Lawrence Person's BattleSwarm Blog

• He told CBS News “I think the war is very complete, pretty much”, and said the US was “very far ahead of schedule”
• Speaking to NBC, he left open the prospect of acquiring Iranian oil, saying “certainly people have talked about it”
• In an interview with the New York Post, he said the administration was “nowhere near” making a decision on whether to order US troops into Iran
• Speaking to Republican lawmakers, Trump said the US was drawn into a “short-term” military operation in Iran to “get rid of some very evil people”
• He went on to say: “We’ve already won in many ways, but we haven’t won enough”
• Trump told the New York Post he is “not happy” with Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, but at his press briefing later did not make clear who he wants to take his place – or how that will be achieved
• At his press briefing, Trump reiterated that the operation in Iran has been a “tremendous success”, but also added that he wants to ensure Iran cannot develop nuclear weaponry “for a very long time” – a much bigger task
• The US still has targets in Iran, Trump tells reporters, but they could be taken out “in one day”
• Still, he says the war will be over “very soon”

…but also Isfahan, include Shahed factories.

The war between the U.S., Israel and Iran has entered a decisive phase that may determine the political future of the Middle East for decades to come.

President Trump declared that there will be no deal with the Iranian regime — nothing short of unconditional surrender. Tehran responded with predictable defiance, announcing that it would never surrender. Yet behind the regime’s rhetoric, reality appears very different.

Much of the leadership now reportedly communicates from undisclosed locations, hiding from sustained strikes while the propaganda machine attempts to project strength and resilience.

The scale of the military campaign has been extraordinary. In the first week alone, the U.S. reportedly struck approximately 3,000 Iranian targets across the country and the region. Israel has launched repeated waves of air strikes — more than twenty separate operations — systematically dismantling the regime’s military infrastructure. Missile launchers, air defense systems, command centers and naval facilities have been destroyed. Advanced weapons systems and new technologies, including next-generation laser defense platforms, are shaping the battlefield.

Israel has reportedly targeted and dismantled hardened command structures associated with the regime’s leadership, including the underground bunker networks linked to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Several key figures may have been killed in these operations, though the regime has yet to publicly acknowledge casualties buried under the rubble of destroyed facilities.

Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic’s military capacity has been devastated. What once appeared to be a formidable regional force increasingly looks like what many analysts suspected all along: a paper tiger built on intimidation, propaganda and bluff.

For decades, the regime invested enormous resources in projecting power across the Middle East, building proxy networks and threatening neighboring states. Now it faces an unprecedented strategic crisis. Today, it is focused primarily on surviving.

The central question confronting policymakers in Washington and Jerusalem is not whether the regime’s military capabilities can be degraded — that process is already underway — but whether the campaign will stop short of dismantling the Islamic Republic itself. Anything short of regime-change risks allowing the system to recover, reorganize and once again threaten regional stability.

The military balance of power favors the U.S. and Israel. Iran’s conventional warfighting capabilities have been severely degraded. Air superiority allows continued targeting of strategic assets, meaning the regime’s ability to project military power beyond its borders will keep declining as long as the campaign persists. In the short run, this places the regime in a defensive posture.

But the weakening of Iran’s military does not automatically translate to the collapse of the regime. The Islamic Republic has historically relied less on conventional military strength and more on asymmetric tools — intelligence networks, ideological mobilization, proxy militias and global terrorism. Even if its missile forces, navy and air defenses are heavily damaged, the regime’s internal security structures — the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the domestic Basij security force, intelligence services and propaganda apparatus — can still function. Note that these institutions exist primarily to protect the regime rather than to defend the country.

Weapons covered:

• LUCAS drones (“even cheaper than the Shahed, around $15,000”).
• Ship-based anti-drone lasers (cost per kill: 50¢).
• Tomahawk
• Precision Strike Missile

Also, BeiDou seems to include its own text message system, which comes with a lot of drawbacks in an active combat environment…

It is important to note that the United States does not currently maintain the ground force numbers in the region required for a full-scale invasion of Iran, nor has it established the logistical infrastructure that such a campaign would demand. Furthermore, there is no visible mobilization that would indicate preparation for a large occupation force. However, the US does have a large number of forward-deployed naval assets, rapid deployment units available back home, and special operations forces that could deploy within 18 to 48 hours to conduct a limited landing designed to seize specific objectives only.

The current goal of the ongoing air campaign appears to be to undermine the Iranian military and political leadership, to ignite internal dissent and local opposition movements, and whereafter, support these through air support and supply drops. Nevertheless, if current aerial efforts fail to create such a scenario, the US may consider scaling up its efforts.

One viable strategy could entail securing a foothold inside Iran to host a provisional government and facilitate overland supply routes instead. The most likely target for such a landing is Bandar Abbas, Iran’s primary southern port and a central node in its oil export system. In addition to establishing a bridgehead, capturing the city would allow US forces to obtain Iran’s main naval base. The accompanying port infrastructure, including cargo terminals and former fleet facilities, could then be repurposed to rapidly unload supplies and serve as a staging ground to support friendly forces inland.

Most importantly, Bandars Abbass’ is strategically located on the Strait of Hormuz. Following the attack, Iran is attempting to blockade the Strait, causing disruptions that are already affecting global shipping lanes. Securing Bandar Abbas would give the US a position from which to guarantee maritime passage to the major oil flows and deny Iran the ability to leverage the strait as a pressure tool.

In preparation for a landing, the US would shift focus to an air campaign aimed at degrading Iranian coastal defenses, displacing Iranian army units from the shoreline, and disrupting their ability to maneuver along the main logistics corridors leading into Bandar Abbas. With defenses disrupted, a numerically smaller landing force could then move into secure administrative buildings, port facilities, and the surrounding districts, in order to secure a perimeter and consolidate control. Infiltration routes through the mountains would be used to send small special forces groups to link up with local resistance networks as well as provide supplies and weaponry overland. Any landing would also force Iranian army units hiding in the surrounding mountains into the open terrain, if they want to contest the US bridgehead. However, any attempt to mass forces for a real counterattack would expose them to US and Israeli airstrikes almost immediately; with over 150 US combat aircraft, several cruisers, and guided-missile destroyers, ready to provide fire support to any landing party.

The alternative for the Iranian army would be a shift toward a guerrilla‑style resistance inside the city and surrounding area. But the operational impact of such a campaign would remain limited if the United States avoids expanding the offensive inland, and positions itself as a supporting force for a new government, instead of an occupying one. High local pro‑Western sentiment, visible in the large protests in the cities and towns here earlier this year, could additionally constrain the Iranian army’s ability to operate covertly.

Highly speculative, but it does contain a certain logic. Plus, with physical control of the oil export terminal, the U.S. could start selling oil in exchange for direct payment, promising to turn over any proceeds after a non-Jihadist government takes power…

• “The United Arab Emirates-based Edge Group is set to purchase a 30 percent ownership stake in Fire Point, Ukraine’s combat-proven missile and drone manufacturer. The proposed deal of around 760 million US dollars will raise the total valuation of the Ukrainian defense firm to roughly 2.5 billion US dollars. Fire Point, which produces the FP-1 and FP-2 unmanned aerial systems as well as the Flamingo cruise missile, has risen to become Ukraine’s leading defense technology manufacturer within just two years, with production of drones currently reaching 6,000 per month.”
• “The most interesting product in Fire Point’s arsenal is the Flamingo cruise missile, of which the company produces 1 to 2 units per day. With 30% share in the company and certain agreements, the UAE can receive around 10 to 20 such missiles and 1800 drones per month, significantly enhancing its ability not only to protect itself against enemies like Iran, but to carry out preventive strikes. Combat-proven with an estimated range of 3,000 kilometers and already successfully used to target critical Russian infrastructure within the 2,000 kilometer range, the missile is capable of reaching and destroying any target across Iran. Air bases, command centers, and missile storage facilities can be targeted with ease by its 1,150 kilogram warhead, forcing the Iranian command to change planning due to another deadly threat in the region.”

…and southern Lebanon.