“Smart rifle” technology seems to have finally arrived in the form of an “AI” enhanced scope that still requires you to pull the trigger, but picks the optimal time to actually fire to take out drones.
“High-tech, often AI powered scopes are something every major military has been working on for the past few years with more failures than successes. The [Smash] 2000L is arguably the most developed such system in existence. However, given the laughably poor records high-tech scopes have, it’s valid to ask if this new system currently in the process of testing and adoption with the US Marine Corps, the UK, Australia, and other countries, is actually worth the hype.”
It only works against small drones because, you know, rifle. “The drones of the Smash 2000L system are designed to take out a roughly the size of a DJI Mavic drone, a system used by both Ukraine and Russia before DJI blocked all exports to both countries, after which both sides continue to produce very similar drones domestically. This drone and other comparable designs are actually among the most used drones in the war, with either side launching around 10,000 of them every single month. That makes them the exact type of threat the Smash 2000L was designed to counter.”
“The Mavic E3 drone measures [roughly] 14 by 11 inches with a height of barely [4] inches. This makes it roughly the size of a large Domino’s pizza.”
“They’re capable of reaching and exceeding speeds of roughly 50 [miles] an hour. Some of them are even capable of doubling that.”
“Drones rarely operate individually. Swarm attacks are most effective as they guarantee results.”
“From February 2022 to today, Ukraine went from domestically producing a total of about 3,000 drones per year to being capable of producing 5 million of them. Russian figures are similar at around 3 and a half million drones a year.” I would like to know where these figures are coming from.
“The obvious solution is just jamming the living shit out of everything. Although autonomous drones are gaining ground in warfare nowadays, most drones are still operated in real time by an operator. That operator communicates with the drone via a radio link and by jamming that link, essentially flooding it with radio frequency, the drone is cut off from its operator. The jammers themselves exist in the form of rifles. One of which famously made an appearance at the funeral of Pope Francis in 2025, the
very first time such a weapon was fielded at a papal funeral.”
Skipping over the jamming/fiber optic drone arms race we’ve covered before.
“Large and small surface-to-air missiles were launched, depending on the size of the approaching drone, and even other drones were used to take down drones.”
“However, the last ditch option for a soldier to use is their own primary firearm. And this is exceptionally difficult for a number of reasons. To take down a drone with their own assault rifle, a soldier who is high on adrenaline and reasonably afraid for their safety, has to hit a target roughly the size of a volleyball at a distance of between 50 and 200 meters as it buzzes around erratically at highway speeds. And they have to do that with a projectile that’s 5.56 or 7.62 mm in diameter.
“Because of this, both Russian and Ukrainian infantry squads have adopted shotguns as their go-to last ditch anti-drone firearm.”
“Shotguns have proven to be much more effective against drones as a last resort, which is why some manufacturers like Benelli have developed anti-drone shotguns with special ammunition.”
“Ukraine has also developed a special 5.56 anti-drone rounds that fires several sub projectiles instead of a solid bullet. The soldier still needs to fire five or six rounds while tracking the target, but the round is far more effective than standard ammunition because of its shotgun principle.”
The main problem is that shooting at drones that are trying to kill you is highly stressful, and accuracy suffers. “Aiming perfectly in such a stressful scenario is just borderline impossible, no matter how accurate you are. And this, of course, is where the Smash 2000L comes in.”
“The idea behind Smash is very simple. Turn every soldier into a sharpshooter. Smash is essentially a very advanced scope that can be installed on most firearms, and it’s allegedly capable of hitting targets, even very small moving targets like drones, with a 95% hit probability. For comparison, experienced shooters using red dot sites at a distance of about 100 m average a 20% hit rate.”
“With a Smash 2000L, even trainees average an 80% hit rate, with experienced shooters reaching the aforementioned 95%. Which is really pretty impressive.”
“Smash consists of a digital camera with an attached display that’s seen by the shooter, a trigger guard, and most importantly, a computer. That computer does all the work. It locks onto a target, analyzes its speed, heading, distance, and environmental conditions such as wind and humidity to estimate the best time for a soldier to take a shot. When it locks onto a target, Smash tracks it until it calculates the best time to shoot.”
“As long as the computer estimates that the hit probability is low, it will block the trigger using the trigger guard. The shooter presses their finger against the trigger, even though it’s blocked. And when the shooter takes aim at the very specific spot on the target, which the computer deems the highest hit probability spot, the computer unlocks the trigger guard, the trigger is pulled and a drone is shot out of the sky.”
“The shooter can also wait for the computer to unblock the trigger before pulling it. But the high hit probability time window is of course very short when it comes to fast flying drones. That’s why it’s easier for the shooter to keep pressing the trigger the whole time and simply wait for the computer to unblock it at the appropriate moment.”
“When testing in the United States, Smash took down loitering drones surprisingly casually. Fast moving drones are likely going to be more difficult, but certainly not impossible and certainly much easier to hit with Smash than without it.”
“The system can also be used to eliminate ground targets such as other infantry troops, and even more easily at that. In that mode, it’s accurate up to 300 m or close to 1,000 ft during the day, while the small drone elimination mode is accurate up to 100 m or around 300 ft in both day and night.”
“Aside from just destroying small drones, Smash is also marketed as being capable of destroying micro drones. These drones are usually used for reconnaissance, not direct attacks, and they’re sometimes so small that they can fit in the palm of your hand.” Like the super-tiny, super-expensive Black Hornet drone.
“The Smash system itself can also fit in the palm of your hand. It weighs 740 g or 26 oz and is smaller than most magnification scopes, with a battery capable of running for 72 hours before needing recharging.”
“Smash is a line of sight system, which means that you have to be able to see the enemy for it to track the enemy. That means a couple of things. For one, you need to expose yourself at least a little bit for Smash to do its job. And secondly, Smash can’t track an enemy behind cover. It can’t see through walls. This also means it’s impossible for the shooter to aim from thick brush, for example, as there’s no way for Smash to get around that.”
“With this in mind, Smart Shooter came up with an addition to the Smash 2000L in the shape of the Smash Hopper 5000, a remote control weapon station, and another thing with a fantastic, very 1990scoded name. A soldier who prefers not to expose themselves to the enemy can mount their rifle with its 2000L system attached on the Hopper 5000 and control it from the safety of cover.”
“The system weighs a substantial 25 kilos or 55 lbs. It’s clunky, takes a while to set up, and it can never have the maneuverability of a soldier.”
“Does the Smash 2000L completely solve the drone problem? No, absolutely not. But it is a step in the right direction, isn’t it? Accuracy and speed of aiming are the biggest hurdles an infantryman has to tackle when shooting down a drone with their firearm. And Smash is essentially just a
system that does that job much more accurately and almost instantly.”
The IDF tried it with only one rifleman per squad. First problem? “Blue-on-blue incidents.”
“At the time of its introduction, the system could not tell the difference between friendly and enemy combatants.”
“Aside from the IDF, the Smash 2000L was purchased by the US primarily to be used by the Marine Corps, as well as the Netherlands, India, Germany, and the United Kingdom.”
“The Israeli manufacturer has since secured a $10.7 million contract with the US Army, making it the second service branch to join the program.
All well and good, but there were many previous “smart” scopes that didn’t work out.”
“Another one of those optic systems that came out of Israel is Arcus, an acronym for Assault Rifle Combat Application, developed by Elbert Systems. The system consists of an eyepiece that the operator attaches to their helmet and wears at all times. The second part is installed on the rifle, essentially acting as an extension of the operator’s eye, providing a live feed from the gun’s point of view.”
“Arcus is capable of recognizing the human body shape and marking the target on the operator’s eyepiece. It can easily detect motion. It provides the operator with a range estimation, and the feed is transmitted to command headquarters at the same time, allowing everyone to see what the operator sees.” Shades of “network-centric warfare.”
“The system also controls fire in a similar way to the Smash 2000L and improves accuracy in the field. It even provides the operator with a built-in compass that essentially allows them to navigate without having to constantly check a map or GPS. The two modes of operation, thermal or electrooptic, allow the operator to use the system in both daytime and nighttime. I mean, it even has a shot counter to let the operator know when they’re low on ammo, which is very video game-esque. It is an absolutely perfect solution for a lot of real problems that infantrymen truly do face, and it could change the way the wars are fought.”
“And yet, nobody’s using it. Not even Israel is using it, let alone any other military. Five years after presenting Arcus and no one has even tried adopting it, with its biggest accomplishment so far being just reminding everyone of the target tracking system from Aliens.”
“The story is not much more positive with the United States’s next generation squad weapon program, which includes the XM157 fire control system.”
“When it comes to the XM157, the test results are disappointing. During testing in 2024, the fire control system received negative reviews from soldiers who used it. To be more specific, the 2024 report says that quote, “The XM7 with mounted XM157 demonstrated a low probability of completing one 72-hour wartime mission without incurring a critical failure.” Is it Windows based?
“It seems like after years of hyping up the next fire control system, the scope has simply gone missing and we’re not going to see it fielded anytime soon because it’s simply not reliable.”
Skipping over the Russian example, since they can’t even get their SAM systems to work right.
“So when we draw the line under AI assisted high-tech scopes,the result is not proportional to the hype surrounding them. Russia’s not using them. The US Army’s not using them, in spite of really really wanting to spend a ton of money promoting them in the news. And even Israel, which has been developing several types of these scopes, is only kind of using them, nowhere close to issuing them across the board to the entirety of the IDF. And this brings us the most obvious question that we’ve been building to this entire video. Are these devices, which are hailed in the media as the next big thing that’s going to revolutionize the way wars are fought, just an endless money pit?”
“Even if scopes such as the XM157 on the Smash 2000L were perfected tomorrow and all their software glitches and battery issues were ironed out, there are still three main issues regarding high-tech optics that are keeping them from becoming the norm.”
“The first two problems relate to doctrine. Over-reliance on technology can only take a soldier or a unit a certain distance before achieving the adverse effect and nullifying their fighting capabilities with old school equipment. At the same time, decision-making tools cannot be blindly trusted. Taking the Smash 2000 as a direct example, what happens if infantrymen start relying on AI to do the aiming and trigger pulling jobs for them too much? Well, the result is that a soldier is demoted from a shooting combatant to somebody who just broadly handles a weapon and points it in roughly the right direction, with the most important part of the job being carried out by the fire control system.” Given current U.S./NATO/Israeli doctrine, I don’t see this as a problem anytime soon.
I’m cutting out a lot of Whistler’s “whatbouts,” as I assume a competent system will allow switchback to manual targeting. Indeed, he reaches much the same conclusion. “Using traditional scopes or iron sights will remain the norm in doctrine, and AI powered scopes will be used sparingly, mostly for specialized tasks such as taking down drones or targets that are particularly difficult for a traditional optic to get an angle on.”
His next point is that sea-based automatic systems still make mistakes as well, and still produce friendly fire incidents.
His conclusion: “It is easy to see why high-tech optics will never fully replace the Mark1 eyeball. They will, mind you, be introduced in huge numbers, and military forces will most definitely find use for them, such as taking down anti-infantry drones, for example, but it’s extremely unlikely that they will become the standard infantry fire control system anytime soon.”
He may be right, but possibly not for the reasons he thinks, namely that ground-based drones will probably take over more and more (but not all) infantry-based functions as those are further developed, though I doubt they will entirely replace infantry (AKA, the Queen of Battle) any time soon.
I just want to note that these wonderscopes are not really AI as we’ve come to understand it, they are merely souped-up, shrunk-down targeting computers that we’ve had for a while. There’s no theoretical reason they can’t, it’s a question of when the system crosses the threshold of cost-effectiveness.
Here’s a tab-clearing roundup of longer videos on the Russo-Ukrainian War, drones, tanks, etc. I’m not going to go point-by-point on everything covered here, just pull out a few of the more important bits.
First up: Perun does one of those “tier rankings” so popular on YouTube, this one about supposed “game changing” weapons in the war.
He ranks glide bombs, used heavily by the Russians, as one of 2025’s most effective weapons. “In 2025 there has been no month where the Ukrainians claim the Russians dropped fewer than 3,000 of these things, roughly 100 per day. In April that number was north of 5,000, getting close to the likes of 170 per day.” I had no idea the numbers were that high.
Also top tier: Drones. “Far from drones fading away as people found ways to counter them over time, I’d argue that drones have just become more dominant with every month that passes. Drone performance improved, their payloads became more dangerous, their operators more expert, the tactics of their use evolved, and the relevant production figures added progressively more zeros. To the point where, while in 2022 drones were a significant enabling element on the battlefield, in 2025 they are one of the most definitive elements. Back in February, RUSI assessed that Ukrainian drones now account for about 2/3 of Russian losses. But if you factor in their contributions to the use of other systems, providing reconnaissance for the infantry, spotting for the artillery and the air force, resupply for forward elements, and all the tasks the Ukrainians leverage UAS to do, I’d argue it goes well beyond even just that. And at the core of the military challenge here is the fact that drones are just very effective, very accessible, and hard to counter.” “So far I’d argue in Ukraine for example, small drones have evolved faster than the defenses intended to counter them.” He also covers the rise of fiber-optic drones. More on drones in another video below.
Also ranked very high: Ukraine’s passive acoustic drone detection systems, which are cheap and widely dispersed, and are key to guiding anti-drone kill teams deep behind the front lines to the right spots to take out drones.
Ukraine is also having a lot of success designing and manufacturing cheap interceptors to take out drones. “During one recent Russian attack, about 20% of all the incoming Russian UAVs were brought down by interceptor drones.”
Just about all the Russian wunderwaffen (like the Oreshnik missile) gets ranked pretty low. (He also wants to see more of Ukraine’s Flamingo cruise missle, as he had only one confirmed strike on that. See below for more on that topic.)
Combat shotguns are making a return as anti-drone weapons, but they’re last-ditch options and not ideal.
Russia is still using turtle tanks (AKA “assault sheds”) as the leads for mechanized assault columns. They can soak up a lot of punishment and mount a lot of drone-jamming equipment, but are still getting taken out by skilled drone operators or artillery. “A lot of Russian shed-equipped vehicles now appear to dispense with the main gun.” They also look even more Mad Max now, with arrays of spikes and branches to further tangle drones. “This isn’t just an approach being used by armored vehicles, and also it is not just the Russians. Drones are a survivability problem for everyone.”
Next up: Nicholas Moran talks about what armies can do to counter the drone threat without shiny new anti-drone weapons. “Getting away from the M is US Army speak for talking about something other than equipment. The M stands for material and is one of the factors in DOTMLPF.” (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader Development and Education, Personnel, Facilities.)
“Drones have been around since World War II, but it’s only been ten years since the US military officially declared the small UAS as a significant threat. We are still very much in the early phases of integrating such drones into warfare. And nobody knows exactly where the chips are going to lie down when they complete their fall.”
“We’re now some five years on from what quite a few would consider the first war in which drones were highly influential and three years into a major large power conflict. So, I think we can at least have a couple of trends observed by now, which are forming.”
“We see lots of videos of drones killing things which are selectively released often from equipment which inherently has inbuilt cameras. The 60 to 80% of drone strikes which don’t kill their target normally aren’t released as there’s not much propaganda benefit to doing so. Artillery shells don’t have cameras and an ISR drone footage of an artillery strike is not really particularly dramatic anymore.”
“The whole truth does not come from videos. The big killers in war today are the same that they’ve always been. Mines, then artillery. Not for nothing are we seeing the largest minefields in history, or a shortage of artillery ammunition and tubes.”
“Now, to be fair, in early 2025, drones were being estimated to have caused more Russian casualties than artillery, but that was also during a period of shortage of indirect fire assets in Ukraine. At the same time, both armies on the front lines of Ukraine have dispersed to incredible amounts by 20th century standards. Not for fear of a small drone with an explosive charge, which frankly really doesn’t care if you dispersed or not, but because they don’t want to be a tempting clustered target for artillery or SRBMS.”
“Infantry is still king or queen. Ultimately, to take and hold ground, someone with hand grenades and a rifle, maybe with a stabby thing on the end, is going to have to close with and destroy the enemy supported by everything else in the inventory. And it’s going to be someone in the dugout with their own grenades and rifles, supported by everything else in the inventory, trying to stop them.”
“Drones are also not great at killing tanks. As one general put it, the only place more dangerous than being in a tank in the Ukraine battle area is not being in a tank in the Ukraine battle area.” More on this below as well.
“There there are always exceptions, but the vast majority of tanks which have been destroyed by drones have first been immobilized by something else, such as mines, artillery, ATGM, cannon fire, whatever. The response times for kinetic drones right now are just too long to have practical effect unless they happen to be in the right place and they don’t show up in mass. Then when the tank is immobilized by these other assets, the drone can come at its leisure and try to hit the stationary or abandoned tank which likely has the hatch still open as nobody bailing out after a hit is going to be standing on the top of the tank trying to close the hatch in an ongoing battle. And if something happens to that drone, which historically is quite likely, another drone can be sent and another and another.”
“Some disabled tanks have had a score of drones try to destroy them. Still didn’t work until finally one drone might show up, which actually does the job. Now, yes, an argument can be made that this is still beneficial on a pure dollar value basis, but it also comes with a slew of caveats related to anything from the availability of recovery assets through to the lack of anything more important for those drone operators to be doing that particular moment in time.”
“Some Ukrainian crews have simply given up counting how many times their tanks have been hit by drones. The best Ukrainian units are reporting a 40% hit rate with their FPVs. Typical units won’t be that good, and that’s flying one drone at a time over the course of hours. Hardly something suitable when a major battle starts, but perfectly suited for the current static warfare environment that we see. Now, that’s the hit rate, not the kill rate.”
“They are also not capable of all weather operations, at least the flying ones. Many are just too small. And when it gets to nighttime, for obvious reasons, the drones used are a little bit more expensive. If an enemy attacks in a storm, you want to have something other than quadcopters to rely upon for your defense. What drones have also failed to do is change the nature of war. The principles of war have not changed. The fundamentals of the offense or the defense have not changed.”
“Drones come and kill things, hardware. Then jammers come to get them to lose control, hardware. Then fiber optic cables come to reduce the vulnerability to jamming hardware. Then kill systems like cannons come. Hardware.”
But we don’t fight with things, we fight with formations that use things.
“A drone may not be able to easily kill a tank but it certainly has a reasonable effect on a bunker, on somebody riding an ATV, or on a supply truck for that tank.”
“I believe the claim is that DJI are making a drone a second and they are being used by both sides in Ukraine. The leader being the Mavic 3.” For more information on that, see here.
“As of early last year, 10,000 drones a month were being expended. And the chances are that that figure is well higher now. The things are being expended like ammunition and a low proportion of them are self-exploding. Most are being shot down, forced down, or crash.”
“Currently, the pendulum is swung in favor of the offensive use of drones. And well, defense is playing catch-up. As it currently stands, the dollar exchange is pretty much in favor of the drone.”
“Using a $200,000 stinger to drop a $10,000 surveillance drone is economically questionable, even if it has to be done. Because if you don’t do that, that $10,000 surveillance drone is going to call in a target for a $400,000 ballistic missile, which will then drop on your $2 million brigade headquarters if you don’t expend a $3 million Patriot missile to kill it. As a result, kill mechanisms need to get cheaper, and the drones need to be forced to become more expensive. And both are happening again.”
“Things like DJIs are civilian grade. They’re not equipped to handle electronic attack. The change and counter change in EM spectrum right now is its own battle which is apparently going on four-week cycles. But if you want to equip the drone so that loss of signal doesn’t immediately result in loss of drone or worse that the drone doesn’t just get hijacked, other measures need to be taken. Be it some form of self-targeting, the use of fiber optics, which leads to its own set of limitations and expense.”
“Then there is resistance to hard kill electronic systems. Currently, microwave weapons are the leading contenders. A single microwave can quickly and efficiently fry the electronics of a whole bunch of drones at once for not much cost.”
“Systems have been demonstrated that are in effect remote weapon stations such as you’ll find on top of a Stryker, or you can put in the back of a pickup truck. They are capable of autonomously detecting, identifying, tracking, and engaging small UAS with a short burst.”
“The reality is the drone swarms don’t work for the simple reason that they take up too much jammable bandwidth talking to each other or controllers. And there aren’t enough operators with enough magazine depth to make a go of it by coordinating conventional operations.”
“Drones may end up flying in packages. Bandwidth concerns may limit the feasibility of true automated swarming.” Better AI may help solve that problem.
“One of the organizational problems or doctrinal problems that the army needs to work on, and this will apply to all armies, is how do you set up the layered network so that the most efficient system is used to engage the best target. So, just because you can shoot down a bomber drone with a Coyote doesn’t mean it’s the best move. Maybe it’s worth letting him get a lot closer to be shot down with a caliber 50 or a microwave.”
“The intent is that ground troops will always make first contact with the enemy by use of a drone or UGV. Now, there are advantages to both. I still haven’t seen the front line of robots in official doctrine, but I still think it’s coming.”
The army is already experimenting with self-driving road vehicles for logistics.
Some of the lessons the Ukrainians have learned may not be appropriate for the more modern and well-equipped U.S. armed forces. ” To kill Orlan and the like at altitude, the Ukrainians have been resorting to things like mothership drones and balloon lifted drones. The US has an air force capable of dominating at 15,000 ft and an F-35 or F-15 with a couple of APKWs hydropods would be a reasonably cost-effective and more responsive way of dealing with the problem. The US has satellite or airborne recon abilities which may take care of tasks that other nations may need drones for. Just how good is an F-35’s radar? Can it detect a number of drones and then hand off to a cheaper system to engage? Or maybe it can illuminate for passive radar purposes without being at risk itself.”
“If we are dramatically reducing our command post sizes, increasing dispersion, massively increasing our air defense EW components, reintroducing air guards, or telling people to break out their ET tools like in the old days, then it’s very obviously demonstrating the case that the US has understood that we need to change things.”
“Remember the [Hans] von Seeckt appraisals after World War I? Nearly four years of terrible trench warfare followed the German attempt at maneuver warfare. After chewing on the matter a bit, the German response about 1921 was the key is still maneuver warfare. And they were right.”
“The trend appears to be that we’re going to use automation to further enable what we’re doing, not change what we’re doing. Is the how, not the what.”
“The characteristics of the offense remain concentration, audacity, tempo, and surprise.”
LazerPig takes aim at what he calls Hurr Durr Drone Syndrome (HDDS), including the idea that drones have made tanks obsolete. He goes into more detail about how the ability of drones to take out tanks is considerably overstated, noting that “cheap” drones capable of taking out tanks aren’t really cheap any more.
(Note: LazerPig had to reupload this video due to a copyright strike, so there’s a chance some of the below is no longer in this version.)
“Symptoms of HDDS include flashy clickbait titles that proclaim any new technology from tanks to jets is doomed, because why spend billions of dollars on a weapon system if a 20 buck drone can take it out?”
“It makes casual references to the ever-increasing loss of Western tanks on the Ukrainian front. Makes grandiose gestures that inflate the actual capability of small FPV drones and surreptitiously, usually just by not knowing any better, parrot Russian propaganda that all Western tanks are too big and too heavy.”
“It ignores the actual opinions of Ukrainian tank crews and fails to take into account that of the 95 Western tanks that have been lost on the Ukrainian front, very few of those were actually taken out by drones. And of that 95, 73 were highly outdated models that have either since been replaced or are in the process of being replaced. Out of those 73, 71 were models built before 1990, and 21 of those were tanks designed in the 1960s.”
“Even under the less than ideal conditions Ukraine fights in, with a comedic list of tanks from various periods and in various states of repair, at the time of recording, for every one Western tank they have lost, 43.7 Russian tanks have been destroyed.”
He says those $20 commercial drones are useless for combat. “The simplest of drones currently on the Ukrainian front cost in excess of $400 to make each. And that is with volunteers, 3D printers, and importing the cheapest made parts from TEMU. And these factories don’t run at a profit. They absorb the full cost through donations, not selling the drones to the military.”
“In the UK, a vast number of drone factories were set up in the hopes of cashing in on the drone military craze. And most of them have failed to expand beyond a single office, 3D printers, small teams of eager 20somes, and a dream. simply because, well…
“Firstly, the actual cost of setting up mass production is far greater than first anticipated, especially when one realizes that it’s not just drone parts they’d need, but camera equipment, night vision, thermals, long-range battery packs, and radio equipment capable of resisting interference, triangulation, and interception, most of which is beyond the capability of these companies.”
“All of this is how a $400 drone becomes a $10,000 drone. Even then, those $400 drones carry about enough munitions to kill a person or knock out light vehicles or generally unarmored targets.”
“In some of these interviews, they have talked about how tanks generally survive multiple hits from drones because the Russians don’t always have access to the heavier munitions required to take them out. Those are considerably more expensive, harder to produce, and considerably more rare, allowing those tanks to race into drone hotspots, take out their target, and withdraw before those munitions arrive.”
“A good example of one of those munitions is the famous Russian Lancet. In a full-time war economy, one of these costs around $20,000 to manufacture, or to put that in perspective, the cost of five artillery shells. This is of course assuming Russia is telling the truth when it gives these numbers up and aren’t just calculating the cost of materials and not including labor setup or the cost of the launcher.”
“The thing about the Lancet is it’s a drone in name only. It’s technically a loitering munition which have been around for quite some time. Every country has been developing them for the past 10 years and some of those were given to Ukraine.”
Just about every country that produces tanks is working on loitering munitions versions for tanks to launch.
“The Switchblade, currently in use by both the US and Ukrainian Army, costs around $60,000 per unit, with the more dedicated anti-tank version costing somewhere in the region of $100,000 per
unit.”
He says he had to delete a long rant about the difference between the Lancet and the Switchblade. “What you need to know is the Switchblade can be carried by one soldier in a backpack, thrown on the ground, and then fired like a mortar within seconds. It’s got infrared as standard. It can do a whole bunch of really clever things like guide other Switchblades onto targets or coordinate with other drones and have multiple Switchblades hit multiple different targets simultaneously, you know, to lower the chances of your enemy going, ‘Oh no, a drone.’ And then doing something really wild like taking cover.”
“The Lancet does none of that. It’s basically just a TV missile on a catapult.”
Cheap drones started out effective until units adapted. “As they develop new systems or techniques or tactics against this cheap weapon, then that system is going to gradually become less effective over time and therefore must evolve to remain potent. The Lancet has gone through multiple versions, each time trying to increase its lethality or counter the defenses Ukraine has developed specifically against it.”
“The Lancet, though it is estimated at costing roughly $20,000 to manufacture via various Russian reports. It was offered at export at $32,000 back when it was only seeing use in Syria. And now it’s no longer offered for export. And that $20,000 number has never been updated as the weapon has grown in complexity…the reality is we don’t know how much it actually costs.”
“It has more than likely now matched the Switchblade in terms of cost.”
We don’t know how effective Lancet is because our information comes from Russian propaganda websites, and Russia has claimed Lancet tank kills on western tanks that were clearly taken out by other means.
“In the later stages of 2022, in response to Ukraine’s increased counterbattery effectiveness, the Russians began pulling hordes of towed artillery out of storage, some of which dated as far back as the Second World War. Yet with the limited ability to retain these units in service due to excessive barrel wear or move them around after they had been fired through the loss of transport vehicles, Russia’s artillery dominance has finally began to wane. And as a result, systems like the Lancet have been forced into this role. The irony here being that a $20,000 drone system, is now doing the work of an artillery shell, which the Russians once bragged they could make for under $1,500.”
“Both sides are potentially lacking the equipment that would have traditionally performed that job and are falling back onto cheaply-made drones to fill the gap.”
HDDS also ignores all the anti-drone technology developed in the last three years.
“In spite of the existence of heavy drone-based munitions that can take out tanks, Ukraine still uses tanks quite a lot.”
One correction: LazerPig says the cope cage were deployed in response to Ukraine’s use of drones, but mentions actually date to the beginning of the Russian invasion in 2022.
“In the first days, Lancets were being used on mass, the Russians would be forced to stop jamming the frequency that the Lancet was being used in. The Ukrainians would simply cycle through frequencies, find the one that wasn’t being jammed, and then jam it themselves, causing the lancets to just fall out of the sky.” The technical difficulties involved here make me wonder if this is a “just so” story.
“In a response, the Russians are now forced to turn off their jamming systems when firing a Lancet to prevent the Ukrainians from figuring out the frequency.”
Counter-jammer technology is not something you find on a $400 drone.
“You might think the best defense against [jamming] is to simply have the drone change frequencies, and you’d be right. But changing frequencies isn’t as easy as pressing a button or changing a dial. In fact, in many cases, the aerial assembly has to be completely ripped off and replaced with one with a newer frequency. Hence why a lot of drones [are] shipped without an aerial, allowing the receiving unit to add their own as needed.”
“Sometimes the drone automatically picking one that is not actively being jammed is quite expensive. And another reason why things like the Switchblade are more expensive than the Lancet. But that’s the old idiom, you get what you pay for.”
“Putting soldiers lives at risk with cheaper equipment that might not always work is the lesson the US military has learned the hard way. Ask any US veteran and they will happily bitch to you about any number of equipment problems based entirely on that topic, often for several hours without ever stopping for breath. It’s quite impressive.”
The response to drone jamming has been the advent of fiber-optic drones. “These drones have caused all kinds of hell for both sides, to the point where parts of the front lines are littered in webs of fiber optic.”
The response to fiber optics has been barbed wire and more cages. “In the front lines of both sides, supply routes are now covered in large arc structures, a cope cage supreme, if you will, that prevent drones attacking convoys and supply trucks. And both sides will typically spend days or often weeks trying to find holes or discreetly make holes in these nets and then have several drones lie in weight across the road ambushing any vehicles they find.”
“This has led to Ukraine up armoring everything from medevac to supply trucks in order to minimize the damage caused by these ambush drones. In much the same way US and British forces in Iraq were forced to up armor their patrol vehicles owing to the threat of IEDs.”
“Ukraine’s best counter to drones remains, and has surprisingly remained, old radar-guided anti-air systems from the Cold War.” Most drones are not remotely stealthy.
“Mobile anti-air systems like the Gepard have proven exceedingly effective at taking them down. Meaning to avoid systems like this, drones have to fly low to the ground, which makes finding targets considerably harder.”
Countries are also developing electronic warfare and laser systems to take out drones. “Where these systems fit into our current doctrine is still being written. And where these things are now technologically will be considerably different in a few years time. Ultimately, these weapons will need mounting onto something. And why can’t that something be a tank? Laser tanks are finally here.”
“It is not the biggest army that wins. It is the one that is the most adaptable to change.”
A lot of this is true, but I’m wondering if the atomized nature of the Ukrainian front isn’t a big factor against cheap drones here. I imagine smaller, cheaper drones with only a few pounds of explosives might be considerably more useful in an urban combat environment that limits jamming and countermeasures. There’s also, I think, a drone class heavier than the lightest drones but lighter than Lancet or Switchblades that could still be racking up mobility kills against tanks and other armored vehicles in such an environment.
Next up: Megaprojects Simon Whistler breaks down Ukraine’s new Flamingo cruise missile.
“If the missile you’re launching at the enemy is easy to take down because it’s not very fast or stealthy, the least you can do is pack it with so many explosives, you basically guarantee complete destruction if just one of them breaks through the enemy lines. And this at least is the basic logic behind the FP5 Flamingo, Ukraine’s new heavy hitter missile.”
“Experts, both domestic and foreign, hailed its arrival. But they warn against obsessive optimism. Because while the Flamingo packs a hell of a punch, it also leaves a lot to be desired.”
“The missile “is constructed mostly of recycled ordinance and aircraft parts.”
“The Flamingo excels in two key areas: warhead capacity and range. The missile is armed with a 1.15 ton or 2500lb warhead, which is just a comically large amount of explosive material for a single missile. For comparison, the BGM 109 Tomahawk land attack missile, which is a reliable American long-range missile, packs about 450 kilos or 1,000 lb of explosives, and the Flamingo comes with 2.5 times that.”
“The engine used with the Flamingo is believed to be the AI-25. This engine is comparably much larger than engines on similar missiles, and it’s used with several aircraft, including Turkey’s combat drone, the Bayraktar. The use of a large engine, one that measures 3.3 m in length and 62 cm in diameter with a weight of over 350 kilos or 770 lb, allows the engineers to skip miniature turbo jets and turbo fans. These propulsion systems are usually preferred for long-range cruise missiles, but they’re really expensive, unlike the AI-25.”
“The AI-25 was incredibly available for Fire Point to purchase in huge numbers from stockpiles. Officials said that they found thousands of these engines at dumps and landfills around Ukraine, in a very practical and literal showcase of the adage, ‘One man’s trash is another man’s treasure.’ Fire Point did not restore these engines to full usage, which would allow them a maximum flight time of 10 hours, but only enough power for the Flamingo to go for 4 hours. They replaced the titanium parts with cheaper materials to save both time and money, and engines that were deemed too damaged were used for spare parts.”
“The biggest advantage of such a powerful engine, which is usually used with much heavier aircraft, is the incredible range of this missile, which is reported to be 3,000 km or about 1,850 miles. This is almost double the range of the block five Tomahawk missile mentioned earlier, and it’s more than enough to strike Russia anywhere in the European part of the country.” Though he notes that claim hasn’t been verified yet.
“The missile travels at speeds about 900 km or 560 mph, which is comparable to the speeds of western missiles.”
“The Flamingo does not have a complex visual guidance system, such as terrain contour matching systems or digital scene matching area correlation systems, which are very common with Western missiles, which are also, of course, a lot more expensive. It does, however, use satellite navigation to guide itself toward the target.”
“The Flamingo uses a jamming resistant controller reception pattern antenna layout, which kind of feels like word salad, doesn’t it? But what it means is that the antenna layout is designed to resist radio jamming and spoofing, keeping the missile on its course.”
“However, the Flamingo lacks any technology to hide from radar, which makes it extremely unstealthy.” But it’s fiberglass construction is less visible on radar than metal.
“Similar to how the A-10 Warthog is an aircraft built around a 30mm rotary cannon, the FP5’s airframe is built around its massive warhead.”
“At first glance, it might remind you of the V1, but the Flamingo is much larger at a length of between 12 and 14m and a wingspan of six.”
He notes the missile’s vulnerability to Russian fighter aircraft, but given how heavily those are overtaxed, I wonder how much they can “fly cap” over the vast distances of Russian airspace, especially after the further dispersion away from Ukraine following successful drone attacks on Russian airbases.
Skipping the history of Ukraine development/acquisition of long range strike platforms.
“After the official unveiling on August the 17th, 2025, production rolled out at a rate of about 50 missiles a month, and Fire Point announced that they plan to increase production to seven missiles a day by the end of the year.”
“The majority of the missile is created from already existing components that can be put together in a factory that’s relatively safe. Even if the factory were to be destroyed, the Flamingo is so easy to put together, the entire manufacturing process can be moved as long as the warheads and the engines are kept safe.”
“And Ukraine’s not alone in this task either. To help streamline production, Denmark announced that a Fire Point subsidiary would start solid fuel production in Denmark by the end of the year.”
“At the time of recording, there is only a single documented use of Flamingo missiles by Ukraine. And their effectiveness is, to quote the Chernobyl TV show, not great, not terrible. Three missiles is a nice reference. Not great, not terrible.”
“Three missiles were launched in a poorly defended target in northern Crimea, and yet only two arrived on site, proving the Flamingo is fairly easy to shoot down. One of the missiles that actually arrived missed the target by about 100-200 meters. The second missile, however, caused significant damage to the building, also damaging six hovercraft despite landing between 15 and 40 meters away from the target.”
“This shows that there are still a lot of kinks for Fire Point to work through to perfect these missiles. The claimed accuracy of the Flamingo is 14 meters, but neither of the two missiles hit within that mark. However, the missile that hit the closest still managed to cause enough damage to deem it a successful strike, showing that the massive warhead can compensate for the lack of accuracy.”
Skipping over his analysis of which Russian air defense systems can shoot it down, since there’s ample evidence of numerous Russian systems letting a wide range of drones and missiles through without shooting them down.
Also skipping over his analysis of the Ukraine campaign against Russian oil infrastructure, as that’s been well documented here. But: “To add insult to injury, the FB5 Flamingo makes the drones used in those attacks look like firecrackers.”
“With this in mind, it’s almost guaranteed that Ukraine won’t be mindlessly launching flamingos at Russia, but will instead carefully plan the flight routes to maximize their effectiveness.”
The Flamingo currently takes a lengthy 20 minutes to set up and launch.
“Valerie Romanenko, a leading aviation expert and researcher with the Ukrainian State Museum of Aviation, says that upon exploding, the Flamingo will destroy any production plant. The facility will be impossible to rebuild because the explosion will result in complete destruction, leaving behind itself a 20 meter crater.”
Large Russian oil facilities are, naturally, likely to be targets.
“It’s interesting how all of the news outlets used Novosibirsk as the designation point of the Flamingo’s range capabilities, because Novosibirsk just happens to be close to Biysk, the home of the Biysk Oleum plant. The Biysk Oleum plant is Russia’s largest producer of military grade explosives and artillery shells. Every month, Russia supplies its forces with about 120,000 artillery shells. And normally, these shells are produced in Nizhny Novagrod, which is about 1,300 km away by road from Ukrainian borders, which means that the shipments are well within the reach of Ukrainian weapon systems. Because of this, Moscow decided to move their production to the Biysk Oleum plant, thinking that production there would be safe.”
“Cue the Flamingo: A huge missile that could in theory destroy the entire plant with one strike and a 3,000 km range. The is just outside of the Flamingo’s range by a few hundred km. But both Ukrainian and Russian forces are well aware that the Flamingo is a huge threat for this production plant.”
“The Biysk Oleum plant isn’t the only arms manufacturing factory at risk. Shahhead drones, which Russia has adopted from Iran, are produced in Yelabuga and Izhevsk factories which are well within range for the FB5. And the same can be said for the Oreshnik missile factory in Votkinsk.”
“Ukraine, for its part, obtains the capability to destroy virtually any defense industrial facility on the Russian territory. This entails a fundamental change in the balance of power.”
The usual new weapon system caveats apply.
As I’ve stated before, one of the first targets for a long-range drone with a large warhead (assuming they can make the targeting more accurate) should be the Omsk Transiberian railway bridge over the Irtysh river, some 2500km from Ukraine. As far as I can tell, that’s the only rail line in Russia that connects Moscow with Russia’s far eastern territories, and is presumably a key supply gateway to China. Russia could reroute some traffic through Kazakhstan’s rail network (which runs on the same Soviet 1,520 gauge rails), but I imagine there would be considerable pain in rerouting things that way. Plus the sort of floating bridges needed to repair that span seem to be in short supply.
Anyway, I though all of those videos had interesting points to make, even though that’s a lot of video to watch (or texts to read).
Here’s another glimpse into what combat is like on the front lines in Ukraine. To my mind, the main takeaway seems to be that combat already seemed atomized and drone-heavy has become even more atomized and drone-heavy.
“What you’re watching right now is the most lethal weapon on the battlefield of Ukraine. 75% of casualties are produced by this. But because it’s not GoPro footage of the zero line, people don’t want to watch it or learn about it. Well, this is a Mavic 3T.” The Mavic 3T is a commercial-grade Chinese drone with thermal imaging that looks to run in the $6,000—7,000 range, depending on options. And the 75% figure is for both drone attacks and drone-enabled artillery fire.
“We’re watching Ivanivske…That’s right outside of Bakhmut and there’s one road that connects Ivanivske with Bakhmut.”
“So the enemy comes from Bakhmut, and they flood the area with infantry, but it’s slowly by two man teams, and then when they finally amount enough forces over a couple months with enough artillery preparation on a target, they move in to gain the ground.”
“Most of the time though they’re killed on routes and that is our main job as a Mavic pilot, to support the infantry holding the line by attritting the Russian reinforcements making the long trek to the zero line.”
“This is the background behind keeping the front line stable against a much larger adversary.”
“Usually right when they kick it off coming from Bakhmut to Ivanivske along that road, we catch them with flashlights on. We catch them carrying diesel to go and power the jammers, and that’s when we start eliminating them.”
“Most of the time they are killed on route and even run away. But other times they succeed despite tremendous casualties. We’re talking about 50%. Now they like to move during nighttime, mostly, but usually dawn and dusk. That’s when us drone operators switch to a different type of drone or we’re done with our 12-hour shift. So they like to move during that time. And at night time, of course, the drones, like us, can still find them with thermal imaging.”
“One of the problems is that they don’t have night vision equipped the normal infantry, so they struggle to conduct large-scale assaults. And the infantry in Ukraine on both sides are mostly just placekeepers, as a scared man in the way of any assault that might happen. Most of the killing is done by artillery and drones.”
“And if the infantry survives that back and forth bombardment until there’s a squad level at least to make an assault, they can finally move up and take what’s left of the position ahead of them. Oftentimes, those infantry men are there for a month or two, too far forward to safely move back, injured, starving, eating rats, and drinking their own piss, or a large enough force comes in and pushes with you.” Just sounds like a swell life in the Russian army, doesn’t it?
Sometimes the Ukrainian drone operator’s job is basic recon. “It begins with us setting up the drone with a new battery about two km dead reckoning to the area just outside of their jammer zone, which is in the middle of Ivanivske. And then we’ll hold a place to survey one sector of the battlefield as the commander gives us his intent. But other times we’ll have us rozvidka, which means reconnaissance, and we’ll be zooming in on different MSRs [probably Mission Support Request], different buildings that we know that are occupied. We’ll zoom in through roofs. We’ll try and find the enemy actively. But it all depends on the tasking.”
“Most of the night the movement by the Russians is limited to the very front line, the very zero line, or the very rear entering rozvidka. So if the AO [Area of Operations] is clear, we’ll be told to rozvidka, like I said, which will scan for targets rather than have a perfect view of the battlefield with overlapping surveillance, showing the commanders in the talk, the layout of the front line.”
“Once we’re given that rozvidka command, we’ll start testing the waters. We scan from MSR to MSR. We’ll scan areas with that we know that they’re hiding in the buildings and the basements underneath.”
“And we’ll even push up further into the village to see if their jammers are working. And often times, most of the time, they’re not, because they ran out of batteries and gasoline long ago. But other times, the Russians will surprise us by turning on the jammer randomly right when we’re over, even possibly for a movement, or just random, and we’ll get caught in the middle of that jamming bubble, and we’ll lose connections for minutes.”
“Sometimes we’ll lose the drone, it’ll crash into the field to the right of us. Or other times we’ll regain connection two minutes later and we’ll have to find our way back because our battery’s almost dead.”
“But it’s almost always worth the risk to look straight down on the buildings to find movement through the holes in the ceilings. This is a very typical frontline village in Ukraine…Nothing but the steel structures and a couple bricks cemented to them standing.”
“The Russians don’t move out from the basement until a plan is set. A maximum two minute run into some shelter ahead of them is what they’ll do. They’re not going to be doing large assaults two hours in the open. You’re going to die.”
You can’t just bomb every structure due to the cost and logistics. “Large drone teams like the Baba Yagas come over and bomb targets, but it’s mostly done at the very zero line where there’s a lot of action. And whenever that zero line Russian position is eliminated, a couple more from the second line, which we are watching as Mavic pilots, usually come in and replace them to keep the pressure on. It’s all about pressure and momentum. The only way to finish the war is to push. So both sides still need infantry.”
“And also the jammers do work. They they’ll work usually and they can take out very expensive large drones, which are not handed out like candy like a lot of people think.”
“You have to remember: This is one section of the front line out of thousands. And this is one night out of thousands of nights that the Ukrainian war has been going on. We have to have enough equipment and logistics to keep us going the next day. So we can’t be sacrificing everything for a couple kills.”
“So use cheap FVs, sure, but FPV teams are one of the most cumbersome units that you can have on the front line. They need like 10 bags, at least, full of batteries and drones and munitions and their own personal kit and water and food. And most of that stuff is only used once. And if you’re not careful, you can go through half of your supplies of FPVs in a single night when you’re supposed to be out there for five.”
Getting closer to the front lines for higher hit percentage is too dangerous for the drone teams. “We’re we’re 2 km away from the Russians and we survey and bomb them. Now it is separated by 10 km. The Mavic teams are pushed back 6-7 km. FPV teams similar or even 10 km. If you get closer, you’re going to be stuck there for a month or two without drones. So although it might be more effective for your hits, it’s only for a couple days and then you can lose a couple FPV operators along the way.”
“The most lethal weapon on the battlefield [is] a Chinese Mavic drone. Still today, that is the most lethal. FPV teams cannot operate without this Mavic. Artillery cannot operate without a Mavic. We do not use binoculars anymore. We have TRPs [Target Reference Point?] and the surveillance drones seen by the commanders will tell them where the enemy is at the specific moment so they can lob a couple more rounds that way.”
“Or sometimes those Mavic teams are dropping VOGs [probably VOG-17 or VOG-30 grenades] and they’ll they’ll drop one or two at a time and get multiple kills a night, and that adds up very quickly in one single deployment.”
“One of our guys had over 80 confirmed killed or wounded in just that section of the front line alone during one single deployment. And that is one team, one dude who’s the pilot. It’s insane.”
So Russia is sending two man teams in dribbles and dabs to hold positions in the front line, in the process of which getting most of them killed by drones and artillery, so they can gather enough men in one spot to take another building two minutes distance deeper into Ukraine. It seems like a slow motion strategy designed to produce maximum casualties for the most minimal territorial gains possible.
