Thermoclines of truth, where valid information can’t make it to the top of organizations because telling unpleasant truths is discouraged, has been an ongoing concern of the blog. Simon Whistler and his crew have taken a look at the Russian military, and it appears that it’s thermoclines of truth (and endemic corruption) all the way down.
He starts out with a discussion of the current state of the war:
“Once upon a time, the Russian military was supposed to be the second most powerful on Earth. Today, the Russian military isn’t even the most powerful military in Ukraine.”
“From the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the nation’s armed forces have been subjected to a strange humiliation ritual, partly because of the cunning and innovation of their Ukrainian rivals, but partly because of the sheer bumbling idiocy of their own commanding officers.”
“Russia’s consistent ability to find its way into new and catastrophic blunders also definitely doesn’t hurt. As painful as the last several years have been for the Russian military, the situation has deteriorated even further in 2026. Russia is losing troops at an unprecedented rate, expending more lives, more munitions, and more state wealth. Even as they capture less and less territory each month, his battlefield commanders are making increasingly poor decisions, and they’re openly lying to their higher-ups when their attacks inevitably fall apart.”
“In the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin and his inner circle are being fed a constant stream of false victories when on the front lines, Russia’s spring and summer offensive has fallen flat on its face.”
“But however incompetent the Russian military might seem, the reality is even worse. Because underneath Ukrainian victories and underneath obvious blunders by Moscow, the Russian military has built a hidden corrupt machine where every battlefield catastrophe puts rubles into Russian pockets.”
“As the time of writing, Russian forward progress on the battlefield has basically halted in an overall sense. But Russia is still pushing forward in some areas just as it is being pushed back in others.”
“The graft and exploitation we’re going to describe today isn’t an accident. It exists because of the war in Ukraine. It feeds off the war in Ukraine. And the people who benefit most from the exploitation are the same people with the greatest incentives to ensure that the war continues even after any honest outside appraisal would suggest that Russian gains aren’t even close to being worth the cost.”
“Just a few short months ago, Russia was moving assets into position for what was intended to be a major push centered on the city of Sloviansk in the partially occupied Donetsk oblast. Taking Sloviansk wasn’t going to be easy for the Russians.”
“But even before there was time for the spring offensive to get underway, Ukraine revealed what’s turned out to be a decisive advantage. a new arsenal of mid-range drones, including an American-made model called the Hornet, plus the tactical advances to use those drones effectively. Dubbed the Martian 2 by Russian soldiers, the Hornet is piloted partially by artificial intelligence, and it’s completely impervious to Russian jamming because it navigates by using that AI to read the terrain visually instead of relying on GPS or remote control. The onboard AI can identify targets and even handle the final kill process all by itself. Flying at a range of over a 100 km, they’re practically silent until just before impact.”
“They’re extremely cheap, and they’ve been used by Ukraine less to target Russian troops at the front, and more to target the staging operations that would have created the foundation of a successful offensive. Russian forces have been unable to protect their ammunition stockpiles, their fuel trucks, or their encampments and training grounds away from the front lines.” More on how Ukraine is hammering Russian logistics here.
“Nor is the Hornet the only drone in Ukraine’s arsenal. Recently, Ukraine’s 412th Nemesis Brigade unveiled the Morrigan, another mid-range strike drone that’s optimized to operate significantly behind enemy lines. Those drones have allowed Ukraine to completely diffuse the spring offensive before it ever really got going.”
“Even more important, Ukraine has achieved those results without putting its soldiers at greater risk. Ukraine’s forces are chronically undermanned and perpetually exhausted. And Kiev does not have the ability to go head-to-head with the full strength of a Russian offensive in any one area, but instead it’s completely destroyed the infrastructure Russia needed to create an offensive that wouldn’t collapse under its own weight.”
“As a result, Russian forces near the front are badly isolated, cut off from easy reinforcement and resupply, while the bulk of the killing takes place away from the front lines where Russian troops naturally have their guard down. Ukraine has even expanded its strikes to target the highway network leading across occupied territory and into Crimea where the impact of Ukraine’s bombardment has gotten so bad that the entire region is on the brink of economic collapse. Fuel trucks, trains, and even ferries are unable to reach Crimea. The existing fuel storage infrastructure there has been destroyed and the problem’s only getting worse with fuel shortages now starting to spread across the Donbas.”
“According to the latest frontline reports, mobile drone defense teams are now at risk of running out of fuel. A crisis that would clear the way for even deeper Ukrainian strikes.”
“Better yet for Ukraine, targeting efficiency is improving constantly, to the point that it now takes only a few minutes for Ukrainian forces to spot a new moving target, get a drone on site, and destroy it.”
“Over the last several years, Russia and Ukraine have been engaged in a cycle of mutual innovation, with one side working out new solutions to battlefield problems and gaining a temporary advantage until the other side counters with innovations of their own. This time, however, Russia hasn’t been able to innovate a solution to the new problems that Ukraine has posed.”
“Russian troops are overextended and they have no choice but to hold their positions on the front when really their manpower is needed to defend the territory that Russia has already captured.”
“In the air, Russia still hasn’t found a way to meaningfully engage its air force in the conflict. Besides the use of strategic bombers and MiG-31 fighters to launch long-range cruise missiles, Russia can’t risk using some of its most valuable reconnaissance and command aircraft after Ukraine proved able to use American-made Patriot missiles to bring them down. And the supposedly world-class Su-57 fighter jet is still almost completely absent from contested airspace.”
“Russia’s aerial problem is expected to get even worse by early 2027, when Ukraine will take possession of its first Swedish-made Gripen fighter jets along with a long-range missile, the Meteor, that will have the range to strike Russian strategic bombers as they conduct those missile launches over the water.”
Snipping discussion of the poor state of Russia’s Black Sea fleet and the most recent St. Petersburg strike that we’ve covered in various LinkSwarms.
“Russian air defenses on the home front appear to be on the verge of complete collapse. Ukrainian long-range drones now regularly impact targets that were once unthinkable. From the Baltic Sea oil terminals at Primorsk and Luga to sensitive or highly specialized defense industrial centers located deep in the Russian heartland. Even Moscow has been targeted successfully.
“According to the chief designer at Ukraine’s leading missile innovator Firepoint, a new line of ballistic missiles will soon be operational and capable of hitting Moscow directly.”
“Russia hasn’t been able to meaningfully address the [air defense] problem.”
“As for its attempts to prevent Ukrainian long-range strikes, Russia seems to be unable to hit the command and control centers or the drone stockpiles that enable the campaign. So instead, Russia tries to deter Ukraine by launching long-range strikes of its own, often targeting population centers, energy infrastructure, or dual use facilities instead of going after the Ukrainian military.”
“Just as important [as Ukraine’s strikes], if not even more so, is the incredible consistency with which Russia manages to shoot itself in the foot. Moscow’s original sin, so to speak, is one that the rest of the world has gotten very familiar with. A supreme overconfidence that’s been helping Russia defeat itself from the very beginning. Despite the alternative storylines pushed out by Russian bot farms and repeated, no doubt, in this very comment section [aside: “Hello there, robots”], the idea that Kiev would fall in three days was very much a Russian invention.”
“But much more important than Russia’s original mistake was the fact that Moscow still hasn’t learned its lesson. Military planners and strategists all up and down the Russian military, from the unit level on the battlefield to Vladimir Putin himself, still base their decisions and expectations on an aggrandized version of the Russian military that simply does not exist.”
“Over time that problem is fused with another one. The fact that Russian leaders, again from the unit level all the way to the top, simply refuse to give each other honest assessments of what’s happening. At a certain point, those leaders realized that they could get away with reporting advances, victories, and other good news that didn’t actually exist.”
“The problem often starts small on the front lines. A Russian army captain sends a small unit to plant a flag and takes a few selfies in a contested area before that unit is annihilated in drone strikes. And then the captain sends those selfies to his major, claiming that today his forces took the territory in the picture. That same day, the major gets several similar reports from other captains. So he reports to his colonel that the front line has moved up by a few hundred meters when in reality most of the forces under his command have not moved at all.”
“That’s a throwaway example, of course, but you get the idea. And that news then travels up the chain until it reaches somebody like chief of the general staff of the Russian armed forces, Valery Gerasimov. We put the spotlight on Gerasimov in particular, because this is how you get statements like the one he made this past April, when he claims that Russia had captured a total of 80 settlements and over 1700 square kilometers since the start of the year. According to independent war monitors, Gerasimov tripled the amount of territory that Russia had actually taken. And of course, he failed to measure the territory that Russia had lost.”
“Don’t just take it from us, though. Even Russia’s milblogger class was calling bullshit in the aftermath.”
“But those institutional miscommunications, combined with the Russian military’s inflated perception of itself, combine to form a third problem, a demand for forward progress at all costs.”
“At this point in the war, commanders and higher-ups have gotten very used to the idea that their troops are consistently moving forward, consistently taking territory, and consistently getting Russia closer to victory. But now that lie has become too big to fail. And if individual Russian commanders were to report results that don’t align with that lie in places Russia wasn’t expecting, then they are at risk of being demoted, relieved of duty, or even worse.”
“As a result, each level of Russian leadership places immense pressure on the next level below them, all the way down to the frontline soldiers. Because their commanders need to deliver forward progress. And because their commanders won’t get into any real trouble if they sacrifice more lives in exchange, those frontline troops are at immense risk of being ordered forward into incredibly risky assaults.”
“Of course, it’s not unusual that a soldier on the front line of a major war would face some risk. But there’s a difference between being asked to advance as part of a coordinated push on a well-defined, well-scouted target and being told to sneak into a zone where there’s been no prior scouting and where Ukrainian surveillance and kamikaze drone coverage is expected to be overwhelming. Those are the kinds of situations that Russian soldiers are being ordered into. Not because there’s any expectation that they would succeed, but because their attempt gives their commanders enough plausible deniability to report success.”
Sometimes it works. “But the costs of munitions, funds, supplies, and especially human life are so much greater than the value of what Russia’s actually capturing.”
“Nor does Russia particularly care which soldiers get sent to the meat grinder. More and more sources from within the Russian military report the troops are sent into assault units regardless of their other qualifications, including skilled recruits who could make meaningful contributions to enhance Russia’s overall situation. Soldiers with experience in electrical work, logistics management, and even the medical field, have been reassigned against their will to assault brigades, often without explanation. At times, those reassignments come after they were recruited into the military on the promise that they’d be working with their advanced skill set.”
“Sometimes the reassignments appear to be random, but at other times they’re used as punishment. Soldiers who disobey orders, try to desert, or otherwise anger their commanders are highly likely to be reassigned to units where they’ll be used as cannon-fodder.”
“But let’s circle back to Ukraine’s mid-range drone campaign, because that makes this problem even worse. At the best of times, Russian troops were being sent forward into these high-risk assaults with at least a few things going for them: A little bit of training and prep time, a decently well supplied sustainment infrastructure to keep them alive, a possibility of MedEvac if they’re wounded, and a possibility that reinforcements would soon join them if they survive.”
“Today, though, that entire support infrastructure has been torn to shreds. Yet, the expectation of forward progress still remains. So, these soldiers are still ordered forward, but they’re overexposed, under-supplied, and isolated compared to what was already a bad situation. When they’re wounded, they aren’t evacuated. They die slow, horrific, predictable deaths. To the point that instead of the usual ratio of killed to wounded in modern war, one killed for every three wounded, Ukrainian assessment suggests that Russia’s balance looks more like two soldiers killed for every one wounded.”
“Even worse, the soldiers who are wounded will often be sent back to combat. Every so often, video footage emerges from the front lines depicting soldiers on crutches or in wheelchairs bearing visible shrapnel wounds or dealing with limbs that won’t work like they’re supposed to, forced back into assault units where their death is all but certain.”
“And all of that would be bad enough if Russia wasn’t so insistent on hobbling its soldiers even further. Take the example of frontline drone equipment. According to Russian milblogger sources, the Kremlin recently ordered most combat units to start giving up drones of various models, sending them back to be reassigned to Russia’s dedicated drone forces. That’s despite the fact that the Russian drone forces are not properly dispersed along the front line, and they’re not part of any efficient decision-making infrastructure that would allow them to support Russian troops in real time. So where a Russian platoon might once have been able to use small FPV drones to scout their surroundings or strike Ukrainian targets, they now have nothing. They’re operationally blind and beholden to another branch of the military for support.”
“On paper, Russia has started to fix the issue. Officials in Moscow say that Russia is now producing record numbers of FPV drones. According to the milbloggers, however, these replacement drones are unreliable, ineffective, and of a dangerously low construction quality. Similarly, Russian troops are still reeling from the decision to cut off access to Telegram a couple of months ago, demanding that Telegram be replaced with the state-run Max app, despite the fact that it is insecure, incomplete, and extremely buggy. Maybe Vladimir Putin vibe coded it. The same could be said for the loss of Starlink, a western controlled connectivity service that Russia chose to remain dependent on instead of dedicating the appropriate resources to build its own alternative.”
“If we were to end this episode right now, the situation we’ve described would already be bad enough. A Russian military that’s completely failed to address Ukrainian combat innovations and one that’s consistently made decisions that puts its troops at extreme unnecessary risk. But all too often, when a country or a fighting force seems to suffer from issues so comprehensive and so obviously stupid, that they seem to resist understanding, it’s important to ask another question. Who’s getting paid?”
“If Russia’s obvious incentives are to increase the combat potency of its troops, make legitimate gains on the battlefield, and eventually win the war, then who benefits inside Russia from making sure that that doesn’t happen? To answer that question, we’re going to invite you to think about the war a bit differently for just a minute.”
“Take away the people, the guns, the tanks, the drones, and the territory, and think about Russia’s invasion as a flow of money. That money is being sent from within Russia and funneled into Ukraine. Sent in the form of military equipment, fuel supplies, and direct payments made to Russian soldiers. Then some of that money flows back into Russia as those soldiers paychecks travel to bank accounts or are sent to their families.”
“That flow of funds is partially regulated, but it’s happening in and around an active combat zone, which means monitoring is difficult, and financial transfers have to happen with limited internal oversight or anti-corruption protections. Not to mention that the Russian state isn’t exactly the best at internal oversight.”
“Transactions happen on the aggregate scale of tens of billions of rubles, meaning that even relatively large amounts of missing cash can easily be dismissed as just a rounding error.”
“If you were a person interested in taking money that you could reasonably obtain somewhere within the Russian economy, then the war is the perfect place to do it. You’ve just got to figure out where you can get in the way of the regular flow of funds, whether those funds are headed into the conflict zone or traveling out.”
“Take another look at the problems the Russian military is dealing with and the specter of internal corruption is everywhere.”
“We’ll start with a few examples at the top from people who exert immense power within the Russian armed forces. Take Roman Demurchiev, a major general who serves as deputy commander of Russia’s 20th Combined Arms Army. Over the span of several years, he engaged in regular shakedowns of his subordinates worth the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of US dollars, some of which he passed up to his superiors who expected additional payouts. As he once texted to one of his subordinates, quote, “War is war, but don’t forget about the cash. Get yours. Delete this message later.'”
“Or take the former deputy defense minister Ruslan Tsalikov, who was brought up on bribery, money laundering, and conspiracy charges that alleged he created a gang to steal from the Russian state budget. He was brought down during a wave of prosecutions that surrounded former defense minister Sergey Shoygu.”
“But even though Russia does occasionally prosecute corrupt officials, the Kremlin’s track record dovetails in a very troubling way with the problem we’ve already mentioned. Commanders only tend to come under real scrutiny when they’ve already failed in some way that requires their removal, usually due to battlefield setbacks. From Vladimir Putin’s perspective, the nice thing about everybody in the Russian leadership being so corrupt, is that when it’s time to remove them, it usually doesn’t take very long to dig into their finances and bring legitimate, damning charges against them.”
“But if these commanders understand that they’ll only be scrutinized after they’ve been found to have committed battlefield screw-ups, then they’re heavily incentivized to ensure that their screw-ups don’t become common knowledge. So they push their subordinates harder and they push their subordinates harder still until frontline soldiers are fighting and dying to create an illusion of frontline progress so their commanders can save their skins.”
“Or take another problem we’ve already mentioned, the cheapy and ineffective FPP drones that are being flooded toward the Russian front lines. That decision was the work of Yuri Vaganov, the commander of the Russian unmanned systems forces who was appointed in late 2025. But here’s the thing about Vaganov. He has got zero military experience, zero military education, despite now holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Instead, he owns a very large drone company, the same drone company that’s now guzzling down rubles from state contracts and mass-producing the FPV drones that Russian soldiers are expected to use. Interesting, isn’t it? In essence, this single aspiring oligarch has worked out a way to position himself within both the Russian military itself and the Russian defense industrial complex so that he could give himself a monopoly over drone procurement in the biggest drone war that the world has ever seen.”
“For Russian soldiers, his appointment is a life-threatening catastrophe. But for Vaganov himself, the incentives will be to cut corners, inflate costs, and otherwise pillage as much of Russia’s drone budget as possible.”
“But let’s talk about the other way that money flows through the Russian side of this war, into soldiers pockets, and then ideally back to their bank accounts or to their families. That’s where lower level commanders get their opportunity, because they wield the power to decide who lives and who dies. Take an article published this April by The Economist, where a dozen Russian contract soldiers describe a system where low-level infantrymen will bribe their commanders for a position away from the front and then spend a high share of their remaining wages financing their commander’s lifestyle while carrying out unpaid labor on the side.”
“As one soldier in that article described, troops often start giving up a portion of their paychecks to buy decent drones or body armor or other assets that might, you know, keep them alive. But then also, quote, ‘You’ll pay forever so they don’t send you to the meat grinder.’ Other Russian commanders have purportedly forced troops to pay exorbitant sums to stay alive and sometimes just to avoid being shot on the spot.”
“According to recent reports by exiled Russian journalists, low-level commanders operate more like gang leaders than actual military personnel, in increasingly sophisticated structures that are informed by the high proportion of ex-convicts that now swell the Russian ranks. Often when new troops arrive, commanders confiscate their bank cards and ping codes and threaten violence against those who don’t comply. And when those soldiers are killed, they’re formally reported by their commanders as missing. A change that ensures that money will continue flowing to their accounts.”
“Think of frontline soldiers as a pure revenue stream, and even some of Russia’s most asinine decisions start to make sense. When a soldier is wounded in combat, that soldier still receives a paycheck. And if they can be kept on the front lines, then the process of extortion can continue.”
“When a higher skill Russian recruit shows up in one of those units, commanders know that they’re likely to have more money, partly because they’re going to be paid on a better contract, and partly because they probably have some form of savings squirreled away from their civilian life. Trap those soldiers in an assault unit, and there’s no limit to what they might be willing to pay in order to avoid the meat grinder. But if they seem as if they’ll cause trouble, then the meat grinder is right there for their commanders to use.”
“Those incentives also help explain increasing reports of physical torture of Russian soldiers by their own commanders on or near the front lines, including soldiers who’ve already been wounded. Our own Warfronts team has encountered footage of Russian troops who’ve had multiple limbs amputated due to combat wounds who were then cling-wrapped onto trees and extorted further. Videos like that can be sent to a soldier’s family who will then ends up paying even more to spare the life of a person who’s locked into conscription or contract by the Russian state.” The Western tradition of military service demands leaders who will do just about anything for the men serving under them, while Russian officers torture their subordinates for money.
“Quoting researcher Alexandra Arapova [Russian families] are saying that literally we paid everything to have our father, brother, husband not to be killed. In many cases, superiors, they use torture to take money from the soldiers.”
“As for the scale of the brutality, we can’t know for sure, but judging by the available information, this kind of treatment is everywhere. One Russian exile outlet, Radio Echo, obtained accounts from soldiers like these, and over a 6-month period in 2025, Radio Echo indicated that they had received almost 12,000 complaints of corruption and violence by Russian commanders against their own men.”
“It’s here that we find the real root of Russia’s ongoing military incompetence. Where Ukraine has spent the last four years learning, adapting, and innovating on the battlefield, Russian generals, defense industrial elites, and low-level battlefield commanders have been building a deeply corrupt machine at every level of the Russian armed forces. That machine exists to extract wealth for the direct and personal benefit of people lucky enough to wield power at the expense of frontline soldiers who aren’t so fortunate.”
“In a system like that, where officials aren’t just personally corrupt, but can safely assume that corruption is all around them, reform just isn’t a goal, even if it saves lives. Reform, there is a danger, even an enemy. Because if Russia were to ever fix the incompetence that runs through its armed forces, then it would destroy the machine that Russian incompetence is built to serve.”
“Right now, that status quo demands constant reports of forward progress, by any means necessary. And the Kremlin is willing to pay every ruble in Russia in order to make that happen.”
“But Vladimir Putin’s military is overrun with people who don’t particularly care about conquering Ukraine as long as they know they’ll be set for life in the post-war Russia that comes next. Russian incompetence is getting worse because it’s becoming streamlined and because the Russian leadership has proved that corruption will go unchecked as long as forward progress continues.”
“The incompetence is the point because the longer this situation lasts, the longer this vast corrupt machine can go on making a profit.”
Thermoclines of truth and endemic corruption are the horrifying reality for Russian soldiers, and also a big reason why Ukraine has a real chance to win.
We previous touched on Putin’s thermocline of truth here.
In this week’s LinkSwarm, I briefly touched on how Ukraine is absolutely hammering Russia’s logistics behind the front lines. So here are a couple of videos that go into more detail. First up: Task & Purpose.
“Right now, Ukraine is hammering away at Russia’s logistics in a big way.”
“Over the past several months, Ukrainian forces have been expanding what are being called middle strikes. Drone attacks against Russian logistics, air defenses, command posts, and support areas dozens of miles behind the front line. These attacks have been reported as typically happening between about 30 and 180 km behind the line of contact, which means roughly 19 to 112 miles.”
“They’ve branded this new campaign as ‘The Logistics Lockdown,’ and Kiev says it is allocating another five billion Hryvnias, or about $13 million, to expand their middle strike capabilities against Russian logistics, warehouses, equipment, command posts, and supply routes.”
“These middle strike drones are being used to hit the stuff that keeps the front line alive.”
“Ukrainian units are using systems like the Chaklun-B, B2, and Decrotia drones to hit Russian targets far from the trenches.”
“If a drone can reliably reach 80, 100 or 150 km behind the front, Russia has to reconsider where it places things that used to feel far enough in the rear. Fuel depots, ammo dumps, repair facilities, all those things that we’ve already mentioned may now have to be pulled back, dispersed, hardened, or used for shorter periods of time before relocating.”
“The farther you pull back, the more that you complicate logistics.”
“This is becoming a significant problem for Russia, especially in occupied southern and eastern Ukraine, where these routes connect Russia with occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea. The Institute for the Study of War says that these Ukrainian strikes are hampering Russia’s ability to move personnel and material along key arteries like the M14 Highway from Rostov to Crimea.”
“More recently, Ukraine’s 412th Nemesis Brigade used a so-called new secret strike drone against the R-280 highway, also called by Russian occupation authorities, the Novorossiya route.” Novorossiya is in Russia’s extremely far east, so I think this is probably a joke. “This route runs through occupied Mariupol, Melitopol, and Simferopol, linking occupied southern Ukraine with Crimea and serving as a key logistics corridor for Russian military equipment and supplies. They claimed that these new strike drones destroyed dozens of trucks and fuel tankers and forced Russia to limit heavy equipment movement along the highway.”
“There are also reports about a drone called Hornet. Defense Express reported that Ukrainian forces have used Hornet strike drones against Russian logistics routes at depths of roughly 50 to 150 km. and they describe the system as a fixed-wing UAV associated with visual navigation and target detection or target capture algorithms.”
“If they’re using onboard terminal guidance through AI chips with cameras, then you really can’t jam them through the typical GPS spoofing or GNSS spoofing. So, these might be kind of a secretish weapon that they’re now using AI to guide to the target.”
“But whether the drone is Hornet, Decrotia—” I don’t which drone this is; the drone they’re showing on the screen is usually referred to as Shark; if you know what a “Decrotia” drone is, or how to properly spell it, feel free t0 share in the comments. “—Chaklun-B, B2, or something still being kept out of public view, it doesn’t really matter.”
Skipping over the section on fiber-optic drones, well-covered and I would be flabbergasted if they’re using them for such long strikes.
“Ukraine is showing what happens when cheap and medium-range drones start focusing on boring logistics trucks and support sites far from the front.”
“Logistics wins wars. So Ukraine is trying to and they’re succeeding in making Russian logistics slower, farther away, more expensive, and just more stressful. And if Russia wants to keep attacking and hold on to the ground that it has taken, it still has to solve the same basic problem that every army has always had to solve ever. Getting the right stuff to the right people at the right time.”
From Task & Purpose to the guy who used to present the Task & Purpose videos, here’s Cappy Army on the same topic.
“Ukrainian forces launched a new logistics lockdown campaign that’s systematically crippling Russian supply lines. Ukraine’s focused on destroying Russian supply trucks and disrupting logistics in a new approach that’s now causing severe problems for the Kremlin. As we’ll see today, I want to examine why this approach has experts licking their finger and saying the strategic winds are now blowing in Ukraine’s favor.”
“The reason why Russia’s supply lines are suddenly collapsing is because of a key concept called Battlefield Air Interdiction, or BAI. It refers to the broader military campaign of using air power or drone strikes to isolate the battlefield. It’s the strategy to destroy transportation arteries. BAI is about denying the enemy the use of crucial logistics lines to sustain immediate frontline operations.”
“Abstract concepts like BAI become reality when you look at the highways leading from Russia into Ukraine. They are just lousy with charred husks of Russian armored vehicles that now sit by the side of logistics roads. Footage has been flooding social media showing Ural heavy recovery trucks destroyed with their tires melted by drone strikes. Open source analysts have counted over 200 strikes just on Russian logistics vehicles.”
He too highlights the importance of attacks on the R-280 highway. “Ukraine has increased the rate of these attacks by five-fold in just a few months.”
“How were they able to do such a feat in mass production? Zelensky announced that they’re already mass-producing attack drones in four European countries, Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, and there are plans to expand drone production into Norway and Sweden soon.” Plus expanding domestic production.
Medium range is also where soldiers rotate to and from the front-lines to decompress. “Middle- range strikes remove any feeling of safety for Russian troops. Ukraine now fires over 160 of these middle-range strikes per month, hitting logistics and ammo depots. They hit drone control points and command posts. It’s hard to appreciate how massive this change really is when you think about four times the amount of strikes compared to February.”
“The new mid-range drones have a payload of about 220 lb, 10 times more powerful and accurate than artillery shells.” The drones shown on screen are the FP-2 Fire Point, the AN-196 Liutyi, and the Peklo, none of which go all the way up to 220 pounds. But the new drones are now cost effective for going after logistics trucks.
“The middle range is the priority right now. Because Ukraine is hitting everything that’s feeding Russia’s front line, that constant pressure is causing some serious problems for the Russian army.”
“Ukrainian drone operators say that before middle-range strike campaign went into full gear, Russia was holding large portions of their supplies and ammunition in the range of between 60 to 80 km back from the front line. But now they’ve had to push all of their supplies twice the distance away to 120 km away. When you’re talking about having to feed Russian artillery teams to match their rate of fire of about 10 to 15,000 rounds a day during surge fighting, every additional kilometer moved back from the front is a huge cost.”
“The US government just signed off on a $370 million deal authorizing sending JDAM extended range glide bomb kits to Ukraine. It would send 1,500 of these glide bombs to Ukrainian fighter jets to fire at targets up to 75 kilometers away with 500 pound bombs. This is the kind of weapon system you send to support offensive operations.”
Back to the M-14 attacks. “The attacks have forced Kherson Oblast’s occupation head Vladimir Soldo to sign a decree restricting the movement of civilian vehicles to only Russian military vehicles here. As a result, Russia’s having an even harder time resupplying its entire southern grouping of forces. A Russian affiliated mil-blogger complained that restricting civilian trucks makes it more difficult for them because now Ukraine knows every vehicle on the highway is a military target. They don’t have to worry about hitting civilians if there are no civilians.”
“Artillery once accounted for 70% of casualties on the battlefield. It’s drones that now account for at least 70% of battlefield deaths.”
“Everyone was shocked when Ukraine’s 129th heavy mechanized brigade went on the offensive, assaulting the town of Odradne in Kharkiv. Armored vehicles pushed forward under artillery fire. Drone strikes blasted Russian soldiers out of trenches. Ukrainian infantry cleared out fortified fighting positions. When it was all said and done, it recaptured the town and 22km with it.”
“And it wasn’t a one-off. Ukraine’s ground forces recaptured 400km largely from the southern sector of Zaporizhzhia. Further east, soldiers retook the city of Kupyansk just when it looked like it was about to fall to Russia. These are just a few of the mounting signs that the momentum of the war is shifting.”
“The clearest indication of a shift came in April when the war hit a major milestone. Moscow lost more territory than they gained for the first time in two years, a net negative of 116km.”
“Russia’s forces [are] slowly losing the ability to sustain the war at the same intensity and momentum.”
There are signs Ukraine is preparing for a new offensive. “The Ukrainian army has started switching from a system of loose brigades with little coordination to a new command level of army corps. The concept puts about five brigades or 80,000 Ukrainian troops, all their drone units, artillery guys, infantry, intelligence officers under one unified command for the first time. The new roughly 18 to 20 something different corps, each report to one of four regional commands. It’s a clear sign that Ukraine is preparing to regain operational maneuver warfare capability.”
“What it means is Ukraine is finally moving away from the old Soviet era model to a NATO style command. This allows for joint planning between brigades for the first time.”
“The old brigade-centric army was good for holding front lines and plugging gaps. Now they will be able to coordinate assault actions. Ukraine is now offense maxing their army’s organization. Another indicator that Ukraine is preparing for localized counterattacks is that in 2026, Ukraine started building two new mechanized brigades, the 160th and the 50th. They’re converting old light infantry formations into mechanized units that ride into battle.”
Skipping over Clausewitz on the importance of morale. “When the Ukrainian war became longer than World War II and less than 1% of territory had been captured since 2023, this was a major turning point in the minds of many Russian troops.”
“Manpower and recruitment are becoming a problem for the Kremlin. Ukraine has come up with the new way to reduce the manpower advantage. They came up with a campaign to kill or wound 50,000 Russian troops per month. Then they gamified it so soldiers get points for every confirmed kill.” We covered the Gamification of the Russo-Ukrainian War here.
“Now evidence shows that the casualty rate is creeping up and retention and recruitment is creeping down. Russia is now struggling to match this rate with fresh recruits. Most open-source analysts have concluded that they’re losing more than they’re recruiting. Most analysts put the numbers at somewhere around 30,000 troops being recruited per month and roughly 35,000 lost each month.”
“This kind of high casualty rate has a negative impact on troops morale.”
“A 24-year-old Russian soldier was fighting in the Donbas last year and he deserted from his unit and spoke to the New York Times about it, saying they spent a month trying to establish a foothold in a small town outside of Pokrovsk, and his unit would move in and then they would get wiped out by Ukrainian drones. Then his commander ordered them to try something different, to start infiltrating in two-man teams to slip through. They eventually had some success with this, and then he deserted to avoid being sent on more assaults.”
Ukraine is also having manpower issues, “and this has led to widespread use of robotic ground systems. In April, Ukraine seized the battlefield position without humans on the ground for the first time of the war, and an estimated 20,000 missions were conducted by ground robots.”
Ukraine seems to winning the technology war. A “one-two punch of the Kremlin blocking telegram messaging apps for many Russian troops because they were unable to monitor it. But it has kneecapped Russian soldiers communications.”
“Then the second punch was Starlink was turned off for Russia by Elon Musk…After access was cut off, Russian commanders were forced to rely on inaccurate maps. They deployed with no means of communication or the ability to use their drones.”
“European countries have agreed to send $100 billion for Ukraine through 2027 to keep their war economy running. When Viktor Orban was defeated in his election recently in Hungary, it unlocked this because he was cock-blocking/vetoing for the deal for years.”
We’ll see if Ukraine can turn their technological advantage in mid-range strikes into more offensive gains.
