A lot of Russo-Ukraine War news bubbled up last week when every other damn thing was happening, so here’s a roundup, much (but not all) from Suchomimus. Plus some bits on Russia’s economy and their continuing friction with various neighbors.
Multiple successful Storm Shadow strikes:
“Storm Shadow and Ukrainian-produced cruise missiles hit a train yard in Yasynuvyata, the officer Headquarters of the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army plus drones destroy oil depot in Luhansk. Multiple impacts are seen–at least EIGHT missiles hit the train yard. Many more targeted the office headquarters. Six drones impacted the oil depot….One of Ukraine’s biggest missile strikes of the war so far.”
“SAM System Factory Hit By Drones in Izhevsk, Russia – Over 1,300 km From Ukraine. Liutyi drones hit the Kupol Electromechanical Plant which produces Tor and Osa SAM systems for Russia as well as drones, including Shaheds.”
Follow-up satellite imagery for the Izhevsk strike:
Another Shahed drone factory strike, this one in Sergiev Posad near Moscow.
Not a super significant story, but this Russian ammo dump cookoff in Khartsyzk, Donetsk is pretty epic:
Colombian volunteers in Sumy?
Usual Reporting From Ukraine caveats apply.
Russia did manage to carry out a massive missile attack against Kiev, but as usual with Russian missile and drone attacks, it’s not clear that anything of military significance was actually hit.
There’s always talk that Russia’s economy is about to crack due to the strain from their illegal war of territorial aggression (as well western sanctions), but Putin recently announced that Russia would decrease defense spending next year. Given that there’s no way for Russia to recover material and equipment losses to its forces while continuing the war, he must imagine some sort of end to the conflict is near.
Russia economy meltdown as metal production plummets 23% and recession fears soar…
The Russian economy is on the brink of recession, with several key sectors showing dwindling productivity, according to analysis. Alexander Kolyandr from the Center for European Policy Analysis took to X to explain that the country’s manufacturing sector was “losing its mojo”, even in military production.
“The country is in a state of stagflation,” the Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting (TsMAKP). “Economic dynamics are declining rapidly, and there is a risk of a technical recession in the second and third quarters, but inflation remains high.”
It’s been less than three weeks since the central bank — supposedly independent from government control — symbolically lowered interest rates: from 21% to 20%. In doing so, it fulfilled a long-standing demand from the Kremlin. It was the first rate cut since September 2022, the year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This marked a break from a long cycle of interest rate hikes aimed at curbing rising prices.
The situation, however, remains dire. Official inflation still hovers around 10% year-on-year, although several independent institutes estimate the real figure to be above 15%. With military spending still running wild, “risks remain skewed towards inflation,” warned Nabiullina. “Our rate cut approach requires greater caution.”
The contradiction facing the central bank is a true reflection of the current state of the Russian economy, which has long dropped out of the world’s top 10 in terms of size. By now, even the Kremlin is beginning to acknowledge the obvious: that the economic boom driven by the war industry is coming to an end and that the savings made before the war are no longer enough.
Maxim Oreshkin, economic advisor to the all-powerful Presidential Executive Office, declared that the emperor has no clothes just before the St. Petersburg Forum: “The model that ensured growth in recent years has largely reached its limit […] We need to advance — not forward, but upward: to the next technological and organizational level.”
Despite those well documented losses, Russia is now sabre rattling about Estonia hosting nuclear-weapon capable F-35 NATO aircraft. Why this is an issue when NATO-member Finland also has F-35s on order is unclear. Also unclear is how Russia thinks it could successfully invade a NATO country when it couldn’t digest Ukraine despite previously possessing considerably higher stores of Soviet-era material and equipment which it has now squandered…
Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan have reportedly reached agreement on a rail line through the Zangezur Corridor, a move that would cut Russia (and Iran) out entirely.
This follows on the heels of a falling out between Azerbaijan and Russia over Azerbaijani nationals being killed in a police raid inside Russia. “All cultural events with ties to Russia were cancelled in protest. A presenter on primetime state television denounced Moscow’s “imperial behavior” toward former Soviet states. On June 30, Azerbaijani authorities arrested two Russian journalists with Russia’s state-funded news agency Sputnik Azerbaijan in Baku. According to media reports, the two were working for the Russian domestic security service, the FSB.” More Azerbaijan arrests of Russian nationals ensued.
This followed on the heels of the Russian shootdown of an Azerbaijani plane last year, and there’s evidently no love lost between Putin and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev. “The Azerbaijani political scientist and member of parliament Rasim Muzabekov says Baku no longer sees Moscow as an external power in a position to dictate the rules in the Caucasus. He told DW that Azerbaijan had begun to develop its own military and energy infrastructures, and that this, in turn, had annoyed the Kremlin.” No doubt. That’s what happens when you invade much smaller nations on your periphery and get bogged down in a quagmire.
These are just the developments I thought worth highlighting. If you know of others, feel free to share them in the comments below.
First up: A Ukrainian F-16 scores its first recorded air-to-air kill of the war against a Russian Su-35:
The Su-35 was shot down over Kursk Oblast, indicating Ukrainian planes are now more comfortable operating near the front line than previously.
A lot has been made of a fourth generation fighter taking down a fifth generation fighter, but America’s kit has pretty much always been better than Soviet/Russian kit, and the Su-35 is more of a “4.5 Generation” fighter anyway, and suffers from a lack of stealth and high maintenance costs.
Reportedly French special forces units are operating as volunteers fighting against Russian forces in Kharkiv:
Caveat: Reporting from Ukraine has lots of detailed information about how particular battles in the war unfold, almost none of which can be independently verified.
They also hit a Russian fuel train in Zaporizhia:
Looks like it blew up real good…
But that’s not the only rail attack! They also evidently used rail grain cars to hit a train transporting tanks and other military vehicles:
Information is sketchy, and a location hasn’t been released or pinpointed yet. But using grain cars to launch drones to attacks targets on the same train is going to have Russian counterintelligence crawling out of their skins yet again. They already had units stopping shipping trucks after Operation Spiderweb, and now they have to do the same for train cars? That’s going to have Russians slowing down their own logistics all over the country hunting secret drone nests.
Russia has lost 996,150 troops in Ukraine since the beginning of its full-scale invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, the General Staff of Ukraine’s Armed Forces reported on June 8.
The number includes 1,120 casualties that Russian forces suffered just over the past day.
According to the report, Russia has also lost 10,911 tanks, 22,748 armored fighting vehicles, 51,225 vehicles and fuel tanks, 28,892 artillery systems, 1,410 multiple launch rocket systems, 1,183 air defense systems, 414 airplanes, 337 helicopters, 39,651 drones, 28 ships and boats, and one submarine.
Such estimates should always be treated with grains of salt.
That’s the news I found worth rounding up. Feel free to share anything you think I missed in the comments.
That’s the assertion of Reporting from Ukraine, who says that the counterattack is happening in Zaporizhzhia:
Reporting from Ukraine is pretty rah-rah for Ukraine, always putting a positive spin on things (“Ukrainian troops successfully withdrew from northern Bakhmut”), but he’s good on reporting the nitty gritty details of tactical movement and seems to have direct sources in the Ukrainian military.
Takeaways:
He’s seeing Ukrainian forces advance all across the Zaporizhzhia front.
“The freshest reports suggest that Ukrainians breached the Russian defense in the trenches in front of Novodanylivka and got closer to Nesterianka and Kopani from the east.”
“Ukrainian presence was also noted in the southern part of Kamianske, which means that Russians highly likely abandoned Piatykhatky as well.”
“Ukrainian Head of Melitopol reported that Russians announced an urgent evacuation from all settlements between Vasylivka and Tokmak, in fear that this may very soon become the most active battleground.”
“In order to prevent the accumulation of a critical amount of heavy equipment in the region, Russian forces started to actively use guided air bombs. These bombs weigh from 500 to 1500 kilograms and have a range of up to 40 kilometers, which poses a significant threat to Ukrainian plans. The craters from the explosions are enormous and can reach up to 50 meters in diameter.” I’m guessing these might be KAB-1500Ls.
“Ukrainians are trying to reciprocate the damage and are also identifying and destroying Russian warehouses with ammunition and equipment.”
“It looks like the same action is going to take place very soon in the Orikhiv direction because Russian reconnaissance recently reported that Ukrainians are actively demining significant clusters of land. Another indicator of the imminent Ukrainian offensive actions here is the fact that certain elements of the 71st Jager Brigade and 46th Assault Brigade recently arrived at Orikhiv, according Russian sources.”
“[The] Ukrainian 72nd Mechanized Brigade conducted a series of assaults in the vicinity of Vuhledar.”
“The intensification of fighting along the whole southern line has been noted by many analysts, but today, the Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense finally confirmed that the counteroffensive operation has started.”
Well, sort of: “She stated that it is incorrect to wait for a specific date because counteroffensive is a long process and it is only the culmination that happens quickly, but no one can predict when the culmination will happen, as it depends on the conditions on the ground.”
“Right now, Ukrainians are testing Russian defenses, letting the newly formed assault units gain combat experience and, for the most part, follow the path of lowest resistance – meaning they push where they can, leaving the strongest positions for later. Russian analysts are predicting that Ukrainians will make at least two huge attacks during the last week of April to test new tactics and then launch a full-scale counteroffensive during the first half of May.” Sounds like probing attacks for now, but I can see Ukraine moving quickly to exploit any gaps or pushing hard if there’s a sudden Russian line collapse.
Institute for the Study of War also has a similar confirmation-that’s-not-quite-a-confirmation: “Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions. Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces will never preemptively announce when the counteroffensive starts and reiterated that Ukrainian forces aim to liberate all Ukrainian territory.”
Deep State shows some small recent-ish Ukrainian gains there:
— Geoff' The Frenchy Fella – War News 🇺🇦 (@Geoff_WarNews) April 20, 2023
So it’s hard to say for sure that this push is the much-anticipated Big Spring Counteroffensive. It could be a probing raid, or it could be a faint, with the main blow scheduled to fall elsewhere. Certainly Zaporizhzhia is the front section that has the most promise to split Russian forces in half and cut Russian forces in Kherson and Crimea off from resupply. Russia has to know this, and has been extending defense trenches throughout the area, but continues to throw troops into the Bakhmut meat-grinder rather than (as far as observers can tell) seriously reinforcing the area. Maybe Russia has reinforced it more than we know, but maybe not. It would be very far from the first time Russia made a stupid, obvious mistake in this war.
Maybe it’s more accurate to say that a counteroffensive is underway.
