia) ‘republics’ of Donetsk and Lugansk in Ukraine’s far east, but it could possibly allow Russia to maintain a land bridge to Crimea and control every port on the Sea of Azov. These separatist republics may soon ‘vote’ to actually join the Russian Federation, which would give further pretext to such an operation.
Above all that, it would give Russia a major foothold to degrade, undermine, and outright attack Ukraine over the long haul. It would also be better situated than ever to launch a new invasion of more territory to the west in the future under such a setup.
Some realism from Zelensky:
to launch counteroffensives large enough to regain the strategic initiative. The Russians have suffered a strategic defeat and tactically adapted from failing to achieve their original operational goals, but the Ukrainians can’t push much across the left bank of the Dnieper. /
Russian morale is poor. “Professor Michael Clarke, former director of the Royal United Services Institute think tank, said: ‘The Russians are making almost every tactical mistake it is possible to make.'”
Are Russian troops fragging their own officers? It’s certainly possible, given how unpopular the war is and how ill-prepared Russian troops were for the invasion, but I’d treat this report with several grains of salt. Speaking of things that need to be taken with grains of salt…
Ukraine has lost at least 74 tanks—destroyed or captured—since Russia widened its war on the country starting the night of Feb. 23.
But Ukraine has captured at least 117 Russian tanks, according to open-source-intelligence analysts who scrutinize photos and videos on social media.
In other words, the Ukrainian army might actually have more tanks now than a month ago—all without building a single brand-new tank or pulling some older vehicle out of storage.
The Russians meanwhile have captured at least 37 Ukrainian tanks—a sum inadequate to compensate for the roughly 274 tanks it is believed to have lost to all causes.
1. If something sounds too good to be true, it probably is. 2. I believe the Russia loss numbers are probably a good floor, given their poor preparation and numerous reports of lack of fuel. But I suspect the Ukrainian loss numbers are probably low. 3. A captured tank is not necessarily a usable, fieldable tank. That said, it is easier for Ukraine and Russia to field each other’s captured armor that most belligerents, given both have the same Soviet roots.
Putin claims he’s come to save the Russian world and the Russians from Nazism — but he’s mostly bombing Russian-speaking cities. Kherson, Mariupol, Odessa, Kharkiv, these are all cities where the majority of the population speaks Russian.
The fact that a big portion of the current Ukrainian leadership is of Jewish descent is no accident — they are fighting for a new, contemporary Ukraine. We want to live like normal people, not like animals: not to be poor, not to be under someone’s thumb, or someone’s boot. We don’t want to be dominated.
Putin doesn’t believe that Ukrainians exist. And he can’t let the new Ukraine state stay alive — he can’t let it slip away from him. So he has to derail the project. He has tried everything. The fact that he had to go to war is already proof that he wasn’t successful, that he couldn’t achieve his goal in any other way.
Another Russia is possible, but for that to happen, Russians have to repudiate today’s Russia — a complex and probably bloody process. They have to repudiate Putinism, the gulag, their nostalgia for the Soviet Union and for the Russian Empire. And if they don’t, then they can’t have a free and democratic Ukraine on their border, since it’s a bad example for Putin’s Russia. Ultimately, this is as much about them as it is about Ukraine.
Fifth Russian general reported dead. “Lieutenant General Yakov Rezantsev, 48, commander of the army’s 49th combined arms division, became the fifth general to be killed after being taken out in a strike by the Ukrainian armed forces, sources in Kyiv said.”
Yakov?
Is Russia suffering from a higher than usual percentage of dud munitions? It’s entirely possible, given the substandard maintenance we’ve seen for the rest of their armed forces over the past month.
For those who claim that #Ukraine was "unprepared" for the war, this is patently not true. @ZelenskyyUa has been trying to purchase missile defense systems, training pilots, producing new weapons, buying drones from #Turkey, restoring fortifications, & even flooding a river. https://t.co/eAjyPtFzri
“Ukrainian forces have seized part of one of Russia’s most advanced electronic warfare systems, which could reveal its military secrets, reports say. The Krasukha-4 command module was found abandoned on the outskirts of Kyiv partly damaged but otherwise intact, The Times of London reported.” (Hat tip: Stephen Green at Instapundit.)
Speaking of captured interesting captured Russian tech:
The richest person in Russia, Vladimir Potanin, has a 35% stake in Moscow-listed Nornickel.
The company is the world’s biggest producer of palladium, a metal used in vehicle catalytic converters, and also the world’s largest producer of nickel, an essential metal for EV batteries and renewable energy.
Former First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and a close associate to President Vladimir Putin, Potanin is a major benefactor of the arts. He recently stepped down from the board of the Guggenheim Museum, after 20 years as a trustee.
Arts and luxury are common among the Russian oligarchs.
The Russian ultra-rich are also among the biggest owners of private jets and superyachts—some of which are getting snagged by law enforcement as part of the sanctions designed to crack down on Russia.
The fifth-richest man in Russia, Alisher Usmanov, owns Dilbar, the largest motor yacht in the world by gross tonnage. The boat is 512-feet long and reportedly cost $800 million, employing 84 full-time crew members.
Named after Usmanov’s mother, the yacht was seized by German authorities who later discovered that it’s really owned by a Malta-based firm and registered in the Cayman Islands.
Besides art and luxury, the Russian oligarchs are also deeply involved with sports.
Roman Abramovich, once Russia’s richest man, is the departing owner of Chelsea Football Club, a London-based soccer team. He was sanctioned by the UK while trying to sell the club for $3.9B.
Besides Abramovich, Mikhail Prokhorov—founder of Onexim Group, a Moscow-based company with interests in banking, insurance, and real estate—owned the Brooklyn Nets basketball team and its home arena from 2009 to 2019.
The list also includes Vladimir Lisin, chairman of the steel group NLMK. A shooting sports enthusiast, he is the president of the European Shooting Confederation.
