Something a little different than the usual Iran roundup: Two videos about Kharg Island, one an after-action report on a U.S. attack run, the other a description of what makes taking the island difficult.
The caveat for the after-action video, a recreation of an actual U.S. attack run, is that it’s done a breathless, overly-dramatic fashion, like something from Most Shocking. But the detailed, blow-by-blow account suggests it was taken from actual after-action reports.
Three B-1B Lancers carrying precision-guided bombs attempted the most surgically demanding strike of Operation Epic Fury — destroying Iranian military targets on Kharg Island without touching the crude oil infrastructure sitting meters away. Then the GPS jamming started, and the mission nearly came apart.
This video reconstructs the full tactical breakdown of the Kharg Island strike: how an Iranian GPS jammer degraded bomb accuracy toward the oil, how the F/A-18 Super Hornets sent to destroy it nearly got hit by friendly JDAMs when a deconfliction failure put them directly in the bomb fall line, and how one Mersad air defense commander’s final radio transmission turned inaccurate anti-aircraft fire into precision-guided shrapnel that bracketed B-1Bs mid-bombing run. We cover the AGM-158 JASSM cruise missile shot that eliminated the SAM battery, the burning missile propellant creeping toward thirty million barrels of crude oil, the IRGC patrol boat sprint toward the supertanker loading channel, and the F/A-18 pilots who descended into accurate anti-aircraft fire from guns they couldn’t suppress to stop a mining operation with laser-guided GBU-54 JDAMs.
The breathless nature of the narration makes me suspect that certain aspects have been embellished for dramatic effect.
Next up: Simon Whistler discusses how difficult it will be for the American military to take and hold Kharg Island. Consider it the pessimist case against the operation.
But I believe there are multiple places where Whistler is unduly pessimistic about such an operation.
- First and foremost, the military assets discussed in the media are not necessarily the assets such an operation would be limited to. Remember how the very public news of B-2s in route to Diego Garcia was a ruse to cover the fact that the real B-2 force was already headed to the target in the June strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. It’s entirely possible (even probable) that America already has assault assets in theater that media outlets don’t know about.
- Some debatable assertions: “Iranian forces are nothing if not creative, and they are highly motivated to accept risk to their own lives in order to deliver damage to an adversary.” And “The first problem that the US would have to account for is the Iranian ground forces. Combination of roughly 350,000 soldiers in the Iranian army, about 150,000 soldiers across the ground forces of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and another several hundred thousand paramilitary fighters of the Basij Resistance Force.” Whistler suggests virtues not necessarily in evidence for Iran’s forces. The IRCG has certainly shown itself highly motivated when it comes to launching terror rockets, supporting insurgencies, or slaughtering civilians, but not so much when it comes to an actual toe-to-toe fight against a real military, a domain in which they have zero experience or demonstrated competency. Likewise, there’s little evidence that Iranian military regulars are all that keen to die for the regime. They also did not notably distinguish themselves in the long, bloody slog of the Iran-Iraq War, a stalemate against an Iraqi military that the United States-led coalition would quickly and comprehensively dismantle in the Gulf War a few years later. And back then, Iran had some relatively modern air power. Likewise the Basij seem well equipped to beat defenseless women for immodesty, but I rather strongly suspect the overwhelming majority will cut and run when faced with trained soldiers who can fire back.
- If America successfully takes Kharg Island, it will be impossible for Iranian forces to get ships across from the mainland to retake it in the teeth of overwhelming American air power, even if they try crossing at night.
- Also, American and Israeli firepower are already destroying Iranian transportation infrastructure. Just how are all these numerous Iranian forces supposed to even reach the coast if the bridges are gone?
- Likewise, the difficulty in taking the island without damaging the critical oil infrastructure that makes it worth taking may cause Iran to avoid their usual inaccurate missile barrages. And Iranian forces will likely find it difficult to set up missile, artillery and drone systems on the coastline under withering American and Israeli attack.
- “The American public is not willing to accept the loss of American troops, and it is not willing to accept long-term or severe economic pain just to see the Islamic Republic overthrown.” This assertion is not necessarily true. The American public can certainly be fickle, but thus far Astroturf protests against the war have modest and populated with the usual foreign-funded, elderly white lefty idiots. Americans over a certain age remember the Iranian Hostage Crisis, and may feel eliminating one of they key sources of jihad terror worldwide for good worth the cost. Also, unlike Iraq or Afghanistan, U.S. military and civilian leadership seems 100% dedicated to absolute victory.
Whistler seems to think that all of Iran’s military forces will fight with the same fanaticism of Imperial Japanese troops on Iwo Jima. Given how badly the regular armies of Muslim nations have fought against first world armies in standup fights, as opposed to fanatical insurgencies running year-long campaigns of attrition, I rather strongly suspect he’s mistaken.