In this week’s LinkSwarm, I briefly touched on how Ukraine is absolutely hammering Russia’s logistics behind the front lines. So here are a couple of videos that go into more detail. First up: Task & Purpose.
“Right now, Ukraine is hammering away at Russia’s logistics in a big way.”
“Over the past several months, Ukrainian forces have been expanding what are being called middle strikes. Drone attacks against Russian logistics, air defenses, command posts, and support areas dozens of miles behind the front line. These attacks have been reported as typically happening between about 30 and 180 km behind the line of contact, which means roughly 19 to 112 miles.”
“They’ve branded this new campaign as ‘The Logistics Lockdown,’ and Kiev says it is allocating another five billion Hryvnias, or about $13 million, to expand their middle strike capabilities against Russian logistics, warehouses, equipment, command posts, and supply routes.”
“These middle strike drones are being used to hit the stuff that keeps the front line alive.”
“Ukrainian units are using systems like the Chaklun-B, B2, and Decrotia drones to hit Russian targets far from the trenches.”
“If a drone can reliably reach 80, 100 or 150 km behind the front, Russia has to reconsider where it places things that used to feel far enough in the rear. Fuel depots, ammo dumps, repair facilities, all those things that we’ve already mentioned may now have to be pulled back, dispersed, hardened, or used for shorter periods of time before relocating.”
“The farther you pull back, the more that you complicate logistics.”
“This is becoming a significant problem for Russia, especially in occupied southern and eastern Ukraine, where these routes connect Russia with occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea. The Institute for the Study of War says that these Ukrainian strikes are hampering Russia’s ability to move personnel and material along key arteries like the M14 Highway from Rostov to Crimea.”
“More recently, Ukraine’s 412th Nemesis Brigade used a so-called new secret strike drone against the R-280 highway, also called by Russian occupation authorities, the Novorossiya route.” Novorossiya is in Russia’s extremely far east, so I think this is probably a joke. “This route runs through occupied Mariupol, Melitopol, and Simferopol, linking occupied southern Ukraine with Crimea and serving as a key logistics corridor for Russian military equipment and supplies. They claimed that these new strike drones destroyed dozens of trucks and fuel tankers and forced Russia to limit heavy equipment movement along the highway.”
“There are also reports about a drone called Hornet. Defense Express reported that Ukrainian forces have used Hornet strike drones against Russian logistics routes at depths of roughly 50 to 150 km. and they describe the system as a fixed-wing UAV associated with visual navigation and target detection or target capture algorithms.”
“If they’re using onboard terminal guidance through AI chips with cameras, then you really can’t jam them through the typical GPS spoofing or GNSS spoofing. So, these might be kind of a secretish weapon that they’re now using AI to guide to the target.”
“But whether the drone is Hornet, Decrotia—” I don’t which drone this is; the drone they’re showing on the screen is usually referred to as Shark; if you know what a “Decrotia” drone is, or how to properly spell it, feel free t0 share in the comments. “—Chaklun-B, B2, or something still being kept out of public view, it doesn’t really matter.”
Skipping over the section on fiber-optic drones, well-covered and I would be flabbergasted if they’re using them for such long strikes.
“Ukraine is showing what happens when cheap and medium-range drones start focusing on boring logistics trucks and support sites far from the front.”
“Logistics wins wars. So Ukraine is trying to and they’re succeeding in making Russian logistics slower, farther away, more expensive, and just more stressful. And if Russia wants to keep attacking and hold on to the ground that it has taken, it still has to solve the same basic problem that every army has always had to solve ever. Getting the right stuff to the right people at the right time.”
From Task & Purpose to the guy who used to present the Task & Purpose videos, here’s Cappy Army on the same topic.
“Ukrainian forces launched a new logistics lockdown campaign that’s systematically crippling Russian supply lines. Ukraine’s focused on destroying Russian supply trucks and disrupting logistics in a new approach that’s now causing severe problems for the Kremlin. As we’ll see today, I want to examine why this approach has experts licking their finger and saying the strategic winds are now blowing in Ukraine’s favor.”
“The reason why Russia’s supply lines are suddenly collapsing is because of a key concept called Battlefield Air Interdiction, or BAI. It refers to the broader military campaign of using air power or drone strikes to isolate the battlefield. It’s the strategy to destroy transportation arteries. BAI is about denying the enemy the use of crucial logistics lines to sustain immediate frontline operations.”
“Abstract concepts like BAI become reality when you look at the highways leading from Russia into Ukraine. They are just lousy with charred husks of Russian armored vehicles that now sit by the side of logistics roads. Footage has been flooding social media showing Ural heavy recovery trucks destroyed with their tires melted by drone strikes. Open source analysts have counted over 200 strikes just on Russian logistics vehicles.”
He too highlights the importance of attacks on the R-280 highway. “Ukraine has increased the rate of these attacks by five-fold in just a few months.”
“How were they able to do such a feat in mass production? Zelensky announced that they’re already mass-producing attack drones in four European countries, Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, and there are plans to expand drone production into Norway and Sweden soon.” Plus expanding domestic production.
Medium range is also where soldiers rotate to and from the front-lines to decompress. “Middle- range strikes remove any feeling of safety for Russian troops. Ukraine now fires over 160 of these middle-range strikes per month, hitting logistics and ammo depots. They hit drone control points and command posts. It’s hard to appreciate how massive this change really is when you think about four times the amount of strikes compared to February.”
“The new mid-range drones have a payload of about 220 lb, 10 times more powerful and accurate than artillery shells.” The drones shown on screen are the FP-2 Fire Point, the AN-196 Liutyi, and the Peklo, none of which go all the way up to 220 pounds. But the new drones are now cost effective for going after logistics trucks.
“The middle range is the priority right now. Because Ukraine is hitting everything that’s feeding Russia’s front line, that constant pressure is causing some serious problems for the Russian army.”
“Ukrainian drone operators say that before middle-range strike campaign went into full gear, Russia was holding large portions of their supplies and ammunition in the range of between 60 to 80 km back from the front line. But now they’ve had to push all of their supplies twice the distance away to 120 km away. When you’re talking about having to feed Russian artillery teams to match their rate of fire of about 10 to 15,000 rounds a day during surge fighting, every additional kilometer moved back from the front is a huge cost.”
“The US government just signed off on a $370 million deal authorizing sending JDAM extended range glide bomb kits to Ukraine. It would send 1,500 of these glide bombs to Ukrainian fighter jets to fire at targets up to 75 kilometers away with 500 pound bombs. This is the kind of weapon system you send to support offensive operations.”
Back to the M-14 attacks. “The attacks have forced Kherson Oblast’s occupation head Vladimir Soldo to sign a decree restricting the movement of civilian vehicles to only Russian military vehicles here. As a result, Russia’s having an even harder time resupplying its entire southern grouping of forces. A Russian affiliated mil-blogger complained that restricting civilian trucks makes it more difficult for them because now Ukraine knows every vehicle on the highway is a military target. They don’t have to worry about hitting civilians if there are no civilians.”
“Artillery once accounted for 70% of casualties on the battlefield. It’s drones that now account for at least 70% of battlefield deaths.”
“Everyone was shocked when Ukraine’s 129th heavy mechanized brigade went on the offensive, assaulting the town of Odradne in Kharkiv. Armored vehicles pushed forward under artillery fire. Drone strikes blasted Russian soldiers out of trenches. Ukrainian infantry cleared out fortified fighting positions. When it was all said and done, it recaptured the town and 22km with it.”
“And it wasn’t a one-off. Ukraine’s ground forces recaptured 400km largely from the southern sector of Zaporizhzhia. Further east, soldiers retook the city of Kupyansk just when it looked like it was about to fall to Russia. These are just a few of the mounting signs that the momentum of the war is shifting.”
“The clearest indication of a shift came in April when the war hit a major milestone. Moscow lost more territory than they gained for the first time in two years, a net negative of 116km.”
“Russia’s forces [are] slowly losing the ability to sustain the war at the same intensity and momentum.”
There are signs Ukraine is preparing for a new offensive. “The Ukrainian army has started switching from a system of loose brigades with little coordination to a new command level of army corps. The concept puts about five brigades or 80,000 Ukrainian troops, all their drone units, artillery guys, infantry, intelligence officers under one unified command for the first time. The new roughly 18 to 20 something different corps, each report to one of four regional commands. It’s a clear sign that Ukraine is preparing to regain operational maneuver warfare capability.”
“What it means is Ukraine is finally moving away from the old Soviet era model to a NATO style command. This allows for joint planning between brigades for the first time.”
“The old brigade-centric army was good for holding front lines and plugging gaps. Now they will be able to coordinate assault actions. Ukraine is now offense maxing their army’s organization. Another indicator that Ukraine is preparing for localized counterattacks is that in 2026, Ukraine started building two new mechanized brigades, the 160th and the 50th. They’re converting old light infantry formations into mechanized units that ride into battle.”
Skipping over Clausewitz on the importance of morale. “When the Ukrainian war became longer than World War II and less than 1% of territory had been captured since 2023, this was a major turning point in the minds of many Russian troops.”
“Manpower and recruitment are becoming a problem for the Kremlin. Ukraine has come up with the new way to reduce the manpower advantage. They came up with a campaign to kill or wound 50,000 Russian troops per month. Then they gamified it so soldiers get points for every confirmed kill.” We covered the Gamification of the Russo-Ukrainian War here.
“Now evidence shows that the casualty rate is creeping up and retention and recruitment is creeping down. Russia is now struggling to match this rate with fresh recruits. Most open-source analysts have concluded that they’re losing more than they’re recruiting. Most analysts put the numbers at somewhere around 30,000 troops being recruited per month and roughly 35,000 lost each month.”
“This kind of high casualty rate has a negative impact on troops morale.”
“A 24-year-old Russian soldier was fighting in the Donbas last year and he deserted from his unit and spoke to the New York Times about it, saying they spent a month trying to establish a foothold in a small town outside of Pokrovsk, and his unit would move in and then they would get wiped out by Ukrainian drones. Then his commander ordered them to try something different, to start infiltrating in two-man teams to slip through. They eventually had some success with this, and then he deserted to avoid being sent on more assaults.”
Ukraine is also having manpower issues, “and this has led to widespread use of robotic ground systems. In April, Ukraine seized the battlefield position without humans on the ground for the first time of the war, and an estimated 20,000 missions were conducted by ground robots.”
Ukraine seems to winning the technology war. A “one-two punch of the Kremlin blocking telegram messaging apps for many Russian troops because they were unable to monitor it. But it has kneecapped Russian soldiers communications.”
“Then the second punch was Starlink was turned off for Russia by Elon Musk…After access was cut off, Russian commanders were forced to rely on inaccurate maps. They deployed with no means of communication or the ability to use their drones.”
“European countries have agreed to send $100 billion for Ukraine through 2027 to keep their war economy running. When Viktor Orban was defeated in his election recently in Hungary, it unlocked this because he was cock-blocking/vetoing for the deal for years.”
We’ll see if Ukraine can turn their technological advantage in mid-range strikes into more offensive gains.
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18 Responses to “How Ukraine Is Hammering Russian Logistics”
This is mostly a work of fiction. The new “mid range” attack drone is the Swift Beat Hornet which has a 5 kg (11 lb) warhead, not 220 pounds. The drone itself is not remarkable, but the AI targeting system – Palantir’s PRISMA – is. The Hornet and Sea Baby drones are the only ones guided by PRISMA, thus far.
PRISMA is the first fully autonomous man killer unleashed on a battlefield – no human intervention. The PRISMA system appears to be responsible for the Starobilsk dormitory atrocity, the R-280 transit bus attack, and the Constantia port destruction. There are issues well beyond the basic ethics of autonomous killing. It appears that dazzle camouflage has pretty much defeated PRISMA land targeting of actual military targets.
The Ukrainians have had to resort to autonomous killing because they have lost so many drone troops. They pulled all their drone troops out of Sumy and Kharkov Oblasts and still there weren’t enough to run the R-280 campaign. Enter Peter Thiel’s Palantir. It is particularly interesting that Thiel has gone into hiding since Starobilsk.
The Russians are still in the technology game. Their destruction of two VMS ZSU speedboats in the Black Sea carrying Ukrainian Marines yesterday with Geran 2 drones, which overcame wild evasive maneuvers, demonstrates they have countered the last Ukrainian tech supremacy, Starlink denial. It also shows that Russia’s Rubikon units are still well staffed and advancing their technology.
The Ukrainian FP-1 drone usually carries a warhead between 60 kilos and 120 kilos up to 990 kilometers. Obviously the larger the warhead the shorter the range. Ukraine has produced over 5,000 of them over the past 16 months and they are building more every month.
” The FP-1 features a slender fuselage with a two-cylinder engine driving a propeller, a solid rocket booster for launching, and fixed straight wings. It carries a modular warhead weighing between 60 kg and 120 kg, selectable for fragmentation or shaped-charge effects.”
per Wiki
The Firepoint FP-1 drone uses satellite and inertial guidance, not machine vision. It cannot select and attack moving targets like vehicles at distance; the type of attacks which were the innovation of the Ukrainian R-280 campaign. The Swift Beat Hornet drone is able to return images to its PRISMA controller, which then selects and directs the final attack.
The Western media is full of Ukrainian slop about how they’re winning the war, pointedly avoiding talking about what’s happening on the front line. There’s always lots of blather about Ukrainian counteroffensives, ignoring that the Ukrainians take huge losses and can never hold the territory because they’re stretched too thin. Ukrainian drones have definitely done some damage in Russia, but it’s repaired fairly quickly for the most part The only thing I notice above that seems to be factual is the fact that Ukrainian drone operators get points for Russian deaths, redeemable for swag. It omits to note that they also get points for killing their own troops trying to surrender and for killing Russian civilians, although the points for the latter are fewer. I’ve heard Russian commentators note that Ukrainian drone operators are not taken prisoner.
Russian Forces EW technicians monitor the locations of RF emitters on FPV control frequencies within 40 km of the FEBA. The coordinates are fed to tube and missile artillery units who respond immediately, with great enthusiasm.
This is how drone operation became a high risk military occupation in Ukraine.
“The Institute for the Study of War says that these Ukrainian strikes are hampering Russia’s ability to move personnel and material along key arteries like the M14 Highway from Rostov to Crimea.”
Ukraine has the advantage of Interior Lines, making it easier for them to shift reserves to where they are required; Russian dependence on the besieged M14 Highway to move their own reserves means that any Ukrainian breakthrough in the South will be met with insufficient resistance.
TAAS news agency reports that the Chongar bridge, linking Kherson Oblast to Crimea has been closed to traffic following a successful overnight bombing attack on the 7th of June. Even if Russian fuel and food supplies successfully run the land corridor gauntlet leading to Crimea, they will meet a bottleneck at the Dzhankoy automobile crossing.
Of course, the Kerch Bridge remains open as a means of resupply to Crimea but Putin would be a fool to expose fuel trains to being attacked, like they were in October 2022 when a truck bomb set train cars alight. Midrange drones carrying 450 pounds of payload apiece would make short work of resupply efforts.
Capturing Crimea was Putin’s supreme achievement in this war. Now let’s see how long he can hold it.
I’m so old I can remember reading that Russian numerical superiority would guarantee victory over the numerically inferior UkroNazis but it is now evident that their battlefield attrition rate has begun to exceeds their ability to recruit replacements.
“Most open-source analysts have concluded that they’re losing more than they’re recruiting. Most analysts put the numbers at somewhere around 30,000 troops being recruited per month and roughly 35,000 lost each month.”
The war looks to be at a tipping point, where the combined losses of men, material and territory serve as a rebuke to Putin apologists, who have assured us for the entirety of the Three Day Special.Military Operation that Russia’s glorious victory is at hand.
“The coordinates are fed to tube and missile artillery units who respond immediately, with great enthusiasm.”
…but with little effect. Artillery has been largely superseded by FPV drones. The Russians are (re)fighting WW II but are struggling without US military support. Until Valery Gerasimov can figure out how to breach Ukraine’s Drone Wall, territorial gains will be vanishing small.
Putin will have to console himself by bombing clinics, hospitals and open air food stalls.
“Ukraine has the advantage of Interior Lines, making it easier for them to shift reserves to where they are required;”
The Russians surged across the R-46 highway at Bogodukhov after the Ukrainians withdrew their drone troops formerly in the area to conduct the R-280 antilogistics operation. The Russian advance effectively isolated Ukrainian forces in Kharkov from those in Sumy. The Bogodukhov operation is similar to W.T. Sherman’s march of destruction through the South in 1864. The Confederates also claimed to benefit from interior lines. You have to have some mobile reserve forces for interior lines to be an advantage.
“…but with little effect. Artillery has been largely superseded by FPV drones.”
Only on the Ukrainian side, only because they have no artillery shells. The Russians are still swimming in tubes and shells. FPV drones don’t work in bad weather and emissions from their radio controllers provide convenient strike targeting for actual artillery. Why the Ukrainians are now short of drone operators and have to rely on autonomous killing.
“Of course, the Kerch Bridge remains open as a means of resupply to Crimea”
The Russians’ Oreshnik strikes have reminded the the Ukrainians that further strikes on the Kerch Strait bridge will result in destruction of the Dnieper Cascade. The Russians should have destroyed the Dnieper Cascade and the other bridges across the Dnieper years ago, it would have ended the war.
“The Bogodukhov operation is similar to W.T. Sherman’s march of destruction through the South in 1864.”
Is this because it is being conducted on horseback because there is no fuel for Ural-4320 trucks?
“Oreshnik strikes have reminded the the Ukrainians that further strikes on the Kerch Strait bridge will result in destruction of the Dnieper Cascade. The Russians should have destroyed the Dnieper Cascade and the other bridges across the Dnieper years ago, it would have ended the war.”
So the war could have ended favorably for Z-Putin?!
Then either Oreshnik strikes are an empty threat or Gerasimov is too stupid to realize their advantage.
Horses are a preferred mode of transport during the Rasputitsa, but I don’t think they were used here. Unlike most recent Russian assaults, the spear points were T90Ms with the ARENA anti drone systems. Because almost all the Ukrainian drone forces were gone, the tanks’ ARENA systems were not overwhelmed.
Hundreds of wheeled Ukrainian UGVs were destroyed by the Russian tanks in the Bogodukhov operation. They were carrying supplies and troops on the R-46 road and were shredded with 125mm cannister rounds. They seem less nimble than horses, and much more expensive.
Destroying the Dnieper Cascade might be considered a war crime today, despite it being no different than our dam buster raids during WW II. The Russians are clearly paying attention to world opinion, despite adverse consequences for their military strategy.
“More recently, Ukraine’s 412th Nemesis Brigade used a so-called new secret strike drone against the R-280 highway, also called by Russian occupation authorities, the Novorossiya route.” Novorossiya is in Russia’s extremely far east, so I think this is probably a joke.
I think it’s a typo for Novorossiysk, which as Russia’s Black Sea naval base, is of course nearby.
Perun talked about this in his Sunday video. He’s a much more astute analyst, and more realistic in his assessments, than the two YouTubers cited here–but his conclusions are close to theirs. Ukraine’s “mid-range” campaign against Russian logistics has been highly effective so far. https://youtu.be/_Nb869vNCIw?si=MKo4dMBFea_pam9r
Novorossiya (New Russia) has been the name of the Russian governate at the mouth of the Dnieper that includes Highway R-280, ever since the Russians liberated the region from the Crimean Khanate in 1764.
“Novorossiya is what the Russians call southern Ukraine. Not a joke”
In 1764, when the Russians named Novorossiya (New Russia), the governate’s population were Russians, Pontic Greeks, Golden Horde Mongols, and Zaporizhian Cossacks. No Ukrainians. The Russians and Zaporizhian Host expelled the Crimean Khan and his white slavers who had been preying on Christians at a great cost in both blood and treasure. The “Ukrainians” contributed nothing.
The left bank of the Dnieper only became Ukrainian under the Communist Stalin’s ukase which created the eastern borders of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922.
The Russians finally destroyed the Crimean Khanate in 1783, ending white slaving in the region. The Crimean peninsula remained Russian until the Ukrainian Communist Khrushchev transferred it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954.
[…] “They’re extremely cheap, and they’ve been used by Ukraine less to target Russian troops at the front, and more to target the staging operations that would have created the foundation of a successful offensive. Russian forces have been unable to protect their ammunition stockpiles, their fuel trucks, or their encampments and training grounds away from the front lines.” More on how Ukraine is hammering Russian logistics here. […]
This is mostly a work of fiction. The new “mid range” attack drone is the Swift Beat Hornet which has a 5 kg (11 lb) warhead, not 220 pounds. The drone itself is not remarkable, but the AI targeting system – Palantir’s PRISMA – is. The Hornet and Sea Baby drones are the only ones guided by PRISMA, thus far.
PRISMA is the first fully autonomous man killer unleashed on a battlefield – no human intervention. The PRISMA system appears to be responsible for the Starobilsk dormitory atrocity, the R-280 transit bus attack, and the Constantia port destruction. There are issues well beyond the basic ethics of autonomous killing. It appears that dazzle camouflage has pretty much defeated PRISMA land targeting of actual military targets.
The Ukrainians have had to resort to autonomous killing because they have lost so many drone troops. They pulled all their drone troops out of Sumy and Kharkov Oblasts and still there weren’t enough to run the R-280 campaign. Enter Peter Thiel’s Palantir. It is particularly interesting that Thiel has gone into hiding since Starobilsk.
The Russians are still in the technology game. Their destruction of two VMS ZSU speedboats in the Black Sea carrying Ukrainian Marines yesterday with Geran 2 drones, which overcame wild evasive maneuvers, demonstrates they have countered the last Ukrainian tech supremacy, Starlink denial. It also shows that Russia’s Rubikon units are still well staffed and advancing their technology.
The Ukrainian FP-1 drone usually carries a warhead between 60 kilos and 120 kilos up to 990 kilometers. Obviously the larger the warhead the shorter the range. Ukraine has produced over 5,000 of them over the past 16 months and they are building more every month.
” The FP-1 features a slender fuselage with a two-cylinder engine driving a propeller, a solid rocket booster for launching, and fixed straight wings. It carries a modular warhead weighing between 60 kg and 120 kg, selectable for fragmentation or shaped-charge effects.”
per Wiki
The Firepoint FP-1 drone uses satellite and inertial guidance, not machine vision. It cannot select and attack moving targets like vehicles at distance; the type of attacks which were the innovation of the Ukrainian R-280 campaign. The Swift Beat Hornet drone is able to return images to its PRISMA controller, which then selects and directs the final attack.
The Western media is full of Ukrainian slop about how they’re winning the war, pointedly avoiding talking about what’s happening on the front line. There’s always lots of blather about Ukrainian counteroffensives, ignoring that the Ukrainians take huge losses and can never hold the territory because they’re stretched too thin. Ukrainian drones have definitely done some damage in Russia, but it’s repaired fairly quickly for the most part The only thing I notice above that seems to be factual is the fact that Ukrainian drone operators get points for Russian deaths, redeemable for swag. It omits to note that they also get points for killing their own troops trying to surrender and for killing Russian civilians, although the points for the latter are fewer. I’ve heard Russian commentators note that Ukrainian drone operators are not taken prisoner.
“drone operators are not taken prisoner.”
Expect this to be SOP for the foreseeable future.
Russian Forces EW technicians monitor the locations of RF emitters on FPV control frequencies within 40 km of the FEBA. The coordinates are fed to tube and missile artillery units who respond immediately, with great enthusiasm.
This is how drone operation became a high risk military occupation in Ukraine.
“The Institute for the Study of War says that these Ukrainian strikes are hampering Russia’s ability to move personnel and material along key arteries like the M14 Highway from Rostov to Crimea.”
Ukraine has the advantage of Interior Lines, making it easier for them to shift reserves to where they are required; Russian dependence on the besieged M14 Highway to move their own reserves means that any Ukrainian breakthrough in the South will be met with insufficient resistance.
TAAS news agency reports that the Chongar bridge, linking Kherson Oblast to Crimea has been closed to traffic following a successful overnight bombing attack on the 7th of June. Even if Russian fuel and food supplies successfully run the land corridor gauntlet leading to Crimea, they will meet a bottleneck at the Dzhankoy automobile crossing.
Of course, the Kerch Bridge remains open as a means of resupply to Crimea but Putin would be a fool to expose fuel trains to being attacked, like they were in October 2022 when a truck bomb set train cars alight. Midrange drones carrying 450 pounds of payload apiece would make short work of resupply efforts.
Capturing Crimea was Putin’s supreme achievement in this war. Now let’s see how long he can hold it.
I’m so old I can remember reading that Russian numerical superiority would guarantee victory over the numerically inferior UkroNazis but it is now evident that their battlefield attrition rate has begun to exceeds their ability to recruit replacements.
“Most open-source analysts have concluded that they’re losing more than they’re recruiting. Most analysts put the numbers at somewhere around 30,000 troops being recruited per month and roughly 35,000 lost each month.”
The war looks to be at a tipping point, where the combined losses of men, material and territory serve as a rebuke to Putin apologists, who have assured us for the entirety of the Three Day Special.Military Operation that Russia’s glorious victory is at hand.
“The coordinates are fed to tube and missile artillery units who respond immediately, with great enthusiasm.”
…but with little effect. Artillery has been largely superseded by FPV drones. The Russians are (re)fighting WW II but are struggling without US military support. Until Valery Gerasimov can figure out how to breach Ukraine’s Drone Wall, territorial gains will be vanishing small.
Putin will have to console himself by bombing clinics, hospitals and open air food stalls.
“Ukraine has the advantage of Interior Lines, making it easier for them to shift reserves to where they are required;”
The Russians surged across the R-46 highway at Bogodukhov after the Ukrainians withdrew their drone troops formerly in the area to conduct the R-280 antilogistics operation. The Russian advance effectively isolated Ukrainian forces in Kharkov from those in Sumy. The Bogodukhov operation is similar to W.T. Sherman’s march of destruction through the South in 1864. The Confederates also claimed to benefit from interior lines. You have to have some mobile reserve forces for interior lines to be an advantage.
“…but with little effect. Artillery has been largely superseded by FPV drones.”
Only on the Ukrainian side, only because they have no artillery shells. The Russians are still swimming in tubes and shells. FPV drones don’t work in bad weather and emissions from their radio controllers provide convenient strike targeting for actual artillery. Why the Ukrainians are now short of drone operators and have to rely on autonomous killing.
“Of course, the Kerch Bridge remains open as a means of resupply to Crimea”
The Russians’ Oreshnik strikes have reminded the the Ukrainians that further strikes on the Kerch Strait bridge will result in destruction of the Dnieper Cascade. The Russians should have destroyed the Dnieper Cascade and the other bridges across the Dnieper years ago, it would have ended the war.
“The Bogodukhov operation is similar to W.T. Sherman’s march of destruction through the South in 1864.”
Is this because it is being conducted on horseback because there is no fuel for Ural-4320 trucks?
“Oreshnik strikes have reminded the the Ukrainians that further strikes on the Kerch Strait bridge will result in destruction of the Dnieper Cascade. The Russians should have destroyed the Dnieper Cascade and the other bridges across the Dnieper years ago, it would have ended the war.”
So the war could have ended favorably for Z-Putin?!
Then either Oreshnik strikes are an empty threat or Gerasimov is too stupid to realize their advantage.
Horses are a preferred mode of transport during the Rasputitsa, but I don’t think they were used here. Unlike most recent Russian assaults, the spear points were T90Ms with the ARENA anti drone systems. Because almost all the Ukrainian drone forces were gone, the tanks’ ARENA systems were not overwhelmed.
Hundreds of wheeled Ukrainian UGVs were destroyed by the Russian tanks in the Bogodukhov operation. They were carrying supplies and troops on the R-46 road and were shredded with 125mm cannister rounds. They seem less nimble than horses, and much more expensive.
Destroying the Dnieper Cascade might be considered a war crime today, despite it being no different than our dam buster raids during WW II. The Russians are clearly paying attention to world opinion, despite adverse consequences for their military strategy.
“More recently, Ukraine’s 412th Nemesis Brigade used a so-called new secret strike drone against the R-280 highway, also called by Russian occupation authorities, the Novorossiya route.” Novorossiya is in Russia’s extremely far east, so I think this is probably a joke.
I think it’s a typo for Novorossiysk, which as Russia’s Black Sea naval base, is of course nearby.
Perun talked about this in his Sunday video. He’s a much more astute analyst, and more realistic in his assessments, than the two YouTubers cited here–but his conclusions are close to theirs. Ukraine’s “mid-range” campaign against Russian logistics has been highly effective so far. https://youtu.be/_Nb869vNCIw?si=MKo4dMBFea_pam9r
Novorossiya (New Russia) has been the name of the Russian governate at the mouth of the Dnieper that includes Highway R-280, ever since the Russians liberated the region from the Crimean Khanate in 1764.
Novorossiya is what the Russians call southern Ukraine. Not a joke
“Novorossiya is what the Russians call southern Ukraine. Not a joke”
In 1764, when the Russians named Novorossiya (New Russia), the governate’s population were Russians, Pontic Greeks, Golden Horde Mongols, and Zaporizhian Cossacks. No Ukrainians. The Russians and Zaporizhian Host expelled the Crimean Khan and his white slavers who had been preying on Christians at a great cost in both blood and treasure. The “Ukrainians” contributed nothing.
The left bank of the Dnieper only became Ukrainian under the Communist Stalin’s ukase which created the eastern borders of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922.
The Russians finally destroyed the Crimean Khanate in 1783, ending white slaving in the region. The Crimean peninsula remained Russian until the Ukrainian Communist Khrushchev transferred it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954.
[…] “They’re extremely cheap, and they’ve been used by Ukraine less to target Russian troops at the front, and more to target the staging operations that would have created the foundation of a successful offensive. Russian forces have been unable to protect their ammunition stockpiles, their fuel trucks, or their encampments and training grounds away from the front lines.” More on how Ukraine is hammering Russian logistics here. […]