There more you start poking around online, the more you turn up reasons why China is screwed.
The first installment in this series was popular. Well, there’s a lot more reasons why China is screwed.
It’s screwed all the way down.
First up: Demographics:
Takeaways:
Remember all that talk of an “Asian Century?” Yeah, not so much.
“China will soon run out of people.”
China’s population pyramid is about to shift from a huge bulge of people in their prime earning years to one where that bulge is disproportionately elderly.
“Everything that made China what it is today has relied on a large, young, and productive workforce. Now, that workforce is about to succumb to biology just as every other generation has in every other country, ever.” Their demographic dividend is running out.
“China’s working-age cohort grew from 58% of the country in 1978 to 74% in 2010. But in less than twenty years, the UN predicts that number will be roughly back where it was in ‘78. By then, China will have twice as many seniors as children under 15.”
“Per capita wealth remains low, on the level of Mexico, the Maldives, and Kazakhstan. That means this mass of retirees won’t just contribute less to the economy, but will also require immense financial support — the kind China’s fractured pension and healthcare system isn’t remotely prepared for.”
“Unfortunately for China, the One-Child Policy has set the cultural expectation firmly at one.”
Replacement fertility: 2.1 children per woman. China’s official fertility rate: 1.6. “Yi Fuxian, a scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison [estimates] the true number at 1.18.”
“China’s preference for male babies means that between 2020 and 2060, there will be roughly 3 single men for every 2 single women.”
“China’s 2020 Census, [tallied] 14.65 million births the previous year — the lowest level since 1961.”
Japan, which is also aging, provides a best case scenario. “With a median age of 48.6, Japan is the 2nd oldest place on earth. Today, its share of the world’s manufacturing exports has fallen from 12.5% to just 5.2. Japan did not fade into global irrelevance. It’s still a great power. But it never fulfilled what once seemed certain: its rise to rival the U.S. as a superpower. And it never will.”
That’s part 1. Part 2 focuses on China’s out of control property market:
It starts off talking about the ghost cities, especially Ordos.
“Ordos does have an interesting story to tell. Just, not the one you might expect. The missing context, at the time, was far stranger than what the unimaginative pessimists concocted: Nearly all of these half-finished homes have owners — the vast majority of which have no intention of ever moving in.”
“All over China are millions of empty, some unfinished, but almost universally sold homes — not just in far-flung corners but also in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Over one-fifth of all urban homes — 65 million in all — sit vacant.”
China relied on “a surplus of cheap labor, which means, by definition, wages are low. You can only compete with the entire rest of the world for so long — and neither do you want to. Low-value manufacturing has long since moved South, to places like Vietnam, Laos, and Bangladesh.”
All the long-hanging fruits of infrastructure spending have already been built.
“Individually, Chinese consumers really don’t spend very much — just 32% of GDP — less than half that of the US, and far below countries like Japan and Germany. Worse, this number has actually been decreasing over time.”
“Chinese consumers are spending, but only on one thing, something not considered ‘consumption’: houses!”
China’s home ownership rate “is among the highest in the world — 90% — to much of the developed world’s mid-60s. It gets much weirder, still. If you can believe it, the majority of recent purchases have been 2nd and 3rd homes. In 2018, for instance, 87% of new home buyers already owned at least one.”
“Because the government tightly controls how much cash is allowed to leave the country, Chinese people simply don’t have a lot of options, and of them, housing is seen as the only sure thing.”
Also, given the sex imbalance mentioned above, for men, home ownership = marriage.
“For all of these reasons, prices have risen to extreme levels. In Shenzhen, Beijing, and Shanghai, it takes 40 years of the average income to afford a home.”
Most are bought before construction even begins.
And here’s where the demographics above provide a double whammy. “The majority of homebuyers, meanwhile, are aged between 20-50 — precisely the segment China will soon lose.”
One huge reason for the bubble: Local governments using their control of land to balance their budgets:
They created what are basically state-owned shell companies called “Local Government Financing Vehicles”. They gave these LGFVs free valuable land, which they then used to take out loans that local governments themselves couldn’t. The trick is that because their debt is hidden, local governments appear far healthier than they really are, while at the same time, meeting the quotas set by Beijing. Following the 2008 crisis, LGFVs transformed from a little quirk of its financial system to the backbone of local economies. If these ‘financing vehicles’ default on their loans, or if housing prices fall too steeply, local governments now have just as much to lose as homeowners. If a local government stops taking out loans, it instantly loses over a third of its revenue, causing a different kind of doomsday. So while the central government may direct local officials to control their debt, the best they can really do is feign cooperation.
Flu Manchu only temporarily halted home price rises, and they’re still soaring.
“Solutions are far too costly to assume their implementation.”
There are a lot more videos of China suckage, but I’ll have to split this up and get to those another time.
Another “Play Stupid Games, Win Stupid Prizes” entry, but with a twist. A man killed home invader who was pretending to be a cop.
A man with a badge around his neck didn’t fool a Pa. resident with a gun in his pocket. The resident, who was bound by zip ties, managed to grab his gun and opened fire on two home invaders posing as cops, killing one of them, police tell 6ABC.
It happened around 10 p.m. Sunday in Philly, where police say a 25-year-old resident was confronted outside his home by two men posing as cops. The man with a badge around his neck forced the male resident inside the home, where he was bound with zip ties.
The fake cops were demanding money and threatening his life. But the resident was able to get his pocketed gun, and he shot the man with the badge three times, killing him, police said. The dead suspect had gunshot wounds to his head, neck and arm.
The are some pretty big giveaways that it wasn’t real cops:
Real cops tends to use handcuffs rather than zip-ties. (There are occasionally exceptions, mostly during widespread civil disorder like mass arrests during riots.)
A real cop would have search him for a weapon.
A real cop wouldn’t be demanding money. Or I should say a real, non-corrupt. Offer void in New York City in the 1970s.
Here are two videos where Peter Zeihan argues that China is screwed for many reasons, not least of which is demographics.
Takeaways:
One child per couple means that China is “the fastest aging society in human history, with the largest sex imbalance in human history.”
“They’ve run out of people of childbearing age.”
They were going shrink in half by 2100. “Then they realized that they had been overcounting people for some time.” Then new data moved the date moved up to 2070. And now they’re saying it will be 2050. “For that to be true, the Chinese would have overcounted the population by 100 million.” And all of those missing people are of childbearing age.
Their population actually peaked 15 years ago.
“We’ve seen a 12-fold increase in Chinese labor costs since 1991.”
“China isn’t getting rich, it’s getting old.” They’re facing demographic collapse within a decade.
Xi’s instituted a cult of personality, and silenced anyone capable of independent thought. “He knows that the country’s current economic model has failed. And he knows he can’t guarantee economic growth, and he knows he can’t keep the lights on, and he knows he can’t win a war with the Americans.”
Xi’s solution? “Naked, blatant, ultra nationalism. Ethnocentric ultranationalism of the Nazi style.”
At the top, they don’t care about keeping the lights on. “A third of the country is facing power rationing.”
“These are the sorts of things that you do if you know that the bottom’s falling out and there’s nothing you can do about it, and you have to shift the conversation to remain in power.”
“In China, money is a political good. It exists to serve the needs of the CCP.”
“All of the economic growth we have seen in China since 2006 is because of debt.”
Corporate debt is 350% of GDP, “making China the most indebted country in human history in both absolute and relative terms.” Every country that’s come within half of this has collapsed under the debt load.
I’m omitting discussion of how China is screwed on semiconductors (covered enough here), and also the possibility of invading Taiwan (this video was released late last year, before Russia invaded Ukraine).
“The Biden administration in bits and pieces is redefining strategic ambiguity, and it’s not clear to me what the endgame is here.” Well, there’s a whole lot that isn’t clear about the Biden Administration…
Zeihan thinks Biden might recognize Taiwan for a foreign policy win. Zeihan also thinks that both China and Russia are so weak we can wait them out. (Remember: Pre-Ukraine invasion.)
Zeihan dismissive of both Obama and Trump foreign policy.
“Joe Biden has been on the wrong side and the right side of every foreign policy decision the U.S. has made in the last 45 years, because he doesn’t have any core beliefs he tacks with the wind.”
Now let’s forward to March 24, where Russia’s colossal failure in Ukraine has actually made China even more screwed.
Takeaways:
The biggest damage that we are seeing from the Ukraine war (outside of Ukraine, obviously) is in China. Because in one month the Russians have pulled back the blinders on what has been a 50-year strategic program, the idea that China can come to global power with American sponsorship, with American indifference, that it can take Taiwan, that it can intimidate Japan, that they can dominate all of east Asia and yet not suffer economically at all. It was always ridiculous, but now it’s been shown to just be absolutely stupid.
No one can escape the power of global markets because of trade.
“The yuan is only traded internally because it’s the most manipulated currency in history. The euro confiscates bank deposits to pay for bailouts.”
Russia is the world’s second largest oil exporter, and it can’t export more to China because the pipes that go east don’t interconnect with the ones that go west. “The rail lines are already beyond capacity.”
In the west: “One way or another, those pipes aren’t surviving this year.” (Not sure that’s correct, but I’ve long thought that we should be seeing more structure hits inside Russia than we’ve seen thus far.)
“The stuff that goes to the Black Sea is in a war zone, so insurance companies will not give the indemnification that is necessary for vessels to operate in that area. So the only way a ship can go and dock it overseas right now is if a country gives its sovereign indemnification and takes all the risk.”
Primorsk, on the Baltic, is open. However: “Ship captains for the most part are refusing to go, and European dock workers are refusing to unload the cargo when it arrives. So that is still in use but not nearly as much, maybe a quarter of what it used to be before the war started.”
To get more oil to China: “You would have to build a fundamentally new infrastructure from the fields in northwest Siberia to Chinese population centers that is greater than the distance from Miami to Anchorage, most of which is through virgin territory that is very rugged. That’s a 10-year program minimum even with the Chinese building it.”
“We’re looking at the single largest removal of crude from the market ever, and in proportional terms it’s going to have a shock somewhat similar to World War II.”
We have insurance companies not doing it, shipping companies not doing it, dock workers not doing it and now Halliburton, Baker Hughes and Schlumberger have pulled out, and they do the technical work that makes a lot of this possible. All the super majors are gone, and we even have a couple of major projects out in Sakhalin that are probably just going to die because the Russians can’t make those projects work by themselves. Most of the oil and gas out of that goes to China, so we’re actually looking at an environment where the Chinese see reduced flows rather than increased, as Russia is just melon-scooped out of the market.
When the Russians fell under sanctions, everything that the Chinese thought was true about their future was laid bare as, at best, wishful thinking and bad analysis. So they are now looking east to the United States and west to the Russians in a little bit of a panic, because they are being tied indirectly to what’s going on in Ukraine. And they have now found out not only does the west’s and specifically the United States’ financial tools work very well, they now know they would work much better against China than against Russia, because at its core Russia is a commodities exporter, most notably oil, natural gas and food. China imports all those things, so if an equivalent sanctions regime was done against the Chinese, you’d have 500 million dead Chinese in less than a year from starvation.
Here I think he overstates the case, as there are a lot of emergency avenues a communist government could pursue to stave off starvation. Like invading Mongolia and turning it into emergency farmland. Which is not to so they wouldn’t have some starvation, especially in worse-case scenarios…
“The Chinese have always seen themselves as anti-American [well, the commies, anyway -LP], they’ve always seen themselves as anti-Western, anti-democracy and now they’re realizing that the mood of the man in the White House determines whether their country exists.”
As tight as the sanctions are, as big as they’re getting, they’re nothing compared to the corporate boycotts. Almost every single company that left Russia was under no legal requirement to do so, they just didn’t want to be associated with the war. And we’re talking about those ESG, social goody two-shoes mammoth companies like Exxon and Halliburton, who are now gone, and everyone else followed. So if that happened to China, you know that’s all of their investment that matters. That’s all of their technology transfers, that’s all of their end markets. This system, if it turned against China, would be far more damning than anything we’ve seen out of Russia so far.
I think Zeihan overstates the case a bit, and probably immanizes the timeline of crisis more than warranted, but the demographic and economic challenges China faces are very real.
Also keep in mind that no one in 1988 expected the Soviet Union to collapse as quickly as it did, either…
This is going to be pretty esoteric for many of my readers, but in previous semiconductor posts covering ASML, some commenters have suggested that fabs can do multi-patterning for smaller nodes rather than having to use ASML’s extreme ultraviolet stepper. The following video explains why, below a certain threshold, no, you really can’t.
I’m not going to summarize every point, but the largest takeaway is that multi-patterning is computationally prohibitive. Double-patterning splits a single mask into two masks, each of which only create half of the mask pattern on the die. Double-patterning was fine for a while, but triple patterning and self-aligned double-patterning start making finding optimal solutions to the mask splitting problem exponentially more difficult.
Take a square. A square has four nodes in it. With double patterning, each of the two masks handle opposing sides of the square. And with this four-node shape, there are two double patterning options available for coloring. The EDA software thus has to check through them for design rule violations and whatnot. With triple patterning, the number of variations explodes exponentially. For that same square four node structure, triple patterning has 18 variations rather than just two with double patterning. A five node structure, 30. And so on. A semiconductor design can have hundreds of different nodes and design variations. The software needs to check through at least a good portion of these. This problem is not solvable in polynomial time. In other words, for you computer science nerds out there, it is an NP complete problem.
And then there’s the cost. “Depending on whose cost model you consult, [10nm]’s triple patterning makes its lithography module 3.85x higher than [28nm].” And the non-EUV 7nm node required triple-patterning and something called “self-aligned quadruple patterning.” And on Intel: “Brian Krzanich has said that in certain cases the company needs to use quad (4x), penta (5x), or hexa (6x) patterning for select features, as they need to expose the wafer up to six times to “draw” one feature. I am not super surprised that it wouldn’t yield. No wonder GlobalFoundries ditched their 7nm node.”
And this summary glosses over big differences between different fab technologies on different companies. TSMC’s 7nm isn’t the same as Intel’s 7nm.
Anyway, all this goes a long way to explain: Multi-patterning is much more painful than simply ponying up the cost for an ASML EUV stepper. And if you want to do 6nm, you have to use EUV.
Welcome to another in the continuing “Why Russia’s X Is Screwed” series! It seems that Russia’s technological infrastructure is even more screwed than their airline industry.
Some takeaways:
If the sanctions are maintained, they will “almost certainly cause the collapse of Russia’s economy on short notice, and will set the country’s technological progress back by decades.”
Russian state entities and miltech was put in “a complete black box.”
“Even non-military end users were still barred from key technologies, such as semiconductors, telecommunication, encryption security, lasers, sensors, navigation, avionics and maritime technologies. Other countries from the EU to Japan and South Korea all imposed similar sanctions of their own.”
Even many private companies that lobbied for special carve-outs from sanctions changed their mind and suspended all business with Russia.
Just about every car and truck manufacturer. “95% of car parts in Russia are imported.”
Apple, Samsung, Dell, HP, Oracle, SAP, and Microsoft have all halted sales.
“Overnight, many industries in Russia are just gone.”
Every high tech company in Russia relies heavily on foreign inputs and expertise.
He talks about the embargo on semiconductors (more on this in the video below), but says that it applies even to chips made with embargoed tech. So if SMIC used an Applied Materials PVD machine, those chips couldn’t legally be shipped to Russia. I am skeptical this is actually the case (and it would be very hard to enforce on Chinese companies).
“The Russian economy did not prepare itself for sanctions anywhere near this severe.”
Two-thirds of Russia’s foreign reserves of $643 billion were parked abroad, which was all frozen when sanctions came down.
“Every part of the Russian economy has just received major damage, and there’s no way they can pivot everything all at once.”
“They’re simply not survivable in the long-term.”
Russia has increased interest rates to 20% to keep the ruble from collapsing further.
Even China has slowed-down or halted loans to Russian entities.
Russia is going to run out of cash “in a few weeks to a few months.”
Russia is heavily reliant on foreign tech, but for most tech companies, Russia is a minor market.
Expect a brain drain as wealthy and skilled Russians lose their jobs, then move abroad.
Many national industries simply cannot exist without foreign inputs. Substitutes would take years, if not decades.
Conclusion:
If these sanctions continue, there will be no economy left to support the Russian military. Russian technological progress will be thrown back by years, if not decades, across the board. And in just a couple of weeks, or maybe months, the vultures will start circling, and they will start picking off every interesting
Russian asset, every interesting Russian employee, oil fields, anything that they can get their hands on. And they’ll start transporting that out of the country as well. I cannot believe that Putin started a war expecting any sanctions anywhere near this scale.
Now on to semiconductors:
TSMC halted all shipments to Russia, as has AMD and Intel.
The Soviet Union had a massive technology gap between it and the United States, which only got worse as time went on.
All the computing power in every computer in the Soviet Union in 1991 combined would fall two generations short of a single Cray.
“The most advanced semiconductor production facilities were in East Germany, Belarus, Ukraine, and so on.”
JSC Mikron is Russia’s largest semiconductor manufacturer. “Today it fabs RFID tickets, SIM cards, and other smart card products.” They did about $260 million in business in 2020 (including government subsidies). They bought IP from STMicroelectronics.
In 2014, Mikron announced “the successful achievement of the 65 nanometer node at a volume of 500 200mm wafers a month.” [record scratch] 500 wafer starts a month??? That’s nothing. TSMC’s top of the line fabs generally do 120,000 wafer starts a month. It’s maybe OK if you’re running weird, demanding, high profit, low-volume processes (say, Gallium-Arsenide chips for use in satellites), but not for Mikron’s main business line (RFIDs).
But all that is beside the point, since they didn’t have a stepper capable of doing 65 nanometer. “Fujitsu, Toshiba, and TSMC started shipping their commercial 65 nanometer nodes in 2005. So this means that Russia’s gap with the leading edge has grown from 9 years to 15+.”
Russia’s Angstrem offers a wafer foundry doing “130 nanometer and 90 nanometer process nodes on 200mm wafers. Their capacity is about 180,000 wafers a year.” They declared bankruptcy around 2019. They were also hit by U.S. sanctions after the Crimean invasion. Successor company NM-Tech has a pie-in-the-sky plan to do 10nm in 10 years. Don’t hold your breath.
(I notice he makes no mention of “Crocus Nano Electronics,” which supposedly runs Russia’s only 300mm wafer fab (“Established in 2011, Crocus Nano Electronics is the world’s first and only 300mm fabrication facility, located in Russia”), but when you get down into their press releases, it says “The development and production of Crocus Nano Electronics ReRAM memory chips were manufactured on 55 ULP CMOS by Shanghai Huali Microelectronics Corporation (HLMC).” So either they’re a fabless design house, or they only do the metal interconnects fabrication and nothing else in the process, which is so weird a model I can’t really wrap my head around it.)
I’m omitting the coverage of various fabless design houses, since they’re dead-in-the-water without access to decent foundry technology or foreign markets.
They can probably get stuff fabbed at China’s SMIC.
If Russia had turned into a regular country after 1991, there’s no reason they couldn’t have launched a competitive domestic tech industry. The Soviet Union had large number of frequently bloody flaws, but they didn’t stint on STIM education, and maintained very competitive space capabilities despite numerous handicaps. But instead, they turned into a corrupt oligarchy-turned-dictatorship, and all that human capital either emigrated or withered on the vine.
And now, thanks to Vlad’s Big Ukraine Adventure, they’re even more screwed than they were before.
Here’s a snippet on the Russo-Ukrainian War from an interview Joe Rogan did with former CIA officer Mike Baker last week.
Some takeaways:
Putin has been “pretty damn consistent over the years.”
If you look at what he did in Chechnya, if you look at what he did helping Assad in Syria, if you look at what he did annexing Crimea, if you look at Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia. Every step of the way he’s been following in his mind this stated desire, that he’s made very public over the years, to rebuild his sphere of influence.
We were too optimistic, thinking that he was thinking like we do in a rational process.
Intelligence on what Putin actually wants is hard because his inner circle keeps getting smaller and smaller.
Human intelligence is hard, and despite movies, blackmail or a honeytrap are rarely the most effective methods.
Putin was a KGB officer for 15 years, and he served in East Germany rather than the west. “He doesn’t really understand how we think.”
The collapse of communism 1989-1991 was a great opportunity for recruiting spies behind the iron curtain.
Putin thinks “You guys have disrespected me, fuck you all. I told you I want my spirit a sphere of influence, and I don’t care whether I have to break it.”
“He called the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest tragedy of the 20th century, and he’s he’s serious about that, he means that.”
He’s cut loose some of his own inner circle over the past couple of weeks.
“Was he given bad intel? Or was he given intel and choose to ignore it?” Like many dictators, Putin has a “thermocline of truth” (though Baker doesn’t use that phrase) between him and any possible bad news.
“They were gonna get in there, maybe within 48 hours, they were going to have control of Kiev, they would be welcomed by the population in Ukraine, and they would be able to establish a puppet regime.”
They’ve lost virtually all their international routes.
They’re basically back to Soviet-era route choices.
Aeroflot now has only one international flight route…into Belarus.
It’s not just flights to and from Russia that are affected. Lots of international flights between Europe and Asia transited now-closed Russian airspace. Flights from Helsinki to Tokyo now take three hours longer.
Russia has also been locked out of the Global Distribution System (GDS), which connects just about all global travel providers.
Middle East airlines are still flying too and from Russia, mainly Moscow. But without GDS, no one can directly book connecting flights to other Russian cities.
A majority of the world’s airliners are leased from an outside company. More than half of Russian airliners are leased from companies outside the country. All those are refusing to continue doing business in Russia.
The Cape Town Treaty governs aircraft repossession, and Russia is a signatory to the treaty.
But instead of following the terms of the treaty, Russia has just sanctioned the theft of those aircraft.
Both Boeing and Airbus have suspended all maintenance support with Russia. Without legitimate spare parts, even Russian-owned aircraft could be banned from flying internationally. And even Russian Sukhoi depends on German Lufthansa Technik for spare parts.
One side effect: Without outside airline ability to overfly Russian territory, Anchorage is likely to become an international hub again.
There’s just enough tank-specific news coming out of the Russo-Ukrainian War to justify a roundup. Despite supposedly having the largest tank army in the world, Russia’s tank corps is clearly taking it on the chin in Ukraine.
You know that “largest tank army in the world” bit? Not so much:
#Russia's active tank fleet is actually not 12,000 strong. In reality it is just over 2,500. By active tanks I mean tanks that are actually in service in an organised unit (i.e. a tank battalion, regiment, brigade etc.) and are not undergoing field tests (T-14 Armata). pic.twitter.com/fJYrGjc5L4
Can Russia pull reserve tanks out of its inventory and put them in active duty? Probably, but: A.) The truck tire issued showed that even active equipment hasn’t been well-maintained. How much worse shape are mothballed vehicles in? B.) How quickly can new tank crews be trained to work effectively? Speaking of maintenance problems:
Russia’s main tank factory has reportedly stopped production and repairs due to a lack of parts:
Russia’s largest tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod, has halted production because of supply shortages, according to Ukraine’s state media and Ukrainian armed forces.
The Kyiv Independent writes that Uralvagonzavod has stopped operations in its Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant in west-central Russia because of the lack of component parts supplied from foreign countries.
The claim was initially made by a report of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and confirmed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense on March 21, according to The Kyiv Independent.
Uralvagonzavod had his assets frozen in the U.K. on February 24 and was hit by European Union sanctions on March 15.
Two reasons to take this with a few grains of salt: A.) It’s a Ukrainian source, and B.) Uralvagonzavod is the company manufacturing the T-14 Armata tank as well as the T-90M, and they were only supposed to produce 100 T-14s total, of which none have been spotted in-theater.
One thing that seems notably absent from combat reports is accounts of Russian active protection systems defeating incoming rounds or missiles. Arena-M seems to be the current Russian APS (a replacement for the Afghanit system rumored to be slated for the T-14?), but previous APS systems (Drozd 2) were supposedly available for earlier Russian tanks. (Shtora is a passive protection system used on Russian armor.) But Arena was first tested in 1995, which would make it pretty long in the tooth on the software side. Would you trust your life to Windows 95?
The lack of effective active countermeasures is one reason so many Russian armored vehicles in Ukraine seem to sport improvised metal cages up top, which appear to be doing Jack and Squat.
A LOT OF Russian tanks involved in the invasion of Ukraine have strange cages welded over the roofs of their turrets. Strange and apparently useless—for many pictures have emerged of destroyed vehicles surmounted by them. Sometimes the cage itself has been visibly damaged by an attack that went on to hit the tank beneath.
Stijn Mitzer, an independent analyst based in Amsterdam, has looked at hundreds of verified photographs of destroyed Russian vehicles. He thinks that, far from acting as protection, the cages have done nothing save add weight, make tanks easier to spot, and perhaps give a false and dangerous sense of security to the crew inside. They have thus been mockingly dubbed by some Western analysts as “emotional-support armour” or “cope cages”.
Snip.
The new cages, the fitting of which seems to have begun late in 2021, appear to be a variant of so-called slat or bar armour. Such armour can provide effective lightweight protection if used correctly (as it is, for example, on American Stryker armoured personnel carriers). But in this case that seems not to have happened. They might thus be seen as symbols of Russia’s inadequate preparation for the campaign, as pertinent in their way as its failures to neutralise Ukraine’s air defences and to shoot down that country’s drones.
One of the main threats to armoured vehicles are HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank) weapons, such as the Russian-made but widely employed RPG-7. The warheads of these rocket-propelled grenades are shaped charges—hollow cones of explosive lined with metal. When the explosive detonates it blasts the metal lining into a narrow, high-speed jet that is able to punch through thick steel. According to Dr Appleby-Thomas an RPG-7 can penetrate 30cm of steel plate.
And RPG-7s are the babies of the bunch. Other, far more powerful shaped-charge anti-tank weapons used by Ukrainian forces include Javelins supplied by America, NLAWs (Next-generation Light Anti-tank Weapons) supplied by Britain, and drone-borne MAM-L missiles, supplied by Turkey.
HEAT warheads may be countered by what is known as explosive reactive armour, or ERA. When this is hit, a sheet of explosive sandwiched inside it blows up and disrupts an incoming warhead before it can detonate. Many Russian tanks are indeed fitted with ERA. However ERA may, in turn, be defeated by a so-called tandem warhead, in which a small precursor charge triggers the armour’s explosive before the main warhead detonates.
Slat and bar add-on armours are a lighter and cheaper way to counter RPGs, though even if used correctly they are, literally, hit or miss protection. The spacing of the bars or slats is crucial. If a rocket hits a bar it makes little difference, for its warhead will detonate anyway. But if it gets trapped between bars it will probably be damaged in a way which means that the signal from the nose-mounted fuse cannot reach the detonator.
This approach is known as statistical armour, because the protection it offers is all or nothing. It is typically quoted as having a 50% chance of disrupting an incoming RPG. But Dr Appleby-Thomas notes that it works only against munitions with a nose fuse, which Javelins, NLAWs and MAM-Ls do not have.
Russia has been fitting slat armour to vehicles since 2016, but the design of the new cages, seemingly improvised from locally available materials, is baffling. They appear to be oriented in a way that protects only against attacks from above. In principle, that might help against Javelins, which have a “top attack” mode in which they first veer upwards and then dive to punch through a tank’s thin top armour. But, as Nick Reynolds, a land-warfare research analyst at RUSI, a British defence think-tank, notes, even if the cage sets off a Javelin’s precursor warhead, the main charge is still more than powerful enough to punch through the top armour and destroy the tank—as the Ukrainian army itself proved in December, when it tested one against a vehicle protected by add-on armour replicating the Russian design. As expected, the Javelin destroyed the target easily.
Enjoy this Sad Trombone gif, unearthed from the archives of the ancient, terrible conflict known only as The Pony Wars
Speaking of the Javelin, it and other western-supplied anti-tank weapons are tearing up Russian armor.
Despite amassing an invasion force of nearly 200,000 troops and thousands of armored vehicles supported by combat aircraft and warships, the Russian military has failed to reach its primary objectives in the three weeks since its offensive into Ukraine began.
Russian military planners expected a blitzkrieg campaign that would last 48 to 72 hours and lead to a quick Ukrainian capitulation, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has led a fierce resistance, and major urban centers, including the capital, Kyiv, remain in Ukrainian hands, surprising Moscow and indeed the world.
Ukrainians’ grit and knowledge of the battlefield have played a large part in their effective defense, but weapons supplied by NATO and EU countries have also played a critical role in stalling the Russian advance.
Ukraine has received billions of worth of weapons from the West — the US has provided $1 billion in security assistance just this week — and among that aid, three weapon systems stand out.
Since the invasion began, US-made FGM-148 Javelins and FIM-92 Stingers and the Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapon (NLAW) designed by Britain and Sweden have been the terror of Russian troops.
Tanks and armored vehicles are at the heart of the Russian military doctrine.
Actually Russian military doctrine is usually described as artillary-centric, but tanks are a close second in importance.
Russia’s battalion tactical groups — 75% of which have been committed to the invasion, a US official said Wednesday — are largely mechanized formations meant to use heavy firepower to overcome resistance.
But BTGs are vulnerable to anti-tank defenses like the Javelin, a reusable, fire-and-forget guided missile.
Javelins have two parts: a launch tube and a command launch unit, which has the controls and optical sights for day and night use. The Javelin missile’s nose has a homing infrared guidance system that allows the operator to fire the weapon and then relocate in order to dodge return fire.
Snip.
Against a tank or another armored vehicle, the Javelin will strike from a high angle of attack, targeting the top of the vehicle, where the armor is thinnest.
Before the invasion, Russian tankers sought to counter that by building cages on top of their tanks to detonate the Javelin before it struck and reduce its force. Hundreds of destroyed Russian tanks suggest that has not been an effective countermeasure.
Against a stationary target, like a building or bunker, the Javelin will strike from a more direct line of attack.
Snip.
Ukrainian forces have been using the British-supplied NLAW anti-tank weapon. Although less sophisticated than its American counterpart, the NLAW is extremely easy to operate, and with a 150 mm high explosive anti-tank warhead, it’s deadly too.
Like the Javelin, the NLAW can strike targets from above, but its effective range of about 800 meters is more limited than the Javelin’s 2,000-meter range.
Information on Stinger use against Russian aircraft snipped.
The US on Wednesday announced another package of security assistance to Ukraine, which included 800 Stingers and 2,000 Javelins, bringing the total of each provided by the US to 1,400 and 4,600, respectively. The package also includes 1,000 light anti-armor weapons and 6,000 AT-4 unguided, man-portable anti-armor missiles.
Evidently, even some of the equipment Russian tanks supposedly have isn’t actually there:
The Russian military’s one-off T-80UM2 experimental main battle tank has been knocked out during recent fighting in Ukraine, marking one of the more unusual kills attributed to the country’s defenders, who continue to disrupt the Kremlin’s invasion plans. The fact that this unique fighting vehicle was even participating in combat in Ukraine is somewhat surprising, but it would not be the first example of new or experimental Russian weapons systems being deployed in the campaign.
The team of researchers at the Oryx blog, who have been compiling photo and video evidence of materiel losses on both sides of the conflict, identified the wreckage of the T-80UM2 and stated that it was destroyed on March 17, or that its remains were uncovered on this date. The tank is rumored to have been knocked out in Sumy Oblast, in northeastern Ukraine, apparently in the vicinity of the town of Trostyanets.
The T-80UM2 is said to have been part of a larger column of Russian vehicles that came under attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and photos show destroyed trucks alongside the T-80UM2. Its turret was knocked off and its hull burnt out, although it’s not immediately clear how it was hit and by what.
The story of the T-80UM2 is a complicated one, tied up with a new-generation tank project with the project name Objekt 640, better known as the Black Eagle. A mock-up of the Black Eagle appeared as long ago as 1997, at which point it was being promoted for the export market.
By 1998 it had become clear that work was also underway on the T-80UM2, as a further development of the Cold War-era T-80. There seems to be substantial overlap between the T-80UM2 and the Black Eagle, to the point that some sources consider them one and the same. If that’s the case, then the T-80UM2 may very well have been intended to serve as a prototype for the Black Eagle which, as it turned out, never entered production.
As for the T-80UM2, this vehicle was based on an upgraded T-80U chassis, the main new addition being a welded-steel turret with advanced armor protection, including Kaktus explosive reactive armor (ERA), panels of which were also applied to the front of the hull. More Kaktus was fitted to the track skirts, while there were anti-fragmentation screens around the front of the turret.
In its ultimate form, the T-80UM2 was also fitted with the Drozd-2 active protection system, a hard-kill system that uses radar to detect incoming anti-tank rockets and anti-tank missiles, before automatically firing high-explosive fragmentation munitions at them, with the aim of destroying, or at last disabling them, at a distance of 20-30 feet from the tank.
The T-80UM2 featured a different crew arrangement compared to the T-80U, with the gunner seated on the right and the commander on the left of the turret, swapping sides compared to the earlier tank.
Otherwise, the new tank used the same main armament as the earlier T-80 series, with a 125mm 2A45M smoothbore gun, but this was now fed ammunition via an improved type of automatic loading system. The magazine was moved from below the turret to the bustle, at the back of the turret, apparently in response to survivability concerns highlighted during fighting in Chechnya.
In western armies, prototypes are rarely pressed into combat service, they’re generally preserved in tank museums (like Tortoise at Bovington or the T-28 at the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor). The fact that this one was pressed into frontline service may suggest a whiff of desperation to throw everything into the fight. Then again, the Russian military has never been known for being overly sentimental…
“Hits” is perhaps too strong, but it did touch down and do some damage right at the I-35/TX-45 flyover in Round Rock, which is about eight miles from my house. It did some damage but I’m not seeing any reports of fatalities thus far. One woman did get pulled from the wreckage of the home she was renting. There were also some power outages.
