Posts Tagged ‘video’

Switchbladeapalooza

Thursday, April 28th, 2022

Sometimes serendipity writes your blog post for you. I literally had just finished watching this video about U.S. Switchblade drones being sent to Ukraine when an NRO article on the same topic showed up in my in-box.

It’s an interesting video, but the title is false advertising, as it says nothing about how effective the drones are against helicopters.

Basically there are two variants of the Switchblade drone:

  • The Switchblade 300: Range 10 km, Endurance 15 min, Weight 5.5 lb (2.5 kg), Speed Cruise: 63 MPH, Dash: 100 MPH and it fits inside rucksack (includes payload, launcher, transport bag), launches from a tube like a knee-mortar, cost of $6,000.
  • The Switchblade 600, a much larger loitering drone designed for harder targets (including armor) with a 1.8 meter launch tube:

    Switchblade 600 represents the next generation of extended-range loitering missiles, delivering unprecedented RSTA support and featuring high-precision optics, over 40 minutes of loitering endurance, and an anti-armor warhead for engaging larger, hardened targets at greater distances.

    As an all-in-one, man-portable solution, Switchblade 600 includes everything required to successfully plan and execute missions and can be set up and operational in less than 10 minutes. Equipped with class-leading, high-resolution EO/IR gimbaled sensors and advanced precision flight control, Switchblade 600 empowers the warfighter with quick and easy deployment via tube-launch, and the capability to fly, track and engage non-line-of-sight targets and armored vehicles with precision lethal effects without the need for external ISR or fires assets.

    Patented wave-off and recommit capability allows operators to abort the mission at any time and then re-engage either the same or other targets multiple times based on operator command.

    Whether it’s from fixed defensive positions, combat vehicles with integrated organic precision fire, or air-launched applications, Switchblade 600 provides field commanders with a multi-mission loitering missile system capable of multi-domain operations.

  • No cost given for the Switchblade 600, but reportedly lower than the Javelin’s $250,000, and it has much greater range.

    Both are suicide drones, diving into their targets.

    The drones are manufactured by AeroVironment, whose CEO fled from the Soviets as a child.

    When he was a young teenager, Wahid Nawabi would go to the roof of his family’s home in Kabul and watch the Soviet helicopters flying in the distance.

    For most of his childhood, Afghanistan had been peaceful and increasingly prosperous. But that all changed after the nation’s democratic government was overthrown by Marxist military officers in 1978 in the Saur Revolution. In December 1979, the Soviet troops invaded, plunging the country into what has become 40 years of war, violence, and instability.

    In 1982, Nawabi and his family fled. Nawabi, then only 14, led his three younger sisters on a harrowing 48-day journey to escape the war-torn country to reunite with their parents in India.

    Because of that experience, Nawabi said he feels a personal connection with the more than 5 million refugees who have fled Ukraine in the wake of this latest Russian invasion. Now as an American and as the chief executive of AeroVironment, a leading provider of military-grade fighter drones, Nawabi said he has a moral obligation to aid the Ukrainian defense effort.

    “We need to help the Ukrainians get their freedom back,” Nawabi told National Review. “I’ve gone through that experience. It’s heart-wrenching for me.”

    Last month, the U.S. government sent 100 of AeroVironment’s Switchblade drones to the Ukrainians, part of a massive weapons package. Switchblades have been described as “kamikaze drones,” because after they lock on to their target, they fly in and explode. The Switchblade 600, which can fly for more than 40 minutes with a 25-mile range, is designed to take down tanks and other armored vehicles. The smaller Switchblade 300, which weighs less than six pounds and can be carried in a backpack, is meant for smaller targets.

    He’s also donated 100 Quantix reconnaissance drones to Ukraine.

    This also gives me an excuse to link this other NRO piece on how drones are changing warfare.

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown the world drones’ power to change the way wars are fought. America should take note.

    The most unlikely hero of the war in Ukraine has been a drone — or, to use the Pentagon’s preferred term, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB-2, a medium-altitude, long-endurance drone that’s 21 feet long with a 39-foot wingspan, can stay aloft for 24 hours at a stretch. It also carries a lethal punch: a “smart” munition that has been taking out Russian armored and supply columns and helping to grind the Russian ground offensive to a halt.

    Meanwhile, civilian clubs of Ukrainian drone enthusiasts have weaponized their much smaller, commercially made drones — including Chinese-made DJI machines — by flying them above ridgelines and buildings to conduct reconnaissance on enemy units and send the information back to Ukrainian artillery units and other commanders. According to the Independent, Ukrainian officers have even been traveling to Poland to learn how to do the same thing with their military UAVs.

    In short, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is showing the world how drones will change the way wars are fought going forward. The question now is: Will our military realize that UAVs as the airpower weapon of the future, or will the lessons of Ukraine be pushed aside and forgotten?

    A lot of U.S. military organizations are getting into drones in a big way, so I’m betting more the former than the latter.

    There’s a related issue that needs to be confronted first, however. Why are the Ukrainians relying on drones made in Turkey and China instead of American drones? It’s true that we are planning to provide Ukraine with Switchblade “kamikaze” drones, which are small enough to be carried in a backpack and explode when they hit their target, and training a small number of Ukrainians to use them. But there’s much more in the way of drones that the U.S. could be offering Ukraine, and the fact that we are not explains why we’re still behind in realizing the potential of UAVs as an airpower weapon.

    First, our ability to export our best and most valuable drones — e.g., the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper or the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk — is hampered by an international agreement known as the Missile Technology Control Regime, which unaccountably treats unmanned-aircraft technology like ballistic-missile technology. I have written before about how this treaty limits U.S. exports even to allies such as the UAE, who as a result have to rely on Chinese-made UAVs instead.

    Second, there is an association in the minds of voters and policy-makers between drones and the war on terror, which has limited the leeway Pentagon strategists have to embrace the full potential of these revolutionary and disruptive weapons. For example, right now the Air Force is planning to retire an entire fleet of one of our best long-range intelligence-gathering tools, the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 30 remotely piloted surveillance aircraft, most of which are under ten years old and still in very serviceable shape. The stated reason for their retirement is that they can be shot down by highly advanced anti-ballistic-missile systems. But by flying at altitudes where they are less vulnerable to those systems, they could still serve as the bedrock of an extended intelligence-sharing network, allowing the U.S. and its allies to keep watch over the Black Sea, Iran, the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea, and North Korea. They could even be shared with our NATO allies and Ukraine through a lend–lease agreement designed to create such a network.

    In the future, squadrons of armed UAVs have the potential to be used for close air support and full-scale air campaigns against enemy ground forces on a much larger scale than they have been in Ukraine — and for airborne ballistic-missile defense. But right now, NATO should be flying large U.S.-made and fully weaponized UAVs such as the Reaper from Poland into Ukraine and handing the controls over to the Ukrainians.

    There’s no question that drones are going to be a big part of future warfare, not least because a drone is a lot cheaper than a tank, a helicopter or a fighter aircraft. I would imagine that in 20-30 years, we’re going to see AI-driven autonomous drone swarms unleashed in a combat area to wreck havoc on enemy units. It takes a while for armies to find the proper middle ground between “We can use planes to drop oats to the horses” and Wild Billy Mitchell’s “Airpower will overwhelm all other military units” advocacy.

    The Russo-Ukranian war is giving an awful lot of militaries chances to test out their theories of drone warfare in real combat conditions.

    Ukraine Update for April 27, 2022

    Wednesday, April 27th, 2022

    It’s been almost a month since we did the last general Ukraine-Russo War update, so let’s catch up. The biggest change is that Russia has given up on trying to take Kiev and has withdrawn all their forces in the northwest:

    And here’s a timelapse map of the ebb and flow of the war:

    Keep in mind the usual caveats (the map is not the territory, the difficulty of sifting truth from propaganda, etc.), but it does appear that not much has changed in the overall contours of the war since Russia’s withdrawal from the northwest. But ISW is reporting that Russia has instituted combined arms offenses, something we didn’t see much of during the opening stages of the war, and have reported minor but steady advances by Russian forces.

    Here’s a roundup of war news, some of it several weeks old but potentially still of interest.
    

  • An awful lot of Russian infrastructure seems to be blowing up all of a sudden.

    Storage tanks at a major oil depot in the Russian city of Bryansk exploded early on Monday. Was Ukraine responsible?

    Before you answer, consider first that this is only the latest disaster to afflict Russian critical infrastructure near the Ukrainian border. Another oil depot on Belgorod was targeted by a Ukrainian helicopter strike in early April. Prior to that, Russian railway lines near the border were sabotaged. A Russian missile research center and a chemical plant also recently suffered explosions.

    These incidents all appear to fit well with Ukraine’s military strategy.

    Bryansk, 62 miles from the Ukrainian border, is beyond the range of most drone systems in Ukraine’s possession. Unconfirmed video from the Bryansk incident indicates the sound of a missile in the terminal attack phase. Considering this noise and Bryansk’s relative distance from Ukraine, short-range ballistic missiles may have been responsible. Regardless, the explosion will disrupt energy replenishment efforts for Russian military forces in Ukraine.

    The explosion also dilutes Putin’s credibility in claiming that his war on Ukraine is not a war, but rather a limited “special military operation.” When stuff keeps blowing up in Russian cities, it’s hard to convince the residents of said cities that Russia isn’t at war.

    That takes us to Ukraine’s evolving military strategy. With Russia forced to scale back its goals in the conflict, Ukraine has escalated its offensive operations in what’s known as the “deep battlespace.” This involves targeting of Russian logistics and command and control units deeper behind the front lines. Employing Western-provided drones and highly mobile small units, Ukraine is degrading and demoralizing Russia’s war machine.

    It’s not a wild leap to expect that Ukraine is now applying these same tactics over the border inside Russia. This is likely a result of British training of the Ukrainian military.

    Don’t start none, won’t be none…

  • More structure hits inside Russia:

  • On the same theme:

  • Are Belarussians also sabotaging rail lines used by Russia?

    The slickly produced video opens with an unlikely scenario. The year is 2023. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is the president of Belarus. And Belarus has been invited to join the European Union.

    “Fantasy? Not at all. The war Vladimir Putin started against Ukraine gives us a unique chance to change history,” the narrator says. “Russia is already losing. And without our bases, railways, and borders, Putin’s defeat will be significantly hastened.”

    The video calls on Belarusians not only to demonstrate against the war, but also to deny Russia the assets they need to prosecute it from Belarusian territory. “Blockade the aggressor at bases and supply routes. Deny them food, fuel, and freedom of movement,” it says.

    In fact, this is more than a call for action. It is actually describing something that is already happening. Since Putin’s Ukraine War began on February 24, at least 52 Belarusians including 30 railway workers have been arrested on charges of treason, terrorism and espionage for disrupting the movement of Russian troops and military hardware, according to the Belarusian human rights group Viasna.

    Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s autocratic regime in Minsk is so concerned with what has become known as “The Rail War” that it has also declared the Telegram channel of the “Association of Railway Workers of Belarus” an extremist organization.

    This railway rebellion is the most dramatic example of how Putin’s war against Ukraine is changing the political dynamic in Belarus. Lukashenka’s slavish submission to Putin, allowing the Kremlin leader to use his country as a staging ground for Russia’s assault on Ukraine, has unnerved and angered this nation of 9.4 million people.

    The only thing being Mussolini to Putin’s Hitler is going to get you is being strung up by your heels.

  • This is one of those “too good to believe” headlines: “Ukraine Now Has More Tanks Than Russia and Things Look Worse In the Future.”

    The Ukrainian battlefield of Putin’s War is incredibly lethal. In the sixty days since Putin’s three-to-four day invasion of Ukraine started, Russia has had 1,700 vehicles or major pieces of equipment destroyed and another 1,200 captured. Tanks losses numbered 560 destroyed and 214 captured, while losses of infantry fighting vehicles/armored personnel carriers come to 930 destroyed and 330 captured. These are not estimates; these are floor numbers that have been counted and geocoded. By the same methodology, Ukraine has lost at least 200 tanks destroyed and 70 captured, along with 790 infantry fighting vehicles/armored personnel carriers destroyed and 90 captured. No one really knows how many vehicles have been lost to combat damage or wear-and-tear….

    By way of scale, Russia entered the war with about 120 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG)) representing approximately 75% of the Russian Army’s combat power as well as the cutting edge of that power. Keep in mind that this is not a Russian Army affair; there is Naval Infantry from as far away as Vladivostok as well as troops of the Rosgvardiya, or the National Guard of Russia….

    The tank losses alone represent all the tanks in 70 BTGs.

    This lethality is why the Ukrainian government has been screaming for more weapons from anyone who has them. Not just munitions, like Javelin or Starstreak, but tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery.

    Snip.

    As incredible as it may seem, Ukraine now outnumbers Russia in the number of tanks on the battlefield.

    Thanks to European resupplies, Ukraine’s military now has more tanks on the battlefield than Russia does two months into the war, according to the Pentagon.

    The delivery in recent weeks of Soviet-era T-72 tanks to Kyiv from the Czech Republic and other European Nato allies has effectively eroded Russia’s advantage, experts have claimed.

    “Right now, the Ukrainians have more tanks in Ukraine than the Russians do, and they certainly have the purview to use them,” an unnamed senior US defence official told reporters on Thursday.
    Ukraine’s armed forces have previously claimed Russia has lost more than 680 of its tanks, the majority of which were destroyed, while some changed hands after being found abandoned.

    So that’s from the Pentagon. May be true, may not be true. It’s possible Russia has cannibalized other units or (some two months into the conflict) refurbished mothballed tanks.

  • “Young Russian conscripts complain they have been given 1940s guns and are suffering heavy losses against Ukraine.” (Hat Tip: Ed Driscoll at Instapundit)
  • Talk about timing! This piece, published April 10, argues that Ukrainian anti-ship missiles will make the Black Sea unsafe for Russian warships.

    The way I see it (and I am in good company), the Russians will not only be lucky not to be routed from all their gains made since February 24, but are at serious risk of losing the Donbas—Luhansk and Donetsk—and Crimea, as well as having most of their current army destroyed. Talk of some sort of possible Grand New Russian Offensive in the east seem fantastical to me and others who put the big-picture together: with which troops, and of what quality (what elite unites haven’t sustained significant casualties?), and with what equipment? Will it be the remaining equipment that has already proven ineffective and easily destroyed especially by Ukraine’s western-supplied anti-tank and anti-air missiles? The units shattered and barely functional or not functional that managed to escape from Ukraine’s counteroffensives? Non-shattered but non-elite units that have also been deployed for months and are still exhausted? Conscripts almost finishing their terms? New conscripts who have never seen combat??

    Yet as major Russian ground fronts have collapsed, attention is drawn away from an area where, with not much additional assistance from the West or perhaps even with aid already just now promised, Ukraine can easily achieve a resounding victory that would combine massive substantive defeats for the Russians with tremendous symbolism and loss of prestige for Russia in addition to greatly affecting the way ground combat plays out in the south and east.

    I am talking about the near-annihilation of the Russian Navy presence in the Black Sea, including almost the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet.

    Snip.

    Russia has cannibalized its other three fleets (Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, and Pacific Fleet) and its one flotilla (the Caspian Flotilla) to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet and support its Ukraine effort, and, with Turkey closing the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to the Mediterranean in early March to incoming military vessels under the 1936 Montreux Convention, that Caspian Flotilla is the only possible source of reinforcements to what is in the Black Sea, coming in though canal from the Caspian Sea, as other possible reinforcements coming in from the Mediterranean are now blocked.

    As far as sizable surface ships in the Black Sea, by mid-March there were only twenty-one, according to a “senior defense official”: just twelve naval-combat-focused ships along with nine amphibious assault ships, accompanied by numerous far smaller patrol and support boats and, of course, submarines that are harder to track.

    But that total was before the daring Ukrainian strike on the morning of March 24, which mysteriously destroyed a large Russian amphibious ship, the now sunk Alligator class Saratov,docked in the eastern Ukrainian Russian-occupied port of Berdyansk. Two other large amphibious ships, the Caesar Kunikov and Novocherkassk, were damaged and fled the port.

    So scratch one, Russia is down now to just twenty major surface vessels.

    That is not a large number.

    I had finished a version of this section before yesterday’s information that the UK and U.S. would be sending anti-ship missiles to Ukraine. But, for now, keep that low number of major Russian surface ships in mind when considering following:

    For starters, as my old War Is Boring editor David Axe notes in detail, Ukraine has been developing its own anti-ship cruise missile, the Neptune, since 2013. It began testing in 2018, and has since tested successfully repeatedly. The system has a range of 174-180 miles (280-300 km) and operates as a sea-skimmer, flying low and close to the water to make it almost undetectable until just before it hits its target. It was scheduled to be deployed this month with a full division of six launchers, seventy-two cruise missiles (more than three for each remaining major Russian surface vessel), and accompanying radar systems. But Russia’s seems to have derailed this timetable, and it is unclear when it will be able to safely deploy its system and have it and its crews be operational. Details are few and far between as Ukraine obviously would want to keep Russia guessing.

    Secondly, this must have been part of the discussion over the past month between Ukraine and NATO nations, and taking into account the issues with the Neptunes, NATO has been working to arm Ukraine with anti-ship missiles for weeks. Reports from early April indicated United Kingdom Prime Minister Boris Johnson has been keen to arm Ukraine with anti-ship missiles, that these would most likely be truck-mounted versions of its U.S.-supplied Harpoon missiles, its version having a range of 80 miles (128 km) and also capable of hitting land targets (Ukraine has actually been asking for these for some time).

    Snip.

    Russian Naval forces are hardly concentrating along the Turkish coast of the southern Black Sea: they are mostly, perhaps virtually all, off the coast of Ukraine to varying degrees in the northern half of the Black Sea or Sea of Azov, trying to offer support and, presumably, debating whether or not to launch amphibious assaults, particularly on Ukraine’s main port in its West, Odesa (the fact that they have not yet shows how confident they are in such an assault’s chances of success; Putin may not care much about throwing his soldiers’ lives away recklessly, but his larger naval vessels are expensive and take time to construct)…

    Ukraine would have excellent coverage with many of these systems. For most of these systems, many, perhaps even all, of Russia’s twenty remaining large warships in the region—including Russia’s most powerful naval ship, the Slava class cruiser Moskva—are well within striking range from Ukrainian-controlled territory. Even if Ukraine will receive only Harpoons, though they have much smaller range than the Neptunes, they should effectively prevent any Russian naval assaults if the Russians are smart (but they are not). After such Harpoons would arrive, they would still secure Ukrainian coastline and push Russian naval operating areas far from Ukrainian-controlled coastal territory (unless Russia is stupid and keeps its ships within range, inviting their destruction) all while, presumably, the Neptune rollout, training, and deployment finishes, possibly in just a few weeks if the invasion has not derailed Ukraine’s timetable.

    At this crucial moment, when Russia is desperate to turn the tide in the face of its massive failures, the soon-to-arrive unspecified anti-ship missiles have effectively killed any realistic Russian hope of a successful naval assault on Odesa or elsewhere on the Crimea-to-Moldova (where Russia illegally has some military forces in another breakaway region, Transnistria) corridor. These missiles will either prevent any assault from happening or virtually doom any would-be assault. This new round of aid with these anti-ship missiles has, thus, basically closed the gap between the Russians collapsing on three fronts and the Neptunes’ presumed deployment.

    If (and hopefully when) Neptunes can be eventually deployed, a large portion of the entire Black Sea, including both the west and east coasts of Russian-occupied Crimea—where many of Russia’s naval vessels are based and resupplied—as well as the Sea of Azov, would be vulnerable.

  • And then, five days later, this happened.

    A Russian warship that was damaged by an explosion on Wednesday has sunk, Russia’s defence ministry has said.

    Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, was being towed to port when “stormy seas” caused it to sink, according to a ministry message.

    The 510-crew missile cruiser was a symbol of Russia’s military power, leading its naval assault on Ukraine.

    Kyiv says its missiles hit the warship. The United States says it also believes it was hit by Ukrainian missiles.

    Moscow has not reported any attack – it says the vessel sank after a fire.

    The blaze caused the explosion of the warship’s ammunition, Russia says, adding that the entire crew were later evacuated to nearby Russian vessels in the Black Sea.

    How bad is the truth when the lie is “No, we screwed up and sunk our own ship through gross incompetence!”

  • Ukraine not only shot down a Russian Su-35 fighter, they recovered the long-range targeting system and are turning it over to the U.S. for analysis. And the Chinese use the same system…
  • Thread: “Where is the Russian Army artillery ammunition they are fighting their “Donbas Set Piece Battle” with?”
  • The Javelin is pummeling Russian armor. Can production keep up?

    Congress is asking the Pentagon whether the Defense Production Act, or DPA, should be invoked to ensure supplies of Javelin anti-tank missile systems, as well as Stinger surface-to-air missiles, continue to flow to Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have used both of these weapons to great effect in their ongoing defense against Russia’s onslaught. At the same time, questions are growing about the U.S. defense industry’s ability to meet increased demand for these missiles, not just from Ukraine, but in the event that the U.S. military needs to acquire more of them quickly during a major future conflict.

    “To produce more of the Javelins, Stingers – all the stocks that we are using and diminishing and running low on and our allies, as well – shouldn’t we be applying the Defense Production Act?” Sen. Richard Blumenthal, a Connecticut Democrat, asked Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at a Senate Armed Services Committee budget hearing today.

    This is a stupid question. Production for high tech weapons is dependent on a wide variety of high tech components, any of which might be from outside the country, and which might or might not have considerable production lead times. If they used custom, MilSpec chips, the wait time right now is about 26 weeks on average, and the fab may or may not be based in the U.S. Optical components may also have long lead times.

  • Another day, another Russian general whacked. “The authorities confirmed the death of the deputy commander of the 8th Army, Major General Vladimir Petrovich Frolov. About it informs press office of the governor’s office.”
  • Russian troops demoralized?

  • They certainly seem to have been lied to.

  • And some are apparently refusing to return to combat.

    Putin’s call for more troops has not had the desired effect so far of inspiring Russians to enlistment offices. It’s certainly not convincing veterans to return for more of the “special military operation” non-war that Putin’s not winning, even if he isn’t quite losing it yet:

    Yelena’s son, Pavel, was serving in the Far Eastern Amur region when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24. Almost immediately, his unit was sent to the front, and he served almost 40 days in combat. Then his unit was sent back to Russia to regroup, Yelena told RFE/RL’s North.Realities. When his unit was preparing to return to Ukraine, Pavel refused.

    “If he doesn’t want to go back, am I supposed to push him, to tell him, ‘Grab your weapon and go,’” Yelena said. “Those who haven’t been there have no right judge those who have.”

    Yelena’s son is one of a significant but unknown number of Russian contract soldiers who have refused to either fight in Ukraine in the first place or who have fought and do not want to return.

    Lawyer Pavel Chikov, founder of the Agora legal-aid NGO, has written on Telegram that more than 1,000 military personnel and National Guard troops from at least seven regions have refused to go to Ukraine.

  • Did Russian troops massacre over 300 civilians in Bucha?

    Monday’s front pages are dominated by stories of alleged atrocities carried out by the Russian military on civilians in Ukraine.

    Under the headline “Horror in Bucha”, the Guardian reports mass graves have been found in the town north-west of the capital Kyiv, as well as evidence of the killing of civilians in the nearby towns of Irpin and Hostomel.

    The attacks have led Ukraine’s foreign minister to brand Russia being as being worse than infamous terrorist group Isis, the Metro reports.

    The paper says the atrocities were “evidenced in pictures too horrific to print”, including the public execution of handcuffed people and civilians who had been driven over by tanks.

    The Daily Mirror leads with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s accusations that the deaths amount to genocide and that the Russian military was attempting an “elimination of the people” of Ukraine.

    The paper adds the executions apparently carried out by retreating troops led to 300 civilians being killed in Bucha alone.

    The Times reports world leaders have demanded Russian President Vladimir Putin should face more stringent sanctions and be prosecuted for war crimes.

    The paper says its reporters visited the sites of two “execution-style” massacres in Bucha, where Russian troops were also accused of rape and of booby-trapping dead bodies with explosives.

    Historically Russian soldiers have never been known for their tender sensibilities and strong sense of self-control…

  • More atrocity reports here.
  • Thread on Russia changing its tune Bucha massacre.
  • Russian column of tanks near Donetsk destroyed.
  • How various air cargo carriers have reacted to the Russo-Ukrainian war.
  • “Exiled oligarch calls on other Russian tycoons to break with Putin. Mikhail Khodorkovsky says they must denounce the invasion of Ukraine if they want to be above suspicion of collaborating with the Kremlin.” Good luck with that, but I wouldn’t bet the hastily privatized collective farm on it…
  • Especially when they turn up dead.

  • Though he’s not the only one calling for reform:

  • It’s good to have wealthy friends.

  • File this one under “possible but skeptical”:

  • “Russia’s 331st Guards Parachute Regiment is considered ‘the best of the best’, but BBC Newsnight has been tracing the casualties as the unit battles through Ukraine.”

  • You know my summary above about how Russia has abandoned Ukraine’s northeast? Well, they reportedly plastered Sumy with an artillery barrage today, so take all generalities with a grain of salt.
  • I totally want these:

  • The Red Dawn “Wolverines!” tank is real:

  • When France 24 does a profile on how sanctions are hurting average Russians, of course they’re going to include the shop that sells French wine.
  • Heh:

  • Why Are Russia’s Arms Sucking So Badly?

    Saturday, April 23rd, 2022

    So why is Russian miltech performing so badly in Ukraine? In addition to some of the reasons we’ve already covered, this video provides additional answers (skip to 1:35 in to avoid the sponsor blather).

  • Russia has 2.5 to 3 million people in arms manufacturing, “20% of the country’s industrial jobs.”
  • “We all thought Russia had the military muscle to be able to take over Ukraine in a matter of days. However, the real way to test a country’s military power is not in a parade but a war. And with the invasion of Ukraine we are seeing something that has become the norm in the Russian economy. Something like an Expectation vs Reality meme.”
  • 60% failure rate for some Russian missiles?
  • “After a month of the Ukraine invasion, we can say it clearly: Russian armament falls far behind the expectations and hype they had created.”
  • Modernization of the armed forces was supposedly a priority for Putin, with up to 5% of GDP spent on defense.
  • Russia should theoretically have military equipment better than anyone but the U.S.
  • One reason they don’t: Attempted capitalism without privately owned arms companies.
  • “The Soviet military industry was full of unprofitable State enterprises, obsolete factories and, above all, a great deal of corruption.”
  • The U.S. bids out contracts. The Soviets depended on state monopolies.
  • “Russia has never embraced free market capitalism.”
  • According to Vladimir Putin, the problem with communism was not the centralized economy but an economy based on ideological principles. In other words, if you want to improve the efficiency of the system, it is enough to change the managers and put technocrats in charge. Technocrats who have been forged in the bosom of the KGB and who have a pragmatic mentality, totally free of the romanticism of communism or any other ideology. This type of person has a name: “SILOVIKI”. And so, just what was Putin’s formula for bringing his military industry into the 21st century? Very simple: To put Silovikis in all managerial positions. This is how Rostec was conceived in 2007, a conglomerate of companies designed to be the great umbrella of Russian defense. Under this umbrella are more than 700 armaments companies: all of them State-owned. By grouping companies together, a lot of duplication can be eliminated. All following purely technocratic criteria. And who is the CEO of Rostec? None other than Sergey Chemezov, who was a colleague of Vladimir Putin himself when they were both in the KGB offices in East Germany. In other words, a textbook SILOVIKI.

    Yes, in this, as in many other areas, Putin is a complete dumbass.

  • “By acquiring more and more companies, Rostec has ended up consolidating even more monopolies. For example: fighter jets. The United States works with four major manufacturers: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Airbus (Yes, Airbus is European but it also has contracts with Washington). In the case of Russia, practically all fighter jets are manufactured by the same company: UAC which, of course, is under the umbrella of Rostec.”
  • “Another major Russian defense company is Almaz-Antey. This company does not depend on Rostec but is directly owned by the Russian Ministry of Finance. The CEO of this company is another textbook Siloviki. In this case we are talking about Viktor Ivanov, another former KGB agent. Almaz-Antey is the giant where NPO Novator, the manufacturer of almost all Russian precision missiles, is located. Yes, those very missiles that are proving to be so flawed in the invasion of Ukraine.” Try to contain your shock.
  • “In 2017, NPO Novator could only produce 60 Kalibr missiles in six months. As you can imagine, these figures are ridiculous if we take into account that, in just one month of war, Russia has launched more than 1,200 missiles.”
  • I know you’ll also be shocked to learn that Yevgeny Prigoshin, another friend of Putin’s, was in charged of the company responsible for providing expired food to Russian troops. “As Alexei Navalny reported, Prigozhin dodged all public tender systems to become the army’s caterer. Today, Navalny is in jail and Russian soldiers are receiving expired cans of food.”
  • Russia hasn’t achieved air supremacy because Russia doesn’t have enough precision munitions for its planes to use, which is why they do stupid things like hit hospitals with dumb bombs and fly low enough to be shot down. “Russia’s best planes are dropping like flies because they don’t have adequate ammunition.”
  • “Are you really saying that the Russians are stupid and have gone to war without ammunition? Well, no: the problem is not that the Russians are stupid. The problem is that a political system with bad incentives generates nothing but failure.”
  • In closing, he wonders just how well-maintained those nuclear weapons and ICBMs are.
  • All this accords with what we have observed in Russia’s operation failures, and with what we know about the basic incompetence and economic misallocation of command economies.

    (Sorry about the delay in getting this up. BlueHost was down earlier today.)

    Narco Tanks of Mexico

    Thursday, April 21st, 2022

    Time to do a report on a war theater where heavily armored vehicles shoot it out with each other in city streets: Mexico.

    (You were thinking Ukraine? Probably an update on that next week.)

    Cartel violence waxes and wanes, and regular readers know that the cartels are heavily armed. Even so, it may come as a shock to many that Mexican drug cartels have their own “tanks” (AKA “Monstruo”), i.e. up-armored civilian vehicles more accurately described as technicals or armored cars.

    Mexican police recently captured one in Jalisco.

    Mexico’s Guardia Nacional in Jalisco have captured a homemade ‘narco tank’ thought to be used by one of the country’s most powerful drug cartels.

    The officials shared the news to Twitter after it was found in the area of Jalisco on 12 April.

    According to the Mexican police, the vehicle was harbouring 2,000 rounds of ammunition.

    In Texas, we call that “a good start.”

    The heavy metal plated vehicle is thought to be owned by the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion [CJNG], who operate in the area, as reported by The Star.

    Painted green to blend in with surroundings, the tank is heavily armoured, with protective metal casing around the driver’s sider.

    Publication Borderland Beat noted that the tank was discovered while being transported inside of a trailer.

    The trailer limitation is probably why it seems unusually narrow.

    Here’s a video covering various captured cartel narco tanks (though the voice-over isn’t the best).

    Here’s a shorter video from several years ago showing various monstruos, mainly from the 2010-2011 timeframe.

    This video shows still more footage, including (about 1:50 in) modern CJNG vehicles that not only look more professionally constructed, but have red-blue flashing lights and a cartel logo on the side, which does rather suggest they’re not trying to keep a low profile. Also includes combat footage of CJNG blowing away Northeast Cartel (CDN) rivals through their own gunholes.

    Here’s a tweet that shows video of two other captured Nueva Generacion vehicles in 2019:

    And here’s one with a handy diagram:

    Some enterprising hobby company could probably sell models of these things…

    Is China Screwed? (Part 2)

    Tuesday, April 19th, 2022

    There more you start poking around online, the more you turn up reasons why China is screwed.

    The first installment in this series was popular. Well, there’s a lot more reasons why China is screwed.

    It’s screwed all the way down.

    First up: Demographics:

    Takeaways:

  • Remember all that talk of an “Asian Century?” Yeah, not so much.
  • “China will soon run out of people.”
  • China’s population pyramid is about to shift from a huge bulge of people in their prime earning years to one where that bulge is disproportionately elderly.
  • “Everything that made China what it is today has relied on a large, young, and productive workforce. Now, that workforce is about to succumb to biology just as every other generation has in every other country, ever.” Their demographic dividend is running out.
  • “China’s working-age cohort grew from 58% of the country in 1978 to 74% in 2010. But in less than twenty years, the UN predicts that number will be roughly back where it was in ‘78. By then, China will have twice as many seniors as children under 15.”
  • “Per capita wealth remains low, on the level of Mexico, the Maldives, and Kazakhstan. That means this mass of retirees won’t just contribute less to the economy, but will also require immense financial support — the kind China’s fractured pension and healthcare system isn’t remotely prepared for.”
  • “Unfortunately for China, the One-Child Policy has set the cultural expectation firmly at one.”
  • Replacement fertility: 2.1 children per woman. China’s official fertility rate: 1.6. “Yi Fuxian, a scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison [estimates] the true number at 1.18.”
  • “China’s preference for male babies means that between 2020 and 2060, there will be roughly 3 single men for every 2 single women.”
  • “China’s 2020 Census, [tallied] 14.65 million births the previous year — the lowest level since 1961.”
  • Japan, which is also aging, provides a best case scenario. “With a median age of 48.6, Japan is the 2nd oldest place on earth. Today, its share of the world’s manufacturing exports has fallen from 12.5% to just 5.2. Japan did not fade into global irrelevance. It’s still a great power. But it never fulfilled what once seemed certain: its rise to rival the U.S. as a superpower. And it never will.”
  • That’s part 1. Part 2 focuses on China’s out of control property market:

  • It starts off talking about the ghost cities, especially Ordos.
  • “Ordos does have an interesting story to tell. Just, not the one you might expect. The missing context, at the time, was far stranger than what the unimaginative pessimists concocted: Nearly all of these half-finished homes have owners — the vast majority of which have no intention of ever moving in.”
  • “All over China are millions of empty, some unfinished, but almost universally sold homes — not just in far-flung corners but also in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Over one-fifth of all urban homes — 65 million in all — sit vacant.”
  • Skipping over description of basic CIGNx = GDP economics.
  • China relied on “a surplus of cheap labor, which means, by definition, wages are low. You can only compete with the entire rest of the world for so long — and neither do you want to. Low-value manufacturing has long since moved South, to places like Vietnam, Laos, and Bangladesh.”
  • All the long-hanging fruits of infrastructure spending have already been built.
  • “Individually, Chinese consumers really don’t spend very much — just 32% of GDP — less than half that of the US, and far below countries like Japan and Germany. Worse, this number has actually been decreasing over time.”
  • “Chinese consumers are spending, but only on one thing, something not considered ‘consumption’: houses!”
  • China’s home ownership rate “is among the highest in the world — 90% — to much of the developed world’s mid-60s. It gets much weirder, still. If you can believe it, the majority of recent purchases have been 2nd and 3rd homes. In 2018, for instance, 87% of new home buyers already owned at least one.”
  • “Because the government tightly controls how much cash is allowed to leave the country, Chinese people simply don’t have a lot of options, and of them, housing is seen as the only sure thing.”
  • Also, given the sex imbalance mentioned above, for men, home ownership = marriage.
  • “For all of these reasons, prices have risen to extreme levels. In Shenzhen, Beijing, and Shanghai, it takes 40 years of the average income to afford a home.”
  • Most are bought before construction even begins.
  • And here’s where the demographics above provide a double whammy. “The majority of homebuyers, meanwhile, are aged between 20-50 — precisely the segment China will soon lose.”
  • One huge reason for the bubble: Local governments using their control of land to balance their budgets:

    They created what are basically state-owned shell companies called “Local Government Financing Vehicles”. They gave these LGFVs free valuable land, which they then used to take out loans that local governments themselves couldn’t. The trick is that because their debt is hidden, local governments appear far healthier than they really are, while at the same time, meeting the quotas set by Beijing. Following the 2008 crisis, LGFVs transformed from a little quirk of its financial system to the backbone of local economies. If these ‘financing vehicles’ default on their loans, or if housing prices fall too steeply, local governments now have just as much to lose as homeowners. If a local government stops taking out loans, it instantly loses over a third of its revenue, causing a different kind of doomsday. So while the central government may direct local officials to control their debt, the best they can really do is feign cooperation.

  • Flu Manchu only temporarily halted home price rises, and they’re still soaring.
  • “Solutions are far too costly to assume their implementation.”
  • There are a lot more videos of China suckage, but I’ll have to split this up and get to those another time.

    Our Stupid World: Fake Cop Home Invader Edition

    Monday, April 18th, 2022

    Another “Play Stupid Games, Win Stupid Prizes” entry, but with a twist. A man killed home invader who was pretending to be a cop.

    A man with a badge around his neck didn’t fool a Pa. resident with a gun in his pocket. The resident, who was bound by zip ties, managed to grab his gun and opened fire on two home invaders posing as cops, killing one of them, police tell 6ABC.

    It happened around 10 p.m. Sunday in Philly, where police say a 25-year-old resident was confronted outside his home by two men posing as cops. The man with a badge around his neck forced the male resident inside the home, where he was bound with zip ties.

    The fake cops were demanding money and threatening his life. But the resident was able to get his pocketed gun, and he shot the man with the badge three times, killing him, police said. The dead suspect had gunshot wounds to his head, neck and arm.

    The are some pretty big giveaways that it wasn’t real cops:

  • Real cops tends to use handcuffs rather than zip-ties. (There are occasionally exceptions, mostly during widespread civil disorder like mass arrests during riots.)
  • A real cop would have search him for a weapon.
  • A real cop wouldn’t be demanding money. Or I should say a real, non-corrupt. Offer void in New York City in the 1970s.
  • Under Soros-backed District Attorney Larry Krasner, Philadelphia now has the highest per capita homicide rate among the 10 largest cities in the U.S.

    Is China Screwed?

    Thursday, April 14th, 2022

    Here are two videos where Peter Zeihan argues that China is screwed for many reasons, not least of which is demographics.

    Takeaways:

  • One child per couple means that China is “the fastest aging society in human history, with the largest sex imbalance in human history.”
  • “They’ve run out of people of childbearing age.”
  • They were going shrink in half by 2100. “Then they realized that they had been overcounting people for some time.” Then new data moved the date moved up to 2070. And now they’re saying it will be 2050. “For that to be true, the Chinese would have overcounted the population by 100 million.” And all of those missing people are of childbearing age.
  • Their population actually peaked 15 years ago.
  • “We’ve seen a 12-fold increase in Chinese labor costs since 1991.”
  • “China isn’t getting rich, it’s getting old.” They’re facing demographic collapse within a decade.
  • Xi’s instituted a cult of personality, and silenced anyone capable of independent thought. “He knows that the country’s current economic model has failed. And he knows he can’t guarantee economic growth, and he knows he can’t keep the lights on, and he knows he can’t win a war with the Americans.”
  • Xi’s solution? “Naked, blatant, ultra nationalism. Ethnocentric ultranationalism of the Nazi style.”
  • At the top, they don’t care about keeping the lights on. “A third of the country is facing power rationing.”
  • “These are the sorts of things that you do if you know that the bottom’s falling out and there’s nothing you can do about it, and you have to shift the conversation to remain in power.”
  • “In China, money is a political good. It exists to serve the needs of the CCP.”
  • “All of the economic growth we have seen in China since 2006 is because of debt.”
  • Corporate debt is 350% of GDP, “making China the most indebted country in human history in both absolute and relative terms.” Every country that’s come within half of this has collapsed under the debt load.
  • I’m omitting discussion of how China is screwed on semiconductors (covered enough here), and also the possibility of invading Taiwan (this video was released late last year, before Russia invaded Ukraine).
  • “The Biden administration in bits and pieces is redefining strategic ambiguity, and it’s not clear to me what the endgame is here.” Well, there’s a whole lot that isn’t clear about the Biden Administration…
  • Zeihan thinks Biden might recognize Taiwan for a foreign policy win. Zeihan also thinks that both China and Russia are so weak we can wait them out. (Remember: Pre-Ukraine invasion.)
  • Zeihan dismissive of both Obama and Trump foreign policy.
  • “Joe Biden has been on the wrong side and the right side of every foreign policy decision the U.S. has made in the last 45 years, because he doesn’t have any core beliefs he tacks with the wind.”
  • Now let’s forward to March 24, where Russia’s colossal failure in Ukraine has actually made China even more screwed.

    Takeaways:

  • The biggest damage that we are seeing from the Ukraine war (outside of Ukraine, obviously) is in China. Because in one month the Russians have pulled back the blinders on what has been a 50-year strategic program, the idea that China can come to global power with American sponsorship, with American indifference, that it can take Taiwan, that it can intimidate Japan, that they can dominate all of east Asia and yet not suffer economically at all. It was always ridiculous, but now it’s been shown to just be absolutely stupid.

  • No one can escape the power of global markets because of trade.
  • “The yuan is only traded internally because it’s the most manipulated currency in history. The euro confiscates bank deposits to pay for bailouts.”
  • Russia is the world’s second largest oil exporter, and it can’t export more to China because the pipes that go east don’t interconnect with the ones that go west. “The rail lines are already beyond capacity.”
  • In the west: “One way or another, those pipes aren’t surviving this year.” (Not sure that’s correct, but I’ve long thought that we should be seeing more structure hits inside Russia than we’ve seen thus far.)
  • “The stuff that goes to the Black Sea is in a war zone, so insurance companies will not give the indemnification that is necessary for vessels to operate in that area. So the only way a ship can go and dock it overseas right now is if a country gives its sovereign indemnification and takes all the risk.”
  • Primorsk, on the Baltic, is open. However: “Ship captains for the most part are refusing to go, and European dock workers are refusing to unload the cargo when it arrives. So that is still in use but not nearly as much, maybe a quarter of what it used to be before the war started.”
  • To get more oil to China: “You would have to build a fundamentally new infrastructure from the fields in northwest Siberia to Chinese population centers that is greater than the distance from Miami to Anchorage, most of which is through virgin territory that is very rugged. That’s a 10-year program minimum even with the Chinese building it.”
  • “We’re looking at the single largest removal of crude from the market ever, and in proportional terms it’s going to have a shock somewhat similar to World War II.”
  • We have insurance companies not doing it, shipping companies not doing it, dock workers not doing it and now Halliburton, Baker Hughes and Schlumberger have pulled out, and they do the technical work that makes a lot of this possible. All the super majors are gone, and we even have a couple of major projects out in Sakhalin that are probably just going to die because the Russians can’t make those projects work by themselves. Most of the oil and gas out of that goes to China, so we’re actually looking at an environment where the Chinese see reduced flows rather than increased, as Russia is just melon-scooped out of the market.

  • When the Russians fell under sanctions, everything that the Chinese thought was true about their future was laid bare as, at best, wishful thinking and bad analysis. So they are now looking east to the United States and west to the Russians in a little bit of a panic, because they are being tied indirectly to what’s going on in Ukraine. And they have now found out not only does the west’s and specifically the United States’ financial tools work very well, they now know they would work much better against China than against Russia, because at its core Russia is a commodities exporter, most notably oil, natural gas and food. China imports all those things, so if an equivalent sanctions regime was done against the Chinese, you’d have 500 million dead Chinese in less than a year from starvation.

    Here I think he overstates the case, as there are a lot of emergency avenues a communist government could pursue to stave off starvation. Like invading Mongolia and turning it into emergency farmland. Which is not to so they wouldn’t have some starvation, especially in worse-case scenarios…

  • “The Chinese have always seen themselves as anti-American [well, the commies, anyway -LP], they’ve always seen themselves as anti-Western, anti-democracy and now they’re realizing that the mood of the man in the White House determines whether their country exists.”
  • As tight as the sanctions are, as big as they’re getting, they’re nothing compared to the corporate boycotts. Almost every single company that left Russia was under no legal requirement to do so, they just didn’t want to be associated with the war. And we’re talking about those ESG, social goody two-shoes mammoth companies like Exxon and Halliburton, who are now gone, and everyone else followed. So if that happened to China, you know that’s all of their investment that matters. That’s all of their technology transfers, that’s all of their end markets. This system, if it turned against China, would be far more damning than anything we’ve seen out of Russia so far.

  • I think Zeihan overstates the case a bit, and probably immanizes the timeline of crisis more than warranted, but the demographic and economic challenges China faces are very real.

    Also keep in mind that no one in 1988 expected the Soviet Union to collapse as quickly as it did, either…

    Q: Can You Double-Pattern Rather Than Use EUV? A: You Don’t Want To

    Sunday, April 10th, 2022

    This is going to be pretty esoteric for many of my readers, but in previous semiconductor posts covering ASML, some commenters have suggested that fabs can do multi-patterning for smaller nodes rather than having to use ASML’s extreme ultraviolet stepper. The following video explains why, below a certain threshold, no, you really can’t.

    I’m not going to summarize every point, but the largest takeaway is that multi-patterning is computationally prohibitive. Double-patterning splits a single mask into two masks, each of which only create half of the mask pattern on the die. Double-patterning was fine for a while, but triple patterning and self-aligned double-patterning start making finding optimal solutions to the mask splitting problem exponentially more difficult.

    Take a square. A square has four nodes in it. With double patterning, each of the two masks handle opposing sides of the square. And with this four-node shape, there are two double patterning options available for coloring. The EDA software thus has to check through them for design rule violations and whatnot. With triple patterning, the number of variations explodes exponentially. For that same square four node structure, triple patterning has 18 variations rather than just two with double patterning. A five node structure, 30. And so on. A semiconductor design can have hundreds of different nodes and design variations. The software needs to check through at least a good portion of these. This problem is not solvable in polynomial time. In other words, for you computer science nerds out there, it is an NP complete problem.

    And then there’s the cost. “Depending on whose cost model you consult, [10nm]’s triple patterning makes its lithography module 3.85x higher than [28nm].” And the non-EUV 7nm node required triple-patterning and something called “self-aligned quadruple patterning.” And on Intel: “Brian Krzanich has said that in certain cases the company needs to use quad (4x), penta (5x), or hexa (6x) patterning for select features, as they need to expose the wafer up to six times to “draw” one feature. I am not super surprised that it wouldn’t yield. No wonder GlobalFoundries ditched their 7nm node.”

    And this summary glosses over big differences between different fab technologies on different companies. TSMC’s 7nm isn’t the same as Intel’s 7nm.

    Anyway, all this goes a long way to explain: Multi-patterning is much more painful than simply ponying up the cost for an ASML EUV stepper. And if you want to do 6nm, you have to use EUV.

    Why Russian Technology Is Screwed

    Tuesday, March 29th, 2022

    Welcome to another in the continuing “Why Russia’s X Is Screwed” series! It seems that Russia’s technological infrastructure is even more screwed than their airline industry.

    Some takeaways:

  • If the sanctions are maintained, they will “almost certainly cause the collapse of Russia’s economy on short notice, and will set the country’s technological progress back by decades.”
  • Russian state entities and miltech was put in “a complete black box.”
  • “Even non-military end users were still barred from key technologies, such as semiconductors, telecommunication, encryption security, lasers, sensors, navigation, avionics and maritime technologies. Other countries from the EU to Japan and South Korea all imposed similar sanctions of their own.”
  • Even many private companies that lobbied for special carve-outs from sanctions changed their mind and suspended all business with Russia.
  • Just about every car and truck manufacturer. “95% of car parts in Russia are imported.”
  • Apple, Samsung, Dell, HP, Oracle, SAP, and Microsoft have all halted sales.
  • “Overnight, many industries in Russia are just gone.”
  • Every high tech company in Russia relies heavily on foreign inputs and expertise.
  • He talks about the embargo on semiconductors (more on this in the video below), but says that it applies even to chips made with embargoed tech. So if SMIC used an Applied Materials PVD machine, those chips couldn’t legally be shipped to Russia. I am skeptical this is actually the case (and it would be very hard to enforce on Chinese companies).
  • “The Russian economy did not prepare itself for sanctions anywhere near this severe.”
  • Two-thirds of Russia’s foreign reserves of $643 billion were parked abroad, which was all frozen when sanctions came down.
  • “Every part of the Russian economy has just received major damage, and there’s no way they can pivot everything all at once.”
  • “They’re simply not survivable in the long-term.”
  • Russia has increased interest rates to 20% to keep the ruble from collapsing further.
  • Even China has slowed-down or halted loans to Russian entities.
  • Russia is going to run out of cash “in a few weeks to a few months.”
  • Russia is heavily reliant on foreign tech, but for most tech companies, Russia is a minor market.
  • Expect a brain drain as wealthy and skilled Russians lose their jobs, then move abroad.
  • Many national industries simply cannot exist without foreign inputs. Substitutes would take years, if not decades.
  • Conclusion:

    If these sanctions continue, there will be no economy left to support the Russian military. Russian technological progress will be thrown back by years, if not decades, across the board. And in just a couple of weeks, or maybe months, the vultures will start circling, and they will start picking off every interesting
    Russian asset, every interesting Russian employee, oil fields, anything that they can get their hands on. And they’ll start transporting that out of the country as well. I cannot believe that Putin started a war expecting any sanctions anywhere near this scale.

  • Now on to semiconductors:

  • TSMC halted all shipments to Russia, as has AMD and Intel.
  • The Soviet Union had a massive technology gap between it and the United States, which only got worse as time went on.
  • All the computing power in every computer in the Soviet Union in 1991 combined would fall two generations short of a single Cray.
  • “The most advanced semiconductor production facilities were in East Germany, Belarus, Ukraine, and so on.”
  • JSC Mikron is Russia’s largest semiconductor manufacturer. “Today it fabs RFID tickets, SIM cards, and other smart card products.” They did about $260 million in business in 2020 (including government subsidies). They bought IP from STMicroelectronics.
  • In 2014, Mikron announced “the successful achievement of the 65 nanometer node at a volume of 500 200mm wafers a month.” [record scratch] 500 wafer starts a month??? That’s nothing. TSMC’s top of the line fabs generally do 120,000 wafer starts a month. It’s maybe OK if you’re running weird, demanding, high profit, low-volume processes (say, Gallium-Arsenide chips for use in satellites), but not for Mikron’s main business line (RFIDs).
  • But all that is beside the point, since they didn’t have a stepper capable of doing 65 nanometer. “Fujitsu, Toshiba, and TSMC started shipping their commercial 65 nanometer nodes in 2005. So this means that Russia’s gap with the leading edge has grown from 9 years to 15+.”
  • Russia’s Angstrem offers a wafer foundry doing “130 nanometer and 90 nanometer process nodes on 200mm wafers. Their capacity is about 180,000 wafers a year.” They declared bankruptcy around 2019. They were also hit by U.S. sanctions after the Crimean invasion. Successor company NM-Tech has a pie-in-the-sky plan to do 10nm in 10 years. Don’t hold your breath.
  • (I notice he makes no mention of “Crocus Nano Electronics,” which supposedly runs Russia’s only 300mm wafer fab (“Established in 2011, Crocus Nano Electronics is the world’s first and only 300mm fabrication facility, located in Russia”), but when you get down into their press releases, it says “The development and production of Crocus Nano Electronics ReRAM memory chips were manufactured on 55 ULP CMOS by Shanghai Huali Microelectronics Corporation (HLMC).” So either they’re a fabless design house, or they only do the metal interconnects fabrication and nothing else in the process, which is so weird a model I can’t really wrap my head around it.)
  • I’m omitting the coverage of various fabless design houses, since they’re dead-in-the-water without access to decent foundry technology or foreign markets.
  • They can probably get stuff fabbed at China’s SMIC.
  • If Russia had turned into a regular country after 1991, there’s no reason they couldn’t have launched a competitive domestic tech industry. The Soviet Union had large number of frequently bloody flaws, but they didn’t stint on STIM education, and maintained very competitive space capabilities despite numerous handicaps. But instead, they turned into a corrupt oligarchy-turned-dictatorship, and all that human capital either emigrated or withered on the vine.

    And now, thanks to Vlad’s Big Ukraine Adventure, they’re even more screwed than they were before.

    Dear Joe Biden: Do You Think You Could Avoid Saying The Quiet Part Out Loud?

    Sunday, March 27th, 2022

    The world would be a better place if Vladimir Putin were out of power, even if that meant a him getting bumped off.

    I have no problem saying this. (And I strongly suspect most people in the free world believe the same thing.) You know why?

    I’m not President of the United States.

    Yeah, Sundown Joe went there. Instead of saying that Putin “cannot remain in Ukraine” he said “This man cannot remain in power.”

    Nothing like calling for regime change against an paranoid dictator of a country that possesses over 4,000 nuclear warheads.

    No wonder Biden Administration officials are frantically walking-back their ostensible boss’s bellicose sabre-rattling.

    Poor Joe. His cognitive decline is such that he can’t avoid saying the quiet part out loud.

    At least he isn’t sending out mean tweets…