Something a little different than the usual Iran roundup: Two videos about Kharg Island, one an after-action report on a U.S. attack run, the other a description of what makes taking the island difficult.
The caveat for the after-action video, a recreation of an actual U.S. attack run, is that it’s done a breathless, overly-dramatic fashion, like something from Most Shocking. But the detailed, blow-by-blow account suggests it was taken from actual after-action reports.
Three B-1B Lancers carrying precision-guided bombs attempted the most surgically demanding strike of Operation Epic Fury — destroying Iranian military targets on Kharg Island without touching the crude oil infrastructure sitting meters away. Then the GPS jamming started, and the mission nearly came apart.
This video reconstructs the full tactical breakdown of the Kharg Island strike: how an Iranian GPS jammer degraded bomb accuracy toward the oil, how the F/A-18 Super Hornets sent to destroy it nearly got hit by friendly JDAMs when a deconfliction failure put them directly in the bomb fall line, and how one Mersad air defense commander’s final radio transmission turned inaccurate anti-aircraft fire into precision-guided shrapnel that bracketed B-1Bs mid-bombing run. We cover the AGM-158 JASSM cruise missile shot that eliminated the SAM battery, the burning missile propellant creeping toward thirty million barrels of crude oil, the IRGC patrol boat sprint toward the supertanker loading channel, and the F/A-18 pilots who descended into accurate anti-aircraft fire from guns they couldn’t suppress to stop a mining operation with laser-guided GBU-54 JDAMs.
The breathless nature of the narration makes me suspect that certain aspects have been embellished for dramatic effect.
Next up: Simon Whistler discusses how difficult it will be for the American military to take and hold Kharg Island. Consider it the pessimist case against the operation.
“The value of Kharg Island is obvious. Control the island, and you could throttle Iran’s oil dependent economy. Capture the island intact, and another nation could make Iran do anything to get it back. Destroy it outright and Iran would transform from a powerful rogue nation into an economic afterthought. And that’s if we’re being generous.”
“The export facilities on Kharg Island are the most important site in one of Iran’s most important regions, meaning that the region is especially important to the Iranian military. This is a region with a well-developed civilian infrastructure, a large presence from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC, and most likely the hidden weapons stockp match. Then there’s the island itself, a low-lying coral crop with an elevation of just 70m at its highest point. With a land area of roughly 20 square km, Kharg Island is basically flat, basically triangular in shape and surrounded by deep waters to enable the transit of oil tankers.”
Some pre-situated weapons and supply caches will likely survive any American bombardment.
“There’s no telling what the US will destroy and what it’ll fail to pick up on, but some of those mines and air defenses will survive, raising the possibility that they could claim the lives of US troops or shoot down vulnerable non-stalthy low-flying aircraft. That said, Kharg will not be an easy place to defend once US ground forces have established a foothold. Iranians on the island will either be left exposed or be forced to use refinery infrastructure as cover unless they allow themselves to be pushed into the island town where most residents live.”
“Iran’s objective is not victory in any conventional sense. Iran is able to accept the deaths of its political and military leaders and the destruction of its cities and mass casualties among its soldiers, paramilitaries, and civilian supporters. Iran’s focus is on regime survival, not the survival of the people who make up the regime, but the survival of the regime itself.” No, that’s the regime‘s goal. Most ordinary Iranians hate the regime’s guts.
He notes the difficulty of getting amphibious landing ships through the Strait of Hormuz. But America will likely have a screening force of destroyers and frigates in addition to overwhelming air superiority, and Iran probably has very little in the way of missiles that can reach across the strait, at night, without real air assets to spot and paint the target, in the face of American air and naval superiority. Given America and Israel’s attacks on their sensor and communication infrastructure, I also doubt the Iranian military is capable of efficient coordination and dissemination of any real-time information they may be receiving from Russian or Chinese satellites.
He’s still right that amphibious and aerial invasions are exceptionally difficult and fraught with peril.
But I believe there are multiple places where Whistler is unduly pessimistic about such an operation.
First and foremost, the military assets discussed in the media are not necessarily the assets such an operation would be limited to. Remember how the very public news of B-2s in route to Diego Garcia was a ruse to cover the fact that the real B-2 force was already headed to the target in the June strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. It’s entirely possible (even probable) that America already has assault assets in theater that media outlets don’t know about.
Some debatable assertions: “Iranian forces are nothing if not creative, and they are highly motivated to accept risk to their own lives in order to deliver damage to an adversary.” And “The first problem that the US would have to account for is the Iranian ground forces. Combination of roughly 350,000 soldiers in the Iranian army, about 150,000 soldiers across the ground forces of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and another several hundred thousand paramilitary fighters of the Basij Resistance Force.” Whistler suggests virtues not necessarily in evidence for Iran’s forces. The IRCG has certainly shown itself highly motivated when it comes to launching terror rockets, supporting insurgencies, or slaughtering civilians, but not so much when it comes to an actual toe-to-toe fight against a real military, a domain in which they have zero experience or demonstrated competency. Likewise, there’s little evidence that Iranian military regulars are all that keen to die for the regime. They also did not notably distinguish themselves in the long, bloody slog of the Iran-Iraq War, a stalemate against an Iraqi military that the United States-led coalition would quickly and comprehensively dismantle in the Gulf War a few years later. And back then, Iran had some relatively modern air power. Likewise the Basij seem well equipped to beat defenseless women for immodesty, but I rather strongly suspect the overwhelming majority will cut and run when faced with trained soldiers who can fire back.
If America successfully takes Kharg Island, it will be impossible for Iranian forces to get ships across from the mainland to retake it in the teeth of overwhelming American air power, even if they try crossing at night.
Likewise, the difficulty in taking the island without damaging the critical oil infrastructure that makes it worth taking may cause Iran to avoid their usual inaccurate missile barrages. And Iranian forces will likely find it difficult to set up missile, artillery and drone systems on the coastline under withering American and Israeli attack.
“The American public is not willing to accept the loss of American troops, and it is not willing to accept long-term or severe economic pain just to see the Islamic Republic overthrown.” This assertion is not necessarily true. The American public can certainly be fickle, but thus far Astroturf protests against the war have modest and populated with the usual foreign-funded, elderly white lefty idiots. Americans over a certain age remember the Iranian Hostage Crisis, and may feel eliminating one of they key sources of jihad terror worldwide for good worth the cost. Also, unlike Iraq or Afghanistan, U.S. military and civilian leadership seems 100% dedicated to absolute victory.
Whistler seems to think that all of Iran’s military forces will fight with the same fanaticism of Imperial Japanese troops on Iwo Jima. Given how badly the regular armies of Muslim nations have fought against first world armies in standup fights, as opposed to fanatical insurgencies running year-long campaigns of attrition, I rather strongly suspect he’s mistaken.
Day 10 of the Iran War: Oil spikes then falls, Iran gets a new theoretical Supreme Leader, China’s low cost GPS substitute is just as crappy as their other MilTech, the gulf states are investing in Ukrainian MilTech, and Habitual Linecrosser tries to cut through the fog of war.
He told CBS News “I think the war is very complete, pretty much”, and said the US was “very far ahead of schedule”
Speaking to NBC, he left open the prospect of acquiring Iranian oil, saying “certainly people have talked about it”
In an interview with the New York Post, he said the administration was “nowhere near” making a decision on whether to order US troops into Iran
Speaking to Republican lawmakers, Trump said the US was drawn into a “short-term” military operation in Iran to “get rid of some very evil people”
He went on to say: “We’ve already won in many ways, but we haven’t won enough”
Trump told the New York Post he is “not happy” with Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, but at his press briefing later did not make clear who he wants to take his place – or how that will be achieved
At his press briefing, Trump reiterated that the operation in Iran has been a “tremendous success”, but also added that he wants to ensure Iran cannot develop nuclear weaponry “for a very long time” – a much bigger task
The US still has targets in Iran, Trump tells reporters, but they could be taken out “in one day”
Theoretically, Mojtaba Khamenei survived the leadership airstrike and is now the Iran’s new supreme leader. Maybe, but I wouldn’t put it past the people currently not running the country to announce him as leader even though he’s room temperature so they can continue to keep not running the country without U.S. and Israeli planes sending them to Allah.
“Third Iranian Shahid Soleimani-class Corvette Hit By America: At Bandar Abbas Port.”
The war between the U.S., Israel and Iran has entered a decisive phase that may determine the political future of the Middle East for decades to come.
President Trump declared that there will be no deal with the Iranian regime — nothing short of unconditional surrender. Tehran responded with predictable defiance, announcing that it would never surrender. Yet behind the regime’s rhetoric, reality appears very different.
Much of the leadership now reportedly communicates from undisclosed locations, hiding from sustained strikes while the propaganda machine attempts to project strength and resilience.
The scale of the military campaign has been extraordinary. In the first week alone, the U.S. reportedly struck approximately 3,000 Iranian targets across the country and the region. Israel has launched repeated waves of air strikes — more than twenty separate operations — systematically dismantling the regime’s military infrastructure. Missile launchers, air defense systems, command centers and naval facilities have been destroyed. Advanced weapons systems and new technologies, including next-generation laser defense platforms, are shaping the battlefield.
Israel has reportedly targeted and dismantled hardened command structures associated with the regime’s leadership, including the underground bunker networks linked to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Several key figures may have been killed in these operations, though the regime has yet to publicly acknowledge casualties buried under the rubble of destroyed facilities.
Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic’s military capacity has been devastated. What once appeared to be a formidable regional force increasingly looks like what many analysts suspected all along: a paper tiger built on intimidation, propaganda and bluff.
For decades, the regime invested enormous resources in projecting power across the Middle East, building proxy networks and threatening neighboring states. Now it faces an unprecedented strategic crisis. Today, it is focused primarily on surviving.
The central question confronting policymakers in Washington and Jerusalem is not whether the regime’s military capabilities can be degraded — that process is already underway — but whether the campaign will stop short of dismantling the Islamic Republic itself. Anything short of regime-change risks allowing the system to recover, reorganize and once again threaten regional stability.
The military balance of power favors the U.S. and Israel. Iran’s conventional warfighting capabilities have been severely degraded. Air superiority allows continued targeting of strategic assets, meaning the regime’s ability to project military power beyond its borders will keep declining as long as the campaign persists. In the short run, this places the regime in a defensive posture.
But the weakening of Iran’s military does not automatically translate to the collapse of the regime. The Islamic Republic has historically relied less on conventional military strength and more on asymmetric tools — intelligence networks, ideological mobilization, proxy militias and global terrorism. Even if its missile forces, navy and air defenses are heavily damaged, the regime’s internal security structures — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the domestic Basij security force, intelligence services and propaganda apparatus — can still function. Note that these institutions exist primarily to protect the regime rather than to defend the country.
LUCAS drones (“even cheaper than the Shahed, around $15,000”).
Ship-based anti-drone lasers (cost per kill: 50¢).
Tomahawk
Precision Strike Missile
Evidently American forces have found a way to jam China’s BeiDou system, their version of GPS:
Also, BeiDou seems to include its own text message system, which comes with a lot of drawbacks in an active combat environment…
A document circulating lays out the possibility of a limited campaign for U.S. ground forces to taking over Bandar Abbas and surrounding areas.
It is important to note that the United States does not currently maintain the ground force numbers in the region required for a full-scale invasion of Iran, nor has it established the logistical infrastructure that such a campaign would demand. Furthermore, there is no visible mobilization that would indicate preparation for a large occupation force. However, the US does have a large number of forward-deployed naval assets, rapid deployment units available back home, and special operations forces that could deploy within 18 to 48 hours to conduct a limited landing designed to seize specific objectives only.
The current goal of the ongoing air campaign appears to be to undermine the Iranian military and political leadership, to ignite internal dissent and local opposition movements, and whereafter, support these through air support and supply drops. Nevertheless, if current aerial efforts fail to create such a scenario, the US may consider scaling up its efforts.
One viable strategy could entail securing a foothold inside Iran to host a provisional government and facilitate overland supply routes instead. The most likely target for such a landing is Bandar Abbas, Iran’s primary southern port and a central node in its oil export system. In addition to establishing a bridgehead, capturing the city would allow US forces to obtain Iran’s main naval base. The accompanying port infrastructure, including cargo terminals and former fleet facilities, could then be repurposed to rapidly unload supplies and serve as a staging ground to support friendly forces inland.
Most importantly, Bandars Abbass’ is strategically located on the Strait of Hormuz. Following the attack, Iran is attempting to blockade the Strait, causing disruptions that are already affecting global shipping lanes. Securing Bandar Abbas would give the US a position from which to guarantee maritime passage to the major oil flows and deny Iran the ability to leverage the strait as a pressure tool.
In preparation for a landing, the US would shift focus to an air campaign aimed at degrading Iranian coastal defenses, displacing Iranian army units from the shoreline, and disrupting their ability to maneuver along the main logistics corridors leading into Bandar Abbas. With defenses disrupted, a numerically smaller landing force could then move into secure administrative buildings, port facilities, and the surrounding districts, in order to secure a perimeter and consolidate control. Infiltration routes through the mountains would be used to send small special forces groups to link up with local resistance networks as well as provide supplies and weaponry overland. Any landing would also force Iranian army units hiding in the surrounding mountains into the open terrain, if they want to contest the US bridgehead. However, any attempt to mass forces for a real counterattack would expose them to US and Israeli airstrikes almost immediately; with over 150 US combat aircraft, several cruisers, and guided-missile destroyers, ready to provide fire support to any landing party.
The alternative for the Iranian army would be a shift toward a guerrilla‑style resistance inside the city and surrounding area. But the operational impact of such a campaign would remain limited if the United States avoids expanding the offensive inland, and positions itself as a supporting force for a new government, instead of an occupying one. High local pro‑Western sentiment, visible in the large protests in the cities and towns here earlier this year, could additionally constrain the Iranian army’s ability to operate covertly.
Highly speculative, but it does contain a certain logic. Plus, with physical control of the oil export terminal, the U.S. could start selling oil in exchange for direct payment, promising to turn over any proceeds after a non-Jihadist government takes power…
Add the Royal Jordanian Air Force to the list of countries flying defensive missions over the Persian Gulf, specifically protecting Bahrain and UAE.
Azerbaijan has reportedly reopened the border with Iran, but the source is TASS, so several grains of salt are probably in order.
Jordan Peterson and Douglas Murray talk about what a scumbag death cult Hamas is.
UAE is investing in Ukrainian MilTech companies and buying Flamingo missiles to counter Iran.
“The United Arab Emirates-based Edge Group is set to purchase a 30 percent ownership stake in Fire Point, Ukraine’s combat-proven missile and drone manufacturer. The proposed deal of around 760 million US dollars will raise the total valuation of the Ukrainian defense firm to roughly 2.5 billion US dollars. Fire Point, which produces the FP-1 and FP-2 unmanned aerial systems as well as the Flamingo cruise missile, has risen to become Ukraine’s leading defense technology manufacturer within just two years, with production of drones currently reaching 6,000 per month.”
“The most interesting product in Fire Point’s arsenal is the Flamingo cruise missile, of which the company produces 1 to 2 units per day. With 30% share in the company and certain agreements, the UAE can receive around 10 to 20 such missiles and 1800 drones per month, significantly enhancing its ability not only to protect itself against enemies like Iran, but to carry out preventive strikes. Combat-proven with an estimated range of 3,000 kilometers and already successfully used to target critical Russian infrastructure within the 2,000 kilometer range, the missile is capable of reaching and destroying any target across Iran. Air bases, command centers, and missile storage facilities can be targeted with ease by its 1,150 kilogram warhead, forcing the Iranian command to change planning due to another deadly threat in the region.”
And what’s happening in the “southern front” of the war? In Lebanon, Israel seems to settling Hezbollah’s hash in both Beirut…
…and southern Lebanon.
Today’s Habitual Linecrosser:
As usual, if you think I missed any significant stories on the war, feel free to share them in the comments below.
Ukraine has allegedly struck the NIP-16 space communications and tracking facility in Crimea. According to reports, the attack was conducted on Saturday (June 22), using U.S.-made MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missiles.
This attack was one of two carried out by Ukraine over the weekend into the Crimean Peninsula. These come just over a month since the United States gave Ukraine the go-ahead to strike into Russian territory using U.S.-made weapons.
The first attack over the weekend targeted the space communications facility with approximately 20 radar dishes. Some of these were combined in large fixtures with eight dishes.
Low-resolution satellite images obtained by the War Zone (TWZ) appears to confirm that the NIP-16 facility was indeed attacked, as claimed. However, due to the image quality, it is difficult to determine the exact extent of the damage.
We’ll get to that in a minute. Snip.
After Russia seized it following the 2014 takeover of Crimea, the facility was handed over to its Aerospace Forces, which then began modernizing it, as reported by the Ukrainian Defense Express (UDE) news outlet.
“As of 2017, reports stated the center had received ten new systems, and the upgrading was still proceeding,” UDE explained. “The initial plan was to spend 1.8 billion rubles on the reconstruction of one radio telescope alone: at the exchange rate of that time, cost about $28 million,” it added.
The Kyiv Post reported that Russia is now using it for ballistic missile early warning, looking towards the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia. Others have postulated that it may be used for GLObalnaya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema in Russian (GLONASS), Russia’s equivalent of the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS).
We’ve got a pretty good idea what was hit because the after satellite photos are already available:
Starting at the top right where the signs of burning are, there’s a pair of laser rangefinders. Moving down around them and in the central area of damage a six meter radom and a five meter radom. And in a bottom bit of damage some items I don’t understand: parabolics on a gimbal, one of them is called, who I’m sure appeared at Glastonbury last year [it’s a radar dish that came move around, like the ones in the Very Large Array]. An M 6 meter case grain [I suspect he means a 6 meter gain antenna], and a 15 meter retractable radar.
Plus “Three new structures which were built since October 2020 the bottom one built in March or April 2021 during Russia’s military buildup.”
OK, let’s talk about GLONASS. According to Wikipedia (the source of all vaguely accurate knowledge), GLONASS has an accuracy range of 4.46–7.38m, which is fine for nuclear weapons, or to track positions of planes and ships, or to hit most buildings, but falls woefully short of tactical battlefield accuracy. During the Desert Storm, U.S. generals would brag that military band GPS would let a cruise missile target an individual M&M in a bowl. Even if we’re limiting Ukrainian access to military band GPS, Civilian GPS + differential GPS (basically using fixed ground tower signals to provide higher accuracy) is probably at least an order of magnitude more accurate than GLONASS.
Differential GPS was something the Russians were going to try to bring online as part of a constellation upgrade, but the Ukraine war (and the sorry state of Roscosmos) might have sidelined that goal. On the other hand, the only scheduled Russian space launches for the rest of this year are all for upgraded GLONASS K1 sats, so maybe that’s the one thing they’re still doing.
Peter Zeihan thinks this move has the Russians way screwed.
“You use a deep space system to basically keep track of all your satellites in orbit and communicate among them and to the ground. And since satellites typically are [orbiting], you need several of these stations around the world in order to provide good coverage.”
“The Russians have never had that, because the Russians have never had a series of allies that they can trust on a global basis. So they have four of these networks within the Russian Federation and that’s it and apparently one of them was completely destroyed within the last 36 hours.”
“It pretty much is the end of the Russian civilian space program. It was already floundering and wasn’t economically viable, especially with the advent of SpaceX because the Russians used to use their old ICBMs as launch vehicles. Basically you use one of them and then it’s gone and then you use another one you keep doing that until they’re all gone and, well, they’re all gone now unless they actually want to go into their active reserve they were using the ones that were decommissioned after the end of the Cold War, so they’re no longer cost effective at all.” I’m not sure that this is true, as all recent Roscosmos space flights have used the Soyuz-2 rocket, whose development split off from ICBM development a long damn time ago.
“Second, military satellites. Most military satellites, like most civilian satellites, are whipping around the planet, and now the Russians have lost one quarter of what was left of their capacity to track and communicate with them. That’s going to provide a real problem for the Russians in terms of satellite communications. Not to mention anyone who was looking at getting the Russians to launch and maintain a military satellite for them now has to find someone who is not Russia to maintain it.”
“And if your goal was to get away from the United States, there just aren’t a lot of options here, because the Chinese don’t have a good network for this either. So basically you’re down to Europe with the Airbus Consortium or the United States.”
“Third and perhaps most significant moving forward is, with the loss of this the Russians are losing the ability to not just keep tabs on their satellites but but to get good telemetry for things like repairs. And if the Russians lose the capacity to do that, then their GLONASS, system which is their equivalent of GPS, starts to fall offline.”
“Now there are already parts of the world that don’t have very good coverage all that often, but if you remove meaningful launch capability and monitoring capability and maintenance capability from the Russian system (losing one more radar system would probably do that) then you’re talking about the Russians losing the capacity to use precision guided munitions using geographic tags, that would be an end to things like, say, glide bombs, which are the newest military innovation that the Russians have used, basically dropping one to two to three ton bombs from within Russian territory and then having them glide and hit targets. If you lose their ability for satellite communication that goes away.”
I think Zeihan slightly overstates the problem for Russia, or more specifically immanentizes the crisis more than is warranted, especially in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian War. First, GLONASS precision wasn’t exacting to begin with, so its ability to hit tactical battlefield targets was questionable. Second, it takes time for sat global positioning errors to add up, even if you couldn’t use one of the three other stations for measurement and precision correction. Third, Russia hasn’t demonstrated much in the way of precision munitions in this war, the overwhelming majority of their weapons seem “dumb” anyway, and changing that has been made harder by sanctions. Finally, Russia could pull a sneaky end-around and relying on GPS as well as GLONASS for any precision weapons (as many civilian devices, including iPhones, have the capability to use) and the US has evidently retired “Selective Availability” for GPS.
My suspicion is that the GLONASS damage will be secondary to the destruction of whatever military radar capabilities Russia added to NIP-16, and which were evidently taken out by the strike as more battlespace preparation for the arrival of Ukrainian F-16s in theater later this year.
Here is a moderately in-depth look at China’s current generation of artillery, and how it stacks up to American artillery.
A lot of this is a fairly detailed order-of-battle breakdown of what and how many artillery pieces are assigned to each level of Chinese military organization, which I’m not going to try to summarize here. But here are some of the more interesting takeaways:
China’s artillery mix seems to be between Russia’s “more is more” giant units of towed artillery and America’s largely mobile, increasingly high tech approach.
There are different mixes of self-propelled artillery deployed to north Chinese units than south Chinese units. The north emphasizes larger systems, while the south features smaller, more mobile systems for more rugged terrain. (Remember, China got its ass kicked in the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979.)
Like the U.S., China supports infantry companies and battalions with mortars.
Towed artillery is on its way out of the PLA. They’re even using self-propelled artillery in light units that look like six-wheeled technicals, so they can shoot-and-scoot. These look like they could be pretty cost-effective.
Like the Russians, China has also gone heavy into unguided rockets.
“The Chinese have also adopted a modular pod-based rocket artillery similar to a larger HIMARS, capable of taking different sizes of GPS guided missiles.”
U.S. artillery tends to be longer-ranged than equivalent Chinese, especially when it comes to guided shells.
Old, big Soviet 152mm and 130mm weapons are being replaced with self-propelled 155mm platforms (PLZ-05, PCL-181).
The PHL-03 is an MLRS firing unguided rockets up to 300km.
The newer PJL-16 fires unguided 300mm, guided 370mm, and 750mm guided missiles using a pod system. The accuracy range on the guided munitions are reportedly 30m, as opposed to the HIMARS 8m.
China has a loading crane system for their advanced MLSR which is better than the Russian system (still loading each tube manually), but not as good as HIMARS self-loading pod system.
The high tech Chinese system isn’t as good as the best U.S. systems yet, but they seem to be catching up. However, I wonder how well they can continue to build high tech weapons guidance system under the new semiconductor sanctions. GPS is an old technology, so presumably China build guidance systems in their older fabs guided missiles using their own GPS-like BeiDou system. But the question is whether they can keep even the older fabs running without U.S. support and inputs, and if they can, how high a priority such munitions will be under the new constraints. There are only so many wafer starts to go around…
Another week of the impeachment farce, another week of an embarrassing nothingburger and bombing ratings for Democrats:
Week one impeachment farce summary: “None of those three witnesses were have met with the President, none of them were on the July 25th phone call, and none of them have firsthand information, and none of them are aware of any criminal activity or impeachable offense. In short, why are we here?” (Hat tip: Director Blue.)
The half dozen seminal columns I published for The Hill on Ukraine were already supported by overwhelming documentation (all embedded in the story) and on-the-record interviews captured on video. They made three salient and simple points:
Hunter Biden’s hiring by the Ukrainian gas firm Burisma Holdings, while it was under a corruption investigation, posed the appearance of a conflict of interest for his father. That’s because Vice President Joe Biden oversaw US-Ukraine policy and forced the firing of the Ukrainian prosecutor overseeing the case.
Ukraine officials had an uneasy relationship with our embassy in Kiev because State Department officials exerted pressure on Ukraine prosecutors to drop certain cases against activists, including one group partly funded by George Soros.
There were efforts around Ukraine in 2016 to influence the US election, that included a request from a DNC contractor for dirt on Manafort, an OpEd from Ukraine’s US ambassador slamming Trump and the release of law enforcement evidence by Ukrainian officials that a Ukraine court concluded was an improper interference in the US election.
All three of these points have since been validated by the sworn testimony of Schiff’s witnesses this month, starting with the Bidens.
Schiff and Pelosi are racing two clocks: The narrative clock for dropping the Horowitz IG report into FISA, etc. abuse, and the judicial clock against three different court cases that might derail the farce. And since they just went into their Thanksgiving break, the House only has eight voting days in December to do it and pass a budget before leaving for the Christmas brealk.
“[Democratic] Former Baltimore Mayor Pugh indicted on 11 counts of fraud, tax evasion in ‘Healthy Holly’ book scandal.” (You only have to get six paragraphs in to learn that Pugh is a Democrat. Progress!)
Federal prosecutors have charged former Baltimore Mayor Catherine Pugh with 11 counts of fraud, tax evasion and conspiracy in what they allege was a corrupt scheme involving her sales of a self-published children’s book series.
In a grand jury indictment made public Wednesday, prosecutors allege Pugh defrauded area businesses and nonprofit organizations with nearly $800,000 in sales of her “Healthy Holly” books to unlawfully enrich herself, promote her political career and illegally fund her campaign for mayor.
Though her customers ordered more than 100,000 copies of the books, the indictment says Pugh failed to print thousands of copies, double-sold others and took some to use for self-promotion. Pugh, 69, used the profits to buy a house, pay down debt, and make illegal straw donations to her campaign, prosecutors allege.
At the same time, prosecutors said, she was evading taxes. In 2016, for instance, when she was a state senator and ran for mayor, she told the Internal Revenue Service she had made just $31,000. In fact, her income was more than $322,000 that year ― meaning she shorted the federal government of about $100,000 in taxes, according to the U.S. attorney’s office.
The charges Pugh faces carry potential sentences totaling 175 years in prison. Prosecutors are seeking to seize $769,688 of her profits, along with her current home in Ashburton, which they allege she bought and renovated with fraudulently obtained funds.
Uncle Sam is not omniscient, but if you’re a public official and you’re taking in ten times as much money as you declare, yeah, I bet they’re gonna figure that one out, Crooked Kathy.
Speaking of Democratic Party mayors being indicted, Mayors Against Illegal Guns member Dennis Tyler, mayor of Muncie, Indiana, was arrested by the FBI as part of a corruption probe. (Hat tip: Stephen Green at Instapundit.)
Last January, former Muncie Building Commissioner Craig Nichols pleaded guilty to wire fraud and money laundering. He was sentenced to two years in federal prison.
Others charged in the federal corruption probe include Muncie Sanitary District Administrator Debra Nicole Grigsby, Muncie Sanitary District official Tracy Barton; and local businessmen Jeffrey Burke, Tony Franklin and Rodney A. Barber.
The Russian government has for the past four years been fighting to keep 29-year-old alleged cybercriminal Alexei Burkov from being extradited by Israel to the United States. When Israeli authorities turned down requests to send him back to Russia — supposedly to face separate hacking charges there — the Russians then imprisoned an Israeli woman for seven years on trumped-up drug charges in a bid to trade prisoners. That effort failed as well, and Burkov had his first appearance in a U.S. court last week. What follows are some clues that might explain why the Russians are so eager to reclaim this young man.
On the surface, the charges the U.S. government has leveled against Burkov may seem fairly unremarkable: Prosecutors say he ran a credit card fraud forum called CardPlanet that sold more than 150,000 stolen cards.
However, a deep dive into the various pseudonyms allegedly used by Burkov suggests this individual may be one of the most connected and skilled malicious hackers ever apprehended by U.S. authorities, and that the Russian government is probably concerned that he simply knows too much.
There seem to be very few elite Russian hacking organizations Burkov, AKA “K0pa,” didn’t have a key administrative role in.
Speaking of hacking: “Ghost ships, crop circles, and soft gold: A GPS mystery in Shanghai.” Somebody in Shanghai has been spoofing GPS signals to make ships (and anything else using GPS) appear they’re someplace else, and GPS experts don’t understand how they’re doing it. (Hat tip: Borepatch.)
Foreign-born researchers working at U.S. agencies secretly joined China’s payroll, sending sensitive U.S.-funded research to the country while U.S. government agencies took almost no defensive measures against a major recruitment operation, a Senate investigation found.
Researchers linked to the Chinese government formed a Chinese cell within the Department of Energy, attained access to American genomic data, and recruited other U.S. researchers to join, the bipartisan report stated.
China’s Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) aims to get foreign governments to finance the communist power’s military and economy by buying off researchers who are doing work abroad. The experts apply to the program, and if approved by the Communist Party, they join China’s payroll and sign secret side agreements that the experts will share their research with that country, according to the investigation.
The Clinton Foundation suffered a $16.8 million loss in 2018. It’s a great mystery how that could have happened…
The upcoming UK election is no longer an election about Brexit, it’s an election about how incredibly unpopular Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn is. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson enjoys a mere plus 4% favorability rating. Corbyn has a minus 43% favorability rating. “This election is no longer primarily about Brexit, it’s primarily about Corbyn and his extreme socialist policies! Corbyn is rightfully getting clobbered.”
The sudden move by the oil-rich regime to ration gasoline and hike fuel prices is a direct result of President Donald Trump’s strategy of “maximum pressure” against Tehran. While the regime thrived under the Obama administration, which handed billions of dollars to Tehran for signing the nuclear deal, the current administration has reinstated stiff sanctions against the ruling Mullahs.
After President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the 2015 deal, the sanctions have crippled Iran’s state-run oil, shipping, and banking sectors. The U.S. government implemented the sanctions against the regime’s top brass and the IRGC, which controls critical sectors of the Iranian economy.
“Reuters Deletes Story Meant to Make Trump Look Bad After Realizing it Made Obama Look Bad.” The Ministry of Truth confirms that this story has been rectified.
I’m sure by now that everyone who has been paying attention knows the Obama Administration’s insatiable appetite for cony capitalism, especially when it comes to shoveling “green energy” subsidies to Obama campaign donors.
But never mind that. The latest Obama scandal has the potential to kill more Americans than Fast and Furious, maybe by three or four orders of magnitude.
The high level summary: A project backed by a prominent Democratic donor might interfere with GPS.
I used to work at both a GPS company, and a company producing RF chips for commercial computer use, so I have a little more technological background on this issue than some. Here’s a summary of the issue by the former Chief Technology Officer of one of the companies I used to work for:
LightSquared uses spectrum right next to GPS, and they expect to have both terrestrial and satellite broadband links. GPS signals are already quite faint by the time they reach the earth’s surface, and any adjacent interference could severely impact the performance of a GPS receiver – its location accuracy could be impaired, or it may not work at all. There are millions of GPS receivers in both civilian and military systems that could be impacted…it would be impossible to retrofit all of these with a fix, so the onus is on LightSquared to figure out how to avoid interfering with GPS.
GPS satellites broadcast a 50-watt signal from 12,000 miles up, across an entire continent, said Pete Large, a vice president at GPS vendor Trimble Navigation who works with the Coalition. By contrast, the LTE base stations used in the recent tests produced signals of up to 1,600 watts within about a mile of GPS receivers. LightSquared’s signals were stronger by 1 billion times or more, Large said.
So GPS signals get overwhelmed by a local source. What’s the worst that could happen?
Well imagine a Boeing 787 Dreamliner conducting an nighttime instrument approach to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport when the GPS signal is overwhelmed at a critical phase. Now imagine that same Boeing 787 Dreamliner plowing into downtown Arlington, Virginia at 150 miles per hour, leaving a wake of bloody body parts and burning jetfuel for a quarter-mile.
– Philip Falcone’s proposed LightSquared Inc. wireless service caused interference to 75 percent of global-positioning system receivers examined in a U.S. government test, according to a draft summary of results.
The results from testing conducted Oct. 31 to Nov. 4 show that “millions of fielded GPS units are not compatible” with the planned nationwide wholesale service, according to the draft seen by Bloomberg News.
“LightSquared signals caused harmful interference to majority of GPS receivers tested,” according to the draft prepared for a meeting next week of U.S. officials reviewing the LightSquared proposal. “No additional testing is required to confirm harmful interference exists.”
It was bad enough when the Obama Administration was just wasting taxpayer dollars on well-connected business cronies like Solyandra. But Fast and Furious has helped kill hundreds of Mexicans and at least one U.S. border patrol agent, all for the the purpose of promoting gun control. In trying to help another batch of well-connected Democratic cronies at LightSquared, the results could easily be hundreds or evn thousands dead. And it might not just be one airliner, because there’s no guarantee the accident investigation would find the cause quick enough to prevent a re-occurrence.
Will the Obama Administration back off it’s efforts to ram through LightSquared approval despite the scientific evidence? Will LightSquared stop trying to get the technology approved?
Don’t bet on it. From the same story:
LightSquared is “outraged by the illegal leak of incomplete government data,” Harriman said in an e-mailed statement. “This breach attempts to draw an inaccurate conclusion to negatively influence the future of LightSquared and narrowly serve the business interests of the GPS industry.”
Yeah, the GPS industry does indeed have a strong business interest in not seeing thousands of people die. Whether the the Obama Administration shares that concern enough to turn their back on a major Democratic donor less than a year before the 2012 elections remains to be seen.
